JUDGMENT S.C. Manchanda, J. - This first appeal was filed against an order of the District Judge Saharanpur remainder the suit under Order XLI, Rule 23 oF the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the plaintiffs. 2. In this Court on a preliminary objection being raised that as the suit in the present case was filed prior to 1st June 1957 i.e. before the amendment made by this Court to Order XLI no appeal lies against such an order under the provisions of Order XLIII, Rule 1 (u) of the, Code of Civil Procedure. As there was conflict, the question was referred by me to a Division Bench. The Division Bench by its order dated the 13th January 1965 has answered the question by saying that. "If in a suit instituted before the 1st June 1957 a District Judge passed an order of remand under the enlarged power conferred on appellate courts by the amendment made by Allahabad High Court in Order XLI, Rule 23, Civil Procedure Code such an order of remand is not appealable." 3. The result therefore is that the first appeal from order does not lie. Learned counsel for the plaintiff - appellant has now asked for the first appeal from order to be treated as a revision. This was objected to strenuously by Mr. Avasthi for the respondent considering that the matter was not free from doubt and the F. A. F. O. was filed within the period of limitation which is also now the period of limitation for revisions under the new Limitation Act, and in the interest of justice, I direct that the appeal be treated as a revision. 4. The scope of revision however is a limited one and the only question to be considered is whether there was any material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction which would justify interference by this court. The plaintiff applicant had filed a suit for possession and for the recovery of Rs. 4668/12/- as Theka money, for use and occupation, price of the trees and as damages. The property originally belonged to the defendant respondent but under a sale deed dated the 7th of June 1946 it was transferred to the plaintiff and on the same date by means of a lease deed was leased to the defendant for three years from 7-6-1946 to 6-6-1949 on payment of Rs. 712/8/- per annum. The property originally belonged to the defendant respondent but under a sale deed dated the 7th of June 1946 it was transferred to the plaintiff and on the same date by means of a lease deed was leased to the defendant for three years from 7-6-1946 to 6-6-1949 on payment of Rs. 712/8/- per annum. In case of default in payment If Theka money for one year the defendant was liable to ejectment from property in suit. The plaintiff claimed that no rent had been paid end therefore he was entitled to possession and for rent and mesneprcots. The defence of defendant No. ho was the contesting defendant as that he had borrowed Rs. 9,500/- om Mr. Jamuna Prasad. The elder brother of Satyarth Prakash the plaintiff and it was Jamuna Prasad ho got the benami sale deed executed in plaintiff's favour by way of security for repayment of the loan. was pleaded that he had supplied licks to Dr. Jamuna Prasad which ere used in the construction of a ionic and therefore he was entitled have the property reconveyed to him. 5. Fifteen issues were struck and ultimately a decree for possession, accept, for one room, and Rs. 3,082/8/- for arrears of rent and by any of use and occupation against defendant No. 1 was passed. In doing so issue No. 2, which was on the question as to whether the sale deed lease deeds in suit were execute benami by the defendant No. 1 in our of the plaintiff for Dr. Jamu a Prasad was also disposed of by building that the deeds Exs. 1 and 2 re not benami in favour of the plaintiff for Dr. Jamuna Prasad and even if such transactions were Betami, defendant No. 1 was estoppel om setting up this plea and challenging the title of the plaintiff. 6. An appeal was filed to the learn d District Judge by defendant No. 1. n the memorandum of appeal it was pacifically mentioned: "This is an appeal against the judgment and decree ...... in respect of ejectment alone. Valuation the appeal for purposes of jurist ion and court fee is Rs. 120/-." 7. is manifest that the appeal was of directed against the decree of rears of rent, or mesne profits deed in the sum of Rs. 3082/8/- and was confined only to that part of the decree which gave possession to the plaintiff. Valuation the appeal for purposes of jurist ion and court fee is Rs. 120/-." 7. is manifest that the appeal was of directed against the decree of rears of rent, or mesne profits deed in the sum of Rs. 3082/8/- and was confined only to that part of the decree which gave possession to the plaintiff. Unfortunately, before the learned District Judge, the plaintiff-respondent's counsel could not appear, the adjournment asked for having been refused. The defendant appellant before the learned District Judge does not appear to have drawn his attention to the fact that the appeal was only against a part of the decree and not in its entirety. In these circumstances the District Judge went on to set aside the entire judgment and decree of the trial court and remanded the case for a fresh trial presumably under Order XLI, Rule 23 as amended by this Court in 1957. 8. The learned District Judge was fully within his jurisdiction to remand the case but the question is whether he could remand only that part of the case which was before him in appeal or the entire suit? Mr. Avasthi, for the defendant-respondent has attempted to justify the remand by invoking the aid of Rule 33 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure and by saying that under Order XLI, Rule 23 it was the "case", that had to be remanded and the suit readmitted at its original number and redetermined. He has not been able to cite any authority for the proposition contended for. He has, however, tried to support the order of the Distt. Judge on first principles. He relies upon Or. 20 Rule 3, for the proposition that a judgment once signed cannot be altered except under Section 152 or by way of review. Section 33 is pressed into service to show that the decree must follow the judgment and Order 23 Rule 6 for the proposition that a decree must agree with the judgment. These provisions of the Civil Procedure Code do not however touch the point which arises in the present case. When these provision are read together they do not lead to the conclusion that the remand cannot be in respect of a part of the case but must necessarily be of the whole suit. These provisions of the Civil Procedure Code do not however touch the point which arises in the present case. When these provision are read together they do not lead to the conclusion that the remand cannot be in respect of a part of the case but must necessarily be of the whole suit. The Supreme Court in interpreting the word "case" which, occurs in Section 115 of the Code of.. Civil Procedure, in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, 1963 A.L.J. 1068 held "That the expression 'case' is a word of comprehensive import and is not restricted by anything contained in this section to the entirety of the proceeding in a civil court. To interpret the expression 'case' as an entire proceeding only and not a part of the proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence which the jurisdiction to issue writs and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject." 9. On a parity of reasoning the word "case" in Rule 23 of Order XLI can not necessarily be read to mean the entire suit. A remand may be in respect of a part of the suit, partly, where a part of the decree has been appealed against and not the remainder. In any event there is no indication that the learned District Judge had applied his mind to the provisions of Rule 33 of Order XLI before setting aside the entire judgment and decree of the trial court and remanding the suit for a fresh trial. 10. In circumstances somewhat similar to the present case, though that was in a matter of an appeal and not a revision a full bench of this Court in Rangam Lal v. Jhandu, I.L.R. 34 Alld. 32, laid down the one principle which they considered could be safely stated in these words: "The courts in the exercise of powers conferred by Order XLI, Rule 33 should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure itself nor of the Court Fees Act nor of the Law of Limitation." 11. In that case the plaintiff had claimed rent of Rs. 294/7/- against the tenant but the decree given was only for Rs. 96/11 /-. The plaintiff appealed, against the decree in so far as it dig missed the balance of his claim. In that case the plaintiff had claimed rent of Rs. 294/7/- against the tenant but the decree given was only for Rs. 96/11 /-. The plaintiff appealed, against the decree in so far as it dig missed the balance of his claim. Th, defendants submitted to the They did not file cross-appeal nor objections. The District Judge remanded certain issues for trial an( those issues in substance involved ; retrial by the court of first instancy of the various issues which that Court had already decided and it particular the amount of Rs. 96/11/- which was decreed and to which the defendant had submitted. It way pointed out by the Full Bench that the District Judge's setting aside that plaintiff's suit in its entirety was not a proper exercise by him of the powers conferred by Or. XLI, Rule 33 and if the defendant was aggrieved by the decree against him fit. Rs. 96/4/- there was no reason why he should not have appealed or filed objections. In the present case, it was the defendant himself who had appealed and yet had deliberately refrained from challenging' the decree for Rs. 3,082/8/- awarded against him by the trial court. In these circumstances there was no power conferred by Order XLI, Rule 33 to reopen the whole case and certain not even that part of the decree which the defendant had acquiesce: in and had not appealed against There is no case that I know of has any been brought to my notice., such as the present, where remand of even that portion of the suit wat made which was not appealed against. The whole difficulty, as already observed, has arisen because that' plaintiff-respondent was unrepresented before the learned District Judge and the defendant-appellant did not "care" to bring to his notice that the appeal was only against a part of the decree and not against the decree as a whole. 12. In these circumstances it mush be held that there was material is regularity in the exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 113 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code. For the reasons given above the television is allowed, the Order and decree of the District Judge is set aside and the appeal is remanded for disposal by the lower appellate court in accordance with law. Ir. the circumstances of the case there: will be no order as to costs. For the reasons given above the television is allowed, the Order and decree of the District Judge is set aside and the appeal is remanded for disposal by the lower appellate court in accordance with law. Ir. the circumstances of the case there: will be no order as to costs. 13. The stay order is cost. 14. Let the represent down forthwith