Shamsher Bahadnr ( 1 ) THIS is a petition of Bawa Singh under Article 226 of the Constitution of India principally directed against the State Transport Authority, respondent No. 1 and the Delhi Transport undertaking, respondent No. 4 which has been granted ten temporary permits for the Delhi Ghaziabad route. ( 2 ) THIS petition came up for hearing in the first instance on 6th of August, 1965, when it transpired that the temporary permits which were sought to be impugned had expired and new ones had been issued in their stead to the fourth respondent. A new petition has been filed to challenge the grant of the new temporary permits and the petition is opposed both by the first and the fourth respondents. ( 3 ) IT was in September, 1964, that the first respondent published application for grant of permits for Delhi Ghaziabad route and 28th of October, 1964, was fixed as the last date for submission of the applica- tions. An application was made by the fourth respondent for the grant of temporary permits. The petitioner as well as respondents 5 to 10 not only opposed this application but submitted that they should be granted the temporary permits. It seems that since March, 1965, both the Delhi Administration and the Uttar Pradesh Government had been conferring about the grant of regular permits on the Delhi-Ghaziabad route. As the need was pressing, ten temporary permits for a duration of four months were granted on 10th March, 1965. These were to operate with effect from 15th of March, 1965 and granted were in favour of the 4th respondent and expired on 13th of July. 1965, when fresh temporary permits for the same permit were granted with effect from 15th of July, 1965 and they are still subsisting. ( 4 ) IT is contended by Mr. Dhawan that the first respondent in granting the temporary permits to the fourth respondent has violated both the letter and spirit of section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act which requires that :- "62. ( 4 ) IT is contended by Mr. Dhawan that the first respondent in granting the temporary permits to the fourth respondent has violated both the letter and spirit of section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act which requires that :- "62. A Regional Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in section 57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily- (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions, such as to and from fairs and religious gathering, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (e) to meet a particular temporary need, and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit; Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under section 46 or section 54 during the pendency of the application : provided further. . . . . . ",it has been contended by Mr. Dhawan that when applications are actually pending before the Transport authority it has no jurisdiction to grant temporary permits. In the answer filed on behalf of the first respondent, it is stated that the applications which were pending at the time of the grant of temporary permits in March, 1964, had been deposited", and this word has been construed to mean, according to the affidavit, that the applications had been consigned and were no longer under consideration. It has been the case of the first respondent that the agreement between the two Government is still in the stage of negotiation and till some agreement is reached it is not possible to grant regular permits. The aid of clause (e) of section 62 has been invoked for the proposition that a temporary permit can be granted to meet a particular need. It is submitted that the failure of the two Governments to reach an agreement has converted a need which is no doubt of a permanent nature into a temporary need as the agreement has not so far been finalised. Mr. Dhawan submit? on basis of the decisions of the Madras and Kerala High Courts, viz. It is submitted that the failure of the two Governments to reach an agreement has converted a need which is no doubt of a permanent nature into a temporary need as the agreement has not so far been finalised. Mr. Dhawan submit? on basis of the decisions of the Madras and Kerala High Courts, viz. , Shri Rama Vikar Service Ltd. v. The Road Traffic Board, Madras and Balagangadadharan v. Regional Transport Board, Quilon, that where the need is of a permanent nature the Regional Transport Authority has no warrant to report to the provisions of section 62 which are designed to meet only temporary needs. In other words, where the need is of a permanent nature the Authority must decided the question of permits on regular basis. In the Supreme Court decision of The Madya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Bairagarh, Bhopal (M. P.) v. B. P. Upadhaya, Regional Transport Authority, Raipur", there Lordships reviewed the authorities on the subject including the Madras and Kerala decisions on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Opposed to the view taken by the Kerala and Madras High Courts is the one taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Jairam Dass v. Regional Transport Authority, where it was held that in a case where the Regional Transport Authority was of the view that the existing regular bus service was not sufficient to meet the traffic and decided to increase the number of regular bases plying on the route it had the power to grant a temporary permit till the necessary formalities for increasing the regular permits were gone through, and that this would be amount to a temporary need. The Supreme Court upheld the decision the Rajasthan High Court as to the interpretation and the effect of section 62 (c) of the Act. Thus, the view that a temporary permit cannot be granted when there is permanent need is no longer good law and this is so particularly when the formalities provided under section 56 have still to be processed and the final decision has to be reached. ( 5 ) FOLLOWING the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, I would accordingly hold that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. ( 5 ) FOLLOWING the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, I would accordingly hold that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. A temporary permit can further be granted for the second time as was also held in the decision of the Supreme Court. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. ( 6 ) I would like to repeat what their lordships had also observed in the Supreme Court decision that the aid to clause (e) of section 62 is not to be sought to permit any abuse of powers by the State Transport Authority and can only be invoked in genuine cases.