JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a landlord's second appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge, Allahabad, reversing that of Munsif West Allahabad and dismissing his suit for the ejectment of the tenant and recovery of rent from him. The plaintiff appellant Raja Ram Gupta is the owner and landlord of house No. 26/28 Hewett Road Allahabad a portion of which was occupied by the defendant-respondent Har Prasad Bajpai as a tenant on Rs. 45/- per month. The appellant alleged in his plaint that the tenant was a habitual defaulter and that finally he fell into arrears of rent for four months which he failed to pay in spite of service of a notice of demand on him. He asked for his ejectment and a decree for the rent due from him. The tenant resisted the suit and denied that he had committed any default in payment of rent, and gave his own version of the dispute between him and the landlord. He alleged that the appellant was anxious to get rid of him as a tenant and in fact applied for permission for his ejectment which was refused by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner. He further alleged that the appellant adopted a strategy of not accepting the rent whenever it was tendered by the respondent with the object of manufacturing a case of default against him. He further alleged that he remitted a sum of Rs. 90/-, being two months rent, a few days before receiving the notice of demand but the money order was returned to him by the Post Office on the ground that the appellant could not be met. He also alleged that on receiving the notice of demand he made a further remittance, by money order of a sum of Rs. 180/-, being four months rent, but this was too returned to him by the Post Office on the ground that the appellant could not be met. The respondent contended that the appellant managed to keep himself out of the way whenever the Post Man went to his house for tendering the money order. 2. The trial court believed the appellants version and held that the respondent had failed to pay the rent in spite of service of a notice of demand and decreed the suit. The respondent contended that the appellant managed to keep himself out of the way whenever the Post Man went to his house for tendering the money order. 2. The trial court believed the appellants version and held that the respondent had failed to pay the rent in spite of service of a notice of demand and decreed the suit. On appeal by the respondent, the learned Civil Judge disagreed with the trial courts assessment of the evidence and disbelieved the appellants version. He held that the respondent had tendered the amount which could not be paid by the Postman to the appellant under circumstances which raised a suspicion that he had deliberately manoeuvred things in such a manner that the money could not be tendered. He allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit in toto. The appellant has come here in second appeal. 3. Mr. T. N. Sapru learned counsel for the appellant, who argued his case with great tenacity, contended that the view of the lower appellate court that the respondent had failed to pay the arrears on demand is erroneous. Learned counsel pointed out that in this case there was no finding by the lower appellate court that the appellant had refused to accept the money order, and the evidence only established that he was absent whenever the post man went to his house or shop, being in another place or out of station. In these circumstances Mr. Sapru contended that the respondent could not rely on those decisions of this court in which it has been held that a tender of rent by the tenant if refused by the landlord, will be equivalent to payment for purposes of Sec. 3(1) (a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In this case there being no refusal the tenants alleged tender cannot be treated as equivalent to payment, and it was his duty to make payment even after the expiry of the prescribed period of one month before he would claim exemption from the delay in payment. Mr. Sapru advanced a somewhat ingenious argument. He contended that Sec. 3(1) (a) impose on the tenant two distinct obligations and he must fulfil both in order to take advantage of the bar against ejectment. These are: (1) payment of the arrears of rent due from him and (2) payment within the prescribed period of one month. Mr. Sapru advanced a somewhat ingenious argument. He contended that Sec. 3(1) (a) impose on the tenant two distinct obligations and he must fulfil both in order to take advantage of the bar against ejectment. These are: (1) payment of the arrears of rent due from him and (2) payment within the prescribed period of one month. The failure to fulfil the second obligation may be relaxed by the court if the tenant can establish that he could not pay the rent within the prescribed period because of the deliberate refusal by the landlord by his absence from the place where payment had to be made. But the first obligation is paramount and must be fulfilled before the tenant could claim exemption from the consequences of delay in payment. In this case Mr. Sapru pointed out that the tenant had made no payment at all either within or beyond the prescribed period of one month and therefore the question of exempting him from the consequences of delay did not arise. 4. The argument is ingenious, but the short answer to it is that this court has held that a tenant can claim exemption from the consequences of non-payment if he or his agent goes to the landlord's place of residence or business for the purpose of making payment but fails to meet him. In Abdul Baqi v. Akhlaq Ahmad, 1962 ALJ 1146, a Bench of this court (V. Bhargava & B. D. Gupta, JJ.) held as follows : "In a case where a person is required to make payment to another the duty of the former is to go to the house of the latter and tender payment, and if there be clear evidence that he did so it must be held that there was full compliance with the requirement of making the payment provided this was done within the time prescribed." 5. The learned Judges further observed "There is ample authority for the proposition that offer of payment at any reasonable hour at the normal place of residence of the person who is entitled to receive payment absolves the person bound to pay from any liability ensuing by reasons of non-payment, irrespective of the question whether payment could not in fact be made because the payee refused to accept or was absent from his residence." 6. The principle laid down in that case will apply to the one before me. The notice of demand was received by the tenant on the 10th of February 1962. The prescribed period of one month expired on the 10th of March. On the 22nd of February he remitted by money order the entire rent demanded by the landlord. The Postman concerned deposed that he first took the money order to the appellants place of residence on the 24th of February but was told by a little girl that the appellant would be found at his place of business at Matiara in Allahabad. He further deposed that on receiving this information the money order was taken to the aforesaid place of business where it was tendered on several successive days, all within prescribed period of one month, but he was informed that the appellant was not there and finally told that he had gone out of station. Thereupon the money order was returned to the respondent. In these circumstances the tender of the money order by the Post Office as the respondents agent will be treated as equivalent to payment for the limited purpose of exempting him from the consequences of non-payment under Sec. 3(1) (a) of the Act. 7. Mr. Sapru then argued that this Court and the effect of this judgment was subsequently explained by one of the judges who was a party to it - B. D. Gupta, J. A certified copy of the subsequent decision of the learned Judge was placed before me and Mr. Sapru relied on the following observation in it, "There can be no controversy that if the money demanded is offered to the landlord and landlord refuses to accept the same, the date on which the offer was made to the landlord will be deemed equivalent to a date on which the defendant-tenant made payment of the amount demanded though, in fact, the landlord refuses to accept it. This is the only principle laid down by the decision in the case of Abdul Baqi v. Akhlaq Ahmad, 1962 ALJ 1146. Mr. This is the only principle laid down by the decision in the case of Abdul Baqi v. Akhlaq Ahmad, 1962 ALJ 1146. Mr. Sapru argued that the observation of B. D. Gupta, J. should be accepted by me as indicating that the decision in Abdul Baqi v. Akhlaq Ahmad, 1962 ALJ 1146, was confined to a case of refusal of the tender by the landlord and did not extend to a case where the landlord is not met. I cannot agree for two reasons. First, B. D. Gupta, J. does not say in his own judgment that the earlier decision to which he was a party was not meant to extend to a case where the landlord is not met. Secondly, even assuming for the sake of discussion that B. D. Gupta, J. did mean what Mr. Sapru attributes to him - and I say this with great respect - it is not open to one of the Judges to give a subsequent interpretation of a judgment of a Division Bench which is manifestly inconsistent with the plain language of that judgment. The position may be different if both the learned Judges make a common observation that they intended these observations to have a limited effect, or if the judge making the subsequent observation states that the other judge concurs in it. But in this case there is no such subsequent interpretation by the Bench itself, nor did B. D. Gupta, J. state that the other Judge concurred in his subsequent remarks. 8. Lastly Mr. Sapru contended that in any case the appellants suit for recovery of rent should have been decreed. This is conceded by the counsel for the respondent. 9. For these reasons I confirm the decree of the lower appellate court dismissing the suit for ejectment but set aside that part of it which dismissed the suit for recovery of rent and decree the appellants suit for recovery of rent but not for mesne profits. 10. Under the circumstances the parties should bear their own costs throughout. 11. 9. For these reasons I confirm the decree of the lower appellate court dismissing the suit for ejectment but set aside that part of it which dismissed the suit for recovery of rent and decree the appellants suit for recovery of rent but not for mesne profits. 10. Under the circumstances the parties should bear their own costs throughout. 11. The counsel for the respondent says that he deposited the amount of rent under Sec. 7-C for abundant caution, and that he is entitled to withdraw this amount in view of decree for rent passed by this court I think there is force in this point The respondent is entitled to withdraw the amount under Sec. 7-C but I think it will be better if I permit the appellant to withdraw that amount and adjust it against the decree for rent which on this with draw will be deemed to have been satisfied to that extent. The appellant is permitted to withdraw this amount. Appeal partly allowed.