ORDER Gyanendra Kumar, J. - This is a revision by the complainant against the appellate order of the Sessions Judge of Etah allowing the appeal of the opposite party Talib Ali and acquitting him of the charge u/s 420 of the IPC, which had been found established by the trying Magistrate. The State has not filed any appeal against the acquittal of the opposite party, but the complainant has come in tevision as stated above. 2. The facts are hardly in dispute. Talib Ali accused [opposite party] was the owner of a house in the town of Kasganj. On 19.11.62 he executed a deed of agreement to sell the house to Smt. Surjit Kaur for Rs. 6,000/-. He also received Rs. 200/ from her as earnest money. However, on 3.12.62, he entered into a similar agreement with Smt. Ram Devi, wife of the complainant (Ex. Ka 1) to sell the house to her for Rs. 6,100/- and received Rs. 500/- as earnest money from her. Nevertheless on 13.12.62 he executed a sale deed of the house in favour of Smt. Surjit Kaur, with whom he had first entered into an agreement of sale on 19.11.62. On that very day, the complainant lodged an FIR against the accused who was sent up by the Police to stand his trial u/s 420 IPC. 3. The accused pleaded not guilty and stated that he had first executed a deed of agreement dated 19.11.62 in favour of Smt, Surjit Kaur for the sale of the house and had received Rs. 200/-from her as earnest monev. But later on he found that she was unwilling to purchase the property, so he entered into a similar contract (Ex. Ka 1) with Smt. Ram Devi on 3.12.62 and received from her a sum of Rs. 500/- by way of earnest money. But his case was that he had disclosed to her and her husband Bishambhar Dayal complainant about previous negotiation with Smt Surjit Kaur. The complainant, however, denied that the accused had made such a disclosure to him or his wife. 4. This case has been argued at considerable length by the learned Counsels for the parties. But his case was that he had disclosed to her and her husband Bishambhar Dayal complainant about previous negotiation with Smt Surjit Kaur. The complainant, however, denied that the accused had made such a disclosure to him or his wife. 4. This case has been argued at considerable length by the learned Counsels for the parties. It is true that one of the cases relied upon by the Sessions Judge was that of Karachi Municipality v. Bhoj Ram (1) (16 Cri LJ 706: AIR 1915 Sin 21) which was dissented from by a Division Bench of our Court in Banwari Lai v. State (2) (AIR 1956 All. 311). Thus the Sessions Judge had, perhaps, erred on the above point of law. In the case of Karachi Municipality v. Bhoj Kaj, (1), the. Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court, relying upon an earlier case of this Court in Emperor v. Bishan Das [3] [ILR [1905] All. 561] had held that an concealment was dishonest within the meaning of Section 415, IPC unless there was a legal obligation to disclose it. This view was dissented from by a Division Bench of this Court in Banwari Lal's case [2]. which laid down that there could be dishonest concealment even in the absence of statutory duty to speak. In that case the accused had pledged a number of tins with a Bank representing them to be full of pure ghee, although most of them contained a mixture of cement, sand and saw dust. To evidence the pledge, the Bank had placed its locks on the godown of the accused. The accused then borrowed large sums of money from the complainant, without any intention to repay the loan, on the security of the same tins alleged to contain pure Ghee, by surreptitiously removing the locks of the Bank and keeping his godown open, so that the complainant might not come to know that the goods had already been pledged with the Bank. Under these circumstances it was held that the accused was guilty of a dishonest concealment and had committed the offence of cheating within the meaning of Section 415, IPC 5. It is noteworthy that in the case of Banwari Lal (2), there was even the statutory duty of the accused to speak and disclose the defects in the title of the pledger as well as faults in the goods. It is noteworthy that in the case of Banwari Lal (2), there was even the statutory duty of the accused to speak and disclose the defects in the title of the pledger as well as faults in the goods. Pledge is only a form of bailment as is clear from Section 172 of the Contract Act. u/s 150 of that Act the bailor is bound to disclose to the bailee faults in the goods bailed, of which the bailor is aware, and which materially interfere with the use of them or expose the bailee to extraordinary risks. Therefore, the accused in that case was bound to disclose to the complainant that the so-called tins of pledged pure Ghee mostly contained mixture of cement, sand and saw dust. He was further bound to disclose to the complainant that he had already pawned those tins with the Bank, whuh had a lien on them, for otherwise the com plainant would be exposed to the extraordinary risk of losing his money in accepting the security of the already pledged goods. Thus Banwari Lai's case (2) does not really help the complainant apd is clearly distinguishable. 6. It is true that the learned Sessions Judge had accepted the version of the accused that he had revealed to the Complainant that the former had already entered into an agreement for sale with Smt. Surjit Kaur for a sum of Rs. 6000/- and that she did not appear to be willing to purchase the propertv. It was also stated by the accused that when he mentioned to the complainant that he would show certain other papers to his wife on some future date, he was referring to the previous deed of agreement with Smt. Surjit Kaur. These explanations furnished by the accused are counter to the terms of the agreement dated 2.12.1962 (Ex. Ka. 1) which he had entered into with Smt. Ram Devi, wife of the complainant. u/s 92 of the Evidence Act, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement could be admitted as between the parties to the agreement for purposes of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from the terms of Ext. Ka-1 which had been duly reduced to the form of a document. u/s 92 of the Evidence Act, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement could be admitted as between the parties to the agreement for purposes of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from the terms of Ext. Ka-1 which had been duly reduced to the form of a document. Therefore, in the present case it may be assumed that either the accused had not made disclosure to the complainant or his wife about the earlier contract of sale with Smt, Surjit Kaur or the same, if disclosed, could not be taken note of in the eye of law. But this would not materially alter the legal position. It has to be remembered that u/s 55 (1)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act the seller was bound to disclose to the buyer only such material defect in the property and in his title thereto, of which the seller was but the buyer was not, aware, and which the buyer could not have with ordinary care discovered. The fact that the seller had entered into an earlier agreement of sale with Smt. Surjit Kaur could neither be called a material defect in the property, nor in the seller's title thereto, inasmuch as he still remained full owner thereof. The last para of the above Section itself makes it quite clear that only an omission to make such disclosures, as are mentioned in para. 1 of Clause (a) of this Section, can be fraudulent. The relevant words are "An omission to make such disclosures as are men tioned in this section, para (1), Clause (a)...is fraudulent." In other words an omission to make other disclosures relating to the property may not be fraudulent. But I have already shown above that an omission to disclose a fact that the seller had already entered into an agreement of sale with another person would not amount to any material defect in the property or in the seller's title thereto, which the latter was bound to disclose to the complainant's wife. Tims the accused could not be held guilty of fraud by withholding the above information from the complainant. 7. Tims the accused could not be held guilty of fraud by withholding the above information from the complainant. 7. The other question which remains for consideration in the instant case is whether the legal mistake of relying on an overruled decision or in accepting the explanation of the accused, which might not have been strictly in conformity with the bar laid down by Section 92 of the Evidence Act, were such as would justify this Court in interfering with the otherwise well considered judgment of the Sessions judge, in its revisional jurisdiction. 8. In D. Stephens Vs. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 , it was laid down that the ambit of revisional jurisdiction is of a very limited nature and a revisional court ought not to interfere with orders of acquittal except on very exceptional grounds. Such a jurisdiction "is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal u/s 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record." Likewise, in another case reported in the same volume at page 316 as Logendranath Jha v. ShriPolai Lal Biswas, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court "This does not mean that in dealing with a revision petition by a private party against an order of acquittal, the High Court can, in the absence of any error on a point of law, reappraise the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal is based...". Thus, where in a revision by a private party against an acquittal, the High Court Judge reversed the pure findings of fact based on the trial court's appreciation of the evidence by merely characterising the judgment of the trial court as 'perverse' and 'lacking in perspective' and directed the retrial of the accused, it was held by the Supreme Court that the "Judge had exceeded his powers of revision in dealing with the case in this manner''. In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 , it was reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that although it was open to a High Court in revisional jurisdiction to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, yet this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. 9. A limitation has been placed on the powers of the High Court to set aside the order of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power could be exercised. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, it is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. But such cases may be-(1) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused; (2) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (3) where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible; where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court and (5) where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. It is true that the above list is not exhaustive, but the real criterion would still remain that the High Court would interfere in its revisional juris-diction against an order of acquittal only where gross miscarriage of justice appears to have been done. The present cannot of treated to be a case of gross miscarriage of justice. Even if the accused had not disclosed to the complainant or his wife that he had already entered into an agreement of sale on a prior occasion with Smt. Suijit Kaur before entering into an agreement with the latter, it cannot be said that he had cheated or defrauded the complainant or his wife because such an omission would not amount to fraud within the meaning of Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. The finding of the Sessions Judge is also not likely to cause any permanent disability to the complainant or his wife in seeking redress in a competent court of law. It is still open to them to file a civil suit against the accused either for specific performance of the contract to sell or for recovery of earnest money or damages. Such a course would give them adequate compensation for the wrong done by the accused to them, if any. 10. Accordingly I do not consider that this is a fit case for interference in revision where the finding of acquittal may be set at naught by this Court at the instance of the complainant. The revision is, therefore, dismissed.