JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a revision under Sec. 115, C.P.C. by Smt. Dayawanti, wife of Bhagwan Dass, opposite party, against the order of the Additional District Judge of Agra allowing the appeal of Bhagwan Dass and thereby reducing the maintenance granted to her under Sec. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act from Rs. 70/- per month to Rs. 30/- per month. 2. Considering that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is limited by the provisions of Sec. 115, C. P. C., it cannot enter into facts, but can exercise jurisdiction only if the lower appellate court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal: to put it differently, if the order passed on a separate application under Sec. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is not appealable. 3. Sec. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act makes a provision for the enforcement of and for appeals from decrees and orders. Whether an appeal lies against an order passed under Sec. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act has been referred to a larger Bench in view of there being a conflict in the decisions of the various High Courts. But it is unnecessary to await the decision of the reference in case the order under Sec. 25 amounts to a decree, which is clearly appealable. 4. Permanent alimony and maintenance can be granted by the court either at the time of passing the decree or at any time subsequent thereto. For example, where the wife sues for judicial separation she can at the same time claim permanent alimony and maintenance and this part of the claim shall also be adjudicated upon at the time of the decision of the suit for judicial separation. Two matters for consideration shall be: (i) Whether the wife is entitled to judicial separation; and (ii) Whether she is entitled to alimony and maintenance under Sec. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Both the orders shall amount to final adjudication of the matters in dispute and they shall also determine the rights of the parties. Consequently, the grant of permanent alimony and maintenance at the time of the passing of the decree shall not only be a part of the decree but will by itself be a decree and hence appealable under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Consequently, the grant of permanent alimony and maintenance at the time of the passing of the decree shall not only be a part of the decree but will by itself be a decree and hence appealable under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. It will lead to, I may say, absurdity if the courts of law were to lay down that the grant of permanent alimony and maintenance at the time of the passing of the decree can be challenged in appeal but not if such an order is passed subsequent to the passing of the decree. The order passed, whether at die time of the decree or at a subsequent stage, is the same, and it is but proper that the order, irrespective of the stage at which it was passed, should be treated similarly and not differently on the ground that such an order was passed at a later stage. In this view of the matter the order under Sec. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, even though passed on an application made after the passing of the decree, shall be subject to appeal. 6. The same opinion can be formed on another ground also. When the law permits that a prayer which could have been made in the plaint and could be granted at the time of the passing of the decree can be made by an application after the passing of the decree, the application made subsequently shall, for all purposes be a continuation of the plaint and hence the application made in continuation of the plaint can be treated as a part of the same suit. The order passed on the application shall thus be a decree as defined in Sec. 2, C. P. C. Further, the order under Sec. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, even though passed on a separate application, is, in substance, a part of the decree already passed and the order can be treated as a supplementary decree or a decree in continuation of the one already passed. Thus from whatever aspect the matter is looked into, the order under Sec. 25 is, in the eye of lave, a decree as defined in Sec. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and hence appealable as such. 7. Thus from whatever aspect the matter is looked into, the order under Sec. 25 is, in the eye of lave, a decree as defined in Sec. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and hence appealable as such. 7. When the appeal was maintainable, the lower appellate court had the jurisdiction to reduce the amount of permanent alimony and maintenance and his order reducing the amount of permanent alimony and maintenance cannot be interfered with in revision. 8. The revision is hereby dismissed. Costs on parties. Revision dismissed.