JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenant's second appeal from the concurrent decisions of the courts below decreeing their ejectment from a shop. The plaintiff-respondents Sheikh Maqbool Hussain and others, alleged that they were the owners of this shop and the appellants had acquired the tenancy by inheritance from their ancestor. They further alleged that during his life time, the ancestor of the appellants had denied the plaintiffs title and consequently they terminated his tenancy. Meanwhile he died and the suit for ejectment was filed against the appellants who had acquired the tenancy by inheritance. The appellants resisted the suit and denied that the plaintiffs were the owners of the shop. Both the courts below have found that the plaintiffs are the owners. This is a finding of fact which concludes this part the dispute. 2. The defendant's ancestor denied the title of the plaintiffs and they were entitled to determine his tenancy and did so. After this he died. It is contended before me that the right to determine the tenancy lapsed with the death of the ancestor who was guilty of denying the appellant's title, and they cannot be held liable for what he did. I do not agree. The appellant's title was no better than that of their ancestor. They inherited the tenancy with all its liabilities. If a tenant renders himself liable to ejectment by denying his landlords title, his heir must take the tenancy subject to this liability. Learned counsel argued that it would be unfair to punish the appellants for the fault of the ancestor. The short answer to this plea is that the appellants title is derived from their ancestor and cannot be better than his. Moreover, the appellant's too denied the landlord's title in this suit, and there are no equitable considerations in 3. The appeal is without any merit and dismissed with costs. 4. The respondents have filed a cross-objection. It appears that the court below granted them compensation at the rate of rent as controlled under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Learned counsel for the respondent argues that the court below erred in taking into consideration the controlled rent. After hearing learned counsel for both sides I am of the opinion that this argument must prevail. The trial court had assessed the compensation due to the respondents at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month. Learned counsel for the respondent argues that the court below erred in taking into consideration the controlled rent. After hearing learned counsel for both sides I am of the opinion that this argument must prevail. The trial court had assessed the compensation due to the respondents at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month. The respondents had led evidence to show that similar shops in the same locality had been let out by other landlords at Rs. 14/- or 15/- per month. But the appellate Judge reduced the compensation to Rs. 1/4/- per month on the ground that the Control of Rent and Eviction Act applied to the accommodation and, therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim compensation at a rate higher than the controlled rent. He observed, "All that has to be seen is what amount of rent the plaintiffs could have obtained under the said law had the shop in suit been vacated." Accordingly he reduced the decree for compensation from Rs. 720/-. to Rs. 90/-. The learned Judge was in error. The U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act was passed "to control the letting and the rent" oil accommodation. It was enacted for the benefit of tenants, not trespassers. If a tenant occupies accommodation to which the Act applies he is entitled to all the remedies provided by the Act for the control or reduction of the rent, but if a trespasser occupies the same accommodation he is not entitled to plead that the compensation for use and occupation to be paid by him cannot be higher than the controlled rent. If the learned Judges argument is accepted, it will lead to the strange result that any trespasser can occupy an accommodation illegally on payment of no more than the controlled rent. The Act will become virtually a charter of immunity for trespassers and enable them to occupy accommodation at rates payable by lawful tenants. 5. The learned Judge observed that as a result of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act "the plaintiffs were debarred to claim and obtain rent more than Rs. The Act will become virtually a charter of immunity for trespassers and enable them to occupy accommodation at rates payable by lawful tenants. 5. The learned Judge observed that as a result of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act "the plaintiffs were debarred to claim and obtain rent more than Rs. 1/4/- per month." I am afraid he overlooked Sec. 5 (1) for the Act which provides, "Except as hereinafter provided in this Section, the rent payable for any accommodation to which this Act applies shall be such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant." Thus there is nothing to prevent the landlord from making an agreement with a tenant which would fetch him a rent higher than the controlled rent. 6. In my opinion, the assessment of compensation for use and occupation should be not on the basis of controlled rent but fair rent. What is fair rent is a question of fact to be decided on the circumstances of each case. If the controlled rent does not represent the fair rental value of the accommodation, mesne profits should be assessed at a higher value. Clifton Securities Ltd. v. Huntley, 1948 (2) All E.R. 283, Bhagwan Das v. Mst. Kokabai, AIR 1953 Nagpur 186 . 7. The next question is: What should be the fair amount of compensation due to the landlords in this case ? They led evidence, which was believed by the trial court to prove that similar shops in the locality were fetching rents from Rs. 12/-to Rs. 15/- per month, and the Court fixed mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month. I see no reason to alter the trial courts assessment. The plaintiffs served notice on the appellants that if they did not vacate the house they would have to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month. They defied this notice at their own risk. 8. I allow the cross-objection with costs and set aside the decree of the lower appellate court reducing the amount of mesne profits to Rs. 90/-and restore that of tire trial court. Cross objection allowed.