JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This is an appeal by the defendants. It arises out of a suit for possession filed in the civil courts at Varanasi. The suit related to plot Nos. 36/2, 37/2, 76/2, 167/2 and 230. 2. The plaintiffs came to court with the allegation that one Kanhai was the occupancy tenant of these plots and about 60 years prior to the suit he had mortgaged them in favour of Harimangal Misir for a sum of Rs. 99/- and had put the mortgagee in possession over those plots. The plaintiffs are the successors of Kanhai aforesaid. On the abolition of zamindari the plaintiffs became the sirdars of the plots and by depositing ten times of the rent they be-came the bhumidhars of those plots. The plaintiffs offered the mortgage money to the defendants who are the heirs of the original mortgagee, but they refused to accept it; hence the suit. 3. The suit was contested on various grounds which it is not necessary to recapitulate. The trial court dismissed the suit mainly on the finding that the mortgage set up by the plaintiffs had not been established. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the finding was reversed. It was held that the plots were mortgaged some time during 1307 to 1334 Fasli. The appellate court held that the occupancy tenancy land could not be mortgaged as it was not transferable; hence the mortgage was void; but relying upon a decision of this Court re-ported in Kaushal Singh v. Ghanshiam Singh, 1956 AWR High Court 537 it held that the plaintiffs could recover possession on payment of the mortgage money, even though the mortgage was void. The suit was decreed for possession on payment of Rs. 250/- which the appellate court found to be the mortgage money. 4. The defendants have now come to this Court in Second Appeal. For the appellants a fresh point is urged, namely, that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The mortgage of occupancy tenancy plots being void, the possession of the defendant-appellants was that of a licences. If the plaintiffs wanted to regain possession, they could only do so on the termination of the licence. Institution of the suit would be tentamount to the termination of the licence. The mortgage of occupancy tenancy plots being void, the possession of the defendant-appellants was that of a licences. If the plaintiffs wanted to regain possession, they could only do so on the termination of the licence. Institution of the suit would be tentamount to the termination of the licence. On termination of the licence the possession of the defendants would cease to be that of a licensee, and the plaintiffs shall be entitled to possession, but only through the Revenue Court. Such a suit was held to be covered by the provisions of Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, see Ajodhia Singh v. Data Din, A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 544. In Kaushal Singh v. Ghansham Singh, A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 544 it was held that such a suit would lie in the civil court. The conflict of opinion raised by these two decisions had now been settled by a Division Bench of this Court in Hansu Ahir v. Ram Adhar Rai, Second Appeal No. 1176 of 1959, decided on 10.7.1963. The Division Bench has held that such a suit would fall within the purview of the Re-venue Court under Section 180 or Section 183 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, as the case may be. 5. Under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act a suit for possession against a person taking or retaining possession otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time in force, can be filed under Section 209 of that Act. In accordance with the view taken in the aforesaid Division Bench decision of Hansu Ahir3, the present suit would be covered by Section 209. Previously suits under Section 209 lay in the civil court; but by virtue of the U. P. Amending Act 18 of 1956 the jurisdiction to entertain a suit under Section 209 was transferred to the revenue court with effect from 28-5-1956. The present suit was filed in 1959. Thus, on the date of its institution, only the revenue court could have entertained it. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that since the defendants had not raised any objection to the jurisdiction of the civil court in the trial court, they should not be permitted to raise it for the first time in second appeal. He has placed reliance upon the decision of Dhavan, J. in Rahmat Ullah v. Ahsan Ali, A.I.R. 1963 Alld. He has placed reliance upon the decision of Dhavan, J. in Rahmat Ullah v. Ahsan Ali, A.I.R. 1963 Alld. 117, where it was held that in case the defendant con-ceded that the trial court had jurisdiction, the appellate court could, in its discretion, refuse to permit the defendant from challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. This decision has been rendered per in-curiam. The various decisions of this Court as well as of higher courts germane to this point were, it seems, not placed before his Lordship. I am doubtful if a court of appeal has any discretion in the matter of considering the question of jurisdiction. The question whether a civil court or a revenue court has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate a particular case depends, inter alia, upon its subject matter. In Ledgard v. Bull, 13 Indian Appeals 134 (PC) the Privy Council ruled that "when the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot by their mutual consent convert it into a proper judicial proceeding". In Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. The Governor General in Council, 1947 PC 78 the Judicial Committee held that jurisdiction cannot be given by consent. It is pars judicis to take jurisdiction into consideration. Hence, a point of jurisdiction must be considered by the court even though not raised by the parties. A Full Bench of our court says that estoppel against a party cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court where it had none and the appellate court is bound to intervene when absence of jurisdiction is clear. An objection to the inherent jurisdiction of a court cannot be waived and can be raised at any stage of a case for the first time. The Supreme Court and the Privy Council say that it must be entertained even if raised in execution proceedings, or in appeals, 10 for the first time. This Court has taken its cognizance in second appeals and in letters patent appeals. Such an objection has been raised and adjudicated upon for the first time before the Privy Council even; see 18, 14. 7. This Court has taken its cognizance in second appeals and in letters patent appeals. Such an objection has been raised and adjudicated upon for the first time before the Privy Council even; see 18, 14. 7. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, A.I.R. 1954 SC 340 Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for the Supreme Court held : "It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." 8. When a court lacks jurisdiction it is Corum non-judice and its judgment and decree is a nullity. It is the Court's duty to see to its own competency. This duty will be circumvented by calling it a discretion, and refusing to entertain the question of Jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant had not raised the objection in the trial court or had conceded that the court had jurisdiction. In view of the consensus of authorities, the decision of Dhavan, J. relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, is not efficacious as a precedent. 9. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The suit is remanded to the trial court with a direction that it shall return the plaint to the plaintiffs for presentation to the proper court. As the objection relating to the jurisdiction of the civil court was raised for the first time in Second Appeal, the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. 10. Before parting with this case I would like to make some observations relating to the question of jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts. This question of jurisdiction has vexed and plagued the civil and revenue courts for nearly a half century. The civil courts sought to limit the revenue courts' jurisdiction, and the legislature continued to fill in the lacuna and bolster and widen the revenue courts jurisdiction. This question of jurisdiction has vexed and plagued the civil and revenue courts for nearly a half century. The civil courts sought to limit the revenue courts' jurisdiction, and the legislature continued to fill in the lacuna and bolster and widen the revenue courts jurisdiction. Even after over 50 years study and debate by jurists and politicians this dyarchy in the administration of justice relating to agricultural land, has remained unsatisfactory. 11. Previously the policy of the legislature had been to keep the adjudication of questions of title relating to agricultural land within the purview of the civil court, and to confine questions relating to tenancy rights to the revenue courts. This policy continued for some time even after the abolition of zaraindari under Sections 332, 332-A and 332-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. By the U. P. Amending Act 37 of 1958 these three provisions have been repealed. Now even a question of title arising in a suit which falls within the jurisdiction of the revenue court can be decided by the revenue court. Similarly a civil court can decide questions relating to tenancy rights arising in suits filed before it. But the demarcation of cases which can be instituted in the revenue court or the Civil Court is neither complete nor clear cut. It has been difficult to know for certain which court is the appropriate one to approach. A litigant with a case for relief has to keep his fingers crossed at the off chance that he may be returned by one court to another, even after a trial and appeal and a second appeal on the merit. The principle that a decree by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and such an objection can be taken even in the highest court of appeal for the first time, is so well settled, that the courts are obliged to entertain such an objection and if well founded, to nullify the whole litigation, and, refer the parties to the other court for a fresh innings. This procedure of law works to no ones gain. The litigants are, in the process, verily ruined. Take the present case. A very small area of land is sought to be recovered from a mortgage of Rs. 250/- only. The parties have spent through three civil courts, their time and money. This procedure of law works to no ones gain. The litigants are, in the process, verily ruined. Take the present case. A very small area of land is sought to be recovered from a mortgage of Rs. 250/- only. The parties have spent through three civil courts, their time and money. They will start from scratch again, in the revenue court. Add to this the time of three courts wasted on this illusory litigation. The question of jurisdiction blights a fairly large percentage of revenue litigation both in the civil and the revenue courts. In appeals, this is one of the favourite points for argument. 12. It will be, I imagine, not inappropriate if the attention of the legislature is drawn to this situation. The legislature may consider the desirability of conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the revenue courts for the entire litigation relating to agricultural land. It may also consider whether this question of jurisdiction deserves to remain such a potent weapon in the armoury of defeated litigants. Other kinds of jurisdictional questions, namely, territorial and pecuniary are also, in theory, as fundamental to the courts power of adjudication, as is the question of jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter. The legislature has intervened in the cases of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the question of territorial jurisdiction. It says : "No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 13. A similar provision has been made to cover pecuniary jurisdiction of courts, by Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. Owing to these provisions the question of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction has ceased to be of vital importance to the life of a case. The legislature may consider if it will be feasible to deal similarly, the question of jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Courts in relation to the revenue litigation. 14. The Registrar shall send a copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh.