JUDGMENT G. D. Sahgal, J. - As a result of the consolidation operations in village Poorab Gaon, Tahsil and district Lucknow, chak No. 26 was allotted to respondent No. 6 consisting of a number of plots constituting his sirdari. Respondent No. 6 wanted to transfer the land to the petitioner and, as sirdari could not be transferred, he made as application to the Tahsildar under Sec. 134 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by depositing ten times the land revenue for a declaration that he had acquired the rights of a bhumidhar. As the matter related to land which was the subject matter of consolidation proceedings, the Tahsildar thought it fit to refer it to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The Settlement Officer (Consolidation), respondent No. 2, called for a report from the consolidator and the consolidator submitted a report to him copy of which, which is incomplete, is contained in annexure 1. In any case, on receiving the report the Settlement Officer forwarded it to the Tahsildar, Lucknow for necessary action. As would appear from the incomplete report, contained in annexure 1, it had some connection with a prayer by respondent No. 5, Jagat Narain Singh, for permission to transfer the land. But no specific orders were passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowing the transfer. The only order that he passed was that he forwarded that report to the Tahsildar, Lucknow for necessary action, vide annexure 2. Respondent No. 6, it appears, then made a transfer in favour of the petitioner of chak No. 26 by a sale-deed dated the 25th of May, 1964 for a sum of Rs. 5.00. On getting the Transfer made in his favour, the petitioner applied for mutation of his name in place of respondent No. 6 before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. Respondent No. 6 did not contest the application. In fact, he made a statement on oath that he had transferred the chak in favour of the petitioner and he supported the petitioner. Respondent No. 5 the Gram Pradhan, also supported the transfer. The Assistant Consolidation Officer, respondent No. 3 however, rejected the application on the ground that permission had not been obtained by the vendor, respondent No. 6, of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) prior to his executing the sale-deed which was absolutely necessary under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The Assistant Consolidation Officer, respondent No. 3 however, rejected the application on the ground that permission had not been obtained by the vendor, respondent No. 6, of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) prior to his executing the sale-deed which was absolutely necessary under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. A copy of that order is contained in annexure 3. The petitioner then made an appeal to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), a copy of the grounds of appeal being contained in annexure 4. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dismissed the appeal as would appear from annexure 5. The petitioner then went up in revision to the Director of Consolidation, vide annexure 6, and the application in revision which was heard by the Deputy Director of Consolidation to whom it was transferred, was dismissed by him, vide annexure 7. In the meantime, it appears, respondent No. 7 began to claim the chak on the basis of a transfer made in his favour was that this writ petition was filed by the petitioner against the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Assistant Consolidation Officer, respondent Nos. 1 to 3, and the State of Uttar Pradesh, respondent No. 4, besides the Gram Pradhan, Jagat Narain Singh, vendor, and Ram Behari Shukla, the subsequent vendee, respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7. The prayer in the writ petition is as follows :- (a) To order the respondents 1 to 3 to produce the originals of Annexures 7, 5 and 3 respectively and quash the same by issuing a writ of certiorari. (b) To order the respondents 1 to 3 to decide the petitioner's case according to law. (c) To order the correct interpretation of Sec. 5 (c) (ii) to declare the sale-deed in favour of the petitioner by respondent No. 6 to be valid under the circumstances and to pass necessary orders in respect alleged subsequent transfer by respondent No. 6 in favour of respondent No. 7, if any. (d) To pass any other appropriate writ, direction or order as may be deemed expedient. (e) To allow costs of the petition to the petitioner. 2. Annexures 7, 5 and 3, as has already been pointed out are the orders respectively of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal and the Assistant Consolidation Officer. 3. (e) To allow costs of the petition to the petitioner. 2. Annexures 7, 5 and 3, as has already been pointed out are the orders respectively of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal and the Assistant Consolidation Officer. 3. The first point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the Assistant Consolidation Officer had no jurisdiction to reject the application for mutation himself. What he could do was that he could have referred it to the Consolidation Officer. He could, according to the contention made on behalf of the petitioner, at the most make an effort, as far as may be, to settle the disputed entries and mistakes by conciliation between the parties appearing before him and pass orders on the basis of conciliation so arrived at and, as to the disputed cases, he had to send them with a report on each case to the Consolidation Officer, reliance being placed for this contention on the provisions of Sec. 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 4. The application for mutation appears to have been made under Sec. 12 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which provides as follows :- "12 (1). All matters relating to changes and transfers affecting any of the rights or interests recorded in the revised records published under Sec. 11-B, for which a cause of action was non-existent when proceedings under Secs. 7 to 10 were started or were in progress, many be raised before the Assistant Consolidation Officer as and when they arise, but not later than the date of notification, under Sec. 52, of under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 6. (2). The provisions of Secs. 7 to 11 shall mutatis mutandis apply to the hearing and decision of any matter raised under sub-Sec. (1), as it is were a matter raised under aforesaid sections." 5. As the application was made after the mutation proceedings had closed and a revised record had been published under Sec. 11-B, the application was obviously made under Sec. 12, but even in the matter of the disposal of this application the provisions of Secs. 7 to 11 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 6. As the application was made after the mutation proceedings had closed and a revised record had been published under Sec. 11-B, the application was obviously made under Sec. 12, but even in the matter of the disposal of this application the provisions of Secs. 7 to 11 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 6. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 9 provided that the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall after hearing the parties concerned make and effort, as far at may be, to settle the disputed entries and mistakes by conciliation between the parties appearing before him and pass orders on the basis on conciliation so arrived at. Under sun-Sec. (3), if this cannot be done by conciliation, the disputed case have to be referred to the consolidation Officer for disposal. The contention on behalf of the petitioner in that as there was no dispute between the parties, respondent no. 6 admitting the transfer in favour of the petitioner and also his possession, the Assistant Consolidation Officer should have made the entries and if the thought that there was an dispute, he should have referred that dispute to the Consolidation Officer. He could not reject the application. 7. The argument, though attractive is fallacious. The Assistant Consolidation Officer did not reject the application on the merits which had could not do. He rejected the application as he could not recognise the transfer made by respondent No. 6 in favour of the petitioner in view of the provisions of Sec. 5(c) (ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, even though there might have been no dispute between the parties about the fact of the transfer and about the fact of the possession having been delivered to the petitioner. He rejected the application because be did not rely on the transfer which, according to him, was not valid. It was not a disputed case inasmuch as there was no dispute between the parties before him. He, therefore, does not seem to have committed any error in not sending the case to the Consolidation Officer. On this ground, therefore, the petition cannot be allowed. 8. It was not a disputed case inasmuch as there was no dispute between the parties before him. He, therefore, does not seem to have committed any error in not sending the case to the Consolidation Officer. On this ground, therefore, the petition cannot be allowed. 8. The next contention of the learned counsel, however, is that the consolidation authorities have committed a manifest error of law in misinterpreting the provisions of Sec. 5(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by not giving effect to the transfer on the ground that permission had not been obtained from the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) before the transfer was made. In order to appreciate this argument it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the statute. 9-10. Section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, insofar as it is relevant, provides that upon the publication of the notification under Sect. 4 in the official Gazette among the consequences that ensue in the area to which the declaration relates from the dae specified in the declaration till the publication of notification under Sec. 52 or sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 6, one is that notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 1950, no tenure-holder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer. Consolidation, previously obtained, shall (i) use his holding or any part thereof for purposes not connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming; or (ii) transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area: Provided that a tenure-holder may continue to use his holding, or any part thereof, for any purpose for which it was in use prior to the date specified in the notification issued under Sec. 4. 11. The contention is that the prohibition under this clause of Sec. 5 is that no holding or any part thereof can be used for purposes not connected with agriculture, horticulture etc. and no transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange of any part of a holding can be made without the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Thus if a tenure-holder wants to use "his holding or any part thereof" for a purpose other than these described above, he has to obtain the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Thus if a tenure-holder wants to use "his holding or any part thereof" for a purpose other than these described above, he has to obtain the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). He has also to obtain the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) if he wants to make a sale, gift or exchange of "any part" of his holding and that permission has to be obtained prior to his making of the sale, gift or exchange. 12. It would appear form the wordings of this provision that while the prohibition against the use for purposes other than agriculture, horticulture etc. is with respect to "the holding of a tenure-holder or any part thereof," the prohibition against transfer, sale, gift etc. is with respect to "any part of the holding". Thus while in one case in the same section the words used are "his holding or any part thereof", in the other portion of the same section the words used are "any part of his holding". It is argued that if the intention of the Legislature was to prohibit the transfer of the whole of the holding, the words used in Sec. 5 (c) (ii) would also have been his holding of any part thereof instead of "any part of his holding" as they have been used in Sec. 5(c)(i). Though ordinarily when there is a prohibition against the transfer of any part of a holding, it should be construed to mean prohibition against the transfer of the whole of the holding also but if in the same provision at one place the prohibition is described with respect to the holding or any part thereof and at another place with respect to any part of the holding, the expression "any part of his holding" should not be construed as including the whole of the holding. There appears to me to be great force in this argument. There appears to the some explanation also behind this distinction. During the course of consolidation, valuation is put on various holdings and as a result of allotments the holding in the possession of another tenure-holder may go to the possession of another tenure-holder. If a holding is being used for purposes of agriculture, horticulture etc. There appears to the some explanation also behind this distinction. During the course of consolidation, valuation is put on various holdings and as a result of allotments the holding in the possession of another tenure-holder may go to the possession of another tenure-holder. If a holding is being used for purposes of agriculture, horticulture etc. and as a result of the allotment that holding is proposed to be allotted to a person other than the tenure-holder in whose possession it originally was, there would be no difficulty in doing so. But, if, supposing, a mill is erected on a part of that holding during the course of consolidation operations, it would not be possible to do so, unless it is brought to the notice of the consolidation authorities before the mill is erected thereon. It is for that purpose that it has been provided that a holding or any part thereof cannot be used for purposes not connected with agriculture, horticulture etc. after the notification under Sec. 4 without the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Whether a part of the holding is put to that use or the whole of it is put to that use, the difficulty will arise. But, if the holding is transferred as a whole, there can be no difficulty in the making of allotment as the person in whose favour the original tenure-holder has made the transfer will stand substituted in his place and will get the chak which was allotted to the tenure-holder, his transferor. In case a portion only of the holding is transferred., complication will arise as the holding will then consist of two portions one belonging to one tenure-holder, the transferor and the other belonging to another tenure-holder, the transferee, and complications will arise in the matter of valuation and also allotment and it will disturb the smooth process of allotment. It has, thus, been provided that if any part of the holding is transferred during consolidation it should be done with the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) so that the consolidation authorities may be apprised of the situation and they may make the necessary alterations during the course of the operations. If the whole of the holding is transferred, permission is not necessary as it will not disturb the consolidation operations, the transferee being substituted as whole in place of the transferor, the original tenure-holder. If the whole of the holding is transferred, permission is not necessary as it will not disturb the consolidation operations, the transferee being substituted as whole in place of the transferor, the original tenure-holder. Apparently, therefore, there has been an error of law in the interpretation of this provision of law. The transfer that has been made by respondent no. 6 in favour of the petitioner is of the entire holding of chak no. 26 and not a portion only and as such it was not hit by the provisions of Sec. 5 (c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 13. Reliance, however, was placed by the consolidation authorities on a decision of this Court in Nathi Singh v. Kanchhida (1962 R.D. (H.C.) 226 wherein the provisions of Sec. 16-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, as they stood prior to the amendment by U.P. Act XXXVIII of 1958, have been interpreted. That provision of law reads as follows:- "16-A (1) After the publication of the statement under Sec. 16 and until the issue of a notification under Sec. 52, a tenure-holder shall not, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) previously obtained, transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any plot or share in any holding included in the scheme of consolidation notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. (2) The Settlement Officer shall grant the permission referred to in sub-Sec. (1) unless for reasons to be recorded in writing he is satisfied that the proposed transfer is likely to defeat the scheme of consolidation." 14. What was been laid down in that case, referring to the argument that the section prohibited only the transfer of some of the plots in the Khata and not of the whole Khata, is that the section did prohibit a transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange of any plot in the Khata which meant that one or some of the plots of a Khata could not be transferred without prior permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The learned Judge did not find it possible to accept the contention that though one or more plots of a Khata could not be transferred, the whole Khata could be transferred without any such permission. The learned Judge did not find it possible to accept the contention that though one or more plots of a Khata could not be transferred, the whole Khata could be transferred without any such permission. That section has been deleted and instead the provisions of Sec. 5(c) (ii) have been introduced in the Act in the form referred to above. Reference to any plot has been confined now to a transfer with respect to a part of the holding. So the difficulty felt by the learned Judge in the interpretation sought to be made before him no longer exists. 15. There was another section namely, Sec. 16-B, which also stands deleted in place of which, we have now Sec. 5(c)(i). That section provided :- "16-B. (1) After the publication of notification under Sec. 4 and until the publication of a notification under Sec. 52, no tenure-holder shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 142 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, use his holding, hitherto used for per-poses connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming for construction of any building, enclosure or any other purpose except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) previously obtained. (2) If any person contravenes the provisions of sub-Sec. (1), he shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding rupees one thousand." 16. It would thus appear that in this case the prohibition was against the use of the holding and not any part of the holding. The position has now been clarified by using the words "holding or any part thereof". The position with respect to the prohibition against transfer also has been clarified by using the words "any part of his holding". To statute, as it now stands, therefore, is materially different from the statute as it stood when it was interpreted by the learned Judge in Nathi Singh's case (supra). Reliance, therefore, ought not to have been placed on that rule as it related to the interpretation of the portion of the statute which was differently worded. 17. To statute, as it now stands, therefore, is materially different from the statute as it stood when it was interpreted by the learned Judge in Nathi Singh's case (supra). Reliance, therefore, ought not to have been placed on that rule as it related to the interpretation of the portion of the statute which was differently worded. 17. The contention on behalf of respondent No. 7 who was contested this petition is that it is only a matter of interpretation and the error if any made in the interpretation by the consolidation authorities cannot be said to be a manifest error of law or an error of law apparent on the face of the record so as to call for interference inasmuch as there was reasonable basis for the interpretation being mace in the manner in which it has been made by the consolidation authorities. It is not possible to concede to this argument as the consolidation authorities lost sight of the fact that in the same section of the statute two different expressions have been used. While reference has been made in one portion to the whole as well as the part, in the other portion reference has been made only to the part. It is thus, a case of a manifest error of law. 18. The result is that the writ petition should be allowed, but the type of declaration that the petitioner seeks in prayer (c), referred to above, cannot be granted. Only the orders of respondent nos. 1 to 3 can be quashed with a direction that the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall now proceed to dispose of the matter in accordance with law. 19. The petition is accordingly allowed and the orders contained in annexues 7, 5 and 3 of respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively are hereby quashed. The Assistant Consolidation Officer shall now proceed to decide the application of the petitioner for mutation in accordance with law. The parties shall bear their own costs.