JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the proceedings arising out of a suit filed by the petitioner under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for ejectment of the opposite party No. 4 to this petition, have been brought for being quashed by a writ of certiorari. 2. Permanand, the petitioner as plaintiff instituted a suit under Sec. 209 of the Act against Ram Narain defendant, opposite party No. 4 herein, for his ejectment from certain agricultural holdings. The plaintiff alleged that he was the Sirdar of the disputed holdings and in 1363 Fasli had given possession to the defendant for one year as a licencee but the defendant having refused to give back possession after the expiry of one year retained possession unlawfully and without plaintiffs consent, was, therefore, liable to be ejected. The defence in the main was that the defendant had been in possession as a lessee from the year 1954 under validly executed Thekanama, for a period of 15 years on payment of Rs. 350/- yearly rent and the plaintiff was not entitled to eject the defendant he being in possession as a lessee and with the consent of the plaintiff. It is unnecessary to mention here certain other pleas raised by the parties, as nothing turns on them. However, it is necessary to mention that on the pleas raised in defence a question also arose whether by letting out the disputed agricultural holdings which was prohibited under the Act, the plaintiffs Sirdari rights, got extinguished and he was not entitled to any relief. The Judicial Officer who tried the suit, mainly relying upon the oral evidence held that the lease granted in favour of the defendant was for a period of 15 years and the defendant being in possession with the consent of the plaintiff the suit under Sec. 209 of the Act was not maintainable. The suit was dismissed. On appeal from the decree of the Judicial Officer the plaintiff urged that the defendant being in possession as a licensee the filing of the suit amounted to revocation of the licensee and the suit was maintainable under Sec. 209 of the Act. The suit was dismissed. On appeal from the decree of the Judicial Officer the plaintiff urged that the defendant being in possession as a licensee the filing of the suit amounted to revocation of the licensee and the suit was maintainable under Sec. 209 of the Act. The Additional Commissioner on the material question whether the defendant was a licencee or a leasee for one year relied on plaintiff's own statement in cross-examination wherein, as observed by the Additional Commissioner, it was elicited from the plaintiff that the disputed holdings were given to the I defendant on Theka for a period of 15 years. The Additional Commissioner, as his judgment shows, took the view that the deed of Thekanama being compulsorily registrable was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration therefore, it was from the oral evidence of the parties that the terms of the contract could be found out. Having eliminated the deed of Thekanama from evidence, the Additional Commissioner affirmed the finding of the Judicial Officer and held that the lease being for 15 years the plaintiff was estopped from challenging the right of the defendant to retain possession. The appeal was dismissed. The plaintiff then went up in second appeal to the Board of Revenue. The judgment of the Board of Revenue shows that it the out the plaintiffs suit mainly on the ground that the lease executed by the plaintiff, being in contravention of the provisions of the Act, resulted in the extinguishment of his Sirdari rights. The Board relied on Sec. 190 (cc) of the Act which was brought on the statute book by Sec. 51 of the U.P. I Act No. XXXVII of 1958 enforced from 7th November, 1958. There is no indication in the impugned judgment of the Board That it ever applied its mind to the crucial question as to the status of the defendant and the nature of his possession on the disputed holdings. It is the validity of the above mentioned judgments and decrees of all the three revenue courts which is questioned in this petition. 3. It is necessary to mention here a material fact. The disputed holdings were evacuee property and the provisions of the Act were extended to evacuee properties by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1954 which added Chapter II-A to the Act. 3. It is necessary to mention here a material fact. The disputed holdings were evacuee property and the provisions of the Act were extended to evacuee properties by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1954 which added Chapter II-A to the Act. U.P. Act No. 20 of 1954 same into force on 10-10-1954 and it is not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties before me hat the holdings in question became subject to the provisions of the Act from that date i.e. 10-10-1954. The need which has been described as the kanama was executed by the plaintiff on 23-2-1954, that is to say, prior to the date when the provisions of the Act became applicable to the holdings which were the subject-matter of the said Thekanama. 4. Sri K.P. Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner, contend that the Board and the subordinate revenue courts manifestly erred in holding that the petitioners Sirdari rights were extinguished and misdirected themselves in not finding out the terms of the contract from the deed itself wrongly eliminating it from evidence and setting up the terms of contract on oral evidence adduced by the parties. A copy of the Thekanama dated 23-2-1954 has been annexed with the petition. Sri R. M. Sahai learned counsel for Ram Narain, opposite party No. 4 has not disputed the correctness of that copy. Prior to the applicability of the Act the rights of the parties on the disputed holdings were governed by the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the requirement of the law, as it stood on 23rd, February. 1954, v/as that a theka was to be in writing. Again it is not disputed by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that the Theka amounted to an agricultural lease within the meaning of Transfer of Property Act. Sec. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act exempted leases for agricultural purposes from the applicability of any of the provisions of Chapter V of that Act unless a notification was published declaring all or any of the provisions of that Chapter to be so applicable. No notification as contemplated by Sec. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act was relied upon by the counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the parties conceded that there was no such notification. No notification as contemplated by Sec. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act was relied upon by the counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the parties conceded that there was no such notification. Thus the Thekanama dated 23-2-1954, assuming that it created a lease for more than a year on reservation of yearly rent, was immune from provisions of Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and did not require registration. When the deed of theka was executed on 23-2-1954, the disputed holdings were not subject to the provisions of U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and the provisions of the Act which require registration were inapplicable. There is no doubt in my mind that the subordinate revenue courts misdirected themselves in eliminating the Thekanama dated 23-2-1954 from evidence. Once the said document was admissible in evidence then the terms of the lease could only be called out or found from the recitals in that document and no oral evidence to ascertain or vary the terms thereof was admissible. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the terms of the Thekanama dated 23-2-1954 strenuously contended that it created a lease for only one year in present and not for 15 years as held by the Additional Commissioner. I refrain from expressing any opinion on the construction and interpretation of the said deed as I propose to send the case back to the Board of Revenue after quashing the judgment and decree of the Board of Revenue for reasons which I would presently discuss. 6. The material question which falls for determination in this petition is whether the Board was correct in its view that the provisions of Sec. 190 (cc) of the Act were retrospective in their application hence the right and the title of the plaintiff-petitioner got extinguished. 6. The material question which falls for determination in this petition is whether the Board was correct in its view that the provisions of Sec. 190 (cc) of the Act were retrospective in their application hence the right and the title of the plaintiff-petitioner got extinguished. I may observe here that the Board on this part of the case has again not determined the question of fact as to what was the actual date of the transfer which it held was in contravention of the provisions of the Act for it appears to me that the real controversy between the parties centred round the assertion by the plaintiff-petitioner that originally the possession was given for one year to the opposite party No. 4 under the Thekanama dated 23-2-1954 and the arrangement was to be renewed every year on the fulfilment of certain contingent conditions and that it was not possible to construe the terms of the said Thaka that the possession was given for a period of 15 years. While the case of the defendant was that under the terms of the contract entered into between the parties as evidenced by the Theka dated 23-2-1954 the possession was transferred to the defendant for a period of 15 years on payment of yearly rent of Rs. 350/-. If what the defendant asserted was the true effect of the Thekanama dated 23-2-1954 then the question would arise as to what would be his status when the provisions of the Act became applicable to the disputed holdings in his possession. If what the plaintiff-petitioner asserted was the true effect of the Theka dated 23-2-1954 then the question would arise whether the plaintiff renued the Theka beyond a period of one year and if so, whether any of such renewals occurred on a date after the disputed holdings because subject to the provisions of the Act. Since the Board has thrown out the plaintiffs suit only on the ground that the effect of the provisions of Sec. 190(cc) was the extinguishment of the plaintiff's right of Sirdari as the amendment had retrospective effect it appears to me that the Board approached the matter on the basis of that on 23-2-1954, the disputed land was let out for a period of 15 years, that is much prior to 7-11-1958 when Cl. (cc) of Sec. 19 was introduced by amendment which in its opinion being retros respective resulted in the extinguishment of the plaintiffs right of Sirdari. 7. The Board has not given reason as to why it thought that the amend ed provisions of Sec. 190(cc) was re prospective. On this aspect of the case the learned judicial Member the Board who delivered the judgment in second appeal in para. 7 his judgment observed as follows:- "Plaintiff-appellant was admittedly a Sirdar. Being a Sirdar, he was not entitled to sublet the land or allow defendant-respondent to remain in possession, contrary to the provisions of Sec. 167, U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act." 8. Then in para. 11 of the judgment the following further observation was made: - "Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that the provisions of Sec. 190(cc), U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act had been introduced by Act XXXVII of 1958 and hence the mere fact that Sirdar had entered into illegal transfer, would not extinguish his rights before the enforcement of Act XXXVII of 1958. This contention is not correct. Once, it was held that transfer by the Sirdar was void, it necessarily followed that the right of Sirdar was extinguished. The provisions of Sec. 190(cc), U.P. Z. A. and L. R. Act should be deemed to have always existed and not merely from 7-11-1958 when Act XXXVII of 1958 was introduced". 9. It is thus clear that the Board made two assumptions. The first assumption was that the transfer being void the necessary consequence of it was that the right of Sirdar was extinguished. The second assumption as that the provisions of Sec. 190 (cc) would always be deemed to have existed in the Act. There is complete absence of any discussion and the reasons on the basis of which the Board concluded as above. How the voidness of transfer by its own force would extinguish the rights of a Sirdar is not understandable rather the conclusion should be just the opposite. The lease of Sirdari land which amounts to a transfer within the meaning of Transfer of Property Act would be void, that is to say, in the eye of law it would be non est. The necessary consequence would be that that transaction would not affect the right of any Sirdar. The lease of Sirdari land which amounts to a transfer within the meaning of Transfer of Property Act would be void, that is to say, in the eye of law it would be non est. The necessary consequence would be that that transaction would not affect the right of any Sirdar. His right as Sirdar would remain preserved and a void transfer would not derogate from that right. The only necessary consequence of the void transaction would be that the lessee transferee would not secure any rights. Of course if the provisions of Sec. 190(cc), as held by the Board, were retrospective in their operation and provided they are also held to be creative of a liability of a penal nature, then certainly the right of the plaintiff Sirdar would get extinguished. 10. As I approach the matter, I do not think that the question of prospective or retrospectivity of the amended provision 190 (cc) is material for the purpose of determining as to what would be the effect of any transfer made in contravention of the provisions of the Act on the right of a Sirdar. The real question that arises is the interpretation of the amended clause 190 (cc). However, I may observe that if once Clause 190(cc) is held to be creative of a liability in the nature of a penalty then Sec. 87 of U.P. Act No. 37 of 1958 will furnish a complete answer on the question of its retrospective application and the Board seems to have overlooked the same. That section says that, "Except as provided in Secs. 85 and 86 any amendment made by the Act shall not affect the validity, effect or consequence of any thing already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred . . ." 11. The Act as stood before the amendment of Sec. 190 by the amending Act 37 of 1958 provided by its Sec. 168 that if a decree had been passed in a suit under Sec. 167 for ejectment of the transferee or any person in possession thereof then the rights and interest of a Sirdar in the holding were to be extinguished. That was the consequence provided by the Act of any transfer made in contravention of the Act. That was the consequence provided by the Act of any transfer made in contravention of the Act. It is clear that by virtue of Sec. 87 of the amending Act No. 37 of 1958 the consequence of letting out in contravention of the provisions of the Act as envisaged by Sec. 168 remained unaffected. I have, therefore, grave doubts that the provisions of Sec. 190 (cc) were intended to be retrospective in their effect. The amending Act 37 of 1958 wherever it intended to make an amendment brought about by it to be retrospective in effect it has expressly said so. This is again a pointer towards the non-retrospectivity of Sec. 190 (cc). There is nothing in Sec. 51 of the amending Act 37 of 1958 which brought about the amendment of Sec. 190 showing that it was intended to be retrospective. I, therefore, do not agree with the view of the Board that the provisions of Sec. 190 (cc) were intended to be retrospective in effect and would be deemed to have been always there. 12. However, as pointed out above, the question of retrospective or prospective application of Sec. 190 (cc) does not appear to be so material as the question of its construction. Sec. 190 occurs in Chapter 8 of the Act which deals with tenures. A careful perusal of the different sections in that Chapter goes to show that there are provisions for extinguishment of Sirdari rights apart from Sec. 150. Then there are also provisions in that Chapter which deal with surrender, abandonment, succession and other modes of transfer permissible and non-permissible and so on and so forth. Even if Sec. 190 were not included in that Chapter it would be seen that either sirdari rights could become extinguished wherever there is an express provision in Chapter 8 to that effect or would become extinguished under the general law. Surrender in law would bring about extinguishment of right and title of the surrenderor. When the land is abandoned, again the legal effect would be that the right and title of the person who abandoned the holding ceased. Likewise when a person dies without leaving any heir the effect in law would be that his property would be escheated i.e. his rights would come to an end. When the land is abandoned, again the legal effect would be that the right and title of the person who abandoned the holding ceased. Likewise when a person dies without leaving any heir the effect in law would be that his property would be escheated i.e. his rights would come to an end. When a land is acquired under any law for acquisition of property and the formality and the procedure under that Act are completed the right and title of the owner of the property acquired gets extinguished. The effect of the Limitation Act itself is that when the remedy for infringement of a right is not resorted to within the time prescribed under Act that right itself is extinguished. In describing the various modes of extinguishment of the Sirdari right, my object is to demonstrate that the provisions of Sec. 190 are not by themselves creative of any liability of extinguishment but can only be fitted in the scheme of that Chapter if they are read as enumerative. I dare say that the enumeration is exhaustive in Sec. 190 for the reason that in this labyrinth of the complicated structure of the whole Act there may be lurking in some dark corner some other mode of extinguishment of Sirdari rights which has not found a place in Sec. 190 But one fact is clearly demonstrated by what was intended by Sec. 190 of the Act as it stood before the amendment, that it only described the various categories or enumerate them at a convenient place as to it what circumstances will the Sirdari rights become extinguished. I may as an illustration, mention here that even if Sec. 190 were not on the statute book, Sec. 168 of the Act would apply in its fullest amplitude and the right and title of the Sirdari would get extinguished if there has been a transfer made by in contra convention of the provisions of the Act and a suit for ejectment of the transferee or any other person as contemplated by Sec. 167 has been decreed. In the same manner even if Sec. 190 were not there and the Sirdari holdings were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act of 1898, the effect of the notification under Sec. 6 of the Acquisition Act would be the extinguishment of the Sir dart rights. In the same manner even if Sec. 190 were not there and the Sirdari holdings were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act of 1898, the effect of the notification under Sec. 6 of the Acquisition Act would be the extinguishment of the Sir dart rights. Once I am correct in this approach then the proper way in which the provisions of Sec. 190 can be construed is that it is enumerative and to a certain extent even superfluous. The vice of tutology and superfluity is not uncommon in drafting of statutes. The same idea may be found repeated in various sections of the Act. It appears to me that the draftsmen of the Act at one convenient place tried to mention the different modes of extinguishment of Sirdari rights and in that attempt for convenience of reference, they listed the various modes. It is difficult for me in the context of the scheme of Chapter VIII of the Act, keeping in view the other material provisions of that Chapter, to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that Sec. 190 is not enumerative but creative of the lability of extinction. 13. Having thus determined the real nature of the provisions of Sec. 190 it is then easy to understand the hope and effect of Cl. (cc) of that section. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the amending Act (U.P. Act No. 37 of 1956) which introduced clause (cc) in Sec. 190 also introduced sub-Sec. (2) to Sec. 167. It has also to be borne in mind that despite the introduction of Cl. (cc) in Sec. 190 the Legislature did not introduce any amendment in Sec. 194. Viewed in this light the proper way in which Cl. (cc) of Sec. 190 can be construed is that it left unaffected the provisions of Sec. 167 and Sec. 168 of the Act otherwise the introduction of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 167 by that very amending Act would have no meaning and purpose. For the same reason it appears to me that the Legislature did not bring about the amendment of Sec. 194 as it thought that the amendment of Sec. 167 itself would enable the defaulting Sirdar to be ejected. For the same reason it appears to me that the Legislature did not bring about the amendment of Sec. 194 as it thought that the amendment of Sec. 167 itself would enable the defaulting Sirdar to be ejected. I am, therefore, of the opinion, that merely the act of letting out in contravention of the Act would not bring about by its own force the extinction of the Sirdari right unless recourse were taken to the provisions of Sec. 167 of the Act and a decrees for ejectment were passed against a transferee or any person found in possession on the suit of the Gaon Samaj and it would be then open to the court, as the circumstances permit, to pass a decree for ejectment against a defaulting Sirdar and when he has been ejected then his right and title would be extinguished. May be the intention behind introducing Cl. (cc) in Sec. 190 was to clarify the position, that is to say, it was introduced as a remedial measure so that it may not be open to argument that, as Sec. 190 did not contemplate the extinguishment of the Sirdari rights on a transfer by a Sirdar in contravention of the Act, therefore, he cannot be ejected, thereby giving rise to grave doubts as regards the scope and effect of Secs. 167 and 168. The above discussion, to my mind, amply demonstrates that the law still in Chapter VIII of the Act, though clause (cc) in Sec. 190 has been introduced, is that the Sirdari rights would not extinguish in the case of a Sirdar having made a transfer of or let out the sirdari holdings in contravention of the Act unless the Gaon Samaj brings a suit under Sec. 167 of the Act and obtains a decree for ejectment. That this approach is correct is also demonstrated when one considers that a transfer by sale results in the vesting of the title in the transferee without delivery of possession. Let us then take a case that a Sirdar executes a sale deed of his Sirdari holding in favour of another person gets it registered, accepts the consideration but does not part with possession of the holding. The transfer being in contravention of the Act if Cl. Let us then take a case that a Sirdar executes a sale deed of his Sirdari holding in favour of another person gets it registered, accepts the consideration but does not part with possession of the holding. The transfer being in contravention of the Act if Cl. (cc) of Sec. 190 is construed as creating a liability extinguishing the right and interest then the very act of registration of the sale deed by the Sirdar would result in the extinguishment of the Sirdari interest. The problem will then arise having regard to the provisions of Sec. 200 of the Act who is to eject him from disputed holding of which he remained in possession? No amendment having been made in Sec. 194 of the Act the Land Management Committee cannot take possession. The transferee not having been put in possession no occasion will arise for filing a suit by the Gaon Samaj against a transferee. In this connection a reference was made to the provisions of Sec. 193 but I do not think Sec. 193 is a provision enabling the Gaon Samaj or the Land Management Committee or the Collector to file a suit against the Sirdar. Its main purpose is to lay down what would be the right of the Sirdar in respect of the standing crops. It is thus clear that sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 167 was introduced by the amending Act No. 37 of 1953 which also introduced Clause (ccl of Sec. 190 to enable a suit for ejectment to be brought by the Gaon Samaj against the Sirdar when he retains possession and a decree for ejectment obtained thereon. When the decree is obtained there as enjoined by Sec. 168 of the Act it is only upon ejectment that the Sirdar's right and title would extinguish. 14. As a result of the discussion above I find that there is a manifest error in the view taken by the Board in throwing out the suit of the plaintiff petitioner on the ground that his Sirdari right had been extinguished. I, therefore, quash the impugned judgment and decree of the Board and direct that the second appeal be restored to its original number and be heard and decided in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made by me in this judgment. I, therefore, quash the impugned judgment and decree of the Board and direct that the second appeal be restored to its original number and be heard and decided in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made by me in this judgment. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs of this petition from the opposite party No. 4.