JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this appeal on behalf of the 15th plaintiff-appellant, Mr. L. Gopalakrishnan Potti, learned counsel attacks the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge of Trivandrum, dismissing the suit O.S. 142/1953, filed by the appellant along with 14 other plaintiffs, for a partition and separate possession of the share of plaintiffs 1 to 14, namely 14/20th share in the suit property. 2. The 15th plaintiff is not a member of either the main tarwad or any of the thavazhies, to which plaintiffs 1 to 14 belong. Plaintiffs 1 to 14 and defendants 5 and 6 belong to the thavazhi of one Kutti Kochupennu, and defendants 1 to 4 belong to the thavazhi of a sister of the former, namely Kutty Kochu Kunchu. The original ancestress was one Nangelikutty; and there appears to have been a partition among her children, namely one son and four daughters, among whom Kochu Kunchu and Kochu Pennu referred to above were two of the daughters. The partition as among the one brother and the four sisters is evidenced by Ex. D-1 of the year 1097. Though the properties were divided into five schedules and all these persons were given properties comprised in each of the schedules referred to in that document, so far as Kochu Kunchu and Kochu Pennu are concerned, there was a Common allotment of properties comprised in schedules B and C as and for their shares. I am particularly referring to this aspect because as to what exactly is the interest obtained by these two sisters under the partition arrangement evidenced by Ex. D-1, is one of the matters which has been debated both before the learned trial Judge as well as before this Court. 3. As I mentioned earlier, plaintiffs 1 to 14 and defendants 5 and 6 are members of the thavazhi of Kochu Pennu. Plaintiffs 1 to 14 executed an assignment of their interest in the properties, namely 14/20th share, in favour of the 15th plaintiff, evidenced by Ex. P, dated 9th July 1953. Though no doubt Ex. P refers also to the share of defendants 5 and 6, there is no controversy that defendants 5 and 6 are not parties to this assignment deed. P, dated 9th July 1953. Though no doubt Ex. P refers also to the share of defendants 5 and 6, there is no controversy that defendants 5 and 6 are not parties to this assignment deed. Two days later, namely on 11th July 1953, the present suit was filed by plaintiffs 1 to 14 and the appellant figuring as 15th plaintiff, claiming partition and separate possession of 14/20th share in the suit properties. There is particular reference in paragraph 14 of the plaint to the effect that plaintiffs 1 to 14 have agreed to sell the rights that they are to obtain as and for their share in the suit properties in favour of the 15th plaintiff and that the 15th plaintiff in turn has also agreed to purchase the same for good consideration. In the relief column contained in the plaint plaintiffs 1 to 14 have asked for a partition of their 14/20th share in the suit properties. They have also requested the court to direct the defendants concerned to deliver possession of the share that may be allotted to them in the suit, to the 15th plaintiff in the action. 4. The contesting defendants in the lower court appear to be defendants 3 and 6. The 3rd defendant, as mentioned already, belongs to the thavazhi of Kochu Kunchu, and so far as the 6th defendant is concerned he belongs to the thavazhi, to which plaintiffs 1 to 14 belong. The 6th defendant no doubt was declared ex parte after he filed the written statement on 9th September 1958. So far as the 6th defendant is concerned, he has categorically stated in paragraph 13 of his written statement that plaintiffs 1 to 14 have no right to demand partition of his share. He has also stated that he does not want his share to be worked out in this litigation. But ultimately he vanished from the picture and has not taken any part in the proceedings. So far as the 5th defendant is concerned, though a member of the thavazhi to which plaintiffs 1 to 14 belong, he also does not appear to have taken any interest in the litigation. Therefore, ultimately before the lower court the 3rd defendant was the sole contesting defendant objecting to the claim for partition made by the plaintiffs. 5. So far as the 5th defendant is concerned, though a member of the thavazhi to which plaintiffs 1 to 14 belong, he also does not appear to have taken any interest in the litigation. Therefore, ultimately before the lower court the 3rd defendant was the sole contesting defendant objecting to the claim for partition made by the plaintiffs. 5. So far as the 3rd defendant is concerned, while dealing with the allegation contained in the plaint regarding the right of plaintiffs 1 to 14 to have a partition and delivery to them of 14/20th share in the suit properties, this defendant states that the demand stated to have been made as and for partition and referred to in the plaint is absolutely false and that allegation is denied by him. He also states that the plaintiffs have never demanded, nor have they any right to demand, a partition. Then the 3rd defendant refers to certain aspects, namely claiming certain rights as and by way of salvage lien for having enabled the tarwad or thavazhi in question to retain possession of certain properties ; and on that ground he claims special rights in his favour, if ultimately the claim of the plaintiffs is to be recognised. This defendant has also raised various other contentions one of which appears to be that the arrangement entered into between plaintiffs 1 to 14 on the one hand and the 15th plaintiff on the other is really to get over the result of the litigation which he fought and ultimately succeeded, as evidenced by Ex. P-2, the judgment of the Travancore-Cochin High Court. At this stage it may be mentioned that the judgment Ex. P-2 was delivered by the High Court on 4th February 1953, and the assignment of the rights of plaintiffs 1 to 14 was taken by the 15th plaintiff on 9th July 1953 under Ex. P. It must be stated that the maintainability of the suit by the plaintiffs claiming only their individual shares and not for the whole thavazhi of which defendants 5 and 6 are also members along with them, was questioned. P. It must be stated that the maintainability of the suit by the plaintiffs claiming only their individual shares and not for the whole thavazhi of which defendants 5 and 6 are also members along with them, was questioned. Though no specific objection based upon the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act (Act 3 of 1100) appears to have been taken, it is seen from the discussion contained in the judgment of the learned District Judge that the provisions of sections 28 to 31 of the Ezhava Act appear to have loomed large; and it was urged by the contesting defendants based upon those provisions that the plaintiffs are not entitled to ask for partition contrary to the provisions of the statute. The contesting defendants also raised the contention that no rights can be claimed, by the appellant 15th plaintiff on the basis of Ex. P because admittedly on the date when he obtained this so-called assignment, namely on 9th July 1953, plaintiffs 1 to 14 were members of an undivided tarwad, and it was not competent for such members to assign their undivided interest in favour of third parties. Therefore it was urged that no right can be considered to have been obtained by the 15th plaintiff under Ex. P. It was further urged that a mere statement in the plaint by plaintiffs 1 to 14 to the effect that in respect of the shares that may be allotted to them by virtue of the decree that has to be passed, possession may be given in favour of the 15th plaintiff, cannot be considered to be a transfer of rights in immovable property; and if it is so considered, such a mere statement, without a registered document to that effect conveying that interest, will not enable the 15th plaintiff to claim any relief whatsoever. 6. In respect of many other minor matters that appear to have been in controversy between the parties, the learned District Judge has also recorded certain findings to which I will advert presently. 6. In respect of many other minor matters that appear to have been in controversy between the parties, the learned District Judge has also recorded certain findings to which I will advert presently. But so far as the major point in controversy is concerned, namely as to whether plaintiffs 1 to 14 can maintain an action for partition of their individual shares in the suit properties without asking for partition of the shares that are to be allowed to the thavazhi of which defendants 5 and 6 are also members, the learned District Judge is of the view that having regard to the provisions of sections 30 and 31 of the Ezhava Act, the plaintiffs are not entitled to institute such an action. Regarding the right of the 15th plaintiff to base any right on the foot of Ex. P or the averments contained in the plaint, the learned District Judge is of the view that Ex. P cannot confer any right on the 15th plaintiff inasmuch as the law does not permit transfer of undivided interest under the Ezhava Act. The learned Judge is also of the view that if the statement in Ex.P is to be treated as assignment of the rights in immovable property by plaintiffs 1 to 14 of their share in the suit properties in favour of the 15th plaintiff, inasmuch as that document is not registered the 15th plaintiff cannot get any relief whatsoever in the suit. Therefore on this question the learned District Judge is of the view that the suit as framed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable and that the 15th plaintiff is not entitled to ask for any relief in this litigation. 7. Then the learned District Judge takes up for consideration certain other minor aspects that formed the subject of the other issues framed in the suit 5 and he is of the view that notwithstanding the fact that the suit is being dismissed, plaintiffs 1 to 14 and defendants 5 and 6 are at liberty to file a suit for partition and obtain their shares in the plaint items in accordance with law. The learned District Judge is also of the view that the prayer of the plaintiffs to allow the 15th plaintiff to recover 14/20th share in the plaint properties cannot be permitted because the plaintiffs 1 to 14 themselves are not entitled to ask for partition of their share, namely 14/20th share in the suit properties. The learned District Judge is also of the view that it is, in evidence that the 3rd defendant appears to have taken steps to save the suit properties by obtaining the decree evidenced by Ex. P-2 and therefore he will be entitled to a lien on the suit propertied for the expenses incurred by him. But it must be stated that the learned Judge has not gone into the details of the claim of the 3rd defendant in this matter, nor has he expressed any opinion as to what exactly is the amount for which the 3rd defendant is entitled to be reimbursed or granted a decree as and by way of lien over the suit properties and if so, to what extent. Ultimately the learned District Judge is of the view that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief, and therefore dismissed the suit. 8. In this Court, plaintiffs 1 to 14 have not challenged the decree and judgment of the trial court by figuring as appellants in the present appeal. No doubt they are on the party array in the appeal as respondents 7 to 20. But the only person who is challenging the decree of the trial court is the 15th plaintiff, who, as I mentioned earlier, has based his claim both on the assignment Ex. P as well as the statement made by plaintiffs 1 to 14 in the plaint that the properties that may be allotted as and for their share in the suit may be delivered over to the 15th plaintiff. I am particularly referring to this aspect again because Mr. G. Viswanatha Iyer, learned counsel for the contesting 3rd defendant who is the 3rd respondent in this appeal, has taken an objection, apart from all other contentions, regarding the maintainability of the appeal by the 15th plaintiff alone. 9. Mr. I am particularly referring to this aspect again because Mr. G. Viswanatha Iyer, learned counsel for the contesting 3rd defendant who is the 3rd respondent in this appeal, has taken an objection, apart from all other contentions, regarding the maintainability of the appeal by the 15th plaintiff alone. 9. Mr. Gopalakrishnan Potti, learned counsel for the appellant 15th plaintiff, has urged that the view of the learned District Judge that the suit for partition instituted by plaintiffs 1 to 14 along with the 15th plaintiff, to work out their shares, namely 14/20th share in the suit properties, is not maintainable, is absolutely erroneous. The learned counsel pointed out that the provisions of the statute, to which I will refer later, do not warrant any such conclusion. In the alternative the learned counsel pointed out, based upon a decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in Gopala Panicken v. Kunji 1958 K.L.T. 253, that inasmuch as no plea at all was raised either by the 3rd defendant or the 6th defendant regarding the maintainability of the suit based upon the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act, it must be held that those parties have waived their objections ; and therefore this aspect should not have been considered by the lower court and a decree should have been passed in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned counsel also pointed out that the view of the learned District Judge that the 15th plaintiff is not entitled to any rights either on the basis of the assignment Ex. P or on the basis of the specific averments made by plaintiffs 1 to 14 recognising his rights in the properties that are to be allotted as and for their share, is again erroneous. The learned counsel placed considerable reliance upon the Full Bench decision of this Court referred to earlier, namely Gopala Panicken v. Kunji 1958 K.L.T. 253. Before I advert to that decision, as well as to the material Padmanai provisions of the statute, it may also be stated that the learned counsel urged that even going by the statute itself, the suit as filed by plaintiffs 1 to 14 along with the 15th plaintiff claiming their individual shares in the tarwad properties is perfectly maintainable. 10. The stand taken by the learned counsel for the appellant has been very strenuously controverted by Mr. 10. The stand taken by the learned counsel for the appellant has been very strenuously controverted by Mr. G. Viswanatha Iyer, learned counsel for the contesting 3rd respondent. As I mentioned already, the learned counsel, even apart from the contentions based upon the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act regarding the maintainability of the suit, and requesting this Court to sustain the judgment of the learned District Judge, has also raised objection to the maintainability of the appeal by the 15th plaintiff. The learned counsel urged that the parties who have asked for partition of their share in the suit properties are plaintiffs 1 to 14, assuming that they are entitled to maintain the suit for individual partition. The learned counsel pointed out that the 15th plaintiff cannot have any rights based on Ex. P, dated 9th July 1953 for this reason, because it amounts only to a transfer by plaintiffs 1 to 14 of their undivided share in the tarwad properties, which is not valid; and for this proposition the learned counsel relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Antherman v. Kannan 1960 K.L.T. 1313 though that decision was rendered under the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932. Then the learned counsel urged that a mere statement by plaintiffs 1 to 14 in the plaint, to the effect that the properties that may be allotted as and for their share under the decree that may be passed in the suit for partition instituted by them may be put in the possession of 15th plaintiff, really amounts to a transfer by the plaintiffs themselves of interest in immovable property or creating in favour of the 15th plaintiff an interest in immovable property of the value of over one Padmanabha hundred rupees, and therefore it requires compulsory. registration; and inasmuch as there is no such registered document to that effect, the learned counsel pointed out that the 15th plaintiff cannot claim any rights on the basis of the mere recitals in the plaint alone. Therefore the learned counsel pointed out that even without considering the other points that have been discussed the trial court, this appeal will have to be dismissed in limine on the sole ground that the 15th plaintiff alone is not competent to file the appeal. 11. Therefore the learned counsel pointed out that even without considering the other points that have been discussed the trial court, this appeal will have to be dismissed in limine on the sole ground that the 15th plaintiff alone is not competent to file the appeal. 11. Prima facie I think there is considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal by the 15th plaintiff alone is not maintainable. No doubt Mr. Gopalakrishnan Potti, learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that in the plaint particularly in paragraph 14, the plaintiffs have pleaded a specific agreement as having been entered into between plaintiffs 1 to 14 on the one hand and the 15th plaintiff on the other, in and by which plaintiffs 1 to 14 have agreed to convey the interest that may be obtained by them by virtue of the decree, in favour of the 15th plaintiff, and the latter having agreed to purchase such interest. Therefore the learned counsel urged that the agreement by itself does not require any registration, and taken along with the further statement in the plaint by plaintiffs 1 to 14 that the properties that may be allotted to them in the partition decree may be handed over on their behalf to the 15th plaintiff, the agreement does not require registration. Therefore the learned counsel pointed out that inasmuch as some specific rights have been created by plaintiffs 1 to 14 by their conduct in executing Ex. P as well as by their referring to the agreement pleaded in paragraph 14 of the plaint, and also having regard to the nature of prayer A in the plaint itself, the 15th plaintiff is entitled to maintain this appeal inasmuch as his right to get possession of the properties on the basis of the claim made by plaintiffs 1 to 14 in the suit has been negatived by the learned District Judge. 12. I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. Under Ex. P dated 9th July 1953 the appellant can at the most be considered to have obtained only transfer from plaintiffs 1 to a 14 of their undivided interest in the tarwad properties. 12. I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. Under Ex. P dated 9th July 1953 the appellant can at the most be considered to have obtained only transfer from plaintiffs 1 to a 14 of their undivided interest in the tarwad properties. As the law stands at present, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Antherman v. Kannan 1960 K.L.T. 1313, is to the effect that it is not open to members of a Marumakkathayam tarwad to transfer their undivided interest in favour of third parties. If that is so Ex. P will not at all create any right in favour of the appellant. The agreement will at the most only mean that if plaintiffs 1 to 14 obtain a decree in the suit in their favour, they will convey the same in favour of the appellant 15th plaintiff. And that again is dependent upon plaintiffs 1 to 14 ultimately establishing their claim for partition of the tarwad properties in the present suit and obtaining a decree on the basis of the said claim being established. The mere circumstance that the plaintiffs 1 to 14 have made a request in the plaint that any properties that may be allotted to them in their favour in the partition decree may be put in the possession of the appellant 15th plaintiff, also does not advance the case of the appellant any further. The rights of the 15th plaintiff, are really dependent upon and in consequence of the establishing of the claim by plaintiffs 1 to 14 for partition of the tarwad properties and recognition of the same by the court. Therefore so long as that claim is not established, in my view the appeal filed by the 15th plaintiff alone will have to be dismissed as not being maintainable. 13. But I will also express my views on the other contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. In this connection it is necessary to advert to four provisions contained in the Travancore Ezhava Act, 1100 (Act III of 1100). Part VII of the Act deals with partition. Section 28 therein provides that except as provided therein no person shall claim or be compelled to divide from any other member of such person's own thavazhi. In this connection it is necessary to advert to four provisions contained in the Travancore Ezhava Act, 1100 (Act III of 1100). Part VII of the Act deals with partition. Section 28 therein provides that except as provided therein no person shall claim or be compelled to divide from any other member of such person's own thavazhi. Then again, it is seen that section 29 provides that no person shall claim or be compelled to divide from any other member of the thavazhi of such person's lineal ascendant in the female line during the lifetime of such lineal ascendant. As to who exactly may claim partition and when, is dealt with in section 30. That right is conferred only (a) after the death of the lineal ascendant, and (b) during the lifetime of the lineal ascendant but with her consent. Even that right for partition is hedged in by two conditions, namely those referred to in clauses (1) and (2) of section 30 which run as follows;. "30. * * * * (1) each collateral thavazhi represented by the majority of the adult members thereof, or (2) the male children or female children without issue of such lineal ascendant and who are not included in the thavazhi referred to in clause (1), may claim an outright partition of property over which the tarwad has the power of disposal. " Under these circumstances, the parties mentioned either in clause (1) or in clause (2) of section 30 may claim an outright partition of property over which the tarwad has the power of disposal. Section 31 of the Act is really a consequential section providing for the manner in which the shares are to be computed, depending upon whether partition is asked for under clause (1) or under clause (2) of section 30. I do not think it necessary to consider this particular provision, viz., section 31, for the purposes of this appeal, because when once the claim for partition is recognised under clause (1) or clause (2) of section 30 the question as to how exactly the shares are to be arrived at is provided in sub-sections (1) and (2) respectively of section 31. 14. It will be seen that unless the plaintiffs 1 to 14 come under clause (1) or clause (2) of section 30 of the Act the present suit for partition should be held to be not maintainable. 14. It will be seen that unless the plaintiffs 1 to 14 come under clause (1) or clause (2) of section 30 of the Act the present suit for partition should be held to be not maintainable. There is no controversy in this case that the lineal ascendant referred to in section 29 is dead. therefore the question of obtaining her consent no longer arises in this case, and the condition precedent for instituting a suit for partition or a claim for partition is present in this case. But the question is whether plaintiffs 1 to 14, when they asked for partition, would come either under clause (1) or clause (2) of section 30 of the Ezhava Act. 15. No doubt Mr. Gopalakrishnan Potti, learned counsel for the appellant attempted to make out that his client's claim will come under clause (2) of section 30. But I do not think that that provision will come into play at all because in this case there is no controversy that plaintiffs 1 to 14 and defendants 5 and 6 form part of the members of the thavazhi of Kutti Kochu Pennu and therefore there is no question in this case of any male children or female children without issue of the lineal ascendant and who are not included in the thavazhy referred to in clause (1) of section 30 asking for partition. Therefore the application of clause (2) of section 30 of the Act, in my view, stands completely eliminated. 16. Then the question is whether in this case plaintiffs 1 to 14 can be considered to have asked for partition as coming within clause (1) of section 30. Section 30 clause (1) has already been quoted in the earlier portion of this judgment. According to Mr. Gopalakrishnan Potti learned counsel for the appellant notwithstanding the waiver to which I will refer presently, even a partition by metes and bounds claiming individual shares in plaintiffs 1 to 14, inasmuch as they represent the majority of the adult members of the thavazhi of Kutti Kochu Pennu, is maintainable under clause (1) of section 30. Mr. Viswanatha Iyer learned counsel for the contesting respondent pointed out that such an interpretation will be doing violence to the provisions of the Act. Mr. Viswanatha Iyer learned counsel for the contesting respondent pointed out that such an interpretation will be doing violence to the provisions of the Act. And if reference is made to section 31(1), wherein the computation of the shares on partition when action taken under section 30 clause (1) is dealt with, it will be clearly seen, the learned counsel pointed out, that the partition that is contemplated under section 30 clause (1) partition of a thavazhi as such from the tarwad, and not of individual members of the thavazhi who have not separated from the thavazhi as such. That is, according to Mr. Viswanatha Iyer, the right that is given is the right of the majority of the adult members of the thavazhi asking for a partition on behalf of the thavazhi under section 30 clause (1). In my view section 30 clause (1) giving a right to partition read along with the provision regarding the computation of the shares as provided in section 31 (1) is in accordance with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. 17. Then the question is whether the decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in Gopala Panicken v. Kunji and relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, has any application to the facts of the present case. In the said Full Bench decision, it is seen that a suit for partition under the Travancore Ezhava Act, III of 1100, was no doubt brought by a few of the members only of a particular thavazhi; and objection was taken by some of the defendants that the suit was not maintainable in view of the restrictive nature of the right to partition recognised under the statute. Sankaran, J., (as he then was), delivering judgment on behalf of the Full Bench, has considered the material provisions of the Ezhava Act, particularly sections 28, 29, 30 and 31 to which I have made reference earlier in this judgment. The learned Judge in that case has ultimately held that notwithstanding the fact that objection regarding the maintainability of the suit based upon these provisions was taken in the written statement, ultimately during the course of the argument, that contention was not pressed and it was actually given up. The learned Judge in that case has ultimately held that notwithstanding the fact that objection regarding the maintainability of the suit based upon these provisions was taken in the written statement, ultimately during the course of the argument, that contention was not pressed and it was actually given up. As to how far a legal contention can be given up by learned counsel, is dealt with by the learned Judge in the latter part of the judgment. But so far as the point that arose for decision was concerned, the learned Judge expresses the view that if a claim for partition is by members falling under any of the categories mentioned in section 30 clauses (1) and (2) of the Act, then such a claim cannot be successfully resisted by the other members of the tarwad or thavazhi, as the case may be. The learned Judge also states that the right to compel a partition and thus to go out of the tarwad or the thavazhi is conferred on the members of Ezhava tarwad, only to the limited extent indicated in section 30 of the Act. But the learned Judge says that where the claim for partition falls outside the categories mentioned in section 30, then there is a right in the other members of the tarwad, who are interested in maintaining the integrity of the tarwad, to oppose and defeat the claim for compulsory partition, because that right is a personal right available to the members of the tarwad and it is open to them to assert that rights or to waive it. The point to be noted in this connection is that the learned Judge, after recognising that personal right in the members of the tarwad to resist a claim for partition falling outside the categories mentioned in section 30, also expresses the view that notwithstanding the right to oppose, it is open to the "members to waive such" right, that is, it is open to them not to raise any such objection and recognise the right of persons who may not strictly come under section 30 of the Act to claim partition. But the learned Judge further says that where no such objection is taken at all by persons entitled to raise such objection, it is not necessary that the court should go into the question of the maintainability of the claim for partition inasmuch as sections 28 to 30 do not impose any restriction on the jurisdiction of the court to entertain a suit for partition by members of an Ezhava tarwad. The learned Judge again emphasises that the restrictions and limitations imposed by the section are only on the right of such members to compel, a partition against the will of the other members of the tarwad. And the learned Judge winds up the discussion on this aspect by saying that there is nothing in the Act itself to prevent partition being effected among the members of an Ezhava tarwad with the consent of all the members of that tarwad, even though the persons who claim partition may not strictly come under section 30, and the court also can pass a decree for partition under those circumstances if no objection or opposition is made to such claim. In that particular case the learned Judge later on in the judgment refers to the fact that notwithstanding the fact that a plea was specifically raised in the written statement regarding the maintainability of the suit for partition as being opposed to section 30 of the Travancore Ezhava Act, nevertheless the learned Judge proceeds to state that during the course of the argument that plea was specifically given up by counsel. The trial court no doubt overruled the objection regarding the maintainability of the suit; but the lower appellate court appears to have recognised the fact that the suit as framed was defective, but in view of certain supervening circumstances held that the suit is maintainable. In Second appeal before this Court, a contention was taken that the decree passed by the court recognising the claim for partition contrary to the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act, is totally null and void. In Second appeal before this Court, a contention was taken that the decree passed by the court recognising the claim for partition contrary to the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act, is totally null and void. That contention was not accepted By the learned Judges, because the learned Judges after considering the scheme of the statute and the purpose sought to be served by the particular provisions, ultimately came to the conclusion that even though the suit was instituted by persons who come outside the class of persons mentioned in section 30 clause (1) or section 30 clause (2) of the Act, it is nevertheless open to the other members of the tarwad not to raise any objection or even waive their objection. 18. In the present case Mr. Gopalakrishnan Potti learned counsel for the appellant stressed that the 6th defendant, who is a member of the thavazhi to which plaintiffs 1 to 14 belong, did not raise any specific contention in his written statement disputing the claim of the plaintiffs based upon the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act. No doubt to this limited extent the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is well-founded because there is . no reference in the written statement to any provisions of the Ezhava Act or the suit being hit by any provision of the said Act. But the 6th defendant makes a very significant statement in the written statement filed by him, at any rate before he was set exparte, to the effect that plaintiffs 1 to 14 have no right to demand any share in the suit properties and that they cannot ask for the share of the 6th defendant. The 6th defendant has also categorically stated that he does not want his share to be worked in the present partition suit. Then coming to the 3rd defendant it is seen that as pointed out by Mr. Gopalakrishnan Potti, learned counsel for the appellant, he has also not taken any specific plea based upon the provisions of the Ezhava Act. There is no doubt a general plea raised by him to the effect that the suit is not maintainable. But as pointed out by Mr. Gopalakrishnan Potti, learned counsel for the appellant, he has also not taken any specific plea based upon the provisions of the Ezhava Act. There is no doubt a general plea raised by him to the effect that the suit is not maintainable. But as pointed out by Mr. Viswanatha Iyer, learned counsel for the respondent, this is not a case where a plea was taken and later abandoned by a party or his counsel, as was the case in the decision of the Full Bench referred to above. Mr. Viswanatha Iyer referred to the denial of the plaintiffs' claim for partition contained in paragraph 14 of the written statement of the 3rd defendant, The learned counsel also urged that it is clear from the judgment of the lower court that the bar based upon the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act loomed large and that is why the learned District Judge has adverted to the material provisions of the Act and ultimately came to a conclusion that under section 30 of the Travancore Ezhava Act the suit filed by the plaintiffs will have to be dismissed. 19. In my view the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there has been a waiver of the plea based upon the bar provided for in the material provisions contained in the Travancore Ezhava Act and therefore the trial court committed an error in considering such a claim made on behalf of the respondent, cannot certainly be accepted. No doubt, as mentioned already, a specific plea based on and referring to the provisions of the Ezhava Act, is not to be seen in the written statement, either of the 3rd defendant or the 6th defendant; but objection was taken to the maintainability of the suit by plaintiffs alone as will be seen from the discussion by the learned District Judge of the material provisions contained in the Act. Therefore there is no question in this case of waiver at all. The only question that now arises will be as to whether the view of the learned District Judge that the suit is barred under section 30 of the Travancore Ezhava Act is correct or not. So far as that is concerned I have already indicated that Mr. Therefore there is no question in this case of waiver at all. The only question that now arises will be as to whether the view of the learned District Judge that the suit is barred under section 30 of the Travancore Ezhava Act is correct or not. So far as that is concerned I have already indicated that Mr. Gopalakrishnan Potti, learned counsel for the appellant made an attempt to satisfy this court that his client's claim will come at any rate under clause (2) of section 30 of the Act. I have already indicated that clause (2) of section 30 stands eliminated in this case. 20. Then the question is whether the provisions of clause (1) of section 30 of the Ezhava Act are satisfied in the suit filed by the plaintiffs 1 to 14 along with the assignee, the 15th plaintiff. So far as that is concerned a perusal of section 30 clause (1) clearly shows that the statute recognises a right of partition not of the individual sharers even by a majority of each collateral thavazhi, but of the majority of the adult members of a particular thavazhi asking for partition in the share of the thavazhi as such. In this case admittedly defendants 5 and 6 are also members of the thavazhi to which plaintiffs 1 to 4 belong, and they have not admittedly asked for partition of their shares, in which case at least it could be held that this is a suit by a majority of the adult members of a collateral thavazhi seeking partition of the thavazhi's share from the main tarwad. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the view of the learned District Judge that the suit is not maintainable is erroneous, cannot be accepted. 21. In view of the fact that I accept the conclusions arrived at by the learned District Judge on the major aspect, I do not think it necessary to go into the other findings recorded by the learned Judge on the minor aspects. Because, if I accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit is maintainable, quite naturally the suit will have to be remanded for fresh consideration of all the other points especially the claim that has been made by the 3rd defendant. Because, if I accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit is maintainable, quite naturally the suit will have to be remanded for fresh consideration of all the other points especially the claim that has been made by the 3rd defendant. That question does not arise, and I have already indicated that apart from the fact that the maintainability of the suit by plaintiffs 1 to 14 is hit by the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act, the appeal filed by the 15th plaintiff alone is absolutely incompetent and will have to be rejected even on that ground. 22. For all these reasons it follows that the appeal fails and stands dismissed with costs of the contesting 3rd respondent.