JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - These thirty-nine writ petitions challenge proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition of land in various villages adjacent to Ghaziabad (district Meerut) for the development of an industrial area through the agency of the U.P. State Industrial Corporation. 2. A notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 16-7-1960 and published in the U.P. Gazette on 23-7-1960, declaring that a large tract of land (said to comprise thirty-four thousand acres) in the vicinity of Ghaziabad was likely to be needed for a public purpose described as "planned development of the area," and by the same notification objections were invited from all persons interested in the said land in accordance with Sec. 5-A of the Act. Subsequently, on 9-2-1962, that original notification under Sec. 4 was modified by means of a further notification, declaring that only a certain portion (said to amount to about six thousand acres) of the area originally notified was needed and cancelling the original notification in so far as it related to the remaining area. All the plots involved in the present thirty-nine petitions are covered by this notification under Sec. 4 dated 16-7-1960, as modified by the subsequent notification of 6-2-1962. 3. In continuation of the aforementioned notification under Sec. 4 number of separate notifications have been issued under Sec. 6 of the Act. The first, was issued on 23-12-1961, declaring that certain plots were needed "for planned development of the land through the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad, for the construction of shopping centre, residential buildings, roads, drains etc."; but none of the plots involved in the present petitions was affected by that notification. The notifications under Sec. 6 affecting these plots came later and are three in number. One notification under 6, which was issued on 20-5-1962 and published in the U.P. Gazette on 26-5-62, covered the land involved in seventeen of the petitions (Nos. 1911, 1912, 1939, 1971, 1975, 1987, 1993, 1994, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2079, 2083, 2087, 2109, 2113 and 2173 of 1962). This merely declared that the plots in question were needed for public purpose, namely "planned development of the area"; and it omitted to mention that any part of the compensation would be paid out of State revenues. 4. 1911, 1912, 1939, 1971, 1975, 1987, 1993, 1994, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2079, 2083, 2087, 2109, 2113 and 2173 of 1962). This merely declared that the plots in question were needed for public purpose, namely "planned development of the area"; and it omitted to mention that any part of the compensation would be paid out of State revenues. 4. Two further notifications under Sec. 6, one issued on 7-9-1962 (published the same day) and the other on 1-11-1962 (published on 3-11-1962), covered the land involved in the remaining petitions. Both these notifications specified the purpose for which the land was required as planned development of the land through the U.P. State Industrial Corporation Limited for the purpose of the establishment of industries"; and both notifications further mentioned that compensation for the acquisition of land would be partly paid out of the revenues of the State. Twenty of the present petitions (Nos. 2855, 2889, 2913 to 2915, 2930, 2977 to 2981, 3274 to 3277, 3279 to 3281, 3381, 3413 of 1962) challenge the Sec. 6 notification of 7-9-1962: one petition (No. 3594 of 1962) is directed against the notification of 1-11-1962; and one petition (No. 1902 of 1963) is directed against both these notifications. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the various petitioners have advanced a number of arguments, which may be set forth as follows:- 1. Piece-meal notification under Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is illegal. Only one notification under Sec. 6 can be issued in pursuance of a single notification under Sec. 4 of the Act; and consequently the notification issued in the present case under Sec. 4 on 16-7-1960 was exhausted when the first notification under Sec. 6 was issued on 23-12-1961, with the result that all the three subsequent notification under Sec. 6 affecting the land involved in the present petitions were void and inoperative. 2. The notification under Sec. 4 of the Act, which declared that the land was likely to be needed for a "public purpose" described as "planned development of the area," was too vague and afforded no adequate basis for the lodging of objections under Sec. 5-A. 3. 2. The notification under Sec. 4 of the Act, which declared that the land was likely to be needed for a "public purpose" described as "planned development of the area," was too vague and afforded no adequate basis for the lodging of objections under Sec. 5-A. 3. The public purpose specified in the notifications under Sec. 6, viz., "planned development of the area" in the notification of 20-5-1962 and "planned development of the land through the U.P. State Industrial Corporation for the purpose of the establishment of industries" in the notifications of 7-9-1962 and 1-11-1962, was bad in law, firstly because the purpose specified was not a public purpose at all and secondly because there was no sufficient compliance with the requirements of Cl. (2) of Sec. 6 of the Act. 4. The notification under Sec. 6 that was issued on 20-5-1962 is bad because it contains no mention that part of the compensation is to be paid from State funds, although the acquisition was for the State Industrial Corporation, which falls within the definition of company given in Sec. 3(e) of the Act. And even if there was a subsequent decision by the Government to pay part of the compensation out of public revenues, that would not suffice to regularise the said notification, because the proviso to sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 6 implies that the decision must precede the issue of the notification. 5. Since the U.P. Regulation of Building Operations Act has been applied to Ghaziabad ever since 1958 and the plots involved in the present petitions fall within the "regulated area" established under that Act, all planned development in the area must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of that Act and it is not open to Government to resort to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for such development. 6. The first point raised on behalf of the petitioners, namely the question of the legality of piece-meal notification under Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, is crucial for the decision of all these petitions. 6. The first point raised on behalf of the petitioners, namely the question of the legality of piece-meal notification under Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, is crucial for the decision of all these petitions. As already pointed out, all the plots involved in these petitions were covered by a single notification under Sec. 4 issued on 16-7-1960 (as modified by the subsequent notification of 6-2-1962); but instead of issuing a single notification under Sec. 6 in pursuance of that, the State Government chose to issue a series of notifications under Sec. 6, starting with one issued on 23-12-1961 (not affecting the land involved in the present petitions), followed by three more notification issued on 20-5-1962, 7-9-1962 and 11-11-1962, (which are the ones challenged in these petitions). If, therefore, it is held that the Land Acquisition Act contemplates the issue of only a single notification under Sec. 6 in pursuance of a single notification under Sec. 4, all the notifications under Sec. 6 challenged in the present petitions will be invalid and the acquisition of all the plots involved in these petitions will be illegal. 7. Mr. S.N. Kacker, who has appeared on behalf of the U.P. State Industrial Corporation, contends that in the absence of any specific provision in the Land Acquisition Act to the contrary there is nothing illegal in issuing separate notifications under Sec. 6 of the Act in respect of different parcels of land, which are covered by a single notification under Sec. 4 of the Act; but he has not been able to cite any judicial pronouncement in support of this view. The cases to which he has drawn our attention R. C. Sen v. Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta, AIR 1921 Calcutta 340 and Corporation of Calcutta v. Omeda Khatun Bewa, AIR 1956 Calcutta 122, are clearly irrelevant for they deal with the entirely different question of whether piece-meal awards can be made in pursuance of a single notification under Sec. 6. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. S.C. Khare, who has argued on behalf of the petitioners, contends on the other hand that the procedure that has been adopted in the present cases violates the basic scheme and purpose of the Land Acquisition Act, which, he argues, was never intended to permit vast tracts of land to be reserved under Sec. 4 so that later on acquisition may be carried out therein in a piecemeal fashion, whenever the State Government sees fit to make up its mind about the necessity for taking over any particular portion of the land covered by the initial notification; and in support of his argument he places particular reliance on two Division Bench decisions, which deal directly with the point in issue, namely Vishnu Prasad Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1962 M.P. 270 and State of Bihar v. Tulsi Ram Tibriwala, A.I.R. 1964 Patna 568. 9. In the Madhya Pradesh case a notification had been issued under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in the year 1949 declaring that certain plots in various villages were likely to be needed for the erection of an iron and steel plant; and in 1956 some land was acquired in one of those villages for this purpose. Subsequently in 1960 a fresh notification was issued under Sec. 6 of the Act proposing to acquire further area in the same village. The learned Judges held that the issue of the later notification under Sec. 6 was inherently unfair, especially as the petitioners were being offered compensation in 1960 at the rates prevailing in the year 1949. It was pointed out that the Land Acquisition Act, being an ex-proprietary enactment, had to be interpreted and implemented very strictly within its own terms and in furtherance of its object"; and it was held that the Act could not be construed as conferring powers on the Government to acquire land at any time it liked after the issue of a notification under Sec. 4. The learned Judges observed: "If the framers of the Act are to be understood to confer powers on the Government to acquire land at any time, the State Government may well issue today a notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act stating therein that land in the whole of the State is needed or is likely to be needed for public purpose and then go on merrily acquiring lands anywhere and in any quantity thereafter till the dooms day at the price prevailing on the date of notification. We do not think it will be fair and correct to scribe such an intention to the framers of the law." 10. The proceedings for acquisition of the petitioners lands under the Sec. 6 notification for 1960 were therefore quashed. 11. In the Patna case a notification was issued under Sec. 4 in the year 1945, declaring that the land in a certain village was likely to be needed for an ammonium sulphate factory and allied industries, together with a power Station and employees quarters, road, etc. required in connection therewith. A notification under Sec. 6 was issued in 1946 and various plots in the said village were duly acquired. Later on in 1951 a second notification under Sec. 6 (based on the same notification under Sec. 4 that had been issued in the year 1945) was published declaring that further land in the village was needed for the construction of a Mechanical and Electrical College. The learned Judges agreed with the view taken in the earlier decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, that exproprietary laws like the land Acquisition Act had to be interpreted and implemented very strictly, and held that the proceedings taken under the second notification issued under Sec. 6 were inherently unfair, inasmuch as the land was being acquired when a considerable period had elapsed after the issue of the initial notification under Sec. 4. They further remarked: "A comparison of the language of Sec. 4. and Sec. 6 shows how Sec. 4(1) really fructifies itself in Sec. 6 ....... In short, by the time that stage is reached when the declaration provided in Sec. 6 is made, the notification under Sec. 4(1) has fully worked itself out; its avowed purpose has been achieved in so far as in pursuance of it the particular land needed has been picked and marked out. In short, by the time that stage is reached when the declaration provided in Sec. 6 is made, the notification under Sec. 4(1) has fully worked itself out; its avowed purpose has been achieved in so far as in pursuance of it the particular land needed has been picked and marked out. In this view of the matter it cannot but be said that upon the making of the declaration under Sec. 6 the notification issued under Sec. 4(1) has lost all meaning and purpose and has exhausted itself." 12. It was further pointed out that one of the main purposes of the notification under Sec. 4 was to give persons interested an opportunity to lodge objections under Sec. 5-A of the Act; and the learned Judges held that when the Government gave its decision on the objections under sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 5-A the purpose of the notification under Sec. 4 must be deemed to have been fulfilled. They went on to observe: "It is quite clear to me that the decision once taken under Sec. 5-A could hardly be cancelled or altered, and, once a decision has been taken in favour of the objector, it was no longer possible to make another declaration in respect of further lands, because quite obviously that would amount to setting aside the decision under Sec. 5-A, which the Act says shall be final. It will follow that if only a portion of the area notified under Sec. 4(1) was sought to be acquired, as was done in the instant case by the declaration of the year 1946, it must be construed that objections to the rest of the area notified were accepted, otherwise the declaration made in 1946 would have included large area that it did ..." 13. Having given the matter our earnest consideration, we find ourselves in general agreement with the conclusions reached in the two cases cited, though we must confess that we do not see eye to eye with the learned Judges of the Madhya Pradesh and Patna High Courts in respect of all the arguments relied upon by them. Having given the matter our earnest consideration, we find ourselves in general agreement with the conclusions reached in the two cases cited, though we must confess that we do not see eye to eye with the learned Judges of the Madhya Pradesh and Patna High Courts in respect of all the arguments relied upon by them. In particular it seems to us that the question of delay is largely irrelevant; for in our opinion a notification under Sec. 4 (which is nothing more than a tentative declaration of the likelihood of acquisition and not a firm decision to acquire) may become inoperative if an unreasonable time is allowed to elapse before any action is taken under Sec. 6, quite irrespective of whether several notifications are issued under Sec. 6 or only a single notification. But we agree that an enactment like the Land Acquisition Act, that deprives persons of their property, must be interpreted and implemented very strictly, and we see that on a close reading of the provisions of the Act the conclusion is unescapable that piece-meal notifications under Sec. 6 in pursuance of a single notification under Sec. 4 are ruled out. We base this conclusion on the unambiguous wording of Sec. 5-A. When a notification under Sec. 4 is issued, all persons interested in any portion of the land covered by that notification are entitled to lodge objections under Sec. 5-A sub-Sec. (2) of which runs as follows: "(2) Every objection under sub-Sec. (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, submit the case for the decision of the appropriate Government, together with the record of the proceedings held by him and a report captaining his recommendations on the objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final." (italicised by us). 14. And under Sec. 6 the Government is empowered to issue a declaration that some particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company only after it has considered the report, if any, made under Sec. 5-A (2). The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final." (italicised by us). 14. And under Sec. 6 the Government is empowered to issue a declaration that some particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company only after it has considered the report, if any, made under Sec. 5-A (2). That report as is clear from the words used in Sec. 5-A (2), can only be made after hearing all the objections that are filed by the persons interested in any part of the entire land covered by the notification under Sec. 4. It is not open to the Government, therefore, first of all to take up and dispose of the objections relating to one portion of the land and issue a notification under Sec. 6 in respect of that particular land and then subsequently to go on to consider the objections relating to another part of the area covered by the notification under Sec. 4 and later on to issue a separate notification under Sec. 6 in respect thereto. But this is precisely what has been done in the present case. Objections regarding the acquisition of the plots in respect of which the notification under Sec. 6 was issued on 20-5-1962 were heard in the month of April 1962 (vide the averments in the counter affidavits filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in writ petitions Nos. 2003 and 2113 for 1962); and those relating to the plots affected by the Sec. 6 notifications of 7-9-1962 and 1-11-1962 were heard in July 1962 (vide the counter-affidavits of the Naib Tahsildar in writ petitions Nos. 2855 and 3584 of 1962). Thus the State Government, in pursuance of the single notification under Sec. 4 dated 16-7-1960, issued its first notification under Sec. 6 on 23-12-1961, presumably after deciding some objections under Sec. 5-A then in April 1962 dealt with further objections and issued another notification under Sec. 6 on 20-5-1963, and then in July 1962 disposed of yet more objections, where after it issued two more notifications under Sec. 6 on 7-9-1962 and 1-11-1962. We are satisfied that such a procedure was never contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act and indeed runs counter to the scheme of the Act as set forth in Sec. 4, 5-A and 6; and consequently the notifications dated 20-5-1962, 7.9.1962, and 1-11-1962, impugned in the present petitions, were invalid and illegal. 15. Mr. Kacker has attempted to salvage the first of the three impugned notifications under Sec. 6, i.e., the one issued on 20-5-1962, by arguing that the notification issued on 9-2-1962, modifying the original notification of 16-7-1960 under Sec. 4, should be treated as a fresh notification under Sec. 4. His contention is that even if the earlier notification under Sec. 6 that was issued on 23-12-1961 be deemed to exhaust the original notification under Sec.4 dated 16-7-1960, the subsequent notification dated 9-2-1962 would provide sufficient legal basis for at least one further notification under Sec. 6 before it in its turn became exhausted. But this argument to our mind does not correctly interpret the meaning of the notification of 9-2-1962. That notification reads as follows: "In partial modification of Government notification No. 213-H/ XXXVI1-50 (26)-H-59 dated July 16, 1960 published on page 1110 of the U.P. Gazette (part 1), dated July 23, 1960 and in exercise of the powers under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act: 1894 (Act 1 of 1894) read with Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act X of 1897), the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to notify for General information that out of the land notified in the aforesaid notification as being needed for the public purpose mentioned therein, only that land as is specified in the Schedule below is needed for the public purpose and to cancel the said notification in so far as it relates to the land not mentioned in the Schedule below . . . ." 16. This, it is clear, was never intended to be an independent notification under Sec. 4 of the Act. It is significant that it does not invite objections from persons interested in the land under Sec. 5-A, but presumably relies on the invitation given by the original notification of 16-7-1960 as constituting sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law in this connection. It is significant that it does not invite objections from persons interested in the land under Sec. 5-A, but presumably relies on the invitation given by the original notification of 16-7-1960 as constituting sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law in this connection. It is further to be noted that this notification of 9-2-1962 expressly cancels the earlier notification of 16-7-1960 as regards land that was found to be no longer needed, but allows that earlier notification to stand so far as the specific plots enumerated in the later notification are concerned. We are satisfied that this notification of 9-2-1962 was never intended to be treated as an independent notification under Sec. 4, but merely served the purpose of restricting the scope of the earlier notification under that section. 17. Furthermore, it seems to us that even if the notification dated 9-2-1962 were to be treated as a fresh and independent notification under Sec. 4, the notification issued under Sec. 6 on 20-5-1962 could not be saved thereby. Before a valid notification can be issued under Sec. 6, the State Government has to dispose of all the objections filed under Sec. 5-A; and this was admittedly not done, since some objections were left to be disposed of in July, 1962. 18. Our conclusion therefore is that all the three notifications, under Sec. 6 that have been challenged in these petitions are invalid. That being the case, the petitions must obviously succeed and we do not think it necessary to deal with the remaining arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners. All thirty nine of these petitions are allowed with costs, the impugned notifications under Sec. 6 dated 20-5-1962, 7.9.1962 and 1.11.1962 being quashed. Petitions allowed.