JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a second appeal by the Union of India (Department of Railways) from the concurrent decisions of the courts below decreeing the plaintiff-respondents 'suit for compensation for damages to goods caused in transit. The facts very briefly are these. 2. The plaintiff-respondent M/s Nathi Mal Mahabir Prasad is a joint Hindu family firm doing business at Etawah. On 26-7-53 a consignment of 200 bags of sugar was entrusted to the Railway at Ghughli station for delivery to the plaintiff firm at Etawah. The goods arrived at Etawah on 17th August 1953 in a damaged condition. On that very date the Station Master Etawah sent the following wireless message to the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Varanasi; "200 BAGS SUGAR CORRECT BUT ALL BAGS BADLY WET BY RAIN WATER. THREE BAGS SHORT. . . ." The Station Master did not issue the usual certificate of damages and shortage to the plaintiff firm till 27-9-1953. On that date he issued the prescribed certificate on a printed form that the extent of damage was Rs. 5/8/- per bag. On that very day the firm took delivery of the goods and removed them from the Railway Station. It then filed a claim for compensation under Sec. 77 of the Railways Act both for shortage of three bags and for damage to all the bags. On 19-5-54 the Chief Commercial Superintendent wrote to the firm that its claim for damages had been rejected because the Railway Claims Inspector had reported after enquiry that there was no loss on account of damage. But he conceded that there was loss due to shortage and remitted a sum of Rs. 26/11/- "on account of shortage" in full and final settlement of the plaintiffs claim. Thereupon the plaintiff firm filed this suit or the recovery of Rs. 1,100/- as compensation for loss suffered by it due to the damage to the goods in transit. It alleged that this damage was caused by the gross negligence of the Railway. 3. The Railway resisted the suit and raised a number of pleas some of which were of a purely technical nature. It denied all liability and pleaded that the damage to the goods was not caused by any negligence of the Railway. It pleaded in the alternative that the plaintiff firm was not entitled to any compensation as it had accepted a sum of Rs. It denied all liability and pleaded that the damage to the goods was not caused by any negligence of the Railway. It pleaded in the alternative that the plaintiff firm was not entitled to any compensation as it had accepted a sum of Rs. 26/11/- in full and final settlement in its entire claim. It also pleaded that the suit itself was incompetent as it could not have been filed in the name of the firm which was not a legal person. It also contended that as the consignment had been handled by two different Railways, the Northern and the North Eastern, the latter was not liable as the loss had occurred while the goods were in the custody of the Northern Railway. Finally it contended that the damages were not at the rate of Rs. 5/8/- per bag but Re. 1/- per bag. The trial court held that the goods had been damaged as a result of the negligence of the Railway; that the loss suffered by the plaintiff firm was at the rate of Rs. 5/8/- per bag; that the plaintiff firm had accepted the sum of Rs. 26/11/- in full and final settlement of its claim on account of shortage but not on account of its claim for damage to the sugar bags; that the suit was not incompetent; and that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for Rs. 1,100/- with costs. These findings were confirmed by the appellate court and the Union of India has come to this court in second appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the Railway urged the following arguments in support of this appeal. First he contended that the finding of the courts below that this suit was competent is erroneous. He pointed out that the plaintiff is admittedly a joint Hindu family firm, and argued that a suit by such a firm could only be filed in the name of the Karta. Learned counsel frankly conceded that he was raising a technical plea but insisted that it was fatal to the competency of the suit. There are two short answers to this argument. First, these pleas were not taken in the grounds of appeal before this court. A belated application was moved for permission to add a ground. But I have rejected this application. There are two short answers to this argument. First, these pleas were not taken in the grounds of appeal before this court. A belated application was moved for permission to add a ground. But I have rejected this application. A party which insists on raising technical pleas against the other party must be prepared to face technical objections against itself. The court has a discretion to grant or refuse permission to add fresh grounds in second appeal, and I see no reason to exercise my discretion in favour of a party which has no equities in its favour. Secondly, the plea itself has no merits. In the plaint the plaintiff is described as M/s Nathi Mal Mahabir Prasad. It is true that the name of the Karta is not mentioned in the array of the parties but this omission is made good in the first paragraph which states : "That the plaintiffs firm is a joint Hindu family firm of two brothers Nathi Mal and Mahabir Prasad and Nathi Mal is the Karta and Manager of the joint Hindu family firm." 5. Furthermore the verification is by Nathi Mal himself in the following words "I, Karta and Manager of the joint Hindu family firm M/s Nathi Mal Mahabir Prasad do hereby verify - ". A plaint must be read and interpreted as a whole. It is thus clear that the suit itself has been filed by Nathi Mai as the Karta of the joint Hindu family firm, but his name was inadvertently omitted from the description of the plaintiff. The appellant seized upon this omission for the purpose of raising a technical plea against the competency of this suit. Ordinary litigants may be excused if they raise all kinds of technical plea, but it is hardly consistent with the dignity of the Union of India to rely upon a type of plea which the Privy Council once described as "the most technical of all technicalities." 6. Learned counsel then argued that the courts below erred in relying on the printed certificate of damages and shortage issued by the Station Master of Etawah (Ex. 3), when the certificate itself contain the words without prejudice". He argued that these words made this document inadmissible in evidence and the plaintiff-respondents suit for damages should not have been decreed without proof independently of the certificate. 3), when the certificate itself contain the words without prejudice". He argued that these words made this document inadmissible in evidence and the plaintiff-respondents suit for damages should not have been decreed without proof independently of the certificate. Counsel relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Union of India v. Shew Bux Satyanarayan, AIR 1965 Calcutta 636, in which it was held that a damage certificate given by the Railway Inspector with the words without prejudice" does not furnish good cause for a decree straightway without proof of actual loss and quantum of damage by the plaintiff, and that such a certificate cannot be treated as an admission of liability. I do not think that this judgment laid down a definite principle of law that a certificate of damages and shortage issued by the Station Master is inadmissible merely because it contains the words "without prejudice". The law governing the admissibility of documents containing the words "without prejudice" is laid down in Sec. 23 of the Evidence Act which runs thus: "23. Admissions in civil cases, when relevant - In civil cases no admission is relevant if it is made either upon an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given, or under circumstances from which the Court can infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given." 7. The section does not contain the words "without prejudice" at all. It says that an admission will not be admissible in evidence if it is given on condition - express or implied - that it will not be used in evidence. Therefore, it is a question of fact in each case whether a document bearing the words "without prejudice" was given on condition that it would not be used as evidence. Before excluding such a document the Court must consider whether there was any understanding between the parties that the document would not be used as evidence. For example, it is obvious that documents exchanged between the parties in the course of negotiations for a compromise, if marked "without prejudice", will be inadmissible under Sec. 23, for the very purpose of compromise talks is to have a frank discussion of each others stand without fear of being committed to any position by any statement made during these talks. In Union of India v. Shew Bux Satyanarayan, AIR 1965 Calcutta 636. In Union of India v. Shew Bux Satyanarayan, AIR 1965 Calcutta 636. The learned Judge deciding the case relied on an observation of the Court of Chancery in Kurta & Co. v. Spence & Sons, (1887) 57 L.J. Ch. 238 (241) but with great respect this observation refers to documents exchanged between the parties which are trying to settle a dispute by compromise. It does not follow that the words "without prejudice" make every document inadmissible in evidence in all circumstances. Whether it is admissible or not must depend upon the condition, express or implied, upon which it was given. The learned Judge in the above case conceded that in an earlier case of the Calcutta High Court, M/s Balchand Badri Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1957 Calcutta 656. A certificate of damage by the Station Master was admissible as prima facie admission of such damage. 8. In the case before me the certificate of damage was written out on a printed form. This indicates and was also conceded that the rules of the Railway provide that in certain cases the Station Master must issue a certificate of damage. The question is What is the purpose of issuing of such a certificate? Learned counsel conceded that the certificate on the printed form has to be issued in accordance with the railway rules, but was unable to explain what purpose this certificate can serve if it is rendered inadmissible in evidence because of the words "without prejudice". In my opinion, these words do not render a certificate of damage issued by the railway inadmissible under Sec. 23 of the Evidence Act but merely reserves the right of both the Railway and the customer to challenge its accuracy by leading evidence to prove that the actual damage was lower or higher (as the case may be) than stated in it. The certificate is therefore admissible as prima facie evidence of the quantum of damage. This was apparently the view of the Calcutta High Court in Balchand Badri Prasad's case, AIR 1957 Calcutta 656, cited above. 9. Moreover, even learned counsel's interpretation of the judgment in Union of India v. Shew Bax Satyanarayan, AIR 1965 Calcutta 636, does not help him; for the Judge in that case laid down that there should be independent proof of actual loss and quantum of damage by a plaintiff claiming compensation from the Railway. 9. Moreover, even learned counsel's interpretation of the judgment in Union of India v. Shew Bax Satyanarayan, AIR 1965 Calcutta 636, does not help him; for the Judge in that case laid down that there should be independent proof of actual loss and quantum of damage by a plaintiff claiming compensation from the Railway. In that case there was no evidence apart from the certificate, but in the case before me the plaintiff gave evidence and proved that he had suffered damage to the extent of Rs. 5/8/- per bag. Learned counsel had to concede that there was independent evidence in this case. In my opinion the plaintiff respondent established his claim for damages. The responsibility of the Railway for any damage to the goods entrusted to it is that of a bailee, and therefore, the onus is on it to prove that the damage was not caused by any negligence on its part. The railway failed to prove that the damage to the sugar bags was not caused by the negligence of its servants. On the other hand, the plaintiff established that all the bags were found wet at destination and this was due to their being soaked with rain water. The Court was entitled to infer from this fact that the Railway had failed to take the necessary precautions against rain while the goods were in transit. 10. The appeal is dismissed with costs. 11. Before leaving this case I must draw the attention of the Union Government to certain features of the defence which are disturbing. A number of technical pleas were taken which ought to have been. It is true that every litigant who is a defendant in a suit is entitled to take any plea which the law allowed him. But the railway department is not an ordinary litigant. It enjoys under the law a monopoly of the trade of carrying goods and passengers by rail. It is immune from competition and all citizens are obliged to deal with it. There is no equality between it and its customers who must rely on it for treating them justly and fairly in cases of disputes. This does not mean that it must be over-generous in allowing doubtful claims at the risk of public interest. It is immune from competition and all citizens are obliged to deal with it. There is no equality between it and its customers who must rely on it for treating them justly and fairly in cases of disputes. This does not mean that it must be over-generous in allowing doubtful claims at the risk of public interest. But its position as a public enterprise enjoying a monopoly does imply that it should not be over-zealous in defeating by technical pleas claims which are otherwise found to be just. State departments enjoying a monopoly of trade in the public sector should not forget that the attitude of the public towards the further expansion of the public sector will be determined by the degree of fairness with which it is treated by the departments running this sector. The public sector in India has great traditions which go as far back as the Maurya Empire. The Artha Shastra contains elaborate rules prescribing the duties of the various Adhykshas or Superintendents General of the various departments of the public sector. The principle underlying these rules was the paramountcy of the public welfare. Today if the State departments take advantage of their monopoly status and treat citizens unfairly in cases of dispute the danger is that public may regard this treatment as a for taste (?) of things to come when the public sector is left with no rivals. 12. In the case before me it is regrettable that an application was moved, presumably under instructions from the railway, for permission to press the technical plea that the suit was incompetent because the name of the karta did not appear as plaintiff. I have rejected this application but should not have made it. Appeal dismissed.