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1965 DIGILAW 6 (DEL)

BALWANT SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA

1965-02-07

D.K.MAHAJAN

body1965
D. K. Mahajan,j. ( 1 ) THE relevant facts for the decision of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution are as follows- ( 2 ). The petitioner is a displaced person and the property in dispute (2 Doctor s Lane, New Delhi-aresidential bangalow), is an evacuee property. This property was put to auction on the 24th April, 1960 and the petitioner s bid being the highest (2,50,100. 00 ). He paid at the spot a sum of Rs. 25,000. 00. A letter dated the 20th June, 1960 was addressed to the petitioner intimating to him that his bid had been accepted and he was required to pay the balance price within fifteen days of the receipt of that letter. According to the petitioner, he received this letter sometimes in July, 1960. No payment of the balance was made within the requisite period. On the 7th July, 1960, the property in dispute was included in the draft Master Plan for Delhi for the extension of the Lady Hardinge Medical College. For the first time in November 1960, by letter exhibit 2, the petitioner made an inquiry whether the property had been included for extension of the Lady Hardinge Medical College in the draft Master Plan of Greater Delhi. In this letter, the petitioner no where indicated that if it was so included, he was not willing to abide by the contract of sale. All he indicated was that, in that event, he would not incur expenses on improvement. ( 3 ) APART from the ea. rliei- show-cause notices, which according to the department were refused and according to the petitioner were never received by him,there is a show-:ause notice dated the 6th November, 1960, exhibit P. 3 which admittedly was received by the petitioner. By this show-cause notice the petitioner was required to show-cause why the bid of the property sanctioned in Ins favour should not be cancelled and the amount deposited by him not forfeitcd. By this show-cause notice the petitioner was required to show-cause why the bid of the property sanctioned in Ins favour should not be cancelled and the amount deposited by him not forfeitcd. The petitioner did not show cause to this notice but maintained the position that the property had been included for the extension of the Lady Hardinge Medical College in the draft Master Plan and, therefore, till this matter was clarified, he was not willing to deposit the money with the result that the department cancelled the bid, forfeited the amont a dre-advertised the property for sale and the property has been sold to Sohan Lal, respondent for a sum of Rs. 2. 51. 400. 00. ( 4 ) THE petitioner has,the moved this petition in this Court praying at the order exhibit P-5 and the consequential-order thereon, be quashed. This petition is opposed by the department and the subsequent purchaser, I may mention here the subsequent sale was by tenders and not by auction. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner, in the first instance, contented that in view of the fact that there was a Master Plan whereby the property was earmarked for extention of Lady Hardinge Medical College, the petitioner was justified in not completing the bargain. This contention has no force because at the time when the property was sold neither there was a Master Plan nor there were any acquisition proceedings pending against the property. The property still was part of the compensation pool and could be validly transferred to the petitioner. Therfore the first contention has no merit. ( 6 ) THE second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no justification for the forfeiture of Rs. 25. 010. 00, the initial deposit made by his client under rule 90 (14) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. For this contention, the argument proceeds thus. ( 6 ) THE second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no justification for the forfeiture of Rs. 25. 010. 00, the initial deposit made by his client under rule 90 (14) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. For this contention, the argument proceeds thus. The auction and the acceptance of the bid, according to the learned counsel amounts to a completed contract of sale and for this, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in M Is Bombay Salt v. L. J. Johnson, Clause 14 of rule 90, according to the learned counsel is a term in the contract, the enforcement of which would bring into play the provision of the Contract Act and, in any case, the principles of the Contract Act. Spacific reference is made to the provision of section 74, of the Contract Act. It is therefore maintained that the initial deposit is not a deposit by way of earnest money and, therefore, unlees there is loss, the initial deposit cannot be forfeited, and in the present case, there being no loss, the forfeiture of the initial deposit is illegal. This argument was noticed by the Mr. Justice S. B. Capoor in Guranditta Mal v. Union of India" -. Civil Writ Case No. 36-D of 1960, decided on the 16th February, 1961, and the learned Judge observed that there was some force in this contention. I was also inclined to accept this contention but for the fact that the learned counsel for the department has drawn my attention to section I of the Contract Act. The relevant part of this section reads thus- "nothing herein contained shall affect the provisions of any Statute, Act or Regulation not hereby expressly repeated. Therefore, wherever the matter is provided for by a Statute, Act or Regulation, the provisions of the Contract Act will not apply. The reason for this is obvious. The Contract Act is meant to cover contracts between the parties and not statutory provisions enacted by a competent Legislature. Rule 90 of the Act is a Statutory provision and, therfore neither section 74 of the Contract Act nor the principles underlying it will govern that statutory provisions. Under rule 90, the department has the right to forfeit part or whole of the initial deposit. Rule 90 of the Act is a Statutory provision and, therfore neither section 74 of the Contract Act nor the principles underlying it will govern that statutory provisions. Under rule 90, the department has the right to forfeit part or whole of the initial deposit. In this situation, it cannot be said that the order of the department is against law or without jurisdiction. ( 7 ) THAT being so, there is not merit in this petition, the same must fail and is dismissed, with no order as to costs.