S. K. Kapur ( 1 ) THE present writ petition is directed against the order of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Delhi, made on the application of Tapeshari Dass respondent No. 2 under section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act against the petitioner. On 20th December 1963 Tapeshwari Dass, (hereafter REFERRED TO to as respondent) made the aforesaid application claiming that he had been in employ of Sher Singh and sons, of which Sher Singh, (hereafter REFERRED TO to as the petitioner) is alleged to be the sole proprietor. The respondent further claimed in his application that he had been in the employment since April 193 8 and his wages were Rs. 250. 00 per mensem. He alleged that the management closed the establishment in the month of August Without any notice to the applicant and the petitioner had failed to pay the dues as required under section 25 FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent, therefore, claimed Rs. 3. 375. 00 asunder :-On these facts the respondent prayed in his application under section 33 C (2) that the Court may compute the amount due to him. The petitioner was called upon to file a reply in which he inter alia stated as under :- (1) The relationship of employer and workman never existed between the parties and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to proceed on merits without deciding this issue ; (2) The surrendering of the possession of the shop to the landlord due to forced unemployment cannot be termed as "closing down of the undertaking" within the meaning of section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947; (3) Tapeshwari Dass was now entitled to any benefits from Sher Singh which would be computed in terms of money by the Labour courts The patitioner was a Gold-smith by profession and was working as diecutter under the name and style of Sher Singh Verma in a rented premises at Nai Sarak, Delhi. He carried on his work without the help of any employee. (4) Tapeshwari Dass who was a man of equal status and skill merely helped Sher Singh as a co-worker and used to perform the job work intrusted to him by the petitioner on contract basis as an independent contractor. He carried on his work without the help of any employee. (4) Tapeshwari Dass who was a man of equal status and skill merely helped Sher Singh as a co-worker and used to perform the job work intrusted to him by the petitioner on contract basis as an independent contractor. Whenever there was some surplus work with Sher Singh he used to pass it on to Tapeshwari Dass as well as other Gold-smiths for completion and such Goldsmiths including Tapeshwari Dass were paid for the job done. According to the petitioner the relationship of employer and workman never existed between the parties. The petitioner also stated that he was left without any work with effect from 10th January 1963 due to the Gold Control policy of the Government of India and he, therefore, surrendered the possession of the premises after obtaining a certificate of being a bona fide displaced Goldsmith from the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, and (5) Tapeshwari Dass had also stolen Rs. 2,500. 00 and a gold tagari on 9th September 1963 belonging to Sher Singh and he had already lodged a report with the police. On the above facts, the Labour Court framed the-following three issues :- 1. Was applicant a "workman" as defined in Industrial Disputes Act. Did the relationship of Master and servant exist between parties ? If so, what was his salary ? 2. Was the business closed on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond control of employer ? If so its effect ? 3. To what benefit, if any, is applicant entitled ? ( 2 ) THE Labour Court came to the conclusion that (a) Tapeshwari Dass was entitled to make an application under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act ; (b) closure of business by the petitioner was due to the causes beyond his control and Tapeshwari Dass was, therefore, entitled only to three months wages as retirement compensation; and (3) Tapeshwari Dass was drawing a salary of Rs. 250. 00 and therefore he was entitled to Rs. 750. 00. ( 3 ) MR. D. D. SHARMA, the learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order of the Labour Court on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to award the relief. 250. 00 and therefore he was entitled to Rs. 750. 00. ( 3 ) MR. D. D. SHARMA, the learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order of the Labour Court on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to award the relief. He says that if the respondent s claim on account of money due to him under the provisions of Chapter V-A, his remedy is to make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money. If on the other hand there is a dispute about the existance of relationship of employer and employee the respondent can raise an industrial dispute but no claim the amount under section 33-C (2) He does not dispute that the word "benefit" under the said provision is not confined merely to non-monetary benefit which could be converted in terms of money and agrees that the section embraces benefits whether monetary or non-monetary to which aworkman may be entitled. Mr. Sharma also does not dispute that in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajugopalan etc. The scope of section 33c (2) is wider than the scope of section 33 C (1) and the claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter V-A may in certain circumstances be competent under section. 33 C (2 ). His submission is short is that the dispute as to whether the relationship of employer and employee exists or whether he is entitled to any wages does not fall to be determined undersection 33 C (2), though it may be open to theemployee to raise an industrial dispute. He strongly relies on the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court m Central Bank s Cose:- "it is unnecessary in the present appeals either to state exaustively or even to indicate broadly what other catagories of claims can fall under section 33-C (2 ). He strongly relies on the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court m Central Bank s Cose:- "it is unnecessary in the present appeals either to state exaustively or even to indicate broadly what other catagories of claims can fall under section 33-C (2 ). There is no doubt that the three catagories of claims mentioned in section 33 C (1) fall under section 33 C (2) and in that sense, section 33 C (2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding; but it is possible that claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter V-A, may also be competant under section 33 C (2) and that may illustrate its wider scope. We would, however, like to indicate some of the claims which would not fall under section 33-C (2), because they formed the subject matter of the appeal which have been ground together for our decision along with the appeals with which we are dealing at present. If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, is would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under section 33 C (2 ). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriatrly tried, but Once it is shown that the employeers dismissal or demot on is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continus to be the Workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a pre-existing contract, cannot be made under section 33-C (2 ). "mr. A. K. Jain on the other hand submits that the question whether such relationship exists or not is incidential to the claim for computation of benefits and is, therefore, within the scope of section 33 C (2), He says that merely because the employer has disputed the existance of such relationship cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. "mr. A. K. Jain on the other hand submits that the question whether such relationship exists or not is incidential to the claim for computation of benefits and is, therefore, within the scope of section 33 C (2), He says that merely because the employer has disputed the existance of such relationship cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. He relies on the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Central Bank s Case :- "besides, it seems to us that if the appallant s construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-section (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entetain the workman s. application. The claim under section 33 C (2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may insome cases, have to be produced by an enquiry into the existances of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-section (2 ). " ( 4 ) MR. Jain has also relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Rammakrishna Ramnath Bidi Manufacturing Kaptee by Manager Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court etc. I must confess that the point is not free from difficulty. After pronoucement of the Supreme Court in Central Bank s case it is clear that the scope of section 33c (2) is wider than section 33 C (1) and the expression "benefit" refered to there in includes both monetary and non-monetary benefits. The trouble some question, however is for which benefits and on whose instance the said provision can be invoked. No doubt it is true that by the employer merely denying the right of the employee to claim benefit cannot oust the jurisdication of the Court under section 33-C (2 ). But before that aspect can be permitted to affect the mind one has to see the scope and ambit of the section itself. No doubt it is true that by the employer merely denying the right of the employee to claim benefit cannot oust the jurisdication of the Court under section 33-C (2 ). But before that aspect can be permitted to affect the mind one has to see the scope and ambit of the section itself. The reading of the section shows that it is only where a workman is entitled to certain benefits that the Labour Court can compute them. But where the existance of relationship of workman and employer is itself in dispute, the matter would fall under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and consequently the. remedy available to an employee would be to raise an industrial dispute. The Labour Court under section 33 C (2) is primarily given power to execute or implement his existing individual right and it may, therefore be necessary in some cases to determine such right. Such determination, however, must be confined to matters incidental to the main issue, namely, the computation of benefits to which a workman is entitled, The question whether the claimant is workman at all or not would not in my opinion, be incidental to the determination of the main question. It is said that the reasons which impelled the supreme Court to hold that the Labour Court can enquire into the existance of right fully apply to the determination of the question about the existance of the relationship if master and servent and an employer cannot be permitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court by merely raising a dispute that the claiment is not an employee at all. In my opinion there is a vast difference between the two. In the former the relationship of masterand servent is admitted and the Court has then to consider whether or not an employee is entitled to the benefit claimed and if so what are those benefits. In the other catagory of cases the dispute centres round the point whether the claiment is a workman at all. If the respondent s contention be upheld than most of the industrial disputes would fall under section 33 C (2) and the provisions of section 10 would at least to a considerable extent be reduced to silence. In the other catagory of cases the dispute centres round the point whether the claiment is a workman at all. If the respondent s contention be upheld than most of the industrial disputes would fall under section 33 C (2) and the provisions of section 10 would at least to a considerable extent be reduced to silence. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Labour Court acted without jurisdiction in deciding the issue as to the existance of relationship of maste and servant. I am not unmindful of the fact that this point was not raised by the petitioner before the Labour Court but since the point goes to the root of the whole matter and relates to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court I allowed the petitioner to raise this question. ( 5 ) IN the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Labour Court is quashed but there will be no order as to costs.