JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, C.J. and S.C. Manchanda, J. - We have heard Sri R. B. Misra at length and are not satisfied that there is any substance in this appeal. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellant was Bhumidhar of the land in dispute and respondent No. 1 was in possession of it as a "Marfatdar" or licensee. A part of the land in dispute was sold by the predecessor-in-interest to the appellant on 2-1-1953 and the remaining part on 6-5-1954. Upto 1361 Fasli the respondent continued to be recorded as in possession as a "Marfatdar". Thereafter he was recorded as merely in (adverse) possession. He continued to be in possession but the entry of his being in possession as a Marfatdar was removed. Then consolidation proceedings started in the village. In the records of the basic year the name of the appellants predecessor-in-interest was still recorded in the column of tenure-holder and the respondent was recorded as in possession. So the appellant applied under Sec. 9 for entry of his name as Bhumidhar in place of his predecessor-in-titles, and for expunction of the name of the respondent. The date on which he applied is not known. Even the date of the notification bringing the village under consolidation operations is not known. The application of the appellant was dismissed by a Settlement Officer on the ground that his bhumidhar right was lost by lapse of time, but was allowed by a Deputy Director. Our brother Asthana has quashed the order of the Deputy Director and restored that of the Settlement Officer. 2. It is not disputed that the respondents possession became adverse to the appellant on the date on which he purchased the land in dispute i.e. on 2-1-1953 in respect of some land and on 6-5-1954 in respect of the remaining land. It is also not disputed that the period of limitation for a suit under Sec. 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by the appellant to recover possession was three years and commenced running in one case on 1-7-1953 and in the other case on 1-7-1954. The period of limitation expired on 30-6-1956 in one case and on 30-6-1957 in the other case. The appellant has not instituted any suit for possession, and, therefore, his right to recover possession was extinguished in one case on 30-6-1956 and in the other on 30-6-1957. The period of limitation expired on 30-6-1956 in one case and on 30-6-1957 in the other case. The appellant has not instituted any suit for possession, and, therefore, his right to recover possession was extinguished in one case on 30-6-1956 and in the other on 30-6-1957. Though the dates on which the application was filed by the appellant and was decided by the Consolidation Officer are not known it was not contested by Sri R. B. Misra that they were after 30-6-1957. Consequently, the appellants right to recover possession from the respondent under Sec. 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was extinguished by lapse of time and under Sec. 210 his bhumidhari rights were extinguished. The consolidation authorities however, held that the period of limitation commenced running, not on the dates on which the appellant acquired the land in dispute but earlier when the respondent obtained possession as a marfatdar. The appellants grievance is that the respondents possession in the time of his predecessor-in-interest, whose licensee he was, was not adverse and that no period of limitation for a suit to recover possession from him started running on the date on which he obtained possession as such. We agree with him; possession of a marfatdar is not adverse at all. But the licence granted by the appellants predecessor-in-interest to the respondent was terminated when he transferred the land in dispute to the appellant. The respondent continued to be in possession and this possession was undisputedly adverse to the appellant because it was no longer as a marfatdar. Even when the period of limitation for a suit under Sec. 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is computed from 2-1-1953 and 6-5-1954 it expired before the appellant applied for entry of his name and deletion of the entry regarding the respondents possession as a "Kabiz". As the appellants right was extinguished and the respondent had acquired sirdari right under Sec. 210 of the Consolidation Officer rightly rejected his application and our brother Asthana rightly set aside the order of the Director setting aside the Consolidation Officer's order. 3. It was contended by Sri Misra that the view taken by the Consolidation Officer and our learned brother that the period of limitation had expired before the appellants application was decided was erroneous because it could not expire during the pendency of the consolidation operations. 3. It was contended by Sri Misra that the view taken by the Consolidation Officer and our learned brother that the period of limitation had expired before the appellants application was decided was erroneous because it could not expire during the pendency of the consolidation operations. Sec. 5 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment in 1958 did not bar a suit for possession; it simply barred a proceeding for correction of records. A suit to recover possession is a proceeding quite distinct from one for correction of records. A proceeding for correction of records does not affect possession at the spot; an order in favour of the applicant does not involve transfer of possession. Even if the records are corrected the possession remains where it was. If the applicant is in possession there is no difficulty in correcting the records on his proving a mistake in them. Even if he is out of possession there is no difficulty in correcting the records on his proving a mistake in them provided his title remains intact and is not extinguished by lapse of time. If his title is extinguished by lapse of time he is not entitled to correction at all and his application will fail on that ground. There was thus nothing in Sec. 5 to bar a suit by the appellant to recover possession from the respondent. Sri Misra relied upon Sec. 49, which bars a suit in respect of a matter in regard to which a suit or application can be filed under the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. There is no provision in the Consolidation of Holdings Act under which a suit or application for recovery of possession can be filed. The only provision under which possession can be delivered is Sec. 28, under which possession is to be delivered to a tenure holder over the land given in his chak after the consolidation. The question of delivery of possession under Sec. 28 arises only after the statement of proposals has been confirmed; prior to the confirmation possession cannot be transferred by a consolidation authority from one person to another. In other words, a person cannot recover possession by any application to a consolidation authority prior to the confirmation of the statement of proposals. The question of delivery of possession under Sec. 28 arises only after the statement of proposals has been confirmed; prior to the confirmation possession cannot be transferred by a consolidation authority from one person to another. In other words, a person cannot recover possession by any application to a consolidation authority prior to the confirmation of the statement of proposals. Even after the confirmation he is entitled to possession only over the land given in his chak which may be quite different from the land included in his holding before the consolidation. As it con not be said that the appellant could file a suit or application under the Consolidation of Holdings Act for recovery of possession from the respondent before he applied under Sec. 9 the bar imposed by Sec. 49 did not apply. At the time when his application was being considered by the Consolidation Officer it could not be said that Sec. 49 barred a suit by him for recovery of possession from the respondent. 4. It is thus clear that the mere fact that the village in which the land in dispute is situated came under consolidation operations did not prevent a suit by the appellant to recover possession from the respondent. The Limitation Act only prohibits the filing of a suit or application after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed therefor: once a suit or application has been filed before the expiry the only question before the court is whether the plaintiff or applicant has succeeded in proving his title to the relief claimed by him. The decision in the suit or application need not be before the expiry of the period of limitation. If the suit or application is for recovery of possession the plaintiff or applicant is entitled to a decree or order for possession if the suit or application was filed before the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for it and he has proved his title. If the suit or application for recovery of possession is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation it will be dismissed on this preliminary ground and no further question of his title to the relief will arise. If the suit or application for recovery of possession is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation it will be dismissed on this preliminary ground and no further question of his title to the relief will arise. Even if the suit or application is allowed to proceed it will fail in the end because the title of the plaintiff or the applicant will be found to have been extinguished by lapse of time. If a suit or application is not for recovery of possession but for a declaration of title or injunction it must be dismissed if it is filed after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such a suit. If it is filed before the expiry of the period of limitation it will proceed but the plaintiff or applicant will have to prove his title to the relief, that is to the property in respect of which he claims the declaration or injunction. If he is in possession no difficulty will arise because his title cannot be said to be extinguished by lapse of time. But if he is out of possession his title to the property might have been extinguished by lapse of time. If the limitation prescribed for a suit to recover possession had expired his title was extinguished and he will fail in his suit or application. If on the date on which the suit or application comes up for final decision it is found that his title had been extinguished prior to that date by lapse of time the suit or application must be dismissed; it will be dismissed not on the ground that it was barred by time but on the ground that the plaintiff or applicant has no subsisting title. Thus when a person sues or applies for declaration or injunction he must have a subsisting title right up to the date on which the suit or application comes up for hearing. It is not enough that he had a subsisting title on the date on which he instituted the suit or application. Thus when a person sues or applies for declaration or injunction he must have a subsisting title right up to the date on which the suit or application comes up for hearing. It is not enough that he had a subsisting title on the date on which he instituted the suit or application. If the period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application for possession expires and by a provision similar to that in Sec. 210 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or Sec. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act his title is extinguished on account of the expiry of the period of limitation he cannot get the relief even though his suit or application for a declaration or injunction was within time. A proceeding for correction of records is similar to an application for a declaration; consequently the appellant had to show that on the date on which his application came to be decided by the Consolidation Officer he had a subsisting title. If his right to recover possession had expired by that date and consequently he had lost title his application for correction was bound to be dismissed. It was bound to be dismissed regardless of whether consolidation proceedings had started or he had applied for correction of records, before his right to recover possession became barred by time. He cannot get his name entered in the records in respect of the land in dispute if he was out of possession and his right to recover possession was lost by lapse of time. The right to recover possession was lost immediately on the expiry of the period of limitation for a suit or application to recover possession regardless of the pendency of consolidation proceedings and the extinction of his title was automatic on the loss of his right to recover possession. Pendency of the consolidation operations did not prevent this legal effect. We, therefore, hold that our learned brother rightly quashed the order of the Deputy Director allowing the appellants application for correction of records and dismiss the special appeal summarily. Appeal dismissed.