JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - The petitioner was appointed as an Inspector in the Central Excise Department and in 1956, was promoted as Selection Grade Inspector. By an order dated March 23, 1959, the petitioner was selected to officiate as a Deputy Superintendent in the department. On March 31, 1962, he was served with a charge sheet and was asked to furnish his explanation to the charges. By a communication dated August 17, 1962, the Collector, Central Excise, intimated to the petitioner that the following adverse remarks had been made in his confidential report for the year ending June 30, 1962: "An intriguing type of officer who concocted evidence against his subordinates." 2. On December 1, 1962, the Collector passed an order reverting the petitioner to his substantive post of Selection Grade Inspector. Against the order of reversion the petitioner filed an appeal but he was informed by a letter dated December 12, 1963, that the appeal had been dismissed. In the mean time, on July 17, 1963, the Enquiry Officer gave a report in respect of the charge against the petitioner, holding that some of the charges had been proved. Thereafter, by an order dated August 17, 1963, the relevant portion of which reads as follows, the Collector stopped the petitioner's increment for one year: "I agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. I hold that charges Nos. 1(2) and III(2) are partly proved : Charge No. V and supplementary charge No. II are wholly proved. To instigate the licensees to lodge complaints containing allegations against the departmental staff, to harass a Sub-Inspector to transfer Class III Staff without authority and to make false allegations against official superiors are unbecoming of a Deputy Superintendent. His work as a Deputy Superintendent was found to be unsatisfactory and he was reverted from the post. Considering the punishment already awarded to him, I take a lenient view in this case and stop his increment for a period of one year from the date the next increment falls due. The stoppage of increment will not affect his future increments." 3. After the dismissal of his appeal against the order of reversion, the petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the order of reversion. The stoppage of increment will not affect his future increments." 3. After the dismissal of his appeal against the order of reversion, the petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the order of reversion. His case is that he has been reverted by way of punishment and as such the reversion amounts to reduction in rank and, since the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution were not complied with, the action taken is illegal. The order inflicting the punishment of stoppage of increment has not been challenged in this writ petition. 4. The only question that arises for determination in this case is whether the reversion of the petitioner was by way of punishment or whether it was a reversion simpliciter. According to the petitioner, the reversion was on account of the fact that certain charges had been levelled against him and that an adverse entry had been made against him. He relies strongly on the words "considering the punishment already awarded to him," occurring in the order of the Collector dated August 17, 1963, in the departmental inquiry. These words certainly refer to the reversion of the petitioner. It is contended by the petitioner that the Collector has himself described the reversion of the petitioner as being by way of punishment and, therefore, it must be taken that the reversion was, in fact, by way of punishment. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is categorically stated that the reversion of the petitioner was not by way of punishment but was on" account of the fact that he was not found suitable for holding the post of a Deputy Superintendent. It appears from the counter-affidavit that apart from the adverse entry quoted above, there were two other adverse remarks against the petitioner which have been filed as Annexures 'A' and 'B' to the counter-affidavit. It further appears from the counter-affidavit that there is a Collector ate Departmental Promotion Committee which reviews the case of every officer every year with a view to recommend; officers for promotion or confirmation or retention in the relevant grades. It was this committee which had, in the first instance, recoin mended the promotion of the petitioner to the officiating post of a Deputy Superintendent. It was this committee which had, in the first instance, recoin mended the promotion of the petitioner to the officiating post of a Deputy Superintendent. In February, 1961, this Departmental Promotion Committee came to the conclusion that the petitioner's record was unsatisfactory and that he should be warned that his retention in the grade of a Deputy Superintendent would depend upon his showing a distinct improvement in future in his performance. Again, in September, 1961 the Departmental Promotion Committee considered the case of the petitioner and found his re cord to be unsatisfactory and warned him finally that his retention in the grade of a Deputy Superintendent' would depend upon his showing a distinct improvement in, his performance in future. The Departmental Promotion Committee again considered the case of the petitioner in November, 1962, and found that he was not suitable for holding the post of a Deputy Superintendent and recommended that he be reverted to his substantive post of a Senior Grade Inspector. It was on this recommendation that the Collector passed the impugned order of reversion. It is obvious from these facts that the reversion of the petitioner is not by way of any punishment but is on account of the fact that he was not found suitable for holding the post of a Deputy Superintendent. It is also clear that the reversion has been made independently of the departmental proceedings which started with the serving of the charge sheet upon the petitioner. In fact, the Enquiry Officer was appointed on December, 1, 1962, that is to say, on the very date on which the petitioner was reverted and he gave his findings much later on July 17, 1963. Therefore, there can be no connection between the charges levelled against the petitioner and the order of reversion. It appears that, in his order in the departmental inquiry, the Collector has used the word "punishment" inadvertently. I am of the opinion that the material on the record establishes that the reversion of the petitioner was not by way of punishment but on account of the fact that he was not found suitable to hold the post of a Deputy Superintendent. 5. I am of the opinion that the material on the record establishes that the reversion of the petitioner was not by way of punishment but on account of the fact that he was not found suitable to hold the post of a Deputy Superintendent. 5. It is then contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the reversion on the ground that the petitioner was "unsuitable" casts a stigma on the petitioner and the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to show that the charge of unsuitability against him was unfounded. According to him, since the impugned order casts an aspersion on the capability of the petitioner, it cannot be treated as a simple order of reversion I am unable to agree with the contention of learned counsel. In my opinion, the reversion of a Government servant officiating in a higher post can legitimately be made on the ground that he is not suitable for holding that post and the reversion on this ground cannot be said to cast any aspersion on any Government servant or to cast any stigma on him. The Supreme Court, while dealing with the case of termination of service of temporary Government servants and probationers, has observed in Jagdish Miller v. The Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449 as follows :- "It is obvious that temporary servants or probationers are generally discharged, because they are not found to be competent or suitable for the post they hold. In other words, if a temporary servant or a probationer is found to be satisfactory in his work, efficient, and otherwise eligible, it is unlikely that his services would be terminated, and so, before discharging a temporary servant, the authority may have to examine the question about the suitability of the said servant to be continued and, acting bona fide in that behalf, the authority may also give a chance to the servant to explain, if any complaints are made against him, or his competence or suitability is disputed on some grounds arising from the discharge of his work, but such an enquiry would be held only for the purpose of deciding whether the temporary servant should be continued or not. There is no element of punitive proceedings in such an enquiry; the idea in holding such an enquiry is not to punish the temporary servant but just to decide whether he deserves to be continued in service or not. If, as a result of such an enquiry, the authority comes to the conclusion that the temporary servant is not suitable to be continued. It may pass a simple order of discharge by virtue of the powers conferred on it by the contract or the relevant rule: in such a case, it would not be open to the temporary servant to invoke the protection of Article 311 for the simple reason that the enquiry which ultimately led to his discharge was held only for the purpose of deciding whether the power under the contract of the relevant rule should be exercised and the temporary servant discharged." 6. These observations apply with equal force to the reversion of a Government Servant from a higher officiating post to his substantive post. Again, in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1854, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "It is well known that Government does not terminate the services of a public servant, be he even a temporary servant, without reason nor is it usual for Government to reduce a public servant in rank without reason even though he may be holding the higher rank only temporarily. One reason for terminating the services of a temporary servant may be that the post that he is holding conies to an end. In that case there is nothing further to be said and his services terminate when the post comes to an end. Similarly, it Government servant temporarily officiating in a higher rank may have to be reverted to his substantive post where the incumbent of the higher post comes back to duty or where the higher post created for a temporary period comes to an end. But, besides the above, the Government may Lind it necessary to terminate the services of a temporary servant if it is not satisfied with his conduct or his suitability for the job and/or his work. The same may apply to the reversion of a public servant from it higher post to a lower post where the post is held as a temporary measure. The same may apply to the reversion of a public servant from it higher post to a lower post where the post is held as a temporary measure. This dissatisfaction the with the work and/or conduct of a temporary servant may arise on complaint against him. In such Cases two courses are open to Government It may decide to dispense with the services of the servant or revert him to substantive post without any action being taken to punish him for his bad work and/or conduct. Or the Government may decide to punish such a servant for his bad work or misconduct, in which case even though the servant may be temporary he will have the protection of Article 311(2)." 7. The legal position regarding reversion of a Government servant from a higher officiating post to his substantive post appears' to be as follows: 8. The reversion may be made on the ground that the incumbent of the higher post has come back to duty, or that the higher post has ceased to exist, or that the Government servant officiating in the higher post has been found unsuitable to hold that post. In order to decide whether the Government servant officiating in the higher post is suitable or not to hold that post, the Government may hold it preliminary inquiry either in the presence of the Government servant or in his absence. If it decides to hold such a preliminary inquiry, the provisions of Article 311(2) will not be attracted to it. After the Government has come to the conclusion, whether upon such a preliminary inquiry or otherwise, that the Government servant is not suitable to hold the higher officiating post, it may pass an order reverting him to his substantive post. Such an order of reversion will not be one by way of punishment and will not amount to reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311. But if the Government decides to punish the servant for his bad work in the officiating post, the provisions of Article 311(2) will have to be complied with. 9. The impugned order reverting the petitioner to his substantive post of Selection Grade Inspector was not by way of punishment and did not amount to reduction in rank. The order does not cast any aspersion or stigma on the petitioner. 9. The impugned order reverting the petitioner to his substantive post of Selection Grade Inspector was not by way of punishment and did not amount to reduction in rank. The order does not cast any aspersion or stigma on the petitioner. The fact that it was Massed on the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee and that this fact is mentioned in the impugned order does not make any difference. The provisions of Article 311(2) were not attracted to the case and the impugned order cannot be challenged on the ground of noncompliance with those provisions. 10. There are no merits in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs