Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in A.D.R.P.124/1959 before the Munsiff's Court, Thiruvella, is the revision petitioner. He filed an application under S.4, 8 and 9 of Act 31 of 1958 for the discharge of the debt due to the 2nd respondent in this petition in instalments. The petitioner and the 1st respondent here, were having money transactions and on that account an amount of Rs. 379 with interest thereon was due to him. On 30th Kumbham 1126 the petitioner executed a pronote Ex. D-1 in favour of the 1st respondent for Rs. 647, viz., the amount of Rs. 379 and the interest thereon. Subsequently the petitioner borrowed Rs. 100 from the 1st respondent and for this amount together with Ex. D-1 amount the petitioner executed a pronote Ex. D-2 in favour of the 1st respondent on 28th March 1953. Ex. D-2 was for an amount of Rs. 884. According to the petitioner Ex. D-2 pronote was renewed by executing Ex. D-3 pronote in favour of the 2nd respondent on 29th February 1956. Ex. D-3 note was for Rs. 1,116. The petitioner's case was that this note was executed in favour of the 2nd respondent benami for the 1st respondent, the 2nd respondent, being the 1st respondent's sister's son. According to the petitioner the principal amounts due were Rs. 379-2-4 and Rs. 100 and the creditor could claim only a moiety of them by way of interest. 2. The respondents contended that Ex. D-3 note was an independent transaction between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent and that it was not in renewal of Ex. D2 note. 3. The court of first instance held that the petitioner was bound to pay the amount due under Ex. D-3 note with 5 per cent interest from the date of the commencement of the Act as the benami character of Ex. D-3 was not proved, and posted the case for the parties to file statements. The petitioner filed an appeal against the order. The appellate court held that it was not open to the petitioner to contend that Ex. D-3 was executed in favour of the 2nd respondent benami for the 1st respondent as S.78 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would preclude him from proving this contention and as there was no evidence to support it and dismissed the appeal. 4. The appellate court held that it was not open to the petitioner to contend that Ex. D-3 was executed in favour of the 2nd respondent benami for the 1st respondent as S.78 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would preclude him from proving this contention and as there was no evidence to support it and dismissed the appeal. 4. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that the view of the courts below was wrong. It was submitted that notwithstanding the fact that there was no evidence to prove the benami nature of Ex. D-3 note, the real question for consideration is whether Ex. D-3 promissory note was a fresh transaction or only a renewal of Ext. D2 note. The consideration recited in Ex. D-3 note was that the 2nd respondent paid the 1st respondent the amount due under Ex. D-2 note. Ex. D-4 is the endorsement on Ex. D-2 note. The endorsement states that an amount of Rs. 1,116 was paid by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent. The submission of the petitioner was that although there were these recitals in Ex. D-3 note and Ex. D-4 endorsement, these recitals did not represent the real state of affairs as there was no payment by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent of any amount, but that an amount owing from the 1st respondent to the 2nd respondent was only adjusted towards the amount due under Ex. D-2 and the transaction closed and that although Ex. D-2 pronote was purported to have been discharged there was virtually an assignment of that pronote in favour of the 2nd respondent and that the petitioner executed Ex. D-3 note in order to discharge that liability, and therefore the debt which is due under Ex. D-3 is the identical debt due under Ex. D-2. In substance the plea is that since the identity of the debt has not changed the petitioner was entitled to pay off the debt represented by Ex. D-3 under the provisions of Act 31 of 1958. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the consideration for Ex. D-3 note was the promise that the 2nd respondent would pay off the liability which the petitioner had contracted towards the 1st respondent, and as that debt had been paid off, petitioner's liability under Ex. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the consideration for Ex. D-3 note was the promise that the 2nd respondent would pay off the liability which the petitioner had contracted towards the 1st respondent, and as that debt had been paid off, petitioner's liability under Ex. D-3 note was a separate and independent one having no connection with Ex. D-2 note. Although the recitals in Ext. D-3 and D-4 are that the amount due under Ex. D-2 was paid off by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent, it was admitted by counsel for the respondents that no amount was, as a matter of fact, paid by the 2nd respondent to the 1st respondent, but that the amount due to the 2nd respondent from the 1st respondent on account of some other transaction between them was adjusted towards the amount due to the 1st respondent under Ex. D-2 note, and that that was the consideration for the execution of Ex. D-3 note. If this is the nature of the circumstances under which Ex. D-3 was executed, then there was a novation, and the result of the novation was that the liability of the petitioner to the 1st respondent under Ex. D-2 was discharged as also the liability of the 1st respondent to the 2nd respondent, with the result that the petitioner became liable under Ex. D3 note to the 2nd respondent. Thereafter the liability under Ex. D-2 note could no longer survive. In 'The Law of Contract', by Cheshire and Fifoot 5th Edn., page 430 it is stated: "Novation is a transaction by which, with the consent of all the parties concerned, a new contract is substituted for one that has already been made. The new contract may be between the original parties, e. g., where a written agreement is later incorporated in a deed; or between different parties, e.g., where a new person is substituted for the original debtor or creditor. It is this last form, the substitution of one creditor for another, that concerns us at the moment. The new contract may be between the original parties, e. g., where a written agreement is later incorporated in a deed; or between different parties, e.g., where a new person is substituted for the original debtor or creditor. It is this last form, the substitution of one creditor for another, that concerns us at the moment. The fact that such a substitution effectively transfers the right to payment of the debt has been concisely illustrated by Builer, J., 'Suppose A owes B f 100 and B owes C f 100, and the three meet and it is agreed between them that A shall pay C the f 100; B's debt is extinguished, and C may recover the sum against A'. In this case a contract is made between A, B and C, by which the original liability of A to B is discharged in consideration of his promise to perform the same obligation in favour of C, the other party to the new contract. A transaction of this nature, however, is not effective as a novation unless an intention is clearly shown that the debt due from A to B is to be extinguished. Otherwise the novation fails for want of consideration." So, if the essence of the novation is the extinguishment of the previous liability, it cannot be said that the liability undertaken by the petitioner under Ex. D-3 is the same as the liability represented by Ex. D-2 note for ex hypothesi it has been extinguished. But counsel for the petitioner submitted that Ex. D-3 was only a renewal of the debt evidenced by Ex. D-2 and that the identity of the debt has not changed, and relied on S.2(h) of Act 31 of 1958. That reads: "'principal' means the amount originally advanced, together with such sum, if any, as has been subsequently advanced, notwithstanding any stipulation to treat any interest as principal and notwithstanding that the debt has been renewed or included in a fresh document whether by the same debtor or by his heirs, legal representatives, or assigns or by any other person acting on his behalf or in his interest;" Petitioner's counsel also relied on the decision in Srinivasa v. Muthayya (AIR. 1956 Mad. 364), and submitted that if the identity of the debt remains the same the question whether the debtor or the creditor has changed is immaterial. 1956 Mad. 364), and submitted that if the identity of the debt remains the same the question whether the debtor or the creditor has changed is immaterial. In that case Rajamannar, C.J., was considering the scope of Explanation III to S.8 of the Madras Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, which is identical in language with the latter part of S. 2(h) of the Kerala Act. At page 367 the learned Chief Justice said: "In our opinion the Explanation as it stands emphasises the identity of the debt. So long as the identity can be traced, any change or alteration in the debtor or the creditor would not take the case away from the explanation. Obviously the explanation is a very wide departure from the rule enunciated by Lindley, L. J. in 1892-68 L. T. 29. According to the explanation, the renewed document may be by a person other than the original debtor and in favour of a person other than the original creditor." In the subsequent case of Venkatasubramania v. Srinivasa AIR. 1919 Madras 445, Rajamannar, C.J. and Ganapatia Pillai, J., quoted with approval the following observations by Subba Rao, J., in Ramaswami Pillai v. Sankara Mudaliar AIR. 1951 Madras 635: "(1) A executes a promissory note in favour of B and later on executes a renewed promissory note in favour of B for the amount due under the earlier promissory note; (2) A may execute a promissory not in favour of B and later on with the consent of B, A may execute another promissory note in discharge of the earlier one in favour of a nominee of B; and (3) A may execute a promissory note in favour of B and later on execute another promissory note in favour of C and discharge the earlier promissory note either paying the amount directly or by directing the second promises to pay the amount to the first promisee. In the third class of cases there is no identity of the debt at all It is really a discharge of the earlier indebtedness by payment either directly or indirectly ... In the third class of cases there is no identity of the debt at all It is really a discharge of the earlier indebtedness by payment either directly or indirectly ... To state that the document executed in favour of a third party with a direction that the amount may be paid to the earlier creditor is a renewal of the earlier promissory note is certainly doing violence to the language of the Explanation." It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the case is really covered by the third class mentioned above since the consideration for Ex. D-3 note was the promise to discharge the amount due under Ex. D-2 note executed by the petitioner in favour of the 1st respondent, that there was no question of any renewal of the debt due under Ex. D-2, and that a new liability was contracted under Ex. D-3 note. 5. When we speak of the identity of a debt, what is meant is the identity of the obligation, because the debt is after all an obligation of the debtor to pay a sum of money or its equivalent to the creditor. Although a debt was considered under the old English law to be a specified thing belonging to the creditor and in the possession of the debtor to be recovered by an action in rem, in modern law a debt is nothing but an obligation. (See Langdell on "A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction" page 27, footnote.) If the essence of the transaction was a novation, there was an extinguishment of the obligation under Ext. D-2 note, and if that be so, it cannot be contended that the identity of the debt has not been changed. It was, however, submitted that although the creditor has changed, what was contracted for under Ext. D-3 was to discharge the debt due by the petitioner to the 1st respondent under Ex. D-2, and therefore all equities attaching to that debt would attach also to the debt evidenced by Ex. D-3. It was, however, submitted that although the creditor has changed, what was contracted for under Ext. D-3 was to discharge the debt due by the petitioner to the 1st respondent under Ex. D-2, and therefore all equities attaching to that debt would attach also to the debt evidenced by Ex. D-3. In the case of novation a distinction has been drawn between a case where a person makes a concrete promise to pay the debt which he owes to one creditor to another person, and a case where he makes an abstract promise to pay an amount to a person, in consideration of that person paying the debt which the promisor has to pay the original creditor. "This distinction between an abstract and a concrete promise is of practical importance in determining a question upon which there is much diversity of opinion among Continental writers, namely: To what extent may A urge against C, suing on the new obligation, defences which were open to A against B, or to B against C, on the old and extinguished obligations? This question may be best answered by considering separately the typical cases of novation. (1-a) A promises C to pay him what A owes B, for C's promise to release B, or, in case B has assigned to C his claim against A, for C's promise not to enforce the assigned claim. If A had a defence against B, and so was not liable to him, by the very tenor of his promise he cannot be charged by C. If, on the other hand, A had no defence against B but B had a defence against C, A much perform his promise. For A. having been released from his debt to B, has no answer to an action on his promise to C. C, however, because of the failure of consideration between him and B, must hold his promise as a constructive trustee for B. (1-b) A gives his note to C upon the understanding that B's claim against A, and C's claim against B, are to be extinguished. If, as before, A was not liable to B, he must nevertheless pay the note to C; for C confessedly has the legal title to the note, and having taken it in the course of business, holds it free from all equities in favour of A. If, on the other hand, A had no defence against B, his promise to C is binding, although B had a defence against C. C, however, will be a constructive trustee of the note for B, as in the case of the bilateral contract under similar circumstances, and for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph." ("Novation" by J.B. Ames in Harvard Law Review, Vol. VI, page 184.) So the distinction between the two types of promises is that in the one case what is undertaken by the debtor is to pay the identical debt which he owes to the third party, and in the other the promise is merely an abstract one to pay a sum of money without reference to his liability to the third party. In this case, if, as a matter of fact, the petitioner had contracted under Ex. D-3 to pay the debt which he owed to the 1st respondent under Ex. D-2, then it would have been open to him to contend that all the equities attaching to that debt must also attach to the debt evidenced by Ex. D-3 note. But, the promise under Ex. D-3 was an abstract promise to pay a sum of Rs. 1,116 to the 2nd respondent without any reference to the liability under Ex. D-2 note executed by the petitioner to the 1st respondent. Therefore it has to be held that notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner could have urged against the 1st respondent that he need pay only the principal sums advanced with interest amounting to a moiety thereon, it is not open to him to urge that contention against the 2nd respondent, the reason being that the obligation contracted under Ex. D-3 was an independent one having no relation to the obligation under Ex. D-2. As we have already said, the essence of novation is the extinguishment of the old obligation in consideration for the new one and as Ex. D-3 by its very tenor represents a new obligation, the equities attaching to the old obligation cannot attach to the obligation contracted under Ex. D-3. D-2. As we have already said, the essence of novation is the extinguishment of the old obligation in consideration for the new one and as Ex. D-3 by its very tenor represents a new obligation, the equities attaching to the old obligation cannot attach to the obligation contracted under Ex. D-3. In this view we hold that the lower courts were right in their conclusions. 6. The Civil Revision Petition fails, and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. Dismissed.