A. R. BAKSHI, N. K. VAKIL, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the Special Judge at Ahmedabad convicting the appellant under sec. 161 Indian Penal Code and under secs. 5 (1) (d) read with sec. 6 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for both the offences for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 100. 00 in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one month. ( 2 ) IN November 1962 the appellant was an employee of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and was serving as a Conservancy Sub-Inspector in the Ward known as Khokhra-Mehmdabad. His duty at that time was to take roll-call of sweepers and other members of the conservancy staff in that Ward at the office located there. Fakirbhai Maganbhai and Shankerbhai Ashabhai were amongst those sweepers who were posted to do the work in that Ward. These two persons have been referred to by the learned Judge as the complainants in his judgment and for conveniences sake we shall also refer to them accordingly. These two persons before they were posted to work as sweepers in the above Ward sometime in October 1962 were working as night-soil workers and they alleged that the appellant was their immediate superior at that time also. He used to harass them in various ways such as fining them when they were a little late for works by ignoring their presence at the time of the roll call and marking them absent and they were asked to go home and were not allowed to resume duties for two or three days thereafter. He wrongly refused to give them leave used to assign to them more onerous work etc. It was the allegation of the complainants that two or three days before November 14 1962 the appellant demanded monthly payment of illegal gratification in order to show favour to these two persons in respect of matter regarding which they used to be harassed. The appellant had demanded Rs. 10. 00 per month from Fakir while from Shanker he had first demanded Rs. 20. 00 but on his appeal on the ground of poverty the appellant agreed to accept Rs. 10. 00 per month from him also. The appellant had demanded Rs. 10. 00 per month from Fakir while from Shanker he had first demanded Rs. 20. 00 but on his appeal on the ground of poverty the appellant agreed to accept Rs. 10. 00 per month from him also. Both those complainants however were not agreeable to give such gratification and therefore on the 14th of November 1962 at about 2-30 p. m. they approached the Anti Corruption Branch and lodged their complaints which were separately recorded by P. S. I. Erulkar. As Dy. S. P. Medh of that Branch was not in Ahmedabad and was not available for investigation he obtained the requisite permission to investigate from the City Magistrate of the 4th Court. On November 15 1962 at about 1 p. m. both the complainants were called and arrangements were made to lay a trap. Each of the complainants was asked to bring two currency notes of Rs. 5. 00 each on which the usual experiment with the anthracene powder and the ultraviolet lamp was carried out in the presence of panchas and after going through the required formalities of preparing the panchnama the said notes were placed in the pockets of the respective complainants. Both were instructed not to touch the notes till the time they were given to the appellant on his demand. They were further instructed to go to the Maninagar office in company with the panch wit- ness Zahiruddin and hand over the amount to the appellant if he demanded the same. Witness Zahiruddin was instructed to try and see and also hear what happens at that juncture. The complainants were further instructed to give the signal if the accused accepted the money. Constable Rasiklal was also asked to remain with Panch Zahiruddin. As per instruc- tions the complainants Panch Zahiruddin and Rasiklal proceeded to Maninagar Conservancy Office. P. S. I. Erulkar himself the other panch and some police constables followed them. Roll-calls at the said office were being taken twice a day once in the morning at six and again in the afternoon at 3. The trap was arranged to work out at the time of the second roll-call on that day. It was the prosecution case that the appellant on seeing Fakir while he was taking the roll-call called him inside the office room and asked him if he had brought the amount. The trap was arranged to work out at the time of the second roll-call on that day. It was the prosecution case that the appellant on seeing Fakir while he was taking the roll-call called him inside the office room and asked him if he had brought the amount. Fakir is alleged to have replied in the affirmative and then he was asked by the appellant to wait outside near the gate of the office and give him the money when he came out of the office. After some time the accused did go out and went near a pan-shop with Fakir but he returned back to the office. Then he again came out and went near the pan-shop. Then he left the pan-shop and went near the bicycle stand where he had kept his own bicycle and there he is alleged to have accepted the money from both the complainants. The panch witness Zahiruddin claimed to have seen what happened between the complainants and the appellant and also heard the demand by the appellant of the money from the complainants. P. S. I. Erulkar also alleged that he had also seen the payment of money from some distance. As soon as the amounts were paid to the appellant he put them in his left side pocket of the pant and when he was about to start on his cycle he was stopped by the P. S. I. and others and was taken to a nearby shop. There on demand by the P. S. I. he produced the four five-rupee currency notes in question. His hands were examined in the ultra-violet light and the shine of the powder was noticed on his palm and the four fingers of his left hand. The shine was also noticed in the pocket of his pant one coin of 5 np. and wrapper of a bundle of pan from that pocket when demonstrated under the ultra-violet light. A panchnama was then made and the usual procedure of the investigation was gone through. The requisite sanction was obtained to prosecute the accused and the charge-sheet was submitted on October 22 1963 The appellant was charged as aforesaid on the above facts. ( 3 ) THE appellants defence was that he had not accepted any illegal gratification. His case was that each of the complainants owed to him Rs. 10. The requisite sanction was obtained to prosecute the accused and the charge-sheet was submitted on October 22 1963 The appellant was charged as aforesaid on the above facts. ( 3 ) THE appellants defence was that he had not accepted any illegal gratification. His case was that each of the complainants owed to him Rs. 10. 00 which he had advanced to them sometime in October 1962 a few days before the Diwali of that year. His case was that both these persons had approached him with a request to give them a loan of Rs. 10. 00 each and had assured him that the amounts would be repaid when they received their next pay which would be due to them on the 14th of November 1962 or thereabout. The appellant supported his version by entering in the box and also examining another witness H. B. Trivedi who was the Conservancy Inspector and his immediate superior in the period prior to the 1st of November 1962. ( 4 ) THE prosecution in order to establish the charges relied upon the evidence of the two complainants punch witness Zahiruddin and Police Sub Inspector Erulkar. They also examined Conservancy Inspector B. R. Shukla of the Corporation for proving certain records. In his cross-examination however he deposed to certain facts which favoured the appellant. We shall deal with this aspect of his evidence at its proper place. ( 5 ) THE learned Special Judge found at the end of the trial (a) that apart from the admission of the accused of his having accepted the amounts of Rs. 10. 00 respectively from each of the two complainants the prosecution had succeeded on good evidence in establishing that fact; (b) that under law therefore the presumption under sec. 4 of the Preven- tion of Corruption Act arose and burden shifted on the accused to prove keeping in mind the definition of the word proved in sec. 3 of the Evidence Act that his version was a true version. The accused however had failed to do so. In coming to this conclusion he relied on the fact that the story of the accused was improbable for various reasons given by him and that the evidence of the accused and witness Trivedi was neither satisfactory nor true. 3 of the Evidence Act that his version was a true version. The accused however had failed to do so. In coming to this conclusion he relied on the fact that the story of the accused was improbable for various reasons given by him and that the evidence of the accused and witness Trivedi was neither satisfactory nor true. (c) That despite some discrepencies in the evidence of the panch witness Zahiruddin he was a reliable and independent witness and he fully supported the prosecution version as to what happened on the 15th of November when the two amounts of Rs. 10. 00each were ultimately accepted by the accused from each of the two persons. It may be mentioned that the learned Judge did not give any weight to the statement of the panch that the accused appeared to be nervous at the time when he actually took the amounts from the two complainants on the ground that it was merely his opinion. ( 6 ) MR. D. C. Trivedi the learned advocate for the appellant did not challenge before us the position that under law the presumption under sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act did arise in this case and the burden of proving his version was an the appellant. But he urged that there were two versions before the Court the version of the prosecution was very improbable and weak and that fact lends support to the version of the defence. He further urged that the appellant had succeeded in discharging the burden in any case by his own sworn testimony and that of his witness Trivedi the Conservancy Inspector. ( 7 ) AS the fact of the appellant having accepted Rs. 10. 00 each from Fakir Magan and Shankar Asha on the 15th of November 1962 is not disputed before us the main question for consideration is has the appellant proved that the said amounts that he accepted on the 15th were only the return of the loan advanced to the complainants. ( 8 ) MR. Trivedi submitted that in a given set of facts or evidence on record three positions may arise:- (1) The accused may succeed in full in discharging the burden by positively proving the truth of his version. When nothing futher remains to be done by the Court and the accused has to be acquitted. ( 8 ) MR. Trivedi submitted that in a given set of facts or evidence on record three positions may arise:- (1) The accused may succeed in full in discharging the burden by positively proving the truth of his version. When nothing futher remains to be done by the Court and the accused has to be acquitted. (2) The accused may fail to discharge the burden in toto leav- ing the Court only with the version of the prosecution supported by the presumption under sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Then the only thing the Court can do is to accept the prosecution case and convict the accused. (3) But the third position is also possible and that is that though the accused had not fully succeeded in proving his version if the material or evidence before the Court is sufficient to raise a doubt in its mind that the version of the accused may be true or may not be true then having regard to the fact that the general burden of proof always rested on the prosecution and the further fact that there is always the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused the accused must be given the benefit of doubt because this position is bound to raise a doubt in the mind of the Court as to whether the prosecution had proved their case beyond any reasonable doubt. In other words it was the submission of Mr. Trivedi that the initial and the general burden of proving the prosecution case always remains on the prosecution though under the presumption the burden of proving or disproving a specific fact may be cast on the accused. Though the accused may be required to discharge some burden under law that burden of proof is not as onerous as is the burden of proof on the prosecution to establish its case. He further submitted that if the evidence on the record is such that it leaves the Court in a reasonable doubt of a prudent man as regards the fact as to whether the amount received is an illegal gratification or not then the Court must hold that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge and the benefit thereof must go to the accused. ( 9 ) FOR this submission of his reliance was mainly placed by Mr. ( 9 ) FOR this submission of his reliance was mainly placed by Mr. Trivedi on the case of Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1963 [1964-V G. L. R 911]. That was a case where the Court was mainly concerned with the nature of the burden of proof under sec. 105 of the Evidence Act. The facts were that the husband was alleged to have killed his wife by causing several stab wounds while they were sleeping together as usual in a room one night. At about 3 a. m. the neighbours heard the cries of the wife that she was being killed. Hearing the shouts the neighbours collected near the door of the room which was found to be locked from inside. On insistence from those neighbours the husband opened the door. When the door was opened the wife was seen lying dead with number of injuries on her person. A defence was put up at the trial by the husband that he was insane at the time when the incident happened and that he was not capable of understanding the nature of his act. The defence was not accepted by the trial Court as well as the High Court and the accused was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. He appealed to the Supreme Court and on his behalf it was contended that the High Court having believed the evidence of the prosecution witnesses should have held that the accused had discharged the burden placed on him for proving that at the time he killed his wife he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. It was further contended that even if the appellant had failed to establish that fact conclusively the evidence on record was such as to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Judge as regards one of the ingredients of the offence viz. criminal intention and therefore the Court should have acquitted him for the reason that the prosecution had not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. criminal intention and therefore the Court should have acquitted him for the reason that the prosecution had not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. While considering this conten- tion the learned Judge speaking for the Supreme Court observed as follows:-IT is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and therefore the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution therefore in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in sec. 299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But sec. 84 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the time of doing that act by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable on knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception under sec. 105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the accused and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. Under sec. 105 of the Evidence Act read with the definition of shall presume in sec. 4 thereof the court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless after considering the matters before it it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist by placing material before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused has to satisfy the standard of a prudent man. If the material placed be- fore the court such as oral and documentary evidence presumptions admissions or even the prosecution evidence satisfied the test of prudent man the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to dis- charge the burden under sec. The accused has to satisfy the standard of a prudent man. If the material placed be- fore the court such as oral and documentary evidence presumptions admissions or even the prosecution evidence satisfied the test of prudent man the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to dis- charge the burden under sec. 105 of the Evidence Act but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may for instance raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in sec. 299 of the Indian Penal Code. If the judge has such reasonable doubt he has to acquit the accused for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general burden which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity. The learned advocate for the appellant before us relied on the aforesaid observations and urged that on the same principle where the burden of proof is thrown on the accused under sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corrup- tion Act if the accused is able to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court that the version of the accused may be true or may not be true and consequently create a reasonable doubt that the prosecution ver- sion may not be true the benefit of that doubt must go to the accused. ( 10 ) WE are unable to accept this submission for very good reasons. This submission does not take into account the very different nature of the subject-matter regarding which the presumption is raised under sec. 105 of the Evidence Act and the one under sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corrup- tion Act. ( 10 ) WE are unable to accept this submission for very good reasons. This submission does not take into account the very different nature of the subject-matter regarding which the presumption is raised under sec. 105 of the Evidence Act and the one under sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corrup- tion Act. It ignores the very vital fact that in one case the burden is only in respect or bringing the case in one of the general or special excep- tions to enable the accused to be excused from the punishment though the various ingredients of the offences may be held to have been proved while in the other the burden is to negative the very existence of one of the ingredients of the offence charged which by statute is presumed to exist. Some of the observations in the very case relied upon by Mr. Trivedi would show that the principle laid down therein cannot have any applica- tion to the case where presumption under sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corrup- tion Act comes into play. In the said case Their Lordships have relied upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in K M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 605 and have quoted the following observations from the said case:the alleged conflict between the general burden which lies on the prosecution and the special burden imposed on the accused under sec. 105 of the Evidence Act is more imaginary than real. Indeed there is no conflict at all. There may arise three different situations: (1) A statute may throw the burden of proof of all or some of the ingredients of an offence on the accused: (see secs. 4 and 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act ). (2) The special burden may not touch the ingredients of the offence but only the protection given on the assumption of the proof of the said ingredients: (see secs 77 78 79 81 and 88 of the Indian Penal Code) (3) It may relate to an exception some of the many circumstances required to attract the exception if proved affecting the proof of all or some of the ingredients of the offence: (see secs. 80 of the Indian Penal Code ). . . . . 80 of the Indian Penal Code ). . . . . In the third case though the burden lies on the accused to bring his case within the exception the facts proved may not discharge the said burden but may affect the proof of the ingredients Of the offence. . . . . That evidence may not be sufficient to prove all the ingredients of sec. 80 of the Indian Penal Code but may prove that the shooting was by accident or inadvertance i. e. it was done without any intention or requisite state of mind which is the essence of the offence within the meaning of sec. 300 Indian Penal Code or at any rate may throw a reasonable doubt on the essential ingredients of the offence of murder. . . . . . In this view it might be said that the general burden to prove the ingredient of the offence unless there is a specific statute to the contrary is always on the prosecution but the burden to prove the circumstances coming under the exceptions lies upon the accused. It is very significant indeed to note that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Nanavatis case while considering the question as to the alleged conflict between the general burden which lies on the prosecution and the special burden imposed on the accused under sec. 105 of the Evidence Act have pointed out that there may arise three situations as referred to in the above quotation from the said ruling and that it is in respect of the third category only that they have laid down that though the burden lies on the accused to bring his case within the exception the facts proved may not discharge the burden but may affect the proof of the ingredients of the offence and that would give the benefit to the accused. The present case does not fall in that third category but falls in the first of them. In cases falling in the first category the principle of the general burden of proof of the ingredients of the offence alleged being always on the prosecu- tion would not apply because there is the specific statutory provision in the shape of sec. The present case does not fall in that third category but falls in the first of them. In cases falling in the first category the principle of the general burden of proof of the ingredients of the offence alleged being always on the prosecu- tion would not apply because there is the specific statutory provision in the shape of sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act which throws the burden of proving that ingredient (that the gratification accepted was either remuneration or any other legal claim) on the accused. The provision of sec. 4 presumes the existence of the fact necessary to prove the ingredient that the accused accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or obtain that gratification as a motive or reward such as mentioned in sec. 161. . . and calls upon the accused to prove to the contrary that is to say to establish the existence of the facts that constitute his defence version to be so pro- bable that a prudent man will act upon the assumption that they exist. The legislative intention to make a statutory provision to throw the burden of proving one of the ingredients of the offence under sec. 161 Indian Penal Code on the accused is most emphatically expressed by the enactment of sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act wherein the legislature has not only said that the accused shall be presumed to have accepted the grati- fication as a motive or reward but has also used the words unless the contrary is proved thus throwing the positive burden on the accused to prove that the said ingredient does not exist. In view of this there can be no doubt whatever that in the case where sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act applies the general burden to prove the ingredient of the offence under sec. 161 does not lie on the prosecution as there is the specific statutory provision to the contrary. The result of this train of reasoning is that unless it can be held that the appellant has proved that the two amounts of Rs. 10. 00 each were accepted by him as the return of loans from Fakir Magan and Shanker Asha he cannot succeed. The result of this train of reasoning is that unless it can be held that the appellant has proved that the two amounts of Rs. 10. 00 each were accepted by him as the return of loans from Fakir Magan and Shanker Asha he cannot succeed. It would not be enough for him merely to create a situation where the Court may be put in doubt that his case may be true or may not be true. ( 11 ) THE next question therefore to consider is what is the nature of this burden on him. It is well established now that the burden upon the accused of proving his case is no higher than that which rests upon a party in a civil litigation to obtain a decision In its favour The rigour of the burden on him is not the same as on the pro- secution of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt It is enough for the accused to establish the preponderance of probability of that which he is called upon to prove. If the present appellant satisfies us from the material on the record that we should as prudent men consider the existence of the facts of his version of having received the amounts as the return of the loans from the two persons so probable that in a civil litiga- tion we would have acted upon the supposition that they so exist and decided it in his favour his appeal must succeed. In other words it may be said that if the appellant can show that there is enough material on the record to entitle him to a decree for these two amounts on the basis of these amounts being loans if this were a civil litigation he is entitled to succeed in the appeal. That takes us to the consideration of the matter on merits. ( 12 ) IN the light of the position in law as pointed out hereinabove the correct approach in appreciating the evidence will be to examine the evidence on record from that point of view and not as to whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond any reasonable doubt. ( 12 ) IN the light of the position in law as pointed out hereinabove the correct approach in appreciating the evidence will be to examine the evidence on record from that point of view and not as to whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond any reasonable doubt. It is at the same time true that the appellant can rely on any material placed before the Court including admissions or matters established by the pro- secution evidence itself which can go to support his version to rebut the presumption and discharge the burden cast on him by sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It will be convenient however to deal with one more point raised by Mr. Trivedi before we actually turn to the appreciation of the merits of the case. ( 13 ) AT one stage Mr. Trivedi referred to the following cases and seemed to urge that what was laid down in those cases was that the burden cast on the accused under sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not as light as under sec. 114 of the Evidence Act and it cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explana- tion offerred by the accused is reasonably probable but in those cases the accused had led no evidence and therefore the emphasis in those cases was only on the aspect of the accused having rested satisfied merely by giving an explanation which was claimed to be reasonably probable and which was held not to be sufficient to discharge the burden. He submitted that the appellant before us had not merely given a reasonably probable explanation before the trial Court in reply to questions put to him under sec. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code but had actually stepped into the witness box and given evidence on oath and also led evidence of an independent witness and this by itself was enough to rebut the presump- tion. Mr. Trivedi seemed to urge that the said decisions in no way injure the defence of the accused but on the contrary the reasoning adopted in the said decisions impliedly support his aforesaid submission. The cases referred to by Mr. Trivedi are as under: (1) Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai v. The State of Maharashtra A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 575. Mr. Trivedi seemed to urge that the said decisions in no way injure the defence of the accused but on the contrary the reasoning adopted in the said decisions impliedly support his aforesaid submission. The cases referred to by Mr. Trivedi are as under: (1) Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai v. The State of Maharashtra A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 575. It was a case where the appellant before the High Court a Resident Engineer for Light houses was charged and convicted under sec. 161 I. P. C. and sec. 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with sec. 5 (2) thereof. He was alleged to have accepted Rs. 1000. 00 as illegal gratification. The receipt of Rs. 1000. 00 was admitted by the appellant. The defence was that he had accepted the said amount to be handed over to the temple authorities for carrying out certain repairs which the complainant in that case had undertaken to do and which he was not able to carry out and had instead given the amount of Rs. 1000. 00 to the appellant with a request that the amount be given over to the temple authorities as compensation The defence was not accepted by the trial Court as well as the High Court. It was contended before the Supreme Court on behalf of the appellant that an accused person is entitled to rebut even the presumption arising by virtue of a statutory provision by merely offering an explanation which is reasonable and probable. The Supreme Court rejected this contention. It pointed out that the burden resting on an accused person in a case where sec. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act applied would not be as light as it is where a presumption is raised under sec. 114 of the Evidence Act and cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and probable. It must further be shown that the explanation is a true one. The words unless the contrary is proved which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by proof and not by a bare explana- tion which is merely plausible. It must further be shown that the explanation is a true one. The words unless the contrary is proved which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by proof and not by a bare explana- tion which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when upon the material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless therefore the explanation is supported by proof the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted. It further held that the question whether a presump- tion of law or facts stands rebutted by evidence or other material on record is one of fact and not of law. (2) The State of Gujarat v. Madhavbhai Narottam I. L. R. 1963 Gujarat p. 827 [ (1963) IV G. L. R. 886]. In the said case the appellant was also charged under sec. 161 I. P. C. and secs. 5 (1) (d) read with 5 (1) (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He was a Head Constable and was alleged to have accepted Rs. 10. 00 per week as illegal gratification to give the complainant a freehand to carry on some kind of gambling. The accused admitted that he bad received the money from the complainant but his explanation was that the amount of Rs. 10. 00 was not received by him as illegal gratification but as refund of the advance that was paid to the com- plainant by him towards the price of shoes. The trial Judge found that the explanation of the accused was reasonable for various reasons and acquitted the accused. The Division Bench of this High Court however set aside the acquittal on appeal by the State and convicted the respon- dent in respect of the two charges. The learned Judges in the said case have laid down the following principles: (1) The word gratification in sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) must be given its literal dictionary meaning. (2) In the case of a public servant when it is shown that he has received a certain sum of money which was not a legal remunera- tion condition prescribed by sec. 4 sub-see. 4 sub-sec. (1) must be given its literal dictionary meaning. (2) In the case of a public servant when it is shown that he has received a certain sum of money which was not a legal remunera- tion condition prescribed by sec. 4 sub-see. (1) is satisfied and the presumption must be raised by the court as mentioned in that section. (3) Once this presumption is raised the burden of rebutting that presumption is on the accused and this burden cannot be said to have been discharged merely by an explanation offered by the accused which explanation might be reasonable and probable. (4) The burden can only be said to have been discharged by the accused when besides offering an explanation which may be reasonable and probable the accused shows that the explanation is a true one and for that purpose it must be borne in mind that the presumption has to be rebutted by proof and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. (5) In this context the court must bear in mind the definition of the word proved occurring in sec. 3 of the Evidence Act. ( 14 ) IT was also held in that case if the explanation given by the accused in his examination under sec. 312 Criminal Procedure Code about the receipt of money which is obviously not a part of the legal remuneration of the accused remains uncorroborated and unsupported by any other material on record it cannot be said that the burden cast upon the accused by sec. 4 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been dis- charged by him. ( 15 ) IT is true that in the cases the accused had merely tried to rely upon the explanation given by them in reply to the questions put by the Court under sec. 342 Criminal Procedure Code to urge that they had given a reasonably probable explanation and had thus discharge the burden But because of that fact it cannot be said that the said observations cannot apply to the present case merely because the accused has stepped into witness box and has led evidence. He has further to show as observed hereinabove that he had succeeded in rebutting the presumption having regard to and within the meaning of the definition of the words shall presume disproved and proved as given in the Evidence Act. He has further to show as observed hereinabove that he had succeeded in rebutting the presumption having regard to and within the meaning of the definition of the words shall presume disproved and proved as given in the Evidence Act. ( 16 ) MR. Trivedi relied upon the English decision of Rex v. Carr-Briant 1943 K. B. p. 607 wherein it was decided that where either by statute or at common law some matter is presumed against an accused person unless the contrary is proved the jury should be directed that the burden of proof on the accused is less than that required at the hands of the prosecution in proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt and that this burden may be discharged by evidence satisfying the jury of the probability of that which the accused is called on to establish. Generally speaking the principle laid down there is sound but at the same time we have to keep in mind the definition given in the Evidence Act of the words proved and disproved. We are in agreement with Their Lordships deciding the case that the burden of proof on accused is less than that required at the hands of the prosecution as has already been observed hereinabove. A passage from the said decision may be with advantage referred to which goes to further support the view that we have already taken as regards the burden of proof on the accused:what is the burden resting on a plaintiff or defendant in civil proceedings can we think best be stated in the words of the classic pronouncement on the subject by Willes J. in Cooper v. Slade (6 H L. Cas 772 ). That learned judge referred to an ancient authority in support of what he termed the elementary proposition that in civil cases the preponderance of probability may constitute sufficient ground for a verdict. The authority in question was the judgment of Dyer C. J. and a majority of the justices of the Common Pless in Newis v. Lark [ (1571) Plowd. 403 ] decided in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. ( 17 ) IN the light of the discussion made hereinabove the suggestion of Mr. The authority in question was the judgment of Dyer C. J. and a majority of the justices of the Common Pless in Newis v. Lark [ (1571) Plowd. 403 ] decided in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. ( 17 ) IN the light of the discussion made hereinabove the suggestion of Mr. Trivedi that the mere fact of the appellant having stepped into the box or having led evidence of a witness would be sufficient compliance in the eye of law to rebut the burden cast on him we are unable to accept. The appellant in order to suceed must show the preponderance of pro- bability in any case in favour of his version. Appeal dismissed. .