Anantanarayanan, J.- These related appeals arise out of a suit by the plaintiff for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 20,750 as damages, out of which plaintiff sought to recover Rs. 20,000 from the Indian Mutual General Insurance Society (second defendant in the suit), with regard to a fatal accident to his son Subbanna, aged 18 years. The learned Subordinate Judge of Chingleput tried the action on the merits, and gave a decree for Rs. 7,500 due from both defendants, with proportionate costs. The Indian Mutual General Insurance Society Limited, Madras (second defendant) has instituted the main appeal from this judgment and decree, which is on the substantial merits as well as on the quantum of damages, namely, A.S. No. 162 of 1961. A.S. No. 309 of 1961 is an appeal by the plaintiff in the suit, which is limited to the ground that the quantum of damages ought to have been determined as at least Rs. 15,000 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. A fact, which is of some relevance in the situation before us, is that D. Peddabhoy Reddi (first defendant), the proprietor of the lorry which caused the fatal accident, according to the evidence, and who was mulcted in damages equally with the second defendant Insurance Society, has not instituted any appeal, from the decree against him. But, however this might be, the second defendant Society (appellant) is certainly entitled to plead that the grounds upon which it seeks to set aside the decree for damages should be independently assessed by us in appeal, notwithstanding the somewhat curious and inexplicable failure of the first defendant to agitate the matter at all, or even to associate himself with the second defendant in the main appeal. Another relevant fact, which may be stated at the outset itself, is that Godi Chakravarthi, the driver of the lorry of the first defendant, who actually caused the fatal accident, was prosecuted for a criminal offence and ultimately acquitted in the Court of Session, Chingleput. It is conceded that while the fact of this acquittal may not be irrelevant, the judgment of acquittal has no direct bearing upon the merits of this action; this action by the plaintiff will have to be judged, exclusively on the facts of its record. It is conceded that while the fact of this acquittal may not be irrelevant, the judgment of acquittal has no direct bearing upon the merits of this action; this action by the plaintiff will have to be judged, exclusively on the facts of its record. Further, it is not in controversy before us that the acquittal by the Court of Sessions was based, not on any explicit finding that the accident occurred in some other manner, as claimed by the first defendant, but on the award of the benefit of doubt to the concerned accused. Before proceeding to the record, we may very briefly indicate the state of the pleadings in the suit, for that is of some importance. According to the plaint, the accident took place at about 11 p.m. on the night of 13th June, 1953, on the Grand Trunk Road near Gummudipundi between miles 29/1 and 29/2. The lorry of the plaintiff (ADC 1024) was then stationed on the road-margin for the night halt, and the deceased Subbanna, who was travelling in the lorry, was lying in front of it, and sleeping at the time. The lorrry of the first defendant (ADN 405), driven by Godi Chakravarthi, came from the opposite direction in such a rash and negligent manner that it collided with the stationary lorry, and not merely damaged it, but. actually pushed it into the main road for a distance estimated at 25 feet or 25 yards. The lorry of the first defendant ran over the unfortunate Subbanna and caused very grave internal injuries, to the effect of which the young man succumbed when taken to the Hospital at Madras. The claim of the plaintiff was based on the Indian Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855), read with section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act. With regard to the quantum of damages, that matter must receive a separate discussion, after a disposal of the claim on the substantial merits. The written statements of the respective defendants are significant. As far as the first defendant is concerned, in paragraph 5 of his statement, he puts forward a quite different counter-version of the accident. According to this defendant, the version of the plaintiff is not true, and both lorries were travelling at the time. The written statements of the respective defendants are significant. As far as the first defendant is concerned, in paragraph 5 of his statement, he puts forward a quite different counter-version of the accident. According to this defendant, the version of the plaintiff is not true, and both lorries were travelling at the time. The lorry of the plaintiff was driven at a very high speed, in a rash and negligent manner, on the wrong side of the road. In spite of the best efforts of the driver of the lorry of the first defendant, ADN 405, there was a collision, and the son of the plaintiff, who was travelling on the top of the lorry of the plaintiff, fell down, and sustained very serious injuries. The driver of the lorry of the first defendant, namely, Godi Chakravarthi, thereafter proceeded to the Police Station and made a report about the accident-Exhibit B-1(a), which is the true account of what took place. The version of the plaintiff, to the contrary effect, is a distinct afterthought; that is . also made evident by the acquittal of Godi Chakravarthi of an offence under section 304-A, Indian Penal Code in the Court of Session, Chingleput. A curious feature of the case is that the second defendant Insurance Society (appellant in A.S. No. 162 of 1961) did not precisely approbate this defence. On the contrary, as far as the written statement of this appellant proceeds, it tacitly accepts the version of the plaintiff as to how the accident occurred. That will be clear from the following sentence in paragraph 3: “The insured lorry dashed against a lorry in front of which the plaintiff’s son was sleeping.” But the main defence is that the insured lorry was not the direct cause of death, and that the conduct of the deceased Subbanna in sleeping in front of his lorry on an open road was imprudent and unnatural, thus constituting a factor of contributory negligence. There are other technical pleas about the liability of the defendant . as an insurer, which need not be gone into here, as the position at law really . admits of no doubt. The relevant issues framed by the Subordinate Judge reflect the controversy, which is on the main issue of fact, how the accident occurred, and whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. as an insurer, which need not be gone into here, as the position at law really . admits of no doubt. The relevant issues framed by the Subordinate Judge reflect the controversy, which is on the main issue of fact, how the accident occurred, and whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. When we look at the facts of the record, in this context, there would appear to be very little room for doubt or difficulty. The driver of the lorry of the plaintiff has been examined as P.W. 5, and two persons who came to the spot from that locality, immediately after the accident have been examined as P.Ws. 4 and 6. P.Ws. 4 and 6 would appear to be quite disinterested witnesses, worthy of credit. Not merely this, but there has been no rebutting evidence of any kind offered by the defendants; even Godi Chakravarthi, the driver of the lorry of the first defen-dant, has not been examined as a witness. Further, the plaintiff has examined the Motor Vehicles Inspector (P.W. 2), who inspected the spot of accident as soon after it as was practicable and made his report (Exhibit A-2) along with a plan showing the details (Exhibit A-3). These documents, and the oral evidence, give the lie direct to the counter-version of the first defendant; there can be no doubt at all that the lorry of the plaintiff had been parked on the road-margin, and that the driver and cleaner were sleeping in the vehicle, while the deceased Subbanna was sleeping in front of it. It was against this stationary lorry, which had not been parked on the road proper at all, except, perhaps, to a very restricted extent, that the lorry of the first defendant collided, clearly driven in a rash and negligent manner. Learned Counsel for the second defendant Insurance Society has been able to advance only two grounds of argument, on the merits. The first is that it is curious that neither the driver, nor the cleaner, of the lorry of the plaintiff sustained injuries, though the impact must have been terrific, and the lorry of the plaintiff was pushed . on to the road for quite some distance, as seen from Exhibit A-3. But the evidence shows that the cleaner was sleeping on the foot-board, and he might have jumped off when the collision occurred. on to the road for quite some distance, as seen from Exhibit A-3. But the evidence shows that the cleaner was sleeping on the foot-board, and he might have jumped off when the collision occurred. The driver was sleeping inside on the seat, and it was not necessary that he should have been injured. The second argument is that the deceased Subbanna would have been crushed unrecognisably to pulp if the accident had really occurred in the manner deposed to. But that is refuted by the expert evidence of Dr. Gopalakrishnan, Head of the Department of Forensic Medicine who actually conducted the autopsy. The expert is very clear that the injuries could have been sustained by the running over of the victim by the lorry of the first defendant, and that abrasions caused by the tyres are not essential. Actually, five ribs were fractured, and there were very grave abdominal injuries; which caused death. We find it established beyond doubt that the accident was directly due to the rash and negligent driving of the lorry of the first defendant and that the youngman succumbed to the effect of the injuries received in such an accident. Considering the manner in which the lorry of the plaintiff had been stationed on the road-margin, there was absolutely no contributory negligence on. the part of the victim, in sleeping very close to his stationary lorry, in front of it. The claim for damages is thus substantiated beyond controversy. With regard to the quantum, the two appeals may be taken up and regarded together. The facts here are that Subbanna was the fourth son of the plaintiff, and that he was looking after the lorry business of his father, who was a middle-aged man. The plaintiff, did not produce his accounts, but the only evidence about profits from the lorry business is that of the plaintiff who alleges that he conducts the business with two lorries, and derives an average profit of Rs. 500 per month. The learned Subordinate Judge was of the view that plaintiff was making a profit of Rs. 208-8-0 per month, or roughly Rs. 2,500 per year, from the lorry business, restricted to the share which could be attributed to the management of Subbanna. From this, he estimated the pecuniary loss as three years’ loss of profit, and quantified the damages at Rs. 7,500. 208-8-0 per month, or roughly Rs. 2,500 per year, from the lorry business, restricted to the share which could be attributed to the management of Subbanna. From this, he estimated the pecuniary loss as three years’ loss of profit, and quantified the damages at Rs. 7,500. Undoubtedly, this is quite arbitrary, and based upon no logical or perceptible foundation. We have been at some pains to ascertain the true principles applicable to the facts as in the record, in estimating the damages to be properly awarded to the plaintiff in an action of this kind. Those principles will be found tersely stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Simonds Edition), Volume 11 at page 257 and 258 (Paragraphs 429 and 430). Again, in Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami1their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider the basis of assessment of damages, in actions for damages arising under the Fatal Accidents Act, and they have referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Davies v. Pomell-Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd.,2 as well as to the dicta of Viscount Simon in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co., Ltd.3In the latter decision, several factors have been elucidated, which would be relevant for the computation of damages. For the present purpose, it is really necessary to particularise them here. We shall select those factors which appear to arise for application on the facts of the present record, when actually computing damages. In Mayne and McGregor on Damages (Twelfth Edition), pages 691 and 692 (Para. 813) the technique of evaluation has been discussed by the learned Authors. As stated by them: “This (basis) may be calculated by taking the annual figure of the dependency, whether stemming from money or goods provided or services rendered and multiplying it by the number of years that the dependency might reasonably be expected to last. This latter figure is generally referred to as the multiplier. The resulting amount must then be scaled down by reason of two considerations, first that a lump sum is being given instead of the various sums over the year, and second that contingencies might have arisen to cut off the benefit prematurely.” The dicta of Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell-Duffryn Associated Collieries2are also cited here, and the contingencies have been particularised in more than one decision. Two recent decisions, which, however, do not bring in any new principle to be applied to the present context of facts, are the decision of this Court (Jagadisan, J.) in Krishna Gounder v. Narasingam4, and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Abdul Mahomed Aga v. Peter Leo D’Mello,5 Upon the formulated basis, it will be clear that, since the plaintiff was aged about 52 when he lost his son, who was actively assisting him in the lorry business, the plaintiff might be considered as normally entitled, or likely to receive, the benefit of the services of this son, for a period of about eighteen years, till his 70th year; in other words, that will be the computed expectation. As regards the factors affecting the evaluation in favour of the second defendant-appellant such as an annuity or a sum of life assurance that might result from the fatal accident, to the benefit of the plaintiff, there is no evidence that any such factor exists. But it is true that the deceased, who was a bachelor, might have married later, in which case his service-contribution might be reduced, or might cease altogether. On the contrary, the service-contribution of the deceased to the dependant (plaintiff) might actually have increased, by greater efficiency and experience obtained by the victim, but for the fatal accident, in the conduct of the lorry business. In any event, since We are awarding a lump sum, we cannot award the maximum due, merely upon an arithmetical computation, with the expectation determined at 18 years. We fix the average contribution at Rs. 125 per month, since this seems to be very reasonable, in the light of the available data. Though the deceased was not the only son, there is no evidence that any other son could have immediately taken up the conduct of the lorry business, and run the business in an equally satisfactory manner. We reduce the period of computation to ten years, for the purpose of the evaluation, and this enables us to arrive at the sum of Rs. 15,000 as quantified damages. Taking all the facts into consideration, we are of the view that this is an eminently just and reasonable estimate. We reduce the period of computation to ten years, for the purpose of the evaluation, and this enables us to arrive at the sum of Rs. 15,000 as quantified damages. Taking all the facts into consideration, we are of the view that this is an eminently just and reasonable estimate. In the result, therefore, the appeals are disposed of by dismissing the appeal of the second defendant Society (A.S. No. 162 of 1961) and allowing the appeal of the plaintiff (A.S. No. 309 of 1961) to the extent of granting a decree for Rs. 7,500, in addition to the decree already granted by the trial Court, against both the defendants with proportionate costs on this sum throughout, in A.S. No. 309 of 1961. There will be no costs in A.S. No. 162 of 1961. V.K. ----- A.S. No. 162 of 1961 dismissed; A.S. No. 309 of 1961 allowed.