JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - The short point for decision on this petition is whether the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Sec. 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935, commences to run from the date which the impugned order bears or from the date on which it is communicated to the party against whom it is made. 2. The petitioner plies a public carrier under a permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. He was liable to pay tax imposed under the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1935. A notice of demand dated September 1, 1963 was served upon him requiring him to pay the tax. The petitioner replied on September, 23, 1963, stating that the tax due for the periods ending March 31, 1963 and June 30, 1963 had already been deposited by him and that he would shortly deposit the tax due for the period ending September 30, 1963. It seems that the petitioner's vehicle was in need of repairs and could not be plied from July, 1963 to December, 1963. Accordingly, he made an application on January 10, 1964 under Sec. 8 of the Act pointing out that the vehicle had not been put on the road since July 1, 1963, and he prayed that he should be allowed remission of the tax for the period July 1, 1963 to December 31, 1963. The application was supported by an affidavit. The petitioner also applied to the Taxation Officer, Kanpur, for an opportunity to produce oral evidence in support of his case that the vehicle had not been plied during the period mentioned in his application. No such opportunity was allowed to him. On October 29, 1964, he received a letter dated October 20/24, 1964 from the Regional Transport Authority, Kanpur Region, Kanpur, informing him that his application had been considered and that the explanation and statement not having been found acceptable, the application had been rejected. The petitioner then proceeded in appeal against the order to the Deputy Transport Commissioner, U. P., Lucknow. The appeal was received in the office of that authority on November 28, 1964. It was dismissed by the Assistant Transport Commissioner on April 5, 1965 on the ground that the date of the order under appeal being October 20/24, 1964 and the appeal having been received on November 28, 1964, it was barred by limitation. The appeal was received in the office of that authority on November 28, 1964. It was dismissed by the Assistant Transport Commissioner on April 5, 1965 on the ground that the date of the order under appeal being October 20/24, 1964 and the appeal having been received on November 28, 1964, it was barred by limitation. The petitioner, aggrieved by this order, has brought the instant petition for certiorari. 3. Sri Ram Autar Sharma, appearing for the petitioner, contends that the appeal was not barred by limitation inasmuch as the petitioner had filed the appeal within thirty days of being informed of the order. He urges that Sec. 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, which provides that a person aggrieved by an order relating to the assessment, imposition and recovery of tax may, within thirty days from the date of that order, appeal to the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration), intends that the period of limitation for filing an appeal is thirty days from the date of communication of the impugned order. There is force in this contention. 4. It is true that Sec. 15 declares that the period of limitation of thirty days for filing an appeal against an order commences to run "from the date of such order". The question is whether the words "from the date of such order" must be construed literally and mechanically. Neither the Act, nor the Rules framed under it, provide for a date to be fixed for the hearing of the appeal nor for a date appointed for the delivery of the decision on it. There is no statutory provision providing for the party coming to know of the order on the date when it is signed. Against that order an appeal has been provided and the statute has prescribed a period of limitation for exercising the right of appeal. When there is no provision under the statute contemplating that a party should come to know of the order on the date when it is signed, and yet the period of limitation has been prescribed for filing an appeal against that order, the only reasonable construction to which the words "the date of such order" can lend themselves is the date on which the party comes to know of that order. Any other constructions could, in certain circumstances, nullify the right of appeal. Any other constructions could, in certain circumstances, nullify the right of appeal. An order may be made on one day and yet not be communicated to the party affected within thirty days from the date of its being made. It seems to me that the observations of the Madras High Court in Annamalai Chetti v. Colonel J. G. Cloete, (1883) ILR 6 Madras 189 fully apply here :- "If there was any decision at all in the sense of the Act, it could not date earlier than the date of the communication of it to the parties; otherwise, they might be barred of their right of appeal without any knowledge of the decision having been passed." 5. That Court in K. V. E. Swaminathan v. Lacchman Chettiar, (1930) ILR 53 Madras 491 was called upon to consider the meaning of the expression "within thirty days after the making of the order" contained in Secs. 73(1) and 77(1) of the" Indian Registration Act. Both the learned Judges, Venkatasubba Rao and Madhavan Nair, JJ., in their separate judgments, pointed to the difficulties which would arise if the words were not construed so as to refer to the knowledge of the party that the order had been made. Venkatasubba Rao, J. considered it necessary that the order should be passed in such circumstances that the parties should have reasonable notice of it, and Madhavan Nair, J. further pointed out: "How is an aggrieved party to take any action unless he knows that an adverse order has been passed by the Registrar ?" 6. Reference may also be made to the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in O. A. O. A. M. Muthia Chettiar v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, (1951) ILR Madras 815 while construing the limitation provision in Sec. 33A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 : ".....if a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order." 7. These decisions were considered with approval by the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, 1962 (1) SCR 676 . These decisions were considered with approval by the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, 1962 (1) SCR 676 . In that case the Supreme Court found it necessary to examine the meaning of the expression "the date of the Collector's award" in the proviso to Sec. 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court expressed the view that the expression should not bear a literal and mechanical construction. At one place, considering the adoption of such construction, it observed: "It is obvious that the effect of this construction is that if a person does not know about the making of the award and is himself not to blame for not knowing about the award his right to make an application under Sec. 18 may in many cases be rendered ineffective." 8. Several bases were indicated by the Supreme Court in its judgment as pointing to the conclusion that the words "the date of the award" must mean the date when the party comes to know of it. It said : "If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively." 9. I am of the view that the principle followed by the Supreme Court and by the Madras High Court fully applies to the provisions of Sec. 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. I am of the view that the principle followed by the Supreme Court and by the Madras High Court fully applies to the provisions of Sec. 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. When Sec. 15 provides that a person aggrieved by an order may "within thirty days from the date of such order" appeal to the Deputy Transport Commissioner (Administration), it must be held to mean that such person can file an appeal against the order within thirty days from the date of communication of the order to him. 10. It was urged by Sri M. N. Shukla, learned Junior Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents, that the petitioner had been directed to appear before the Taxation Officer for the hearing of his application, on which the order was subsequently made, and that therefore he must be taken to have had knowledge of the order. It seems that the Taxation Officer informed the petitioner that he should submit all the material upon which he relied for proving that the vehicle had not been used during the period mentioned in the petitioners application, but there was nothing in the notice so issued to the petitioner informing him that the order would be pronounced on any specified date. There is no material before me to show that the Taxation Officer informed the petitioner of any date appointed for the purpose of pronouncing the order. 11. In my judgment, the order of the Assistant Transport Commissioner (Administration) dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation is manifestly illegal. 12. The petition is allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari shall issue quashing the order dated April 5, 1965 made by the Assistant Transport Commissioner (Administration), U.P. The appeal shall now be disposed of by him in accordance with law. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.