Judgment :- 1. This is a reference under S.438 Cr. P.C., made by the learned District Magistrate, Palghat recommending that the order of the Sub-Magistrate, Palghat in Calendar Case No. 1500 of 1963 discharging the accused under S.251A(2) be set aside. S.436 Cr. P. C., gives power to the District Magistrate on examining any record under S.435 to make or direct any subordinate Magistrate to make further inquiry into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged. In this case, the Sub-Magistrate found the accusation to be groundless and ordered the discharge of the accused. If therefore the District Magistrate himself had the power to make an order proposed, a reference will be incompetent. The question is whether the District Magistrate himself can act under S.436 Cr. P.C. Probably, the learned District Magistrate was of the view that he had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of discharge under S.251 A(2) of the Code. As far as I could see there are two decisions which take that view. They are Govindaswamy v. State AIR. 1960 A.P. 391 and another decision of the Assam High Court in Tabarak Ali v. Mantaj Ali (1961) 2 Cr. L.J. 460 following the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 2. S.251A (1) says: "When in any case instituted on a police report, the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial...." Under S.252, in any case instituted otherwise than on a police report, when the accused appears, evidence has to be taken in support of the prosecution case; and under S.253, if upon taking all the evidence, no case is made out, he can discharge the accused. In such a case, upto that stage, the proceeding is in the nature of inquiry and not a trial. It has been held by a large number of decisions of the various High Courts that a trial would commence only on the framing of the charge by the court. 3. The question is, was it the intention of sub-section (2) to S.251A to depart from this rule and make the proceeding preceding a discharge under subsection (2) partake the nature of a trial. 3. The question is, was it the intention of sub-section (2) to S.251A to depart from this rule and make the proceeding preceding a discharge under subsection (2) partake the nature of a trial. The words 'at the commencement of the trial' in the sub-section suggest prima facie that a trial starts at the moment the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate, but on a close scrutiny of the section, it will be seen that no such meaning attaches to the words. What actually transpired before a discharge is made is only that the Magistrate makes sure that the documents contemplated by S.173 are duly furnished to the accused and upon a consideration of those documents and the statement of the accused, if necessary, the Magistrate has to find whether there is ground to frame a charge. There is very little in the nature of a trial. Merely because the word 'trial' has been used is not decisive for holding whether the proceeding amounts to an inquiry or a trial. The word 'trial' is of wide import and is actually used in the Code not in a uniform sense. S.4(1)(k) only defines 'inquiry' as including every inquiry other than a trial conducted under the Code by a Magistrate or court. 4. In the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh AIR. 1957 SC. 389 it is stated: "The words 'tried and trial' have no fixed or universal meaning. In quite a number of sections in the Code the words 'tried' and 'trial' have been used in the sense of reference to a stage after the inquiry. That meaning attaches to the words in these sections having regard to the context in which they are used. There is no reason why where these words are used in another context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which they are used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the provisions under consideration." Therefore, in my opinion the word 'trial' has been used in sub-section (1) to S.251A in the sense of a proceeding of the nature of an enquiry commencing from the appearance of the accused. This interpretation appears to be consistent with the scheme of the rest of the sub-sections. This interpretation appears to be consistent with the scheme of the rest of the sub-sections. Sub-section (2) of S.251A speaks of a discharge following a consideration by the Magistrate of the document, if any, of the accused. I am fortified in the view that I take by the decisions in Fakuridin v. State Police, Nirmal AIR. 1962 A. P. 236; In re Pakkirisamy Pillai AIR. 1962 Mad. 142; Kanbi Bechar Lala v. State AIR. 1962 Guj. 316; Ganesh v. State (1963) 2 Cr. L.J. 109; Abbas Beary v. State of Mysore AIR. 1965 Mys. 35 and In re Rangasamy 1965 M.L.J (Crl.)78. 5. In Govindaswamy v. State AIR. 1960 A.P. 391, Krishna Rao, J., took the view that with regard to warrant cases instituted on police report the trial commences as soon as the stage of sub-section (1) of S.251 is passed, and therefore the trial commences when the accused is brought before the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate has no power to interfere in a case of discharge under sub-s. (2) of S.251A. With great respect to the learned Judge, I find myself unable to agree with the view taken for reasons already mentioned by me. I may also point out that in a later decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Fakuridin v. State Police, Nirmal AIR. 1962 A.P. 236 a Bench of that High Court has considered the matter in great detail and differed from the view of the learned Single Judge. The other case of the Assam High Court has followed the decision of the Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Hence in my view the learned District Magistrate himself can proceed under S.436 Cr. P.C. and direct further inquiry if thought fit. The reference is answered as above.