JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - These thirty-six writ petitions challenge proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition of land in various villages adjacent to Ghaziabad (district Meerut) for the development of residential and commercial areas through the agency of the Ghaziabad Improvement, Trust. 2. A notification covering the land involved in these petitions (with the exception of part of the land mentioned in petition No. 4245 of 1963) was issued under Sec. 4 of the Act on 13-8-1962 and published in the U.P. Gazette on 18-8-1962, declaring that the plots in question were needed for a public purpose, namely "planned development of the area"; and in continuation of this a notification under Sec. 6 of the Act was issued on 2-7-1963 and published on 6-7-1963, in which again the public purpose for which the plots were being acquired was described merely as "planned development of the area." 3. In petition No. 4245 of 1963 only part of the land involved was covered by the above mentioned notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 dated 13-8-1962 and 2-7-1963 respectively. The rest of the land has been acquired under a notification under Sec. 4 issued on 16-7-1960, followed by a notification under Sec. 6 issued on 24-4-1963. But we have already held this latter notification under Sec. 6 to be illegal and have quashed it - vide our judgment in writ petition No. 3643 of 1962, decided on 10-12-1965. The discussion in the present judgment, therefore, will be confined to the Sec. 4 notification dated 13-8-1962 and the Sec. 6 notification dated 2-7-1963. 4. As already noted, the public purpose for which the land covered by these petitions is being acquired has been specified merely as "planned development of the area." But the counter-affidavits that have been filed give further details and disclose that, the said planned development is to be carried out by the Ghaziabad Improvement Trust, which will clear and level the sites, construct roads, install drainage, water supply, sewerage electricity and street lighting and provide public amenities such as parks, playgrounds, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, welfare centres, places of entertainment, shops, banks, post offices, police stations, fire stations, administrative buildings, cremation and burial grounds, dhobi ghats, open places, Government offices etc. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the various petitioners have advanced a number of arguments, which may be set forth as follows:- 1. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the various petitioners have advanced a number of arguments, which may be set forth as follows:- 1. The notification under Sec. 4 of the Act declaring that the land was likely to be needed for a "public purpose" described as "planned development of the area" was too vague and afforded no adequate basis for the lodging of objections under Sec. 5-A. 2. Since the U.P. Regulation of Building Operations Act has been applied to Ghaziabad and the plots involved in the present petitions fall within the "regulated area" established under that Act, all planned development in the area must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of that Act and it is not open to the Government to resort to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. for such development. 3. The notification under Sec. 6, specifying the public purpose as "planned development of the area", was bad in law, firstly because such development cannot be deemed to be a public purpose at all and secondly because there was no sufficient compliance with the requirements of Cl. (2) of Sec. 6 of the Act. 4. The acquisition of the land for planned development by the Ghaziabad Improvement Trust is illegal as no scheme for such development has been drawn up by the Improvement Trust in accordance with the provisions of the Town Improvement Act. 6. Regarding the first line of argument, it is to be noted that Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (in contradistinction to Sec. 6) does not require the notification published thereunder to specify the precise public purpose for which the land is needed or likely to be needed. Moreover, this contention of the petitioners, that the Sec. 4 notification should have given details of the said purpose and is invalid because it omitted to do so, is clearly untenable in view of the Supreme Courts pronouncement regarding notifications under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1960 SC 1203, in which it was observed: "It is argued that in terms the notification does not state that the land sought to be acquired was needed for a public purpose. In our opinion, it is not absolutely necessary to the validity of the land acquisition proceedings that that statement should find a place in the notification actually issued. In our opinion, it is not absolutely necessary to the validity of the land acquisition proceedings that that statement should find a place in the notification actually issued. The requirements of the law will be satisfied if, in substance, it is found on investigation, and the appropriate Government is satisfied as a result of the investigation that the land was needed for the purpose of the Company, which would amount to a public purpose under Part VII, as already indicated." 7. A similar view has been expressed with regard to the analogous provisions for the Bombay Land Requisition Act in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, A.I.R. 1955 SC 41, in the following words: "In our opinion it is not necessary to set out the purpose of the requisition in the order. The desirability of such a course is obvious because when it is not done proof of the purpose must be given in other ways.........But in itself an omission to set forth the purpose in the order is not fatal so long as the facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court in some other way." 8. We do not consider therefore that in the case of the notification under Sec. 4 issued on 13-8-1962, with which we are at present concerned, the mere omission to give further details regarding the public purpose for which the land was likely to be needed, beyond saying that it was required for the "planned development of the area", would invalidate that notification. The question of whether there was any genuine public purpose at a11 we propose to consider when we take up the third argument of the petitioners; but we are satisfied that the petitions cannot at any rate succeed on account of any formal defect in the wording of the Sec. 4 notification. 9. The second contention of the petitioners is that it was not open to the State Government to have recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of securing planned development in a regulated area established under the U.P. Regulation of Building Operations Act. 9. The second contention of the petitioners is that it was not open to the State Government to have recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of securing planned development in a regulated area established under the U.P. Regulation of Building Operations Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners emphasise that the latter Act, which was passed "to pro vide for the regulation of building operations with a view to prevent haphazard development of urban and rural areas," was specifically in tended to secure planned development by providing for a Master Plan "defining the boundaries, character of land use, zoning, stages of development, main existing and pro posed communication lines and major open spaces including public buildings etc." and by laying down the procedure whereby the Prescribed Authority (functioning under the control of a Controlling Authority) may sanction private development schemes which are in conformity with that Master Plan. Sec. 6 of that Act prohibits all building operations not sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority; and Sec. 5 of the Act empowers the Controlling Authority to issue directions for various specified purposes (such as the reservation of land for roads and open spaces, the height, character and alignment of buildings etc.) and for "any other matter which is necessary for the proper planning of any regulated area and for preventing buildings being erected haphazardly in any area." Thus, it is argued, the Regulation of Building Operations Act provides a complete and comprehensive code for the planned development of any area to which it is applied; and in such an area there can never be any necessity for resorting to acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in order to promote planned development. The result, according to the petitioners, is that in areas in which the Regulation of Building Operations Act is in force the operation for the Land Acquisition Act is excluded, at any rate as far as planned development is concerned. 10. We are not impressed by this line of argument. The fields covered by the Land Acquisition Act and by the Regulation of Building Operations Act are totally distinct (though they may overlap to some extent) and there can be no question of one Act ousting the other. Moreover the Regulation of Building Operations Act itself envisages resort being had to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act - Vide Cl. Moreover the Regulation of Building Operations Act itself envisages resort being had to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act - Vide Cl. 11(2) of the U.P. Regulation of Building Operations Directions, 1960, And it is obvious that situations are quite likely to arise in which the powers conferred on the authorities by the Regulation of Building Operations Act may prove inadequate. Individual owners may sit tight on their plots, without developing them, in the hope of selling them off later at fancy prices; and similarly speculators may acquire plots and hold on to them without any idea of initiating development schemes, purely with the object of reselling at a profit at some later date. Owners of plots in key positions can hold up development schemes for years in this way. Nor is it easy to co-ordinate individual development schemes with each other. Development under the auspices for the Regulation of Building Operations Act, therefore, is likely to prove spasmodic and slow, compared with development carried out by Government agencies after acquiring extensive areas under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. We are satisfied therefore that there is ample justification for having recourse to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, for the purpose of securing speedy and well co-ordinated planned development, even in areas to which the Regulation of Building Operations Act has been made applicable. 11. Now we come to the third submission made on behalf of the petitioners, viz. that the notification under Sec. 6 issued on 2-7-1963 was defective and invalid. Under sub-Sec. (1) of that section a declaration has to be made that "any particular land is needed for a public purpose"; and sub-Sec. (2) requires that declaration to be published in the official Gazette, stating "the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. The contention is that the notification stating "the purpose for which it is needed" should not be vague and general in its terms but should state precisely the specific purpose in view; and it is urged that the words "for planned development of the area," used in the impugned notification, are not enough to satisfy the requirements of the section. The contention is that the notification stating "the purpose for which it is needed" should not be vague and general in its terms but should state precisely the specific purpose in view; and it is urged that the words "for planned development of the area," used in the impugned notification, are not enough to satisfy the requirements of the section. "Planned development," it is argued, is an extremely vague phrase that may be applied to many different things, not all of which will necessarily amount to a `public purpose'. It is contended, therefore, that in the circumstances of the present case it was essential, when framing the notification under Sec. 6, to specify the precise kind of planned development that was envisaged, so as to make it dear that the development was of a type that would prove useful and beneficial to the public at large or a substantial section thereof. 12. To this argument there are three answers. In the first place, by the amendment introduced into Sec. 3 (f) of the Land Acquisition Act by the U.P. Amendment Act of 1954 "the extension, planned development or improvement of existing village sites or townships" has been expressly recognised as a public purposes; and consequently the words "planned development of the area," used in the impugned notification, must be deemed to refer to a public purpose, as defined in the Act. Secondly, by virtue of Cl. (3) of Sec. 6 of the Act, the declaration made in this notification "shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose"; and it is not open to the petitioners to challenge the fact that their land is being acquired for a public purpose, once a declaration to that effect has been made and published in the Gazette. Thirdly, even if the words used in the notification are held to be vague and ambiguous (being applicable to things which would not amount to a public purpose as well as to things which would), those words can be supplemented and explained by the Government by means of affidavits - as was done in Smt Somawanti v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 SC 151, where the notification merely stated that the land was required for setting up a factory for manufacturing refrigeration equipment, but the Supreme Court observed : "Further, the notification itself sets out the purpose for which the land is being acquired. That purpose, if we may recall, is to set up a factory for the manufacture of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment. The importance of this undertaking to a State such as the Punjab which has a surplus of fruit, dairy products etc., the general effect of the establishment of this factory on foreign exchange resources, spread of education, relieving the pressure on unemployment etc., have been set out; in the affidavit of the respondent and their substance appears in the earlier part of this judgment. The affidavits have not been controverted and we have, therefore, no hesitation in acting upon them." 13. In the present cases the counter-affidavits that have been filed reveal that the kind of "planned development of the area" that is to be undertaken is the clearing and levelling for sites, the construction of roads, the installation of drainage, water supply, sewerage, electricity and street lighting, the provision of public amenities such as parks, playgrounds, schools, hospitals etc. And it can scarcely be denied that such development would be conducive to the public welfare and would constitute a public purpose within the meaning given to those words in the Land Acquisition Act. For all these reasons we are fully satisfied that no legal flaw is to be found in the wording of the notification under Sec. 6 and that the requirements of Cl. (2) of that section have been adequately complied with. 14. The last point argued on behalf of the petitioners is that the impugned acquisition proceedings are illegal because although the planned development was meant to be carried out by the Ghaziabad Improvement Trust, no scheme for such development has been framed by the Trust in accordance with the provisions of the Town Improvement Act. 14. The last point argued on behalf of the petitioners is that the impugned acquisition proceedings are illegal because although the planned development was meant to be carried out by the Ghaziabad Improvement Trust, no scheme for such development has been framed by the Trust in accordance with the provisions of the Town Improvement Act. That Act, which was passed "for the improvement and expansion of towns in Uttar Pradesh," provides for the creation of Improvement Trusts to which are assigned the duties of drawing up improvement schemes of various types (enumerated in Sec. 23) in accordance with certain procedure (set forth in Secs. 33 to 44) and of implementing those schemes after they have been sanctioned by the State Government. In the case of the land that has been acquired from the present petitioners, it is admitted that the Ghaziabad Improvement Trust has not so far framed any schemes of its own in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Town Improvement Act; and it appears that what is, proposed is that the Trust should carry out development of the area in conformity with the Master Plan that has been drawn up under the Regulation of Building Operations Act. We entertain grave doubts as to the legality of such action. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, who has appeared on behalf of the State, has attempted to argue that the Town Improvement Act envisages the implementation by the Trust not only of schemes framed by the Trust itself under the Act but also of schemes framed by other authorities under the provisions of other statutes; but we are unable to find any indication in the Town Improvement Act that would lend support to such an argument. Nor are we inclined to agree with Mr. Shanti Bhushans alternative submission that in regulated areas proclaimed under the Regulation of Building Operations Act the provisions of the Town Improvement Act regarding the framing of improvement schemes have been superseded by the provisions of the Regulation of Building Operations Act relating to the drawing up of Master Plans. 15. Nevertheless, even if there is any illegality in carrying out the development for the acquired land through the agency of the Improvement Trust in this way, that would not affect the legality of the acquisition itself. 15. Nevertheless, even if there is any illegality in carrying out the development for the acquired land through the agency of the Improvement Trust in this way, that would not affect the legality of the acquisition itself. As we have already pointed out, there is no legal flaw in the notification that was issued under Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on 2-7-1963. The notification declared that the land was needed for "planned development for the area"; and that declaration was undoubtedly correct and true, as is clear from the subsequent disclosures in the counter-affidavits filed in these cases, which reveal in detail what the Government has in mind. There is consequently no reason to hold that the notification under Sec. 6 was invalid, or that possession could not be taken in pursuance thereof, resulting in the vesting of the land so acquired in the Government. The acquisition of land for a particular purpose and the subsequent carrying out of that purpose are two entirely separate and distinct stages; and even if some irregularity or illegality is committed in respect of the latter stage, that would in no way affect the validity of the former i.e. the actual acquisition itself. 16. It is important to note that the challenge to these writ petitions is directed solely against the actual acquisition proceedings that have been or are being taken under the Land Acquisition Act, the reliefs claimed being a writ of certiorari to quash the notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Act and a writ of mandamus to compel the State of U. P., the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad, and the Collector of Meerut to refrain from taking steps to acquire the petitioners land. No relief has been asked for against the Ghaziabad Improvement Trust (which is an autonomous body, not an organ of the State of U. P.). In the circumstances we see no reason to strike down the impugned notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act merely because there may be some illegality in the measures that are being adopted for the implementation of the Governments plans for development of the petitioners land after it has been acquired. 17. Having considered the various submissions made on behalf of the petitioners in these thirty six cases, we have come to the conclusion that they are without force. 17. Having considered the various submissions made on behalf of the petitioners in these thirty six cases, we have come to the conclusion that they are without force. Consequently we dismiss all these petitions, except No. 4245 of 1963, with costs. Petition No. 4245 of 1963 is allowed in part, inasmuch as the notification under Sec. 6 dated 24-4-1963 stands quashed, for the reasons given by us in our judgment in writ petition No. 3643 of 1962, decided on 10-12-1965; but it is dismissed as regards other reliefs. In view of the partial failure of petition No. 4245 of 1963, we make no order as to costs in respect thereto. All interim orders that may have been passed by this Court in any of these writ petitions stand vacated. All petition except No. 4245 of 1963 dismissed..