Judgement DAYAL, J. :- This is a plaintiff's appeal under S. 6-A of the Court-Fees Act. The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of a number of properties on the allegation that he was the next reversioner and that different defendants were in possession of the properties by virtue of allegations by the widow and that after the death of the widow he was entitled to the properties. The valuation was given and on the total valuation of the properties court-fee was paid. The defendants in their written statement pleaded that the suit had been undervalued and the court-fee paid was not sufficient. The point was therefore taken up as a preliminary issue before going into other facts. 2. The court below after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that against each of the defendants there was a separate cause of action and the plaintiff had therefore combined different causes of action in one suit and court-fees had therefore to be paid valuing each of the property in favour of a different defendant separately. On the question of actual value of each property, on the one hand, there was the report of the Commissioner (issued by the court). On the other hand, the plaintiff produced Sri A.P. Vaish, Retired Engineer, who had seen the Kanpur properties and who gave his report and valuation of each of the properties, but Mr. Vaish did not give any report with regard to the two houses in Lucknow which had been included in the Commissioner's report regarding its valuation. On the question of actual valuation of the properties, the court below did not accept the statement of Sri Vaish produced by the plaintiff but accepted the Commissioner's report and accordingly directed that treating the valuation as given by the Commissioner, the court-fee should be calculated on the market value of each property as reported by the Commissioner. 3. The plaintiff in this appeal has contested both these points. On the question of law his contention is that the cause of action in favour of the plaintiff is one and the same against all the defendants which are on the death of the limited owner the widow, and mat the Court was wrong in treating causes of action to be distinct against different defendants. On the question of law his contention is that the cause of action in favour of the plaintiff is one and the same against all the defendants which are on the death of the limited owner the widow, and mat the Court was wrong in treating causes of action to be distinct against different defendants. He has also contended that the statement of Sri Vaish was more reliable than the report of the Commissioner and the court below was wrong in rejecting the statement of Mr. Vaish. 4. We will now deal with both these points separately. On the question of law, it has to be noted that the matter has to be decided on an interpretation of S. 17 of the Court Fees Act as amended in this State. This section provides that if in a suit in which two or more separate and distinct causes of action are joined, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees with which the plaints or memoranda of appeal would be chargeable under this Act if separate suits were instituted in respect of each such causes of action. The point to be seen is, therefore, whether there arc separate and distinct causes of action joined in one suit in the present plaint and if that is so court-fee is chargeable on each of such causes of action which would have been payable if separate suits had been filed. In the plaint after stating the history regarding the ownership of the property and alleging that on the death of Srimati Kesar Bai in 1946. the plaintiff inherited the property as the next reversioner. in Para. 11 the defendant had alleged that defendants 2 to 22 are in possession of the property in suit as detailed in Schedules A and B without any right, title or interest. They claimed to be transferee from Srimati Kesar Bai or Laxmi Narain, defendant No. 1, who wrongly alleged himself to be the adopted son of Kesar Bai, the deceased widow of Ram Gopal. The plaint then goes on to say that Kesar Bai had a limited interest and could not transfer the property beyond her lifetime and that there was no legal necessity and so on, which we think is not a matter relevant for the decision of this issue. The plaint then goes on to say that Kesar Bai had a limited interest and could not transfer the property beyond her lifetime and that there was no legal necessity and so on, which we think is not a matter relevant for the decision of this issue. Different defendants filed different written statements and claimed right according to circumstances alleged by them which we need not consider as it is well settled that question of court-fee has to be decided on the allegation of the plaint. We may, however, observe that even in the plaint there may be allegation which may not be necessary for obtaining a decree in favour of the plaintiff and even these allegations should be ignored in order to find out what is the cause of action on which the suit is based. 5. The phrase 'cause of action' has repeatedly been considered in different actions by courts in England as well as in India. The classical definition of 'cause of action' given by Lord Esher, M.R. in Read v. Brown, (1888) 22 QBD 128 has been taken to be the accepted definition of that phrase for all purposes. It is as follows :- "Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved." From this statement it is quite clear that the plaintiff has not only to allege facts which would show his title to the property or the right claimed but also facts which would show that the defendant has infringed that right, for otherwise there would be no cause of action against the defendant impleaded. That it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege a trespass upon his right by the defendant, was laid down in Balmakund v. Mst. Sangari, (1897) ILR 19 All 379 (FB) by Mr. Justice Baimerji in the following words :- "A plaintiff's cause of action is not only the right which he asserts but the infringement of that right by the defendant. Sangari, (1897) ILR 19 All 379 (FB) by Mr. Justice Baimerji in the following words :- "A plaintiff's cause of action is not only the right which he asserts but the infringement of that right by the defendant. Where the plaintiff's right is infringed by more persons than one and by different acts done separately, by each of them, the plaintiff has a separate cause of action against each of those persons." This statement of law was reiterated by another Division Bench in Govind Krishna v. Sirajunnisa, (1910) 7 All LJ 627 and was repeated by the learned Banerjee, J. in Bindo Bibi v. Ram Chandra, 17 All LJ 658 at p. 661 : (AIR 1919 All 270 at p. 272). The same argument was raised before their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mohammed Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian, 1948 All LJ 574 : (AIR 1949 PC 78). That was a case where a second suit having been filed with regard to property on the basis that the plaintiff had inherited that property, the defendants raised the question that the suit was barred by O. II, R. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court accepted the defence and dismissed the suit on that ground. The same question was therefore considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council and after considering a number of cases defining the cause of action, they laid down five points in order to determine whether the cause of action in the previous suit was different and distinct from the cause of action in the second suit. Out of these five propositions, propositions Nos. 2 and 3 are relevant for our purposes and are quoted below :- "(2) The cause of action means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to judgment. (3) If the evidence to support the two claims is different then the causes of action are also different." After laying down these propositions, their Lordships considered the contention of the appellant before them. Among other propositions it was also contended that the cause of action is the plaintiffs right in law and the facts by which he must prove that right plus the infringement of that right". Among other propositions it was also contended that the cause of action is the plaintiffs right in law and the facts by which he must prove that right plus the infringement of that right". Their Lordships agreed with this contention but held that the judgment of the High Court on the point was correct and they quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of the High Court. "In the case before us the trespass on title or slander of title in the case so far as the Oudh suit was concerned "was not distinct and different either in point of time or in point of character from the trespass on possession in the case of the Shahjahanpur property." On that finding therefore their Lordships held that the plaintiff having one title to both the properties and the trespass of the plaintiff's title to both being not different and distinct either in point of time or in point of character, the cause of action in both the suits was the same. We have therefore to see whether in the present case there is any indication in the plaint that the infringement or denial of the plaintiff's title by the different defendants who are in possession of different properties is one and the same. This can be so in two ways. Either where the infringement of the plaintiff's title is by all the defendants jointly or when the plaintiff's title is infringed by one principal defendant and then the others derive their title from that principal defendant. But in a case where the infringement of the plaintiff's title is by different defendants, independently in respect of different sets of property, then the infringement would be different and independent and would give rise to different causes of action because in that case against each set of defendants the plaintiff will have to allege a different trespass upon his right and also will have to give different evidence to prove their trespass. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that here the plaintiff was not required to allege any trespass of the plaintiff's right by the defendants by virtue of the two principles of the Hindu Law : (1) that the burden or proving whether an alienation by a widow is for legal necessity and therefore binding beyond her lifetime is upon the alienee; and (2) that the reversioner can assume that the alienation by the widow is a nullity after her death. We think that these two principles do not go to the extent of saying that the plaintiff need not even allege a trespass upon his title by the defendants. These principles only go to show that the plaintiff need not allege in his plaint what rights the defendants are claiming and such rights do not exist because the transaction in their favour was not supported by any legal necessity and therefore was not effective after the death of the limited owner. But that does not mean that the plaintiff need not even allege that the defendant is in possession of the property against law and has denied his title. In the circumstances of the present case, the title of the plaintiff accrued to him on the death of last widow. If on that date different defendants were in possession of different part of the estate, and they denied the plaintiff's title to succeed to the property, independently of each other, every denial of plaintiff's title was an independent trespass upon the plaintiff's right and consequently gave rise to a different cause of action. In the plaint and in Para. 11 thereof it has been distinctly stated that different defendants are in possession of the properties mentioned in the schedule and claim title to it which they do not possess. We therefore think that in this case there are several causes of action in respect of each property in the possession of a particular set of defendants. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the observation made in Parbati Kunwar v. Mohmud Fatima, (1907) ILR 29 All 267. In this case a suit was filed by two daughters of a deceased Mohammadan against their mother and two brothers for possession of their share of the estate left by the father. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the observation made in Parbati Kunwar v. Mohmud Fatima, (1907) ILR 29 All 267. In this case a suit was filed by two daughters of a deceased Mohammadan against their mother and two brothers for possession of their share of the estate left by the father. The defendants to the suit were the mother and the two brothers and also some alienee from the mother and the two brothers. The defence was that the father had left a will by which the whole property was inherited by the mother and the sons and the plaintiffs had no right to claim any right in the property. The mother and the sons had transferred different parts of the property which were in possession of the other defendants. The question in the suit was whether the suit was bad for multifariousness and it was held that it was not. On the facts of this case it is quite clear that the trespass of the plaintiff's right was by one denial by the mother and the sons claimed the whole right to the property under the will and the rights of the other defendants were merely derived from that one denial and the evidence which would demolish those rights of defendants 1 to 3 would be sufficient to demolish the rights of other defendants who were claiming through these defendants. There was therefore only one infringement of the plaintiff's title in that case and no question of multifariousness did arise. Learned counsel also relied upon a Full Bench case of this Court in Kubra Jan v. Ram Ball, (1908) ILR 30 All 560 (FB). In this case, the plaintiff sued as a heiress of her father to recover from her brother and from certain transferees from him her share in the property of the deceased father. This case was therefore similar to the case reported in (1907) ILR 29 All 267 and the trespass to the plaintiff's title was by the son who denied her right and the rights of all other defendants were merely derivative titles. This F. B. ruling was distinguished by another D. B. of this Court in Govind Krishna's case, (1910) 7 All LJ 627 on this very ground and we agree with respect. 7. This F. B. ruling was distinguished by another D. B. of this Court in Govind Krishna's case, (1910) 7 All LJ 627 on this very ground and we agree with respect. 7. The last case referred by the learned counsel for the appellant in this connection was Raj Rai Bahadur Singh v. Shatranjai Singh, AIR 1942 Oudh 412. That was a case under the Court Fees Act. In this case the appellant claimed this property as the entire estate left by Raja Gobardhan Singh. He claimed the property under the will of the Raja. The appellant disputed the validity of the will but contended that even if it was valid, he is entitled to these villages under another right. In this case also, therefore, the trespass to the plaintiff's right was by one defendant and in this case no question was involved of there being more than one defendant in the suit. It was in those circumstances held, that there was only one cause of action with regard to the whole estate. We think that these cases are clearly distinguishable and do not lead to the conclusion that in the present case there was only one cause of action. 8. On the other side, reliance was placed upon Karan Singh v. Kunwar Sen, ILR (1942) All 862 : (AIR 1942 All 387). This case arose on an application for transfer made to this Court under S. 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. The plaintiff in that suit which was instituted in Saharanpur claimed the property both at Hardwar and in the Punjab on the allegation that both the sets of property belonged to one Badri Dass who left two daughters Jwala Devi and Prem Devi and he claimed himself to be the reversioner on the death of Prem Devi who died last. In the meanwhile both Prem Devi and Jwala Devi made transfers and the alienees were made parties to the suit. The contention of the applicant was that the case may be transferred to the Punjab Court under S. 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the meanwhile both Prem Devi and Jwala Devi made transfers and the alienees were made parties to the suit. The contention of the applicant was that the case may be transferred to the Punjab Court under S. 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships considered the facts of the case and doubted the applicability of S. 22 to that case because that was applicable only to a case which could be filed either in the Punjab or in Saharanpur and therefore the point for consideration was whether one suit could combine the reliefs with regard to the Punjab properties as well as Saharanpur properties. After considering the law, the learned Judges came to the conclusion that it could not and therefore the application under S. 22 was held to be incompetent. The learned Judges referred to a very old case of Mt. Jehan Bebee v. Saivuk Ram, (1867) 1 Agra 109 (FB). That was a Full Bench decision of this Court by which unconnected transfer by a widow of properties comprised within the husband's estate were held not to give rise to one cause of action against the various transferees and it was observed by the learned Judges that the authority of Mt. Jehan Bebee's case, (1867) 1 Agra 109 (FB) has not been questioned at all. We may also refer to a case Ganesh Lal v. Khairati Singh, (1894) ILR 10 All 279. In that case the plaintiff alleged himself to be entitled on the death of a Hindu widow and he brought a suit against three sets of defendants in whose favour the widow had made alienations in her lifetime. It was held that the suit was bad for multi-fariousness. 9. On a consideration of all these authorities, we are of the opinion that the present suit is not based upon one single cause of action but on several causes of action against each set of defendants in possession of the properties specified in the schedule. The objection of the defendants, therefore, that the court fee has to be paid on the aggregate value of the properties, which would have been payable if separate suits had been filed in respect of each of the properties is correct. 10. The objection of the defendants, therefore, that the court fee has to be paid on the aggregate value of the properties, which would have been payable if separate suits had been filed in respect of each of the properties is correct. 10. Coming to the next question of the actual value of each property we find that there is a report of the Commissioner who was appointed by the court below and there is also the evidence of Sri. A.P. Vaish, a Consulting Engineer who was produced by the plaintiff. The Commissioner was not examined in court. Sri A.P. Vaish was produced in court and his evidence was subjected to cross-examination. From the report of the Commissioner we find that the Commissioner in assessing the value of the property has made obvious mistakes. In determining the rate at which he has calculated the value of the built portion, he has not indicated any standard which has actuated him to apply that rate. He has also not considered the height of each storey and that is a factor which is bound to affect the rate to be applied for valuing the structure. The Commissioner has also valued the land but has not given any data on the basis of which he has fixed the price of the land at the rate mentioned by him in his report. He has also not considered the age of the building and has made no allowance for the depreciation thereof. In these circumstances the report of the Commissioner cannot be taken as giving the correct value of the property and the court below was wrong in accepting that report and putting a value of the property according to that report. On the other hand the statement of Sri A.P. Vaish is based on scientific principles. He has applied the rates according to the P.W.D. rates of 1946 which were approximately very near to the time of the death of the last widow when the plaintiff alleged to have become entitled to the property. He has also given the depreciation in the property and also in his report he has disclosed the basis on which he fixed the price of the land of each house. He was put into the witness box and the defendants were free to cross-examine him and to elicit facts which would indicate that the price given by him was wrong. He was put into the witness box and the defendants were free to cross-examine him and to elicit facts which would indicate that the price given by him was wrong. He was not cross-examined on that issue and his statement with regard to the price of the land also therefore cannot be rejected as unreliable. He has however not valued the properties at Lucknow. 11. We, therefore, direct that the valuation of the property at Kanpur will be taken from the statement of Sri A.P. Vaish. The valuation of the Lucknow property given by the Commissioner will be accepted as value of the whole property. But only half of this property is in dispute. Therefore half the value of the Lucknow property given in the Commissioner's report will be taken to be the value of the Lucknow property. 12. With this observation, the case will be sent back to the court below for charging the proper court-fee unless the plaint is amended. Case remanded.