JUDGMENT PATEL J. -This revisional application arises out of an order made under the provisions of O. XXII, r. 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure in a suit. 2. The short facts are that one Balaji left two sons Vithoba and Pandurang after his death, who were members of a joint family. Vithoba died in 1912 leaving behind him Vyankati, defendant No.1 and Gopala, defendant No.2: Pandurang died in 1941 leaving his widow Sarubai and a daughter Indubai who was married. At the time of his death, the joint family was possessed of the suit properties. In August 1961, Pandurangs widow Sarubai filed a suit claiming partition of her share in the property against the defendants. After issues were framed, Saruba,i was examined on commission. Thereafter she died on October 20, 1962. Before her death she had executed a will and bestowed her properties in favour of her daughter Indubai. Indubai then made an application under the provisions of O. XXII, r. 3, for being brought on record in place of her mother as the plaintiff, claiming the properties under the will or, in any event, by reason of s, 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. She claimed, therefore, to be the legal representative of the deceased Further evidence had not been led. The learned trial Judge dismissed the application. 3. The learned Judge rejected the contention of the petitioner that s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applied as Sarubai was not in possession of the property at I the date of the suit. He relied upon her evidence on commision that after her husbands death she did not live with the defendants that is, since 1941 she did not stay in the family house saying: "she remained aloof from the family for more than twenty years after her husbands death. He relied upon her evidence on commision that after her husbands death she did not live with the defendants that is, since 1941 she did not stay in the family house saying: "she remained aloof from the family for more than twenty years after her husbands death. Therefore, it could not be inferred that she was in possession as a widow of her husband and her interest became enlarged by reason of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act." Then he relied upon Sudarsan Das V. Ram Kirpal Das1 and Babaji V. Jivajil and said "the doctrine is that possession of a ioint estate is adverse to any claim to such an estate as a separate one, and that possession by a joint family may by lapse of time become adverse to a separate estate." Then while considering the decision in Kotturuswami V. Veeravvas he observed "Sarubai never showed any concern to the suit property right after 194,1. She remained away immediately after pandurangs death. The defendants possession there - fore became adverse" and held that in such a case rights of her reversionary heirs would of course be barred at the expiration of twelve years from Pandurangs death and relied upon Mst. Kirpal K1tar V. Bachan Singh.4 As to agricultural land, he relied upon s. 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, and the decision, Sitabai V. Kothulal.5 4. Mr. Manohar relies on s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. in support of the will in favour of the applicant and her right to succeed to Sarubais interest otherwise than under the will. 5. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, effected a change in the old Hindu law and converted widows estate into an absolute estate in respect of all "property possessed by her" . In Venkayamma V. Veerayya6 "possession" was construed in its widest sense to mean the state of "owning or having in ones hands or power". Similar view was taken by this High Court. This view has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kotturuswami V. V eeravva. The application of this meaning of the phrase was also not left in doubt in this case. In this case A, the husband of B, had died in 1920 and by will authorized her to adopt a son. Similar view was taken by this High Court. This view has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kotturuswami V. V eeravva. The application of this meaning of the phrase was also not left in doubt in this case. In this case A, the husband of B, had died in 1920 and by will authorized her to adopt a son. She adopted a son C in 1942 and he was placed in possession of the property. D alleged that he was the nearest reversioner of A and filed the suit for declaration that the adoption was invalid and not binding on. him. He failed in the trial Court and also in the High Court and at the hearing of his appeal to the Supreme Court a preliminary objection was taken under s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the contention being that Inasmuch as the widow had become the full owner of the estate, his suit could not succeed. Their Lordships said that if the adoption was invalid, the widow would become the absolute owner under the section as Cs possession must be regarded permissive possession and the appeal was dismissed. 6. The question is whether Sarubai possessed the property in the above sense. Mr. Khare contends that she did not possess the property at all and so there is no question of s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act applying. His contention is that Sarubai no doubt acquired an interest in the property, but on her death the cause of action did not survive and the suit abated. He relied on the decisions in Shamrao V. Kashibai,7 Subba Hao V. Krishna Prasadam8 and Jiwanandan Singh V. Sia Ram Prasad Singh.9 We must, therefore, consider the nature of her interest in the property when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into force and the effect of her filing the suit. 7. Under old Hindu law a widow had no right except that of maintenance in the property of the joint family of which her husband died as a member. Even in the case of separate property if her husband left a male issue then her only right was one of maintenance. By Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, substantial change was made in her rights. Section 3, the most important, is divided into four parts. Even in the case of separate property if her husband left a male issue then her only right was one of maintenance. By Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, substantial change was made in her rights. Section 3, the most important, is divided into four parts. Sub -section (2) gave her on the death of her husband as a member of the joint family "the same interest as her husband had." By sub -so (1) as to separate property of a coparcener and in the case of those governed by the Dayabhaga school, the widow took equally with the son. However, she got a limited estate known as widows estate but got the right to claim partition. 8. The Legislature gave her full right in the property that her husband had without any limitation except that she got the estate as a widow. It is clear that this right is given to her not in lieu of maintenance Or only for the purpose of maintenance. It was, therefore, held that she could alienate her interest in the coparcenary property for legal necessity as she could the separate property of her husband which she got as his heir under the same Act: Harekrishna Das V. Jujesthi Panda10 and Pem Mahton V. Bandhu Mahto.ll It was also held by this Court in Dagadu Balu V. Namdeo Rakhamaji 19 that she could alienate her own restricted interest to enjoy the property during her life time and that the alienate could also enjoy the property during her life time and for this purpose he could claim partition. The ratio of these decisions is that she had disposing power over the property. 9. The decisions in Subba Rao V. Krishna Prasadam, Shamrao V. Kashibai, Jiwananilan Singh V. Sia Ram Prasad Singh and Alamelu Ammal V. Ohellammal13 were given with reference to the position obtaining before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, ca~e to be enacted. Apart from this, it seems to us with great respect that the scope of s. 14 of the Act which gives the widow rights in the property of her husband is considerably narrowed down by considerations of old law. The decisions in Dagadus case and Mahadu Kashiba V. Gajarabai Shankar14 do not support this view. There is no justification in our view for saying that the right of the widow in the property ended with the death of the widow. The decisions in Dagadus case and Mahadu Kashiba V. Gajarabai Shankar14 do not support this view. There is no justification in our view for saying that the right of the widow in the property ended with the death of the widow. If the husband could put an end to his joint status by declaring his intention to effect partition she also could, as she had the same interest in the property as that of the husband. There can also not be any doubt that the interest in her husbands property which she got under sub -so (2) was also by devolution, in the same way that she got a share in the separate property of her husband as a son under sub -so (1), as sub -s. (3) of that Act speaks of both as devolution. The argument sometimes made that because the word "succession" is not used in the Act the widows rights are personal and end with her death is not justified as the word has been applied in many statutes even to survivorship also. (See In re Hindu Womens Rights To Property Act.)15 It is not necessary however to pursue the question further as, in our view, S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act has considerable effect on the matter. 10. As stated earlier "possessed" as used in the section means the state of "owning and having a disposing power". This must mean a right in the pro. perty which is capable of enjoyment whenever the widow wills so to do. Having regard to decisions in Harekrishna Das V. Jujesthi Panda, Prem Mahton V. Bandhu Mahto and Dagadu V. Namdeo she had owner op over her interest in the joint family property that she got on her husband death without even cl11iming partition and, if that is so, she must be regarded as being in possession of the property. It is not necessary, in our view, that she should reduce her share to possession either by actual partition or even asking for partition. By reason of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act her limited estate became transformed into full estate with all its incidents including that of its passing to her heirs in accordance with S. 15 of the Act. It is not necessary for us to decide whether she could will away the property without demanding partition. By reason of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act her limited estate became transformed into full estate with all its incidents including that of its passing to her heirs in accordance with S. 15 of the Act. It is not necessary for us to decide whether she could will away the property without demanding partition. In the present case, she had demanded partition and she would, therefore, be entitled to make valid bequest by will. II. The learned trial Judge held that defendant No.1 had prescribed adverse joint family title and at another place he has held that he became owner by adverse possession. Without a trial the learned Judge ought not to have gone in these matters. It seems to us that there has been confusion of thought in the reasoning of the learned Judge. It is well settled that in the case of members of a joint family even if a member has gone out for a considerable length of time and has not enjoyed the benefit of the property his rights in the property are not lost. Even in the case of co -owners, possession of one is regarded as that of all. In other words, mere non -enjoyment of the property as a co -owner does not mean that those in possession prescribe adverse title to that of the non -participating owner. In order that adverse title can be prescribed ouster .must be proved. See Nargisbai Acidwala V Jehangir Mody16 and Sudarsan Das V. Ram Kirpal Das. The learned Judge has also misunderstood the decisions in Babaji V. Jivaji, as well as the decision in Mat. Kirpal Kuar V. Bachan Singh. In Babajis case joint family possessed certain property as joint property which a coparcener was claiming as separate property and the Court held that the joint family had prescribed an adverse title. In Mst. Kirpal Kuars case, a widow who had no right in the property except that of maintenance had been in enjoyment of the property as if she were entitled to it and it was held that she had become owner by adverse possession. The learned Judge was in error in holding that Saru - bais right in the property was lost. 12. Mr. Khare has contended as a last resort that at least qua the agricultural property, the applicant has no right to come on the record. Mr. The learned Judge was in error in holding that Saru - bais right in the property was lost. 12. Mr. Khare has contended as a last resort that at least qua the agricultural property, the applicant has no right to come on the record. Mr. Khare has invited our attention to the provisions of s. 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, and contended that the section prescribes a special mode of succession and, therefore, its operation is not affected by reason of s. 4 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Such a view was taken by Vyas J. in Sitabai V. Kothulal.17 13. Section 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code runs a8 follows: - "Subject to his personal law, the interest of a tenure -holder shall on his death pass by inheritance, survivorship or bequest, as the case may be." 14. Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act was intended to give overriding effect to the provisions of the Act over all other laws applicable to Hindus except as provided by the Act. Out of this, an exception has been created by sub -so (2). It says: "For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any law for the time being in force providing for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings or for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings." In this case no reliance is placed on any law providing for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilings. It IS said however that s. 151 provides for the devolution of agricultural lands and, therefore, this sub -section applies. This argument, therefore, must be examined. 15. In order that the exception created by S. 4 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act can apply the legislation must provide for devolution of tenancies. Tenancy legislations were and are well known. It is impossible to regard the Land Revenue Act as tenancy legislation. So far as the four districts of the Central Provinces are concerned the earliest Act is the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act. It speaks of proprietary rights in the land and the tenure of land prevalent seems to be similar to Bhagdari and Narwadari tenures of Gujarat in some respects. So far as the four districts of the Central Provinces are concerned the earliest Act is the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act. It speaks of proprietary rights in the land and the tenure of land prevalent seems to be similar to Bhagdari and Narwadari tenures of Gujarat in some respects. As the occupants of land were proprietors they had hereditary and transferable title and, therefore, no express provision seems to exist in this respect. Then came the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917. As the rights were proprietary rights, again, no specific provision was made since widows right to inheritance was such as she would get in other property on the death of her husband. In Raiyatwari villages by s. 212 the rights of Raiyat3 were declared heritable but not transferable. As to the ceded districts of Berar the Governor General in Council made a law known as the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928, under the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Council, 1902. Section 56 of the same is in terms similar to s. 151 of the present Land Revenue Code and the marginal note is "Occupants rights heritable and transferable". The present Code of 1954 seems to be a sequel to abolition of special tenures and Jamindaris. It has prescribed the condition under which a tenure holder occupies the land. There are two classes of tenure holders, Bhumiswamis and Bhumidharis; but S. 151 applies to both. The holding of the tenure holders are not tenancies. Not being a tenancy legislation, exception in s. 4 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act does not apply. 16. Even apart from this, the contention cannot be accepted. The 8ec~iop occurs in Chapter XII of the Code which defines the classes of tenures, their liabilities and privileges. The tenure holders have permanent rights in the land and the section is intended to make it clear that the right is heritable. No doubt the language is not very happy but having regard to the legislative history it is clear beyond doubt that ordinary law of the holder is intended to apply. It also recognizes the right of the holder to pass it on by bequest. If the holder is an individual, it would pass to heirs by inheritance and by bequest if he has left a will. If a joint family held the land, it would go by survivorship according to the ordinary law. It also recognizes the right of the holder to pass it on by bequest. If the holder is an individual, it would pass to heirs by inheritance and by bequest if he has left a will. If a joint family held the land, it would go by survivorship according to the ordinary law. It is not as if that a special rule has been laid down in order to preserve the integrity of land and prevent its further sub -divisions or for the convenience of the collection of the revenue or the rent. The ordinary law, therefore, of inheritance, survivorship or bequest operates. If a holder is governed by any special law, customary or statutory, then the devolution is intended to be governed by the same. 17. What Mr. Khare contends is that the words "subject to his personal law" meant the personal law as it existed when the statute was passed, that is, in 1954. He contends that s. 151 (of Land Revenue Code) is a reproduction of s. 11 of the Central Province Tenancy Act, 1920, as amended in 1941, and the words "subject to his personal law" must be confined only to the law as then obtaining. The history of the legislation does not justify the contention. It may be that the Tenancy Act came to be repealed by the Code but that may be due to the very comprehensive recent tenancy legislations. Does it mean the personal law as in force in 1928, 1941 or the personal law as in force in 1954? The purpose of s. 151 was one of applying the law of succession by which a holder was governed. It can only mean personal law by which he was governed when the succession opened. There are no words in this section to mean personal law as. applicable on a particular day. The normal rule of instruction is that "the language of a statute is generally extended to now things which are not known and could have been contemplated by the legislation when it was passed." (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, pp. 75 and 262). Until 1956 the personal law of a Hindu was the ordinary law applicable to him. By the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, his personal law was changed in supersession of all his old law and, therefore, on the date when the question arround this became his personal law . 75 and 262). Until 1956 the personal law of a Hindu was the ordinary law applicable to him. By the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, his personal law was changed in supersession of all his old law and, therefore, on the date when the question arround this became his personal law . 18. True, the decision in Sitabai V. Kothulal supports Mr. Khare. With respect, we find it very much difficult to agree with the conclusions of the learned Judge. The learned Judge assumes that s. 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code prescribed a particular law of devolution and secondly that it is with respect to tenancies. It only provided that the holding was heritable and his personal law of succession applied. The next s. 152 makes the Bhumi -swami -tenure transferable and Bhumidhari -tenure transferable except by mortgage. In view of what we have said there can be no question of s. 4 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act saving the rights of survivors. 19. We may also observe that this does not involve constructing the words "any law for the time being in force", in sub -s. (2) of s. 4 of the Hindu Succession Act to mean "any law which came into force", as has been supposed in the above case, once it is held that s. 151 of the Code merely recognizes that the tenure is heritable and will pass according to the law applicable to the tenure holder. 20. There is a serious difficulty in accepting the ratio in Sitabais case. Section 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code applies to all land holders from the Government, that is, rural as well as urban and open as well as built upon. We may take the case of land in a city on which huge building has been built. According to the decision in the above case in a case like the present, the land would be taken by the survivor or survivors while the structure would be taken by the heir of the husband of the widow. One has to imagine the chaos resulting in such cases. It is true that if the language of an enactment is clear, then the Court has no concern with the consequences and it must apply the law. Giving a reasonable and natural meaning to the section, as we have done, avoids such a consequence. 21. One has to imagine the chaos resulting in such cases. It is true that if the language of an enactment is clear, then the Court has no concern with the consequences and it must apply the law. Giving a reasonable and natural meaning to the section, as we have done, avoids such a consequence. 21. The matter may be viewed from another point of view. The law applicable to Pandurang under the Land Revenue Acts was the ordinary Hindu law as amended by Hindn Womens Rights to Property Act, as a result of which Sarnbai took the property on his death. The limitation of her rights in the property is a limitation on her and that has been removed. This does not affect in any manner anything that is prescribed in s. 151 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, since the section does not place any restriction on a woman acquiring absolute rights of ownership. This contention, therefore, also fails. 22. It was lastly contended by Mr. Khare that in any event the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, could not possibly apply to agricultural property. Originally when the Act was passed, it was hardly realised that the Central legislature would have no power to legislate with regard to agricultural lands. It was only after the decision of the Federal Court In the matter of the Hindu, Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, that this position seemed to have been crystallized. Different States, therefore, enacted Acts giving similar rights to widows in respect of agricultural lands. In this area the Central Provinces and Berar Act (No. VI of 1942) being the Central Provinces and Berar Hindu Women’s Rights to Property (Extension to Agricultural Land) Act, 1942, received the assent of the Governor on June 6, 1942, and it provided that the term "property" in the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, and the Hindu Womens Rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938, as in force in Madhya Pradesh, shall include, and shall be deemed always to have included, agricultural land. The proviso thereof is not material for our present purposes. This proviso creates an exception. It was attempted to be argued that inasmuoh as this Act was passed in 1\J42 and Pandurang died in 1941 the Aot will not apply to agricultural land left by Pandurang. The proviso thereof is not material for our present purposes. This proviso creates an exception. It was attempted to be argued that inasmuoh as this Act was passed in 1\J42 and Pandurang died in 1941 the Aot will not apply to agricultural land left by Pandurang. The simplest answer is that the Act has been made retrospective expressly by its very language. By now it is well settled so far as this Court is concerned that the words "shall be deemed always to have" gave retrospective operation to a statute. We have, no doubt, therefore, that the Act applied to oases where the owner died even before the local Act was enacted provided that the provisions of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, and Hindu Womens Rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938, were applicable. 23. In the result, we set aside the order made by the learned trial Judge and direct that the petitioner be shown as the legal representative of Sarubai in her place and the suit be proceeded with forthwith. In view of the fact that the suit is of 1961 and four years have already elapsed, we direct that the trial Judge shall hear the suit from day to day and decide it within three months after the vacation. The petitioner will get her costs from the opponents in this Court and also in the trial Court in respect of this application. Order set aside.