S. K. Kapur, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed againstthe order of the Commercial Subordinate Judge, Delhi, dated 19/10/1959. Krishna Kumari appellant purchased a plot of land No. 27-B/iiwestern Extension Area, Karol Bagh, Delhi. Certain disputes arose between the parties concerning the land and the matter was REFERRED TO thesole arbitration of one Ram Narain, father-in-law of Brij Rani, respondent No. 8. The arbitrator made an award on 6/02/1957. On 14/06/1957, the arbitrator filed the award in Court along with anapplication praying that the same be made a rule of. the Court. Thecourt by order dated 28/08/1957, directed a notice to be issued to-theparties of the filing of the award. No objection having been filed against the award it was made a rule of the Court by order dated 27/05/1958. On 22/11/1958, the appellant made an application for settingaside the ex parte order making the award the rule of the Court and theconsequent ex-parte decree in pursuance thereof. The said applicationwas dismissed by the trial Court by the impugned order. ( 2 ) THE trial Court came to the conclusion that the appellant wasnot served with the notice issued to her on 28/08/1957, regarding the award having, been filed m Court. The application was, however, dismissedby the trial Court on the ground that she knew in October, 1957, aboutthe award having been filed in Court and, therefore, she could have filedobjections for setting aside of the award only writing 30 days of the dateof her knowledge. There is no finding that the source of her knowledgewas any notice from the Court either in writing or orally under sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act. It came to theconclusion that the application dated 22/11/1958, was hopelesslytime-barred. ( 3 ) MR. Radhey Lal, the learned counsel for the appellant, has raised two-fold contentions. He submits that (l)limitation for filing objectionsagainst the award would, in view of the language of section 14 (2) of theindian Arbitration Act, start after a notice had been given to the appellant by the Court about the filing of the award; and (2) the Court belowwas wrong in coming to the conclusion that the appellant knew about thefiling of the award in October, 1957. In support of his first contentionthe learned counsel relies on Shri Chand Prasad v. Mohan Singh. In support of his first contentionthe learned counsel relies on Shri Chand Prasad v. Mohan Singh. Theprovisions of section 14 (2) are in my opinion, mandatory and the Courtis in all cases bound to give notice to the parties of the filing of theaward. It is, no doubt, not necessary to give a formal notice in writingand notice may be given orally, but the period of limitation will startfrom the date of service of notice to the party concerned. That is fromthe date of communication that the award has been filed. The expressiondate of service of notice in column 3 of Article 158 of the Limitation Actwould include that date of informal or constructive notice. That, however, does not do away with the requirements of section 14 (2) and consequently a notice must emanate from the Court. Knowledge of a partyfrom some private source about the filing of the award will not have theeffect of starting the period of limitation for filing objections to the award. The question has been set at rest by their Lordships of the Supreme Courtin Nilkanth v. Kashi Nath. It has been held that an informal communication is sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 14 (2 ). Regarding the second contention the trial Court has based its conclusionon a letter dated October 2, 1957 (Exhibit R. 1) alleged to have beenwritten by the appellant to Shanti Devi, respondent No. 2, and the. evidence of Manohar Lal, R. W. 3. The appellant, when appeared as herown witness, stated that she did not write this letter but her signatureshad been obtained on a blank paper by Manohar Lal about 9 monthsearlier. Mr. Radhey Lal submits that no reliance should be placed onthis letter as it was impossible to accept that the appellant would writethis letter to respondent No. 2 when they were living in the same houseand that the language of the letter itself showed that the document was aforged one. I have gone through the letter and am not prepared to placeany reliance thereon. In my opinion a letter written in the normal coursewould not be couched in such a language. There was no reason for theappellant to write in the said letter the words "therefore I did not acceptsummons and I,will not accept any. " It is also significant that Shantidevi never appeared as a witness. So far as the evidence of Manoharlal. In my opinion a letter written in the normal coursewould not be couched in such a language. There was no reason for theappellant to write in the said letter the words "therefore I did not acceptsummons and I,will not accept any. " It is also significant that Shantidevi never appeared as a witness. So far as the evidence of Manoharlal. R. W. 3, is concerned he has merely stated that he did not get anyblank paper signed from the appellant. He has said nothing regardingappellant s knowledge about the filling of the award. A question does,however, arise that a decree having been passed in pursuance of the awardunder what provision of law could the same be set asidp. Mr. Radheylal submits that it could be done under Order 9, rule 13, Civil Procedurecode. In Shri Chand Prasad s case the Patana High Court took the viewthat the provisions of Order 9, rule 13, Civil Procedure Code. were notattracted in such circumstances. Since, in any case, this Court has inherentpower to set it aside, it is not necessary to descide that question. In the result, the appeal is allowed and I set aside the ex-partedecree passed on the basis of the award. The Court will now proceed totake appropriate further proceedings, in accordance with law, I may alsopoint out that this case came up before Mahajan J. on 6/05/1965 andhis Lordship directed notices to be issued to the respondents for an actualdate. Registered acknowledgment due notices were issued to the respondents on the addresses on the record but they have been received backwith the remarks that the ladies are not available on the addresses. Having regard to the fact that the ladies were once served in 1950 andsupplied no other address to the Court, I hold that there is sufficientservice of the notice of the hearing of this appeal. Having regard to thecircumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.