JUDGMENT V. Bhargava , J. - This special appeal is directed against an order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the petitioner who has challenged the validity of the appointment of respondent No. 4 as Secretary of the District Board of Basti and his continued employment at present by the Zila Parishad of Basti. The ground for challenge was that respondent No. was appointed during the term of a district board of which a relation of respondent No. had been a member. It appears that one Shri Kailash Shankar a relation of respondent No. was a member of the Board upto November, 1955, and he submitted his resignation from membership on 6th November 1955. On 20th December, 1955, his resignation was accepted. The actual appointment of respondent No. 4 as Secretary of the District Board was made on 19th August, 1956. Even upto the date of appointment of respondent No. 4 the same District Board was still functioning without re-elections, so that the term of the District Board, of which Shri Kailash Shanker had been a member, was still continuing. The point raised was that, under Rule 1 of the rules prescribing qualifications and scales of pay of District Board Secretaries, this appointment was invalid. The relevant clause relied upon reads as follows:- "1. No person shall be appointed as Secretary of a district board unless- (e) neither he nor any of his relations has been a member of the board in whose term the appointment takes place." 2. On this language, the submission on behalf of the appellant was that the expression "in whose terms" should be read as qualifying the word "board" and, in the present case, respondent No. 4 having been appointed during the term of the board of which his relation had been a member even though afterwards he had ceased to be one the appointment was invalid and contrary to this rule. The learned Single Judge saw some force in this submission and, consequently proceeded to decide the case against the appellant on a different ground. To us it appears that this ground, which has been urged on behalf of the appellant, has no force and that the appointment of respondent No. 4 was not contrary to this rule. 3. The learned Single Judge saw some force in this submission and, consequently proceeded to decide the case against the appellant on a different ground. To us it appears that this ground, which has been urged on behalf of the appellant, has no force and that the appointment of respondent No. 4 was not contrary to this rule. 3. We are of this view as, in our opinion, the expression "in whose term" should be held to qualify the whole of the expression "member of the board" and not merely the word "board". In other words, the expression "in whose term" is an adjectival clause qualifying the word "member" and not the not the word "board". We consider that this would be the proper interpretation on both considerations, viz., the object of the rule as well as the language used in it. 4. So far as the question of object is concerned, it seems to us that the appointment of any person as a servant would bee justifiably barred while a relation of his is a member of the board and while, in that capacity, he can use his influence in the Board in order to obtain the appointment. Once the relation ceases to be a member of the board, there can be no such fear of undue influence being used by the relation in order to obtain the appointment. Then there is another circumstance that has to be kept in view which brings out an anomaly. Supposing some one is appointed a servant of the board, and and subsequently, in a bye-election during the term of the same board, a relation of that person happens to be elected as a member and becomes a member. Will it mean that the appointment already made will thereafter be deemed to have been in contravention of this rule? Thus, considering the purpose of this rule, we think that the correct interpretation of the rule is that the determining factor is the term of the member and not the term of the board and an appointment is bared only when it is made during the term of the member who is the relation of the person being appointed. 5. Next we take up the consideration of the language used in this rule. 5. Next we take up the consideration of the language used in this rule. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that, in the District Boards Act, wherever the word "term" is used with reference to a member, the expression used is 'term of office of a member' while it is only with respect to the term of the board that the Legislature has used the expression 'term of the board' and that, since, under the present rule, the word used is 'term' and not the expression 'term of office', this word 'term' should be interpreted to refer to the term of the board and not of the member. This submission was supported by learned counsel by reference to three provisions of the District Boards act in which the word 'term' has been used with reference to a board. These are Sections 4-B, 26-A and 32 of the District Boards Act. 6. In order to see what weight can be attached to this submission made before us, we looked up the original District Boards Act and the subsequent amendments made in that Act and we discovered that the submission is negatived by the historical consideration of the changes that have been made in the U.P. District Boards Act. The rule, which has been relied upon on behalf of the appellant, came into force in January, 1932. At that time, the District Boards Act did not use the expression "term of the board" at all. Section 26-A was, no doubt, introduced by Section 4 of the U.P. District Boards (Amendment) Act 1 of 1930 but it made no reference to the "term of the Board" All that was laid down by this section was. "In the year 1931 and thereafter in every fourth year there shall be a general election of members of all district boards on such date or dates as the local Government may specify by notification in the Gazette." 7. "In the year 1931 and thereafter in every fourth year there shall be a general election of members of all district boards on such date or dates as the local Government may specify by notification in the Gazette." 7. It was for the first time in the year 1939 that by the U.P. District Boards (Amendment) Act III of 1939 a proviso was added to this Section 26-A and that proviso referred to the term of the Board or boards as follows:- "Provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, extend the term of any board or boards and postpone general elections of members thereof for a period not exceeding one year." Subsequently, this Section 26-A was also amended by the U.P. Districts Boards (Amendment) Act No. III of 1940, No. XVI of 1942 and No. XII of 1958. All these three amendments make a mention of the "term of the board" in the proviso. The second provision in the District Boards Act, which refers to the terms of the Board, is Section 4-B and that section, we find, was introduced for the first time by Section 4 of the U.P. District Boards (Amendment) Act XII of 1958. Thus this section was also introduced in the Act at a very late stage and did not exist at the time the rules were made. The third provision in the U.P. District Boards Act, which contains a reference of the term of a district board, is Section 32(30 which reads as follows:- "32(3) - A member removed under any other provisions of the preceding section shall not be so eligible until the expiry of the period of two years or the expiry of the term of the board, whichever is later." 8. The provision also, when originally enacted in the U.P. District Boards Act, did not make any reference to the term of the board. The provision also, when originally enacted in the U.P. District Boards Act, did not make any reference to the term of the board. The reference to the term of the boards was introduced for the first time by the U.P. District Board (Amendment) Act VIII of 1936 by which the words "until the expiry of the period of two years or the expiry of the term of the board, whichever is later" were substitute in place of the words "until he is declared to be no longer ineligible, and he may be so declared by an order of the Provincial Government." the words as they originally existed in the District Boards Act. 9. This history of the amendments in the District Boards Act thus shows that the word 'term' with reference to a board was introduced in this act for the first time in 1936 in Sec 32 (3) of the act. Subsequently, in 1939 it was introduced in Section 26-A and, lastly, that expression was used in Section 4-B in the year 1958. Prior to the year 1936, there was no reference in the act to the expression 'term of the board' in any form whatsoever. The rule, which we have now been called upon to interpret, was, as we have said earlier, framed in the year 1932 which means that it was framed at a time when there was no reference to the term of the board in the District Boards Act in any section at all. The only reference was to the term of office of a member of the board. In these circumstances, we consider that the correct interpretation of the rule would be that the word 'terms' referred to the term of office of the member and not to the term of the board. There could have been no intention of the rule-making authority to refer to the term of the board when there was no reference to the term of the board in the Act itself. The Act had used the word 'term' with reference to a member only though, of course, when using it, the expression used was 'term of office'. That would be immaterial for the purpose of giving the interpretation when we find that there was no reference at all anywhere to the terms of the board. The Act had used the word 'term' with reference to a member only though, of course, when using it, the expression used was 'term of office'. That would be immaterial for the purpose of giving the interpretation when we find that there was no reference at all anywhere to the terms of the board. The rule, when framed in the year 1932, could, therefor, refer to the term of the member only and not to the term of the board. Grammatically also, this interpretation follows if it is held that the expression 'member of the board' has to be read as one expression and it is that expression as a whole which is qualified by the subsequent clause beginning with the words "in whose term." 10. We may add in thus connection that, subsequently, the rule-making authority has itself clarified the position by amending this rule, so that it now reads as follows:- "No person shall be appointed as Secretary of a district board unless - (e) neither he nor ant of his relations is a member of the board at the time the appointment is made." 11. Thus the original intention of the rule-making authority, which had got confused because of the subsequent amendments made in the U.P. District Boards Act, has again been clarified by altering the language of the rule so as to leave no doubt it relates to appointments which are made at a time when a relation of the person appointed is a member of the board. On this interpretation the appeal fails and it is not necessary for us to consider the alternative reason which led the learned Single Judge to dismiss the petition. 12. The appeal fils and is dismissed with costs.