JUDGMENT :- This appeal purports to be an Execution First Appeal by decree-holders. The appeal is directed against an order of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Agra, allowing an objection under O. XXI, R. 36, C.P.C., and S. 151, C.P.C. 2. The dispute between the parties relates to certain premises at Agra. The building was jointly owned by Parma Nand, Smt. Kamla Devi and Basdeo. Parma Nand and Smt. Kamla Devi owned one-half share in the premises; while the other one-half share was owned by Basdeo. Parma Nand and Smt. Kamla Devi mortgaged their one-half share with Kanhaiya Lal and Darka Prasad. They executed a rent note in favour of the mortgagees. The mortgagees filed suit No. 13 of 1954 to recover arrears of rent from Parma Nand and Smt. Kamla Devi, and for partition of one-half share in the premises. The suit was decreed in 1956. Basdeo died. His sons and daughters applied for execution of the partition decree by separating their one-half share in the premises. There was request for erection of a partition wall for this purpose. Dharam Chand filed the objection under O. XXI, R. 36 on the ground that he was tenant of a portion of the building, and he could not be disturbed. That objection was allowed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Agra. He directed that execution must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of O. 21, R. 36, C.P.C. 3. Mr. S.D. Agarwala appearing for the respondent No. 1 raised a preliminary objection that the order, dated 29-3-1962 is not appealable. He pointed out that an order under O. XXI, R. 36, C.P.C. has not been made appealable under O. 43 of the C.P.C. On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Kirty appearing for the appellants urged that the impugned order amounted to a decision under S. 47, C.P.C., and was, therefore, appealable as a decree. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain whether the impugned order amounts to a determination of a question under S. 47, C.P.C. Sub-Section (1) of S. 47, C.P.C. states :- "All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree. The matter decided by the lower Court certainly related to the execution of a decree. The matter decided by the lower Court certainly related to the execution of a decree. The question remains whether that was a matter between parties to the decree or their representatives. It was conceded for the appellants that Dharam Chand was not a party to suit No. 13 of 1954. But Mr. A.K. Kirty urged that since Dharam Chand claims to be a tenant, he must be deemed to be a representative of one of the parties. The suit was filed in the year 1954. The evidence on the record indicates that Dharam Chand was in possession as a tenant at least from the year 1951. Thus, his tenancy was prior to the institution of suit No. 13 of 1954. 4. Under S. 47, C.P.C. the term "representative" includes a transferee of the interest of a party whether by assignment, succession or Otherwise, if that party is bound by the decree. Where the transfer is made by a party before the institution of the suit, the transferee cannot be deemed to be a representative of the party for purposes of S. 47, C.P.C. 5. In Rashbehary Mookhopadhya v. Maharani Surnomoyee, ILR 7 Cal 403, the holders of a taluq hypothecated certain property as security for rent. A decree for rent was obtained Prior to attachment the taluqdars transferred their interest in eight annas of the property to A. When the decree-holder attempted to execute the rent decree, an objection was filed by A. That objection was disallowed. It was held that no appeal lay from the order disallowing the objection, as A could not be considered to be a 'representative' of the taluqdars within the meaning of S. 244 of the C.P.C., and he was, therefore, debarred from appealing under Ss. 278 and 283. It is true that that case was decided under the old Code of Civil Procedure. But the principle applies to the present Code also. 6. We have seen that the decree was passed in suit No. 13 of 1954. Dharam Chand's claim as a tenant dates from a period before 1954. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dharam Chand is a representative of one of the parties to the decree. A dispute between certain parties to the decree and Dharam Chand cannot be said to be a dispute between parties and their legal representatives. Dharam Chand's claim as a tenant dates from a period before 1954. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dharam Chand is a representative of one of the parties to the decree. A dispute between certain parties to the decree and Dharam Chand cannot be said to be a dispute between parties and their legal representatives. This was not a determination of a question under S. 47, C.P.C. I uphold the preliminary objection, and hold that the impugned order, dated 29-3-1962 was not appealable as a decree. 7. Even on merits, I do not think that the lower Court was wrong. Before the learned Civil judge there was some controversy as to whether Dharam Chand was a tenant at all. But this point was not seriously pressed before me. We may take it that Dharam Chand occupied the shop for a number of years as a tenant. Mr. Kirty suggested that Dharam Chand might be a tenant of Parma Nand or Dwarka Prasad, but was not a tenant of Basdeo, who was the predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants. Dharam Chand filed certain receipts (Exs. 3 to 6). These receipts indicate payment of rent to Parma Nand. It may be that rent was paid to Parma Nand. But that circumstance by itself does not establish some separate agreement between Parma Nand and Dharam Chand. Dharam Chand's case went before the Rent Control Officer, Agra, on a number of occasions. Dharam Chand's status as a tenant appears to have been upheld by the authorities. Before 1954 the property was jointly owned by all the co-sharers. Considering that Dharam Chand occupied the shop as a tenant for about 10 years without any objection by Basdeo, it may be assumed that Dharam Chand remained on the premises as a tenant on behalf of all the co-sharers. 8. Order XXI, R. 36, C.P.C. provides for delivery of immovable property under a decree when such property is in the possession of a tenant. 8. Order XXI, R. 36, C.P.C. provides for delivery of immovable property under a decree when such property is in the possession of a tenant. Order XXI, R. 36 states :- "Where a decree is for the delivery of any immovable property in the occupancy of a tenant or other person entitled to occupy the same and not bound by the decree to relinquish such occupancy, the Court shall order delivery to be made by affixing a copy of the warrant in some conspicuous place on the property, and proclaiming to the occupant by beat of drum or other customary mode, at some convenient place, the substance of the decree in regard to the property." 9. Mr. A.K. Kirty advanced several grounds in support of his contention that the present case is not governed by O. XXI, R. 36, C.P.C. He pointed out that R. 36 makes no mention about a decree for partition. He urged that a decree for partition has to be executed whether there is a tenant on the premises or not. It is true that R. 36 makes no reference to a decree for partition. But a decree for partition of immovable property is essentially a decree for the delivery of immovable property. 10. In Ram Sarup v. Chanan Singh, AIR 1964 Punj 525, it was held that when land is jointly owned, but leased out by one of the co-sharers, and the other co-sharer obtains a decree for partition, the tenant can be ejected in execution. In that case the lease had been executed by one of several co-sharers. In the present case there is reason for believing that Dharam Chand occupied the premises as a tenant on behalf of all the co-sharers. Ram Sarup's case makes no reference to O. XXI, R. 36, C. P. C. 11. In Mt. Shamshunnissa v. Latafat Husain, AIR 1950 All 688 , the decree-holders applied for partition by erecting a wall. There were two tenants-Latafat Husain and Fayazan. They objected to the erection of such a partition wall. Sapru, J. overruled their objection, and held that execution had to be carried out in accordance with the decree. In that case the objectors were impleaded before the trial Court, but not in appeal. In the present case Dharam Chand objector was never a party to suit No. 13 of 1954. Sapru, J. overruled their objection, and held that execution had to be carried out in accordance with the decree. In that case the objectors were impleaded before the trial Court, but not in appeal. In the present case Dharam Chand objector was never a party to suit No. 13 of 1954. The decision in Shamshunnissa's case largely rested on the proposition that the executing Court could not go behind the decree. There was no discussion under O. XXI, R. 36, C.P.C. 12. In order to get the advantage of O. XXI, R. 36, C.P.C., the tenant has to establish three points :- (1) The decree is for the delivery of immovable property; (2) The premises are in the occupancy of a tenant entitled to occupy the same; (3) He is not bound by the decree to relinquish such occupancy 13. In the present case we are dealing with a decree for partition of immovable property. Such a decree is in substance a decree for the delivery of immovable property. We have seen that the premises have been in the occupation of Dharam Chand objector as a tenant. Further, he is not bound by the decree passed in suit No. 13 of 1954. Thus Dharam Chand objector satisfied all the three tests laid down in the Rule. The learned Civil Judge was right in holding that execution had to proceed, as laid down in O. XXI, R. 36, C.P.C. 14. The appeal is dismissed with costs to respondent No. 1. Appeal dismissed.