ORDER : This revision petition has been directed against an order of the learned Munsiff, Manipur, rejecting an application of the petitioner made under Or. 21, R. 29 C.P.C., on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to stay the execution of the decree under Or. 21 R. 29. 2. The facts giving rise to this revision, petition lie in a short compass and may be briefly narrated as follows : On 10-7-1957, the opposite party Leisangthem Tombi filed the suit against Thoudam Ningol Ningthoujam Ongbi Muktarei Devi for delivery of possession in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Imphal. The suit was decreed on. 28-4-1958. On 29-4-1959, the opposite party (decree-holder) presented an application for the execution of the decree. The execution petition remained pending in the Court of Subordinate Judge upto 29-5-1963. On 30-5-1953 it was transferred to the Court of Munsiff, Manipur. On 12-6-1964, the petitioner-plaintiff filed a suit No. 100 of 1964 for setting aside the decree passed in the previous suit. Thereafter on 14-7-1964, he applied under Or. 21 R. 29 for stay of execution of the decree till the disposal of the Suit No. 100 of 1964. 3. The respondent decree-holder objected to the stay of the execution and contended inter alia that this Court was not competent to stay the execution of the decree under R. 29 Order 21 C.P.C. 4. The learned Munsiff upheld the objection of the decree-holder and refused to stay the execution of the decree, dismissing the application. It is against this order that the present revision petition has been preferred. 5. Heard the learned lawyers appearing on both sides and perused the record. 6. On the above facts, the main question which arises for consideration in this petition is whether the transferee Court has jurisdiction under Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. to stay the execution of the decree transferred to it when the judgment debtor institutes a suit in the transferee Court challenging the validity of the very decree transferred for execution. The counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Court below was wrong in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction by holding that it could not stay the execution proceeding under the provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. 7. The counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Court below was wrong in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction by holding that it could not stay the execution proceeding under the provisions of Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. 7. Rule 29 of Order XXI C.P.C. is as follows : "Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided." The important words in this rule are "such Court". If we read the rule, it is plain that the words "such Court" must mean "a transferee Court". The lawyer for the petitioner has conceded that the words "such Court" must mean the Court to which the decree has been transferred for execution. Yet he contends that the transferor Court also must be deemed to be "such Court" if we read Sections 37 and 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure together. 8. Firstly he relies upon Section 37(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 37 reads as follows : "The expression "Court which passed a decree," or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of decrees, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to include – X X X X (b) where the Court of first instance has ceased lo exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit." He next relied upon Section 42 C.P.C. which reads : The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree is if it had been passed by itself. X X X X" He, therefore, contends that under Section 42, the transferee Court shall have the same powers as the transferor Court and argues that under Section 37(b) the transferor Court i.e., the Court of first instance has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute it having transferred the decree to the Munsiffs Court for execution. X X X X" He, therefore, contends that under Section 42, the transferee Court shall have the same powers as the transferor Court and argues that under Section 37(b) the transferor Court i.e., the Court of first instance has ceased to have jurisdiction to execute it having transferred the decree to the Munsiffs Court for execution. If that is so, he then contends that it is the Munsiffs Court which would have all the powers of the transferor Court. I am unable to accede to this argument. This is not a case where the Court of first instance had ceased to exist. It cannot be said that because the Court which passed the decree has transferred it for execution to another Court, it ceased to have jurisdiction. The transferor Court does not altogether surrender its control. 9. The Privy Council case reported in Maharaja of Bobbili v. Narsaraj, 43 Ind App 238 : (AIR 1916 PC 16) gave rise to some extent to a difference of opinion among some of the High Courts a few holding that after transferring a decree to another Court for execution, the Court which passed that decree cannot itself execute it on an application for execution made to it after the transfer and before the certificate of non-satisfaction under Section 41 has been returned. The other view is that there is no justification for holding that the transferor Court cannot execute the decree after it is transferred to another Court and that when the transferor Court transfers a decree, it does not divest itself of its powers but only vests the transferee Court with powers which it would not otherwise have. The difference is only with regard to whether when the decree has been transferred to another Court for execution, the transferor Court could execute the decree. But the consensus of judicial opinion now is that the transferor Court does not divest itself of its powers; e.g., when the decree has been transferred lo another Court for execution, it may withdraw the execution by calling back the decree or it may even make an order for simultaneous execution by another Court or it may make an order for ratable distribution. Likewise, it has jurisdiction to decide an objection as to the limitation if referred to it by the transferee Court. Likewise, it has jurisdiction to decide an objection as to the limitation if referred to it by the transferee Court. If the decree is assigned after transfer, the assignee must apply for execution to the original Court. If the judgment-debtor dies after the decree has been transferred for execution, the Court which passed the decree is by reason of Section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure the proper Court to order that execution should proceed against the legal representative. These instances illustrate the fact that the transferor Court does not divest itself of its powers though the decree made by it has been transferred for execution to another Court. Thus, in my view, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner based on S. 37(b) read with S. 42 C.P.C. must fail. 10. However, he relies upon a decision reported in Saradakripa Lala v. Comilla Union Bank, Ltd. AIR 1934 Cal 4. No doubt, this decision entirely supports the contention put forward by the lawyer for the petitioner. The facts in that case are somewhat similar to the facts of the present case, and, therefore, the counsel for the petitioner pressed this ruling in support of his contention. It has been held in that case that under the provisions of Sections 37 and 42 the Court to which the decree has been transferred has power to slay execution of the decree under Order 21, Rule 29 C.P.C. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court relied upon the decision to which I have already referred viz., AIR 1916 PC 16 : 43 Ind App 238. It was held in the Privy Council decision that when a decree of a District Court was sent to the Court of a Munsiff for exaction, the proper Court in which to apply "for execution or to take some step-in-aid of execution" of the decree is the Court of the Munsiff, the original Court having ceased to have jurisdiction. In that view of the case, according to their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court, the words "such Court" under S.37 C.P.C. will include the Court to which the decree was transferred. Then their Lordships referred to Section 42 C.P.C. and slated that the Chittagong Court had powers to stay the execution of the decree which was transferred to it under O. 21, Rule 29. 11. Then their Lordships referred to Section 42 C.P.C. and slated that the Chittagong Court had powers to stay the execution of the decree which was transferred to it under O. 21, Rule 29. 11. It appears their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court read the Privy Council case to mean that the original Court totally ceased to have jurisdiction, and having thus read came to the conclusion that the transferee Court could stay execution of the decree under Order 21, Rule 29, C.P.C. With great respect I am unable to agree with the view taken by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court. I have already stated by way of illustration the instance where the transferor Court does not divest itself of its powers. It appears that the attention of their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court was not invited to Rule 26(1) of Order 21, C.P.C. It reads : "The Court to which a decree has been sent for execution shall, upon sufficient cause being shown, stay the execution of such decree for a reasonable time to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the Court by which the decree was passed or to any Court having appellate jurisdiction in respect of the decree or the execution, thereof, for an order to stay execution, or for "any other order relating to the decree or execution which might have been made by such Court of first instance or appellate Court if execution had been issued thereby, or if application for execution had been made thereto." It is apparent from this rule that the transferee Court has been given power to stay the execution of the transferred decree for a "reasonable time" to enable the judgment-debtor to apply to the transferor Court and obtain the necessary orders. If, as has been held by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court, the transferee Court could stay execution of the decree under Rule 29, then it is rather difficult to understand why the legislature provided in Rule 26 that the transferee Court shall stay the execution of such decree for a reasonable time. This also indicates that the transferor court does not divest itself of its powers. If we read together Rules 26 and 29, it appears to me that the transferee Court has been empowered to stay the execution of the decree for a reasonable time only. 12. This also indicates that the transferor court does not divest itself of its powers. If we read together Rules 26 and 29, it appears to me that the transferee Court has been empowered to stay the execution of the decree for a reasonable time only. 12. References may also be made to Rule 28 of Order 21, C.P.C. which states : "Any order of the Court by which the decree was passed, or of such Court of appeal as aforesaid in relation to the execution of such decree, shall be binding upon the Court to which the decree was sent for execution. This also indicates that the transferor Court does not divest itself of its powers. The provisions made in R. 26 empowering the transferee Court to stay the execution of a decree for a reasonable time only, clearly indicates that the transferee Court cannot stay the execution under Rule 29. 13. The aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court has been dissented from the Madhya Pradesh and Rangoon High Courts. The Allahabad High Court also has taken a view contrary to it. 14. In M/s. Khemchand Rajmal v. Rambabu Johrimal, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 131, the facts in which are similar to the facts in the present case, it was held : "If the words of Order 21, Rule 29 are interpreted in their plain meaning it will be clear that in order to enable the Court to pass suitable orders for stay the identity of the Court passing the decree under section and the Court trying the pending suit is necessary so that, if the Court which passed the decree under execution is different from the Court in which there is the pending suit with judgment-debtor as the plaintiff, then the power under the rule cannot be invoked. This position is not altered by reason of the provisions of Sections 37 and 42." Nevaskar, J. after referring to the decisions in AIR 1916 PC 16, Inayat Beg v. Umrao Beg, AIR 1930 All 121 (1) and M.P.L. Chettyar Firm v. Vanappa Chettyar, AIR 1936 Rang 184, held that the view taken by the Allahabad and Rangoon High Courts was preferrable to that taken by the Calcutta High Court. 15. 15. Their Lordships of the Rangoon High Court in AIR 1936 Rang 184, in similar circumstances, found themselves unable to agree with the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court, and held that Rule 29 of Order 21, C.P.C., does not empower the transferee Court to stay the execution of the decree. The Allahabad High Court in the decision reported in AIR 1930 All 121(1) which is an earlier case, has taken a similar view. Since the facts in the, aforesaid cases are practically, similar to those in the instant case, I do not think that any detailed examination of that said cases is necessary. 16. I, therefore, agree with the view taken by their Lordships in AIR 1958 Madh Pra 131, AIR 1936 Rang 184 and AIR 1930 All 121 (1). Therefore, the contention put forward by Shri T.N. Bhattacharjee that the transferee Court could stay the execution of the decree under Rule 29 of Order 21 C.P.C. fails. 17. Thus, as a result of foregoing discussion, I hold that the order passed by the trial Court is correct and must be upheld. Consequently, the revision petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.