JUDGMENT D.D. Seth, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal. The plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendants for their ejectment from the premises in dispute and for recovery of Rs. 294-95 Np. as arrears of rent and Rs. 270.00 as damages for use and occupation. 2. The plaintiff's case was that they were the owners of the premises in dispute and had let out a portion of the premises to the defendants on a monthly rent of Rs. 50.00. The plaintiffs obtained permission under Sec. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter called the Act) from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for filing a suit against the defendants for their ejectment. The defendants tried to have the permission set aside from the court of the Commissioner in revision and from this Court but failed. Thereupon the plaintiffs sent a notice to the defendants on 3rd February 1959 terminating their tenancy. The defendants replied that they were taking proceedings under Sec. 7-F of the Act. Then the plaintiffs again sent another notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 27th July 1960 and a third notice was finally sent on 27th March 1961. The defendants refused to vacate the premises and hence the suit. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants who pleaded that the plaintiffs did not require the premises for their own use and that the permission to file a suit had been obtained only by plaintiff No. 4 and, therefore, it could not be availed of by the other plaintiffs. It was further pleaded that the permission was granted to the plaintiff by an officer who was not authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act. The defendants also pleaded that they were not defaulters and that the plaintiffs had waived the notice of ejectment by accepting rent upto June 1961. 4. The trial court held that although the initial burden was on the plaintiffs to prove that Sri B. R. Sharma, who was the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, had been authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act the plaintiffs did discharge that burden and it was for the defendants to prove their allegation that Sri Sharma had no authority to grant the permission. The trial court further held that the plaintiffs did not accept rent upto June 1961 and, therefore, it cannot be said that they waived the notice for eviction. On these findings the trial court decreed the plaintiffs suit. Defendants went up in appeal but the appeal was also dismissed by the public officer performs his functions learned 2nd Temporary Civil and properly. According to Sri Khare Sessions, Judge, Allahabad. It is against the judgment and decree of that courts below that the present appeal has been filed by the defendants. 5. I have heard Sri Ramanand, the learned counsel for the appellants and Sri S.C. khare and Sri Bashir Ahmad appearing for the plaintiffs respondents. 6. Sri Ramanand contended that the permission granted by Sri B.R. Sharma, Rent Control and Eviction Officer was without jurisdiction as there was no valid authorisation and delegation of powers by the District Magistrate in his favour and as such the plaintiffs suit was not maintainable. The learned counsel also urged that before presumption could be drawn that the act of granting permission had been properly done it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show that the doer of the act had been duly authorised. According to the learned counsel the plaintiffs did not discharge the burden which lay on them to show that Sri B.R. Sharma had been authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act. Sri Ramanand also submitted that the defendants had remitted a money order for Rs. 311.95 and had also intimated to the plaintiffs that the money order had been sent and since the plaintiffs kept quiet after that intimation it must be presumed that the plaintiffs did receive the money order and, therefore, the defendants could not be said to be defaulters. 7. Sri S.C. Khare, on the other hand submitted that this appeal is concluded by findings of fact and that the burden lay on the defendants to prove that Sri B.R. Sharma had not beenduly authorised by the District Magistrate and further that there is a presumption that a public officer performs his functions properly. According to sri Khare the plaintiffs discharged the burden that there was proper delegation of authority in favour of Sri B.R. Sharma by filing Exs. 1 and 9 which are on record. According to sri Khare the plaintiffs discharged the burden that there was proper delegation of authority in favour of Sri B.R. Sharma by filing Exs. 1 and 9 which are on record. Sri Khare also submitted that the authority of Rent Control and Eviction officer to grant permission was not challenged by the defendants before that officer. Sri Bashir Ahmad contended that the defendants are defaulter and, therefore, the plaintiffs suit was maintainable. 8. Sec. 2, sub-Sec. (d) of the Act defines a District Magistrate and says: "District Magistrate includes an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under this Act." 9. The actual order dated 7th November 1953 passed by the District Magistrate authorising Sri B.R. Sharma to perform any of his functions under the Act is not on record. The plaintiffs filed Ex. 9 which has been described by the lower appellate court as "search application." By Ex. 9 the plaintiffs asked the question whether Sri B.R. Sharma had been delegated the power to grant permission. A reply was given to the plaintiffs by the Chief Inspector Rents that "D.M.'s order dated 7-11-1953 authorises T.R.O., Allahabad to decide cases under Sec. 3 of the R.C. Act." The actual order passed by the District Magistrate authorising Sri B.R. Sharma to perform any of his functions under the Act not being on record, Ex. 9 cannot be of any service of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also filed Ex. 1 which is an extract of the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 7th December 1954. Only the operative portion of the order passed by Sri B.R. Sharma is contained in Ex. 1. Ex. 1 does not purport to be a certified copy of the order passed by Sri B.R, Sharma. There is nothing on the record to show that Ex. 1 was the actual order passed by Sri B.R. Sharma. Ex. 1 is only a copy of the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It is correct that no particular form is prescribed under the Act for delegation of authority by the District Magistrate but an order to be valid must be so worded as to indicate that order had the effect and was intended to authorise the officer to perform the functions of the District Magistrate under the Act. Such an inference does not follow from Exs. Such an inference does not follow from Exs. 1 and 9. It must. therefore, be held that the order granting permission was passed by an officer who had no authority to make the order granting permission.Sri S.C. Khare relied upon M.A. Rafiq v. Smt. Maya Devi, 1963 ALJ 827. It was held by a learned Judge of this Court that:- The initial burden of proving that the suit is filed with a valid permission is on the landlord who would fail if he does not produce any order purporting to give permission, but after such an order has been produced the burden would shift on the defendant who would fail if after the production of an order purporting to have been passed by an officer with authority, he produces no evidence in support of his allegation that the officer in fact had no authority." 10. This decision also cannot be of any help to the plaintiffs because in that case the plaintiff of that case had produced a certified copy of an order purporting to have been passed by the Town Rationing Officer granting him permission to file the suit for the ejectment of the defendant. That copy was also certified to be a true copy. In the case before me Ex. 1 has not been certified to be a true copy of the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The ruling relied upon by Sri S.C. Khare is, therefore, distinguishable. 11. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiffs did not discharge the burden that lay on them to prove that Sri B.R. Sharma had been authorised by the District Magistrate to discharge any of his functions under the Act. The burden of proof, therefore, did not shift on the defendant and the view of law taken by the courts below is not correct. The question of burden of proof is a question of law and can be agitated in a second appeal. 12. Regarding the question of default of rent the defendants filed Ex. 8 which is a reply sent by the counsel for the defendant to the counsel for the plaintiff and is dated 16th June 1961. It is stated in Ex. 8 that the notice of the plaintiffs dated 27th March 1961 was received by the appellants on 19th 1961 and further that only Rs. 8 which is a reply sent by the counsel for the defendant to the counsel for the plaintiff and is dated 16th June 1961. It is stated in Ex. 8 that the notice of the plaintiffs dated 27th March 1961 was received by the appellants on 19th 1961 and further that only Rs. 311.95 were due from the defendants as rent of the plaintiffs on 14th June 1961, i.e. within one month of the service of the notice upon him on 19th May 1961. The defendants also filed the money order coupon by which they had remitted Rs. 311.95 to the plaintiffs as Ex. A. 3. No reply was received by the defendants from the plaintiffs denying the fact that the notice dated 27th March 1961 was served upon the appellants on 19th May 1961. In the absence of such a reply it must be presumed that the plaintiffs did receive the money order sent by the defendants. The defendants were, therefore, not defaulters within the meaning of the Act. 13. For the reasons mentioned above I allow this appeal and set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below and dismiss the plaintiffs suit for the ejectment of the defendants. The appellants shall be entitled to get their costs from the respondent.