J. M. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) THIS Special Civil Application and Special Civil Application Nos. 695 794 861 930 931 1017 588 and 949 of 1963 and Nos. 168 811 812 and 65 of 1964 involve identical facts and common questions of law and can therefore be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. Special Civil Application Nos. 588 of 1963 and 168 of 1964 however raise an additional question which we propose to deal separately in this judgment. The facts in all these petitions being similar it is not necessary to recite them from all the petitions and it will be enough if we take the facts in Special Civil Application No. 572 of 1963 as typical for a proper appreciation of the questions raised before us. ( 2 ) THE petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 572 of 1963 was at all material times a barkhalidar and as such his rights as those of a barkhalidar were accepted first by the former Junagadh State and thereafter by the ex-Saurashtra State and cash annuity orders were issued in respect of the lands situate at Gorviali and Ranpur in the District of Junagadh in recognition of his being a barkhalidar within the meaning of the Barkhali Abolition Act 1951 The State of Saurashtra with a view to improving the economic and social conditions of the peasants and for other objects passed several ordinances the last of which was the Saurashtra Gharkhed Tenancy Settlement and Agricultural Lands Ordinance 1949 being Ordinance 41 of 1949. Thereafter the Saurashtra Agrarian Commission was appointed by the Government of India with a view to study the revenue and tenancy problems of Saurashtra and on that Commission having issued its report the State of Saurashtra enacted the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act XXV of 1951 and the Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act XXVI of 1951 abolishing thereunder the girasdari and barkhali tenures. Both the Acts were reserved for the consideration of the President and have duly received his assent. The two Acts were brought into operation on September 1 1951 by a notification dated August 18 1951 ( 3 ) THE petitioner being a barkhalidar on the commencement of the Barkhali Abolition Act all his rights and interests in the agricultural lands comprised in the aforesaid two villages of Gorviali and Ranpur came to an end and vested in the State of Saurashtra under sec. 5 of the Act. Under the provisions of that Act the petitioner became entitled to get a cash annuity in accordance with the provisions of secs. 18 and 19 and as prescribed by that Act. By a public notice dated July 12 1952 the Mahalkari of Bhesan Taluka published the rates of assessments in respect of the several barkhali and girasdari villages including the villages of Gorviali and Ranpur. These rates of assessment were published by the Mahalkari under the provisions of sec. 44 of the Land Reforms Act 1951 and sec. 19 of the Barkhali Abolition Act of 1951. The rates of assessment published by the Mahalkari in respect of the village Gorviali were Rs. 4-7-6 per acre and in respect of Ranpur Rs. 3-10-1 per acre. These rates were fixed by the Mahalkari under the provisions of sec. 19 and following the principles and procedure laid down in rules 83 83 and 84 of the Barkhali Abolition Rules framed by the Saurashtra Government under power reserved to them under the Act. Thereafter the petitioners tenants in Gorviali and Ranpur applied to the Mamlatdar for occupancy certificates in respect of lands of which they were the tenants and the Mamlatdar after an enquiry as prescribed by the Act and the Rules passed orders specifying therein assessment of occupancy holdings as required by sec. 12 of the Act. That order was challenged in appeal and in revision on issues other than the assessments specified therein and the cases of the tenants of Gorviali were finally decided on January 3 1955 in Revision Applications Nos. B. A. 133 to 142 by the Revenue Tribunal and the cases of the tenants of Ranpur were finally decided in appeal by the Deputy Collector Northern Division Junagadh against whose order no revision was filed. As aforesaid neither in these appeals nor in the revisions the tenants challenged the rates of assessment fixed by the Mahalkari and according to the petitioner those rates of assessment became therefore final and conclusive for the purposes of the Act. As prescribed by the Abolition Rules the Mamlatdar caused to be entered into the statement of particulars in Form VII particulars of cases and orders passed on the applications of tenants and among the other particulars the assessment of occupancy holding and the amount of cash annuity payable to the petitioner were also entered. As prescribed by the Abolition Rules the Mamlatdar caused to be entered into the statement of particulars in Form VII particulars of cases and orders passed on the applications of tenants and among the other particulars the assessment of occupancy holding and the amount of cash annuity payable to the petitioner were also entered. On January 30 1956 the Mamlatdar issued two cash annuity payment orders in the prescribed form in respect of the said two villages and according to the petitioner he therefore became entitled to draw cash annuity from the treasury on February 1 1952 and every year thereafter on that date until the last annuity due thereunder was paid to him. There is no dispute that until February 1 1962 the petitioner was permitted to draw his cash annuity from year to year as set out in the said cash annuity payment orders. ( 4 ) ORDINANCE No. XXXIX of 1948 the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1878 was adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra as from August 13 1948 On the integration of the former State of Junagadh with the Saurashtra State on January 20 1949 the Code was made applicable to the area of the Junagadh State. At the time when the Code was made so applicable or even when the Barkhali Abolition Act was passed in 1951 the Bombay Land Revenue Rules as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra did not contain rules 17 and 18 as the two rules were repealed by the Government of Bombay by a notification dated March 5 1940 In exercise of the powers conferred by sec 214 of the Code the Government of Bombay amended the Land Revenue Rules as adapted and applied to the Saurashtra State by a notification dated September 27 1957 and inserted in the said Rules rule 17 for the assessment of agricultural land under sec. 52 of the Code. That rule however did not apply to agricultural lands covered by the Land Reforms Act and the Barkhali Abolition Act. The Government of Bombay amended the Rules by a notification dated May 20 1959 whereby for rule 17 as framed in 1957 a new rule was substituted providing assessment of land under sec. 52 of the Code and bringing with its purview agricultural lands covered by the said two Acts. The Government of Bombay amended the Rules by a notification dated May 20 1959 whereby for rule 17 as framed in 1957 a new rule was substituted providing assessment of land under sec. 52 of the Code and bringing with its purview agricultural lands covered by the said two Acts. By an order dated September 9 1959 the Collector Junagadh in exercise of the powers under sec. 52 of the Code read with the new rule 17 fixed in respect of ex-girasdari and barkhali villages in Bhesan Mahal assessments to be calculated for each holding according to the rates correspondingly shown against each village in the schedule attached to that order and the order provided that the assessment so fixed was to be levied for the year 1958-1959. Under that order the rates of assessment for the lands situated in the two villages were fixed according to the class of land as specified in the schedule to that order. The rates of assessment fixed by the Collector and set out in that order were lower than the rates fixed by the Mamlatdar in 1952 under sec. 19 of the Act. By another order dated April 10 1960 the Collector Junagadh refixed the rates of assessment in respect of the said two villages to be calculated for each holding according to the rates correspondingly shown against each village in the schedule attached to that order and the assessment so fixed by this order was to be levied for the year 1959-1960. Under this order the rates of assessment in respect of the aforesaid two villages were further reduced by the Collector. By a circular dated November 6 1962 the Government of Gujarat informed all Collectors of Rajkot Division that it had come to the notice of the Government that even after the fixation of the rates of assessment by the Collector the revenue authorities continued to pay cash annuity to barkhalidars at the rates of assessment fixed under sec. 19 of the Act by the Mamlatdar. The circular directed that cash annuities should be paid to barkhalidars at the rates of assessment fixed by the Collector and that those rates of assessment were to have effect as from the dates of the said orders passed by the Collector that is to say from the year 1958-1959 and onwards. 19 of the Act by the Mamlatdar. The circular directed that cash annuities should be paid to barkhalidars at the rates of assessment fixed by the Collector and that those rates of assessment were to have effect as from the dates of the said orders passed by the Collector that is to say from the year 1958-1959 and onwards. When this circular came to be shown to the barkhalidars their association made a representation to the State Government contending amongst other things that the rates of assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 19 of the Act were final that the amount of cash annuity calculated according to those rates should be paid throughout the prescribed period and that the lower rates of assessment fixed by the Collect or were not relevant for calculating the cash annuity payable to the barkhalidars. That representation was rejected By a notice dated May 22 1963 the third respondent as the Mamlatdar of Junagadh called upon the petitioner to submit his cash annuity payment orders for amendment so as to substitute therein the amount of annuity payable to him at the rates fixed by the Collector. On the same day the petitioner replied that the State Government had no right to reduce the annuity or alter the annuity payment orders issued in his favour by the Mamlatdar. By a notice dated June 20 1963 the Mamlatdar informed the petitioner that under the circular dated November 6 1962 annuity in respect of village Gorviali was to be paid at the reduced rate of assessment fixed by the Collector and that annuity at such reduced rate would be payable to him from the date of the order of the Collector i. e. from the year 1958-1959 and therefore instead of Rs. 2 729 np. which used to be paid to him until then the annuity would be reduced to Rs. 1 229 np. that the excess of Rs. 5 772 np. paid during the period from 1958-1959 would be recovered from him by four instalments and that therefore no amount was payable to the petitioner as cash annuity for the current year as the amount for the current year was appropriated towards the excess payment. A similar notice was served upon the petitioner in respect of village Ranpur and the petitioner was informed that instead of Rs. 379-61 np. A similar notice was served upon the petitioner in respect of village Ranpur and the petitioner was informed that instead of Rs. 379-61 np. payable as cash annuity under the aforesaid order he would be entitled to be paid only Rs. 124-37 np. that Rs. 1 41 np. would be recovered from him as and by way of excess paid and therefore no amount was payable to the petitioner for the current year as cash annuity as the amount for the current year would be appropriated towards recovery of the excess payment. Aggrieved by the aforesaid circular and the said orders the petitioner has filed this petition for a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus quashing the circular dated November 6 1962 the Collectors aforesaid orders dated September 9 1959 and April 10. 1960 and the notices issued by the Mamlatdar and for a direction that the respondent should pay to the petitioner cash annuity mentioned in the cash annuity payment orders issued by the Mamlatdar copies of which are annexed to the petition 8 as Exhibits B and C. ( 5 ) AMONGST the petitioners before us there are we are told some who had proprietary interest in the lands held by them and though their grant cannot strictly fall under the accepted concept of barkhali tenure they have been declared barkhalidars by the Government by a notification issued under sec. 2 (1) (b) of the Barkhali Abolition Act. Therefore the Act applied to them also and they have filed their respective petitions raising their claims under the provisions of the Act. ( 6 ) THE challenge in the petition is based on a number of contentions which may be summarised as follows:- (1) The State of Gujarat has no power to reduce the amount of cash annuity fixed under secs. 18 and 19 of the Act by fixing a lower rate of assessment under sec. 52 of the Code. Under sec. 18 of the Act assessment means the assessment calculated on an arithmetic average of assessments leviable in the adjoining khalsa or assessed non-khalsa lands or villages until the village in which the land is situated is settled and surveyed. Therefore by virtue of sec. 19 of the Act until such survey and settlement take place the assessment fixed on an arithmetic average was final and conclusive for the purpose of cash annuity. Therefore by virtue of sec. 19 of the Act until such survey and settlement take place the assessment fixed on an arithmetic average was final and conclusive for the purpose of cash annuity. (2) Under sec. 3 of the Barkhali Abolition Act the provisions on that Act have an over-riding effect over other laws including the Land Revenue Code. Secs. 18 and 19 of the Act and sec. 52 of the Code have different scope and objects and are inconsistent with each other in that whereas under secs. 18 and 19 of the Act it is the Mamlatdar who has the power to fix the assessment under sec. 52 of the Code it is the Collector who has the power to fix the rates of assessment. Further under secs. 18 and 19 of the Act the Mamlatdar fixes the rates of assessment on an arithmetic average while the Collector under sec. 52 of the Code fixes them on principles laid down in rule 17 of the said rules. The function of the Mamlatdar is judicial or quasi-judicial while that of the Collector under sec 52 is frankly executive. (3) The petitioner acquired a vested right to receive cash annuity on certificates issued to him. The provisions of sec. 18 and 19 of the Act having an over-riding effect his right would be adversely affected by an order under sec. 52 of the Code. (4) The Act creates a special machinery under secs. 18 and 19 for determining the cash annuity and the Mamlatdar is the authority for doing so under sec. 21 (e) of the Act. Against the orders passed by the Mamlatdar there were appeals and revisions and finally writ petitions in the High Court of Saurashtra. These orders being judicially made final they were not subject to any reduction by executive orders of the Collector under sec. 52 of the Code. (5) The power of the Collector under sec. 52 is subject to the rules made under secs. 214 of the Code. These rules provide for payment of land revenue to the State. They therefore cannot be allied for determining cash annuity payable under sec. 18 of the Act whose purpose is different from the purpose of sec. 52 and the Revenue Rules. Under sec. 52 is subject to the rules made under secs. 214 of the Code. These rules provide for payment of land revenue to the State. They therefore cannot be allied for determining cash annuity payable under sec. 18 of the Act whose purpose is different from the purpose of sec. 52 and the Revenue Rules. Under sec. 52 read with rule 17 the Collectors power is to fix only a provisional assessment until survey and settlement are and therefore rule 17 has no application for determining assessment for the purpose of payment of cash annuity. (6) The assessments fixed by the Collector under sec. 52 are arbitrarily fixed without following the principles laid down in rule 17. The rates of assessment have been fixed and the classification of lands have been made by him without following the principles of rule 17 and without the necessary materials regarding matters therein contained. (7) No notice was given to the petitioner regarding fixation of the revised assessment and the orders were thus passed behind the back of the petitioner. (8) The reduction of annuity was made upon an assumption that the State was liable to pay only that amount of compensation which it was entitled to recover as revenue from occupants of the barkhali lands. This assumption was not warranted by the Act. (9) The Saurashtra Legislature enacted the Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors Relief Act 1954 with the object of providing relief to girasdars and barkhalidars as the paying capacity of the girasdars and barkhalidars was reduced as a result of the abolition of the girasdari and barkhali tenures. This Act was part of the scheme of agrarian reform and reading sec. 28 of that Act in the context of that scheme it is clear that compensation payable under sec. 18 was to remain the same until at any rate survey and settlement were made under the Land Revenue Code and (10) the Act having received the assent of the President as required by Article 31 the provisions of the Act cannot be ignored and therefore compensation fixed thereunder cannot be adversely affected without amending the Barkhali Abolition Act and without obtaining a fresh assent of the President for any such amendment Act. ( 7 ) MR. ( 7 ) MR. Nanavati who appears for the petitioner in this and the other petitions argued in an elaborate and able argument that the petitioner was entitled to compensation as on September 1 1951 when the Act came into force. Therefore it was on the basis of the assessment as on that date and in relation to that assessment that his lands were acquired. If there was a change in the character of the land and that change was reflected in the surveyed and settled rates it would not be an assessment in relation to that land which was acquired. He also argued that an annuity connoted fixity of the amount and the period and therefore when the assessment was quantified it operated as from September 1 1951 when the Act came into operation and the liability of the Government was crystallized as from that date. What was paid under sec. 18 of the Act was annuity and not the land revenue assessment for the current year. He also argued that survey and settlement as contemplated by sec. 19 had a definite connotation and that such survey and settlement was survey and settlement as provided by Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code. Until such survey and settlement took place the arithmetic average which was to be the basis for the fixation of assessment by the Mamlatdar would prevail. The settlement as contemplated by the Code and therefore by sec. 19 of the Act would be based on classification of lands that is to say a survey made under Chapter VIII of the Code and the rate would be fixed on the classification value. Therefore if an artificial principle were to be adopted by the Collector while fixing assessment under sec. 52 it would not be settlement within the meaning of Chapter VIII-A of the Code. His contention next was that the reduction of annuity payable tohim was effected without hearing the petitioner. The right to receive cash annuity being a right to property and that property having been adversely affected without giving a hearing to him the orders of the Collector were in breach of Article 19 of the Constitution. His contention next was that the reduction of annuity payable tohim was effected without hearing the petitioner. The right to receive cash annuity being a right to property and that property having been adversely affected without giving a hearing to him the orders of the Collector were in breach of Article 19 of the Constitution. He also contended that rule 17 of the said Rules violated Article 19 in that by reducing the assessment the annuity payable to the petitioner was prejudiced and such prejudice was caused to him without giving him an opportunity of being heard. His last contention was that when sec. 19 uses the expression until surveyed and settled the section refers to events which were to happen under the Land Revenue Code and not to any power. When the assent of the President was taken the only law that was then existing was the one contained in Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code and sec. 19 of the Act. The President therefore could not be deemed to have applied his mind to any principle of assessment other than the one contained in sec 19 namely the principle of arithmetic average and the principles laid down in Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code. Therefore if a fresh assessment were to be made under different principles provided in sec. 52 of the Code and rule 17 it could only be done by amending sec. 19 and by obtaining a fresh assent to such amendment Act. ( 8 ) WE propose to consider these contentions in the order in which they were raised not only by Mr. Nanavati but also by the other learned advocates who appear for the petitioners in the other petitions. But before we proceed to do so it would clarify matters if we were first to state certain undisputed facts. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioner was a barkhalidar in respect of the two villages that his rights as such were accepted and recognised by the State of Saurashtra and that on the abolition of barkhali tenure occupancy certificates were issued to his tenants on the one hand and cash annuity payment orders were issued in his favour on the other in the sum of Rs. 2 729 in respect of the village Gorviali and Rs. 2 729 in respect of the village Gorviali and Rs. 379-10-0 in respect of Ranpur on the strength of the rates of assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 19 of the Barkhali Abolition Act. It is also an undisputed fact that the two villages in question were not surveyed and settled when the Barkhali Abolition Act and the Land Reforms Act came into operation and therefore as provided by sec. 19 of the Barkhali Abolition Act the Mahalkari fixed the rates of assessment at Rs. 4-7-6 for Gorviali and Rs. 3-10-1 for Ranpur on the basis of arithmetic average certificates of cash annuities were issued on the basis of these rates of assessment and until the year 1962 payments were made to the petitioner in accordance with these annuity certificates. It is an admitted fact that under powers reserved to it by sec. 214 of the Code the State of Bombay inserted rule 17 in the Land Revenue Rules 1921 by a notification dated September 27 1957 That rule was substituted by another under a notification dated May 20 1959 As rule 17 then stood it did not apply to ex-girasdari or barkhali lands. But by a circular memorandum dated May 5 1959 rule 17 was extended to lands covered by the Land Reforms Act and the Barkhali Abolition Act and with a view to extending relief in assessment to deemed settled lands covered by the two Acts the orders embodied in Government circular memorandum dated October 28 1957 and the circular memorandum dated January 16 1959 were applied to those lands also. On rule 17 being inserted in the Land Revenue Rules of 1921 and its applicability being extended to the ex-girasdari and ex-barkhali lands covered by the Land Reforms Act and the Barkhali Abolition Act the Collector in exercise of his power under sec. 42 read with rule 17 fixed the rates of assessment for these two villages at reduced amounts. On such rates having been fixed orders were issued to fix cash annuities payable to the petitioner in accordance with the rates of assessment fixed by the Collector and since these rates were fixed for the year 1958-1959 cash annuites were ordered to be paid according to the revised rates as and from that year and recoveries were ordered to be made in respect of excess payment made from that year. ( 9 ) CONTENTIONS (1) (5) and (6) raised in the petition involve the question as to construction of secs. 18 and 19 of the Barkhali Abolition Act the nature and the scope of the right thereunder of a barkhalidar on the extinguishment of barkhali and the scope of the power of the Collector under sec. 52 of the Code read with rule 17 of the Rules 1921 These contentions can be expediently considered together. The rest of the contentions largely depend upon the answer to these contentions and in particular to the question as to the scope and the nature of the right of a barkhalidar. The principle contentions of Mr. Nanavati were (1) that secs. 18 and 19 of the Act are self-contained provisions giving a right to receive cash annuity to a barkhalidar and (2) that that right cannot be curtailed or reduced by the Collector fixing revised rates of assessment under sec. 52 of the Code for sec. 52 is only concerned with the States right to assessment and cannot be used for reducing the annuity payable to a barkhalidar. We will therefore proceed to consider these questions first as the rest of the contentions as aforesaid depend upon answers to these questions. ( 10 ) THE Barkhali Abolition Act was enacted as its preamble shows to abolish barkhali tenure just as its companion Act the Land Reforms Act was enacted at the same time for abolishing girasdari tenure. Sec. 3 contains provisions providing an over-riding effect of the Act over other laws and lays down that the provisions of the Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law or any usage agreement settlement grant sanad or any decree or order of any Court or other authority. Sec. 5 provides for the abolition of barkhali tenure and lays down that on the commencement of the Act or on the date of the notification issued under clause (i) of sec. 2 as the case may be all rights title and interest of all the barkhalidars in agricultural lands comprised in barkhali estate shall cease and be vested in the State free from all encumbrances subject to the provisions of this Act. 2 as the case may be all rights title and interest of all the barkhalidars in agricultural lands comprised in barkhali estate shall cease and be vested in the State free from all encumbrances subject to the provisions of this Act. Sec. 6 provides for an application by barkhalidars for allotment of land for personal cultivation and sec. 7 provides for an enquiry to be held by the Mamlatdar for the purpose of issuing an order of allotment. Sec. 10 provides for an application by the tenant for acquisition of occupancy rights and sec. 11 provides for an enquiry by the Mamlatdar on receipt of such application. Sec. 12 provides that after making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary the Mamlatdar may subject to any order or allotment under the provisions of this Act pass an order specifying therein (a) the holding or part thereof in respect of which the tenant may be declared to be an occupant referred to in the Act as an occupancy holding and (b) the assessment of such occupancy holding. Sec. 15 provides that a barkhalidar shall become an occupant in respect of land allotted to him under sec. 7. These provisions show that on the barkhali tenure coming to an end the rights under such barkhali tenure would become vested in the State and on an occupancy certificate issued to the barkhalidar or the tenant as the case may be both would become occupants liable to pay assessment. Sec. 16 provides for the liability to payment of land revenue under the provisions of the Code and the Rules made thereunder. Then follow sec. 18 providing for payment to barkhalidars and sec. 19 which provides a meaning to the expression assessment which is a measure for the cash annuity payable under sec. 18. Since a major part of the arguments addressed to us was based on the provisions of these two sections it is necessary to cite them in full. Sec. 18 provides as follows:-"consequent upon the abolition of the Barkhali tenure under this Act Government shall subject to the provisions of sec. 18-A pay to the Barkhalidars shown in column one of the Schedule cash annuity which shall be equal to one assessment in respect of the land in possession of their tenants for the period specified against them in column two thereof. " ( 11 ) SEC. 18-A pay to the Barkhalidars shown in column one of the Schedule cash annuity which shall be equal to one assessment in respect of the land in possession of their tenants for the period specified against them in column two thereof. " ( 11 ) SEC. 19 provides:-" (1) For the purposes of this Act assessment shall mean in relation to any land until the village in which such land is situated is surveyed and settled assessment calculated on an arithmetic average of assessment leviable in the surrounding and adjoining khalsa or assessed non-khalsa lands or villages; (2) For the purpose of determining the assessment on any land the Mamlatdar may hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner and fix the assessment on such land and the assessment so determined shall be published in such manner as may be prescribed:- provided that where the assessment so calculated is manifestly unfair the Government may modify it keeping in view the above principle. " ( 12 ) IN regard to these two sections the contention on behalf of the petitioners was that on the extinguishment of the rights of a barkhalidar such a barkhalidar gets under sec. 18 a right to payment of cash annuity which would be equivalent to one assessment. But that assessment which is to be fixed under sec. 19 must be certain throughout the period of fifteen years or eighteen years as the case may be and cannot be variable Once therefore the assessment is fixed under sec. 19 it remains the same throughout the period of payment and is not and cannot be liable to any variation on a subsequent alteration of assessment made by the Collector under sec. 52 of the Code. For this purpose reliance was placed on the meaning of the word annuity in Burrows Words and Phrases Volume I page 189 namely An annuity is a right to receive de anno in annum a certain sum that may be given for life or for a series of years. Mr. Nanavati argued that the fact that the Legislature has advisedly used the expression cash annuity suggesting certainty as to the sum payable coupled with the absence of the words namely for the respective years after the words one assessment in sec. Mr. Nanavati argued that the fact that the Legislature has advisedly used the expression cash annuity suggesting certainty as to the sum payable coupled with the absence of the words namely for the respective years after the words one assessment in sec. 18 indicates that the amount of cash annuity and assessment once fixed by the Mamlatdar was to be unchangeable and was to apply throughout the period of payment. Therefore he argued on a proper construction of secs. 18 and 19 when the assessment is fixed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 19 a barkhalidar would get a right under sec. 18 to get cash annuity on the basis of the first assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar and that the amount payable as cash annuity cannot be reduced by lowering the rates of assessment in subsequent years The question is whether there is merit in this contention. ( 13 ) SEC. 18 no doubt deals with payment to a barkhalidar and under that section a barkhalidar gets the right of being paid to the extent and in the manner provided therein. The section is clear as to the extent of that payment namely that the cash annuity is to be equivalent to one assessment and that assessment is the one defined by sec. 19. Therefore on the question as to what that assessment is one has necessarily to turn to sec. 19. The question is is that assessment variable and has that assessment anything to do with the assessment payable by an occupant whether he be a tenant or a barkhalidar under sec. 16 ? As we have already seen under sec. 16 the liability to pay assessment by both the classes of occupants namely the tenant and the barkhalidar to whom an occupancy certificate has been issued is under the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder. Sec. 19 it will be noticed commences with the words For the purposes of this Act which must mean that the assessment equal to which the cash annuity is payable under sec. 18 is the assessment according to the meaning given to it in sec. 19. Is that assessment as defined by sec. 19 a fixed and an immutable assessment once it has been fixed by the Mamlatdar on the principle of arithmetic average ? 18 is the assessment according to the meaning given to it in sec. 19. Is that assessment as defined by sec. 19 a fixed and an immutable assessment once it has been fixed by the Mamlatdar on the principle of arithmetic average ? Sec. 19 does not appear to support that interpretation for the words in that section themselves show that the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar is not permanent but subsists until the time the village in which the land is situated is surveyed and settled. Therefore once the village in which such land is situated is surveyed and settled the assessment for the purposes of this Act i. e. including the purposes of sec. 18 through fixed initially by the Mamlatdar is liable to give way to an assessment made as a result of survey and settlement of the village wherein the land in question is situated. It seems therefore somewhat clear that where the land is not surveyed and settled the Mamlatdar has for the time being to fix assessment calculated on an arithmetic average of assessment leviable in the surrounding khalsa or assessed non-khalsa lands or villages. From the use of the word until in sub-sec. (1) before the words the village in which such land is situated is surveyed and settled it is clear that such assessment is only provisional and is liable to give way to an assessment made on survey and settlement. That it is that assessment fixed under sec. 19 the equivalent of which is payable as cash annuity under sec. 12 is certain from the words in sec. 18 itself and in particular the opening words of sec. 19. Therefore the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar is to subsist only until survey and settlement of the village in which the land is situated and not throughout and consequently it is not something which is immutable throughout the period of payment. It is equally clear that the assessment which is to be fixed on survey and settlement would be under the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder for there is not and cannot be from the nature of the Barkhali Abolition Act any provision in the Act as to survey and settlement and the fixation of rates of assessment on such survey and settlement. The fixation of rates of assessment on survey and settlement of the village though made under the Code and the rules made thereunder would be the assessment for the purposes of this Act under sec. 19 and that being so the cash annuity payable under sec. 18 and which is equal to one assessment would then have to be equal to the assessment fixed on survey and settlement. Thus from the language used in secs. 18 and 19 it is clear (1) that the obligation of the State is to pay the barkhalidar cash annuity equal to one assessment (2) that the assessment under sec. 19 would be in the initial stage assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar based on arithmetic average and (3) on survey and settlement the cash annuity would be equal to the assessment based on survey and settlement fixed under the provisions of the Code. Secs. 18 and 19 thus contemplate that the assessment is liable to vary the assessment by the Mamlatdar based on an arithmetic average giving way to the assessment made by the Collector when the village in which the land is situated is surveyed and settled. It will also be noticed that even where the village is not surveyed and settled and the Mamlatdar has fixed assessment on the basis of arithmetic average the proviso to sec. 19 lays down that where such assessment is manifestly unfair the State Government has the power to modify it keeping of course the principle of arithmetic average in view. The proviso does not lay down that such modification need take place immediately. Prima facie therefore the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar may be modified at any time when the Government comes to the conclusion that the assessment calculated on an arithmetic average by the Mamlatdar is manifestly unfair. Thus the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar is liable to be changed (1) under then proviso when the Government modifies it and (2) when the village is surveyed and settled. It follows therefore that the argument that the assessment under sec. 19 made by the Mamlatdar is something which is unchangeable is not correct. Since it is changeable and the cash annuity having to be equal to one assessment secs. 18 and 19 Contemplate that when such a change occurs the cash annuity is also liable to change. It follows therefore that the argument that the assessment under sec. 19 made by the Mamlatdar is something which is unchangeable is not correct. Since it is changeable and the cash annuity having to be equal to one assessment secs. 18 and 19 Contemplate that when such a change occurs the cash annuity is also liable to change. ( 14 ) IT is true that cash annuity by its very nature has an element of certainty. But then it cannot be said that the annuity in this case is not certain for sec. 18 provides a measure which is certain viz. that the annuity has to be equal to one assessment whatever that assessment for the time being is. What sec. 18 does is to provide two things (1) a right to payment by way of cash annuity and (2) the measure for that annuity namely one assessment. The right given under sec. 18 is the creature of the statute and has therefore to be ascertained in accordance with the provisions of that statute. The provisions of the statute are fairly clear namely that a barkhalidar will be paid cash annuity equal to one assessment as defined by sec. 19. Under sec. 19 that assessment is the one fixed by the Mamlatdar until that is substituted by the rates of assessment fixed on survey and settlement of the village in which the land is situated or when such assessment is modified by the Government under the proviso to sec. 19. The language of sec. 19 itself indicates that two kinds of assessment are contemplated made by two different authorities on two different principles. One is by the Mamlatdar on the basis of arithmetic average and the other on a survey and settlement made under the Code. 19. The language of sec. 19 itself indicates that two kinds of assessment are contemplated made by two different authorities on two different principles. One is by the Mamlatdar on the basis of arithmetic average and the other on a survey and settlement made under the Code. Since the right to get the cash annuity is the creation of the statute and is therefore governed by the statute and since the annuity payable annually for each year is equal to one assessment if the assessment is varied the annuity payable under the statute is also liable to vary depending upon what the assessment is during the year in which the annuity is payable By its very nature cash annuity is an annual payment and so also the assessment which is an annual occurrence As the annuity is equal to one assessment the quantum of assessment must govern the quantum of the annuity. In this view it would not be possible to sustain the contention that cash annuity is not liable to change even if the assessment on a survey and settlement of the village is reduced or that the assessment fixed by the Collector on survey and settlement would not be the assessment within the meaning of sec. 19 for the purposes of payment of cash annuity or that the assessment fixed under the Code and the rules made thereunder would not affect the annuity payable under the Barkhali Abolition Act. Secs 16 18 and 19 of the Act clearly show that the Code and the rules made thereunder are not irrelevant for the purposes of the Act notwithstanding the over-riding effect given to the provisions of the Act under sec. 3 for sec. 16 itself provides in express terms that the liability to pay assessment is under the Code and similarly sec. 19 in express terms provides that an assessment made by the Mamlatdar thereunder is to subsist until survey and settlement is made such survey and settlement having to be made under the Code the fixation of rates of assessment also having to be made under the Code and such assessment also being the assessment under sec. 19 for the purposes of the Act i. e. inter alia for the purposes of sec. 18. ( 15 ) IN support of his proposition that there is only one assessment for the purposes of secs. 19 for the purposes of the Act i. e. inter alia for the purposes of sec. 18. ( 15 ) IN support of his proposition that there is only one assessment for the purposes of secs. 18 and 19 and that is by the Mamlatdar on the basis of arithmetic average and that that assessment is final for the purpose of determining cash annuity which once fixed cannot be altered on a subsequent assessment even when that is made on survey and settlement. Mr. Nanavati relied on the rules as to assessment contained in Chapter VI of the Barkhali Abolition Rules 1951 made under sec. 35 of the Act. Support was sought in these rules to show that even when the State Government modifies the assessment fixed on an arithmetic average by the Mamlatdar under the proviso to sec. 19 such modification has to be made at the time when the Mamlatdar determines the assessment and the modified assessment would take effect from September 1 1951 when the Act extinguished the barkhali and such modification can be made only at that stage and not thereafter. To consider this contention it will be necessary to turn to these rules. Rule 83 provides the procedure to be followed by the Mamlatdar in fixing the assessment on the principles of arithmetic average and also gives therein an illustrated example as to how arithmetic average is to be worked out. It appears that the draftsman feet that a mechanical fixation of assessment on the basis of arithmetic average might perhaps result in injustice and therefore he introduced in rule 83 a proviso empowering the Mamlatdar to send a report to the Government if he felt that such assessment was manifestly unfair and empowered in that case the Government to modify the assessment so calculated by the Mamlatdar. Since the assessment so worked out would be subject to such modification the assessment if modified would still be the assessment by the Mamlatdar and would take effect from September 1 1951 That is one stage where the Government is authorised to modify. Under rule 83-A the Mamlatdar has to publish the assessment worked out by him under rule 83 by affixing a copy thereof at the village Chora or any conspicuous place of the village and at his office. Under rule 83-A the Mamlatdar has to publish the assessment worked out by him under rule 83 by affixing a copy thereof at the village Chora or any conspicuous place of the village and at his office. Even after such publication if the Mamlatdar feels that the assessment so fixed by him is manifestly unfair he has to report to the Government through the Collector and the Government is authorised to modify it. That is the second stage where modification can be made by the Government and since the assessment is still not finalised the modified assessment would take effect as from September 1 1951 Under the proviso to rule 83-A an objection can be filed by any person within two months from the date of publication by the Mamlatdar on the ground that the assessment is manifestly unfair. The Mamlatdar has in that event to send his report on such objection to the Government and the Government can modify the assessment on such objection. The modified assessment once again would take effect from September 1 1951 as the assessment by the Mamlatdar till then cannot yet be said to be finalised. Rule 85 provides for an appeal before the Collector and a revision before the Revenue Tribunal and rule 86 provides that the final order in appeal or revision has to be recorded by the Mamlatdar in the relevant registers. Rule 83 and the Rules onwards thus lay down the procedure to be followed by the Mamlatdar in fixing the assessment under sec. 19 on the principles of arithmetic average the power of the Government to modify it where it is manifestly unfair and for the right of appeal and revision by any one affected by such assessment. It is evident from these rules that they deal with the stage when the Mamlatdar fixes the assessment and since the assessment is not finalised untill its modification by the Government or till an appeal or revision therefrom as the case may be is disposed of it is only the modified or the finalised assessment that would be the assessment made under sec. 19. But these rules provide for the modification or revision and finalisation at that stage. 19. But these rules provide for the modification or revision and finalisation at that stage. It would be too much to say that because there are no rules framed for a subsequent modification by the Government on the ground that the assessment is manifestly unfair the Government is precluded from modifying it at any subsequent stage. There is no such limitation in the proviso to sec. 19 and to contend that the Government is not empowered to modify the assessment at a later stage would amount to inducting into the proviso a limitation which the draftsman has not imposed in it. ( 16 ) IN this connection Mr. Nanavati drew our attention to an unreported judgment of the High Court of Bombay in a Letters Patent Appeal in Jadeja Jagatsinhji Dipsinhji v. The Director of Land Records and Settlement Officer No. 1 of 1956 decided on December 9 1957 by Chainani J. as he then was and Patel J. against the decision of M. C. Shah J. who had rejected the special civil application filed by the appellants who were the girasdars under the Land Reforms Act 1951 The appellants there were the girasdars of lands situate in Sajjanpur village in Morvi Taluka. This village had not been surveyed. On September 1 1951 the Land Reforms Act came into force and which provided for the acquisition of occupancy rights by tenants. On January 29 1952 fifty-one tenants made applications under sec. 28 of the Act for acquisition of occupancy rights. As required by that section they also deposited certain amounts in the treasury. The Act provided for payment of compensation to girasdars for the loss of occupancy rights. Since compensation was fixed on the basis of assessment provision had been made in the Act for the determination of assessment in cases of unsurveyed villages. Under sec. 44 of the Act assessment in the case of unsurveyed villages was fixed on the basis of assessment leviable in the surrounding and adjoining khalsa or assessed non-khalsa lands or villages. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 44 gave power to the Government to modify the assessment if it found that the assessment fixed on the basis of the assessment leviable in the surrounding and adjoining villages was manifestly unfair. As required by the Act the Mamlatdar made an enquiry and on August 24 1952 he fixed provisional assessment at Rs. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 44 gave power to the Government to modify the assessment if it found that the assessment fixed on the basis of the assessment leviable in the surrounding and adjoining villages was manifestly unfair. As required by the Act the Mamlatdar made an enquiry and on August 24 1952 he fixed provisional assessment at Rs. 3-3-4 per acre and published the assessment and invited objections thereto from the persons concerned. No objections were filed by the tenants but the appellants submitted their objections and asked for increase in the rates. The Government considered their objections and increased the assessment to Rs. 3-9-7 per acre. The revised assessment was pulished in the village and on September 23 1953 the Mamlatdar made an order directing that occupancy rights should be transferred to the tenants and that occupancy certificates should be issued in their names on their paying the balance of the amount of compensation payable under secs. 28 and 33 of the Act on the basis of the assessment being Rs. 3-9-7 per acre. No appeals were filed against the orders passed by the Mamlatdar and the appellants were paid instalments of compensation on the basis of the revised compensation namely Rs. 3-9-7 per acre in the years 1952 to 1954. It appears that some of the tenants thereafter made representations and on March 2 1954 the Director of Land Records informed the Mamlatdar that the rate of assessment for this village calculated on the basis of average rate per acre in the adjoining villages worked out at Rs. 2-15-4 and he directed the Mamlatdar to publish the aforesaid rate and to invite objections thereon. The Mamlatdar accordingly issued a notification on March 9 1954 A few days thereafter the appellants filed a special civil application under Article 226 of the Constitution contending that the assessment having once been fixed under sec. 44 and having already been revised by the Government on the ground that it was manifestly unfair it could not be revised by the Government again on the same ground and prayed for a declaration that the assessment fixed at Rs. 3-9-7 per acre was final and for a direction that the respondents should pay to the appellants compensation at that rate. 3-9-7 per acre was final and for a direction that the respondents should pay to the appellants compensation at that rate. Sec. 28 (1) of the Land Reforms Act provided for an application being made by the tenant for the acquisition of occupancy rights in his holding. But before making such an application he had to deposit in the treasury an amount equal to six times the assessment and under sub-sec. (3) thereof to attach to his application a receipted chalan showing the payment into the treasury of that amount. Sec. 30 (1) provided that after making an enquiry the Mamlatdar had to pass an order specifying therein three things (a) the holding in respect of which the tenant may be declared to be an occupant (b) assessment on such occupancy holding and (c) the amount payable by the tenant to the girasdar as compensation in respect of such occupancy holding. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 30 provided that if the amount deposited by the tenant fell short of the amount specified in clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) the Mamlatdar could direct the tenant to deposit the balance within such time as might be specified. Sub-sec. (3) then provided that when the tenant had deposited the required amount the Mamlatdar had to issue an occupancy certificate in respect of the occupancy holding. Sec. 33 provided for payment of compensation to the girasdar. A part of this compensation was payable by the tenant and that was equivalent to six times the assessment and which the tenant was required to deposit before he made an application for occupancy rights. Sec. 33 (1) gave right to the girasdar to withdraw the amount specified in the order of the Mamlatdar as being payable by the tenant. Sub-sec. (2) of that section provided that in addition to the compensation paid by the tenant in respect of the holding the Government should pay to the girasdar as compensation every year for fifteen years an amount equal to the assessment of the holding as fixed by the Mamlatdar under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 30. Sub-sec. (3) provides that an instalment under sub-sec. (2) shall become due and payable on February I every year the first instalment falling due on February 1 immediately following the date on which the occupancy certificate became effective. (1) of sec. 30. Sub-sec. (3) provides that an instalment under sub-sec. (2) shall become due and payable on February I every year the first instalment falling due on February 1 immediately following the date on which the occupancy certificate became effective. In the case before the High Court the certificates became effective on August 1 1951 under sec. 32 of the Act. The appellants were paid the first instalment on April 29 1952 As already seen sec. 44 of the Act provides for the determination of the assessment in the case of lands which are not surveyed and settled and is in the same language as sec. 19 of the present Act and the proviso to that section also empowers the Government as the proviso to sec. 19 of the present Act does to modify the assessment if it finds that as calculated by the Mamlatdar it is manifestly unfair. Presumably the Government modified the assessment and reduced it to Rs. 2-15-4 under the power reserved to it by the proviso to sec. 44. The High Court held that compensation which the girasdar was entitled to receive either from the Government or from the tenant was to be determined on the basis of the assessment calculated by the Mamlatdar and specified in his order passed under sec. 30 and there being no provision in the Act empowering the Mamlatdar of any other authority to revise the order passed by him under sec. 30 and to alter the amount of compensation every time the assessment was revised under sec. 44 or under some other provision of law the subsequent revision of the assessment would not affect the amount of compensation payable to the girasdar. The reasoning adopted by the High Court for this conclusion was that compensation to which the girasdar was entitled for the acquisition of his occupancy rights was made up of two parts one payable by the tenant and the other by the Government. Under sec. 28 the amount payable by the tenant was equal to six times the assessment. Under sec. 30 (1) the Mamlatdar had to specify in his order the assessment on the land and also the amount payable by the tenant to the girasdar as compensation. Therefore the Mamlatdar had to determine not only the assessment but also the amount payable by the tenant as compensation. Under sec. 30 (1) the Mamlatdar had to specify in his order the assessment on the land and also the amount payable by the tenant to the girasdar as compensation. Therefore the Mamlatdar had to determine not only the assessment but also the amount payable by the tenant as compensation. Compensation payable by the tenant was therefore the amount specified in the Mamlatdars order calculated on the basis of the assessment specified in the same order which must be the assessment in force at the date of the order of the Mamlatdar. A subsequent change in the assessment would not therefore affect the amount of compensation determined by the Mamlatdar as being payable by the tenant. This being a specific amount it could not be altered on account of an alteration of assessment merely because it was fixed on the basis of the assessment. Compensation payable under sec. 33 (2) by the Government was payable for fifteen years equal to the assessment of the holding as fixed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 30 (b ). The amount payable by the Government every year was therefore the assessment specified in the Mamlatdars order and not the assessment in force at the time when the demand was made. ( 17 ) WILL be observed that the scheme of the Land Reforms Act is totally dis-similar from the scheme in the present Act and the reasoning in the decision shows that the conclusion arrived at by the High Court was based on the specific words used in the sections set out above. Under sec. 30 of that Act the amount payable by the tenant was six times the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar and specified by the Mamlatdar in his order and it was that amount that the tenant had to deposit and which the girasdar was entitled to withdraw. Similarly under sec. 33 (2) the Government had to pay compensation every year for a period of fifteen years the amount so payable being an amount equal to the assessment as fixed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 30 (1) (b ). Therefore once the assessment was fixed by the Mamlatdar the amount of compensation became fixed also and which the Government was obliged to pay and not any other amount. 30 (1) (b ). Therefore once the assessment was fixed by the Mamlatdar the amount of compensation became fixed also and which the Government was obliged to pay and not any other amount. That being so the High Court held that that amount could not be varied even if there was modification of the assessment in any subsequent year. This decision cannot apply to the present case because the scheme and the language of secs. 18 and 19 are totally different from the language and the scheme of secs. 28 30 and 33 of the Land Reforms Act. It will be noticed that though the language of sec. 44 of the Land Reforms Act is similar to that of sec. 19 of the Act before us the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court did not decide that the Government thereunder had no right to modify the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar. They on the contrary left that question open and the only thing that they decided was that in view of the express language of secs. 28 30 and 33 and the scheme of the Land Reforms Act a subsequent modification of assessment by the Government would not affect the amount of compensation payable to the girasdar after the Mamlatdar had fixed the assessment and compensation on the basis of such assessment payable by the tenant was fixed and specified in the order deposited in the treasury and allowed to be withdrawn by the girasdar. This decision there fore is not an authority for the proposition that under the present Act once an assessment is fixed by the Mamlatdar it is unchangeable or that cash annuity for a period of fifteen years or eighteen years or for life as the case may be is not variable although the assessment may be varied either when survey and settlement take place or where the Government modifies it under the proviso to sec. 19. ( 18 ) THE conclusion which we are inclined to arrive at is supported by the fact that unlike the scheme for compensation under the Land Reforms Act the scheme of the present Act is that the barkhalidar is to be paid annually as and by way of cash annuity an amount equal to one assessment and therefore any change that takes place in such assessment is bound to affect the quantum of the annuity payable to him. Mr. D. D. Vyas appearing for the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 588 of 1963 and three other petitions at one stage however argued that the provisions as to payment of compensation to an ex-girasdar under the Land Reforms Act and of cash annuity to an ex-barkhalidar under the present Act are the same and therefore just as the compensation under the Land Reforms Act once fixed by the Mamlatdar cannot be reduced by a subsequent variation in the assessment the amount of cash annuity also cannot be reduced by a subsequent reduction of assessment. When the the provisions of sec. 28 (1) of the Land Reforms Act were pointed out to him in order to show that the Legislature had used a phraseology in that section different from the one used in sec. 18 of the present Act i. e. the words the assessment in sec. 28 of the Land Reforms Act and the words one assessment in sec. 18 of the present Act he argued that even if the Legislature had used the same phraseology it would not still have made any difference. He also argued that whether you call payment under the Land Reforms Act compensation or payment under the present Act cash annuity it again made no difference. In our view such an argument cannot be accepted for an examination of the two Acts clearly shows that though they were simultaneously enacted each of them deals with different class of tenure-holders and provides for. compensation in a different manner and under a different scheme and therefore the Legislature advisedly used a different phraseology and phraseology used in each of them has a meaning disclosing the true construction to be given to it. The argument also loses sight of the fact that the girasdari tenure is different from barkhali and the Legislature being aware of this difference dealt with each of them in the two Acts differently making a different scheme of payment. Whereas a girasdar under girasdari tenure had proprietary interests in the land held by him a barkhalidar had no such proprietary rights in the land held by him. Whereas a girasdar under girasdari tenure had proprietary interests in the land held by him a barkhalidar had no such proprietary rights in the land held by him. As stated in Bada Saheb v. State of Saurashtra A. I. R. 1955 Saurashtra 80 at page 83 barkhalidars were entitled under their grant to usufruct only and the feature of a barkhali grant was that it was resumable at will and therefore barkhalidars had no proprietary interests in their holdings. That being sos the Legislature was aware that while under the Land Reforms Act what it was doing was extinguishing the proprietary interests of a girasdar in the land held by him in the Barkhali Abolition Act what it was doing was to extinguish the rights of a barkhalidar to usufruct only Therefore in the Land Reforms Act the Legislature provided for payment of compensation for the abolition of proprietary rights while under the Act before us it provided for cash annuity payable for a certain period for the abolition of rights to usufruct only in respect of the land held by the tenure-holder. The difference in the language of the two Acts therefore is not accidental but deliberate. A distinctive treatment on the abolition of the respective rights is also noticeable in the two Acts. ( 19 ) SINCE proprietary rights in lands held by a girasdar vested in him and these rights were abolished by the Land Reforms Act on the extinguishment of girasdari a provision was made in sec. 28 for transference of occupancy rights from the girasdar to the tenant. Therefore under sec. 28 any tenant could apply for occupancy rights and the Mamlatdar had to issue an occupancy certificate in every case where the tenant fulfilled the conditions contained in that section. That is not so in the Act before us. Occupancy rights never vested in as barkhalidar but in the State and therefore there was no question of a transference of those rights from a barkhalidar to his tenant. Consequently under sec. 12 of the Act the Mamlatdar has been given a discretion to issue occupancy certificates and therefore it is not as if occupancy certificates have to be issued in favour of all the tenants applying for occupancy rights. Consequently under sec. 12 of the Act the Mamlatdar has been given a discretion to issue occupancy certificates and therefore it is not as if occupancy certificates have to be issued in favour of all the tenants applying for occupancy rights. ( 20 ) UNDER the Land Reforms Act the scheme is that the girasdar is paid compensation partly by the tenant and partly by the State. As already seen under sec. 28 (1) a tenant applying for an occupancy certificate has to pay an amount equal to six times the assessment payable in respect of agricultural land included in the holding and under sub-sec. (3) thereof he has to deposit that amount in the treasury and produce a chalan therefor along with his application. Under sec. 30 when the Mamlatdar passes his order issuing an occupancy certificate he has to mention therein the assessment on such occupancy holding and also specify the amount payable by the tenant i. e. six times that assessment and the girasdar is given the right to withdraw that whole amount immediately on the issuance of that certificate. Sec. 33 provides for payment of compensation by the State and that compensation is payable in fifteen years divided into fifteen annual instalments each instalment being equal to the assessment on the holding as fixed under sec. 30 (1) (b ). The assessment so fixed is the assessment worked out according to sec. 44 i. e. fixed on the basis of arithmetic average until the village in which the land is situated in surveyed and settled. The expression the assessment therefore is the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 44 and specified in his order under sec. 30 (1) (b) and compensation payable by the tenant under sec. 28 and by the State under sec. 33 (2) is six and fifteen times respectively of that assessment. once therefore that assessment is fixed compensation payable to him is not only crystallized but specified in the order of the Mamlatdar and a right to receive that compensation immediately accures to the girasdar and therefore that compensation cannot be varied on a variation sub sequently made in the assessment. The words used in sec. 18 of the Act before us are different in that the section provides not for payment of a sum equal to the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar as in the case of secs. The words used in sec. 18 of the Act before us are different in that the section provides not for payment of a sum equal to the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar as in the case of secs. 28 and 33 (2) of the Land Reforms Act but equal to one assessment. If the Legislature intended to give the same meaning to the two expressions namely the assessment and one assessment there was no reason why it should have resorted to different language in the two Acts when they were enacted at the same time and had a similar design to extinguish the two tenures. Such an intention cannot be attributed to it for the Legislature was conscious that it was abolishing two tenures of a different nature and each required a differential treatment and therefore provided in one case compensation fixed at the time when there was transferance of occupancy rights from the girasdar to his tenant and annuity payable according to the assessment prevalent at each time such annuity became annually payable. The effect of the use of different phraseology coupled with the difference in the scheme of payment in the two Acts in our view supports the construction which we have placed on secs. 18 and 19 of the Act before us. . ( 21 ) IN support of the contention that assessment means the assessment determined on arithmetic average by the Mamlatdar and not any other assessment Mr. Chhaya in Special Civil Application No. 1017 of 1963 argued that if we were to construe the words one assessment in sec. 18 as meaning assessment in respect of the lands at the time when they were in possession of the tenants of the barkhalidar the word assessment must mean that assessment which subsisted on September 1 1951 because on the extinguishment of barkhali the relationship of landlord and tenant ceased as between the barkhalidar and his tenants. Considering however the other provisions and the distinctive scheme of the Act as compared with the companion Act namely the Land Reforms Act 1951 it is not possible to accept this interpretation. What is meant by those words is that the assessment is assessment in respect of the lands which on the date of the operation of the Act were in possession of the tenants. What is meant by those words is that the assessment is assessment in respect of the lands which on the date of the operation of the Act were in possession of the tenants. In other words the words in possession of their tenants are not used to indicate a point of time in respect of assessment but are used as deseriptive of the lands in respect of which assessment is to be fixed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 19 of the Act. ( 22 ) BEFORE we part with this pa rt of the argument we may dispose of one more contention raised by Mr. Nanavati based on sec. 28 of the Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors Relief Act XXIII of 1954. The preamble to that Act states that the Act was passed for amelioration of conditions of the girasdars and barkhalidars and for rehabilitating them since the estates of these two classes of persons had diminished and their paying capacity had been reduced. Section 28 of that Act defines paying capacity and the explanation thereto inter alia provides that in the case of a barkhalidar cash annuity payable to him under sec. 18 of the Barkhali Abolition Act 1951 valued at four per cent per annum shall be taken into consideration while deciding his paying capacity. The argument was that since the paying capacity of a barkhalidar under sec. 28 has to be determined on the capitalised value of the cash annuity payable to him the annuity must be something which is fixed and definite and not liable to change as the assessment changes from time to time. The premise of this argument is that assessment changes from time to time. That is not so. What is forgotten is that the Government has the power to modify the assessment only when it is of opinion that the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar is manifestly unfair and even where the Government modifies such an assessment it has to keep in mind the principle of arithmetic average laid down in sec. 19. It is therefore not as if the assessment can be frequently altered or that it can be altered at the whim or the sweet-will of the Government. Besides when the Debtors Relief Court has to decide the paying capacity of a barkhalidar it would calculate the capitalised value of the annuity prevalent at the time of such decision. 19. It is therefore not as if the assessment can be frequently altered or that it can be altered at the whim or the sweet-will of the Government. Besides when the Debtors Relief Court has to decide the paying capacity of a barkhalidar it would calculate the capitalised value of the annuity prevalent at the time of such decision. The function however to determine the paying capacity on the basis of the annuity cannot mean that the amount of the annuity is immutable and unchangeable. It is true that the Debtors Relief Act was passed in view of the consequences which arose as a result of the enactment of the Land Reforms Act and the Barkhali Abolition Act. But the provisions of the Debtors Relief Act cannot govern the construction of a provision in another Act whose object is wholly different. The construction of secs. 18 and 19 urged by Mr. Nanavati and the contention that once the Mamlatdar has fixed the rates of assessment on arthmetic average under sec. 19 and calculated the annuity payable to the barkhalidar the assessment and the annuity become fixed and crystallised and the right to receive the same accrues to the barkhalidar which right continues until the end of the prescribed period cannot be accepted. ( 23 ) THE argument next submitted by Mr. Nanavati was that the expression surveyed and settled in sec. 19 meant survey and settlement made under Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Land Revenue Code that when the rates of assessment were revised under sec. 52 by the Collector those rates were not fixed upon such survey and settlement and therefore there had not been in the instant case any survey and settlement and consequently the rates of assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar in 1951-1952 still continued and the annuities payable to the petitioners therefore had to be paid on the basis of the rates of assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar. He also contended that since the expression used in sec. 19 was survey and settlement the process of survey and settlement had to be one continuous one and that process must consist of operations provided for in Chapter VIII and Chapter VIII-A of the Code and therefore the assessment fixed by the Collector under sec. He also contended that since the expression used in sec. 19 was survey and settlement the process of survey and settlement had to be one continuous one and that process must consist of operations provided for in Chapter VIII and Chapter VIII-A of the Code and therefore the assessment fixed by the Collector under sec. 52 not being based on survey and settlement under Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code the assessment made by him was not the assessment within the meaning of sec. 19 of the Act. Chapter VIII and Chapter VIII-A of the Code deal with survey and settlement respectively. Sec. 95 provides that it shall be lawful for the State Government whenever it may seem expedient to direct survey of any land in any part of the area to which the Code extends with a view to the settlement of the land revenue and to the record and preservation of rights connected therewith and such survey shall be called a revenue survey. Such survey may extend to the lands of any village town or city generally or to such land only as the Government may direct. Sec. 106 empowers the State Government to direct at any time a fresh survey or any operation subsidiary thereto and sec. 108 provides that the survey officer or the settlement officer on the occasion of making or revising a settlement of land revenue has to prepare a register called the settlement register showing the area and assessment of each survey number and such other records as may be prescribed by the State Government in that behalf. Sec. 117c which appears in Chapter VIII-A defines settlement as meaning the result of operations conducted in a zone in order to determine land revenue assessment. Sub-section (1-A) of the section states that a zone means a local area comprising a taluka or a group of talukas or portions thereof of one or more districts which in the opinion of the State Government or an officer authorised by it in this behalf is contiguous and homogeneous in respect of physical configuration climate and rainfall principal crops grown in the area and soil characteristics. Sub-sec. Sub-sec. (4) defines classification value as meaning the relative valuation of land as recorded in the survey records having regard to its soil water and other advantages and class of land is defined as meaning any one of the classes of land namely dry crop rice or garden land. Sec. 117d empowers the State Government to direct at any time a settlement called an original settlement of the land revenue of any land of which a revenue survey has been made under sec. 95. It also empowers the Government to direct at any time a fresh settlement called a revision settlement of the land revenue of such land provided that no enhancement of assessment shall take effect before the expiration of the settlement for the time being in force. It would appear from these sections that survey means classification and measurement of land and settlement contemplated by Chapter VIII-A means the settlement of land revenue assessment of a zone or of any land of which revenue survey has been made under sec. 95 or not. Section 52 on the other hand deals with land in respect of which settlement 4as not been fixed under Chapter VIII-A. The section provides that on all lands which are not wholly exempt from the payment of land revenue and on which assessment has not been fixed under the provisions of Chapter VIII-A the assessment of the amount to be paid as land revenue shall subject to the rules made under sec. 214 be fixed at the discretion of the Collector and the amount due according to such assessment shall be levied on all such lands. The question is has the assessment fixed by the Collector under sec. 52 been made on survey and settlement and whether such assessment can for the purposes of this Act fall under sec. 19 of the Barkhali Abolition Act ? As already stated by a notification dated May 20 1959 the Government of Bombay substituted rule 17 by another rule which took in the lands covered by the Land Reforms Act and the Barkhali Abolition Act also and therefore the new rule applied to all agricultural lands in respect of which there was no survey under Chapter VIII and no settlement under Chapter VIII-A. The assessment to be fixed under sec. 52 read with this rule is to have effect only till survey and/ or settlement is made under Chapters VIII and VIII-A. Rule 17 as introduced on and from May 20 1959 inter alia provides that the Collector has to arrange to form groups of villages homogeneous as far as possible in respect of physical configuration climate and rainfall prices and yield of principal crops and then classify the lands into three classes namely 8 dry crop rice and irrigated land. The Collector has then to determine area of the pre-reorganisation State of Bombay excluding the transferred territories to which these crops can be compared on the basis of homogeneity of soil and crop pattern and fix the respective rates of assessment per acre for the dry crop and rice classes of land in each group having regard to the respective rate of assessment of such classes of land prevailing in the area determined as above. The rule further provides that he has to fix the rate of assessment per acre for the irrigated class of lands namely for lands irrigated by wells at a rate not exceeding two times the rate of lands classed as dry crop in the same group and for lands irrigated by tank or canal at a rate not exceeding two times the rate fixed for lands irrigated by wells in the same group. Where survey and classification of each individual holding has already been made under Chapter VIII of the Code he has to fix for each individual holding assessment payable by the holder thereof on the basis of survey and classification so made at the rate fixed. But where such survey and classification of each individual holding has not been made under Chapter VIII of the Code he has to classify each class of land first into dry crop rice and irrigated and then into three sub-classes namely good medium and inferior and after taking into consideration the yield of the principal crops produced or the classification that may have already been adopted for the purpose of fixation of Udhad or Vighoti fix for each individual holding assessment payable by the holder thereof by applying the rate appropriate to the group and class of lands determined as above in the proportion therein set out. Sub-rule (6) of the rule provides that the assessment fixed by the Collector shall remain in force for the current revenue year and shall remain thereafter in force until it is revised by the Collector in accordance with sub-rule (6) or till the lands to which the rule applies are settled under Chapter VIII-A of the Code whichever is earlier. Sub-rule (6) of the rule provides that in revising the rate or amount of assessment the Collector shall have regard to the several factors stated therein. It is clear from sec. 52 itself that the power of the Collector to fix assessment is limited to lands in respect of which there has been no settlement under Chapter VIII-A and furthermore he has to exercise this power subject to the rules made under sec. 214 of the Code. It is equally clear from rule 17 that such assessment is to be made after classification of lands and fixing them in groups comparable with such groups or lands in other parts of the State. Survey and settlement under Chapters VIII and VIII-A mean classification and fixing of assessment according to the class in which the village or the lands situated therein fall. That is also what is enjoined upon the Collector under sec. 52 read with rule 17 except that whereas under Chapter VIII-A assessment is done zone-wise under sec. 52 read with rule 17 what the Collector has to classify and assess are lands in respect of which there has not been survey and/or settlement under Chapters VIII and VIII-A. It is clear that the object of sec. 52 and rule 17 was to i have classification and assessment made until survey and settlement are done under these two chapters so that in the meantime the lands not surveyed and/or settled can be assessed on a scientific basis and uniformly with the rest of the lands in the pre-reorganisation State of Bombay. Though classification and assessment done under sec. 52 read with rule 17 are provisional and in respects of lands and not in respect of a zone there can be no doubt that the operations done by the Collector under sec. 52 are operations of survey and settlement. The question is what is the meaning of the expression surveyed and settled used in sec. 19 of the Barkhali Abolition Act ? The contention urged by Messrs. 52 are operations of survey and settlement. The question is what is the meaning of the expression surveyed and settled used in sec. 19 of the Barkhali Abolition Act ? The contention urged by Messrs. Nanavati Vyas and Hathi was that when the Act was passed rule 17 was not in the Land Revenue Rules 1921 and therefore the only survey and settlement that the Saurashtra Legislature knew of was survey and settlement as provided in Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code and therefore when sec. 19 speaks about lands surveyed and settled it means lands surveyed and settled under these two chapters of the Code. Consequently the fixation of assessment by the Collector under sec. 52 read with rule 17 would not constitute survey and settlement within the meaning of sec. 19 of the Act and therefore the assessment which would still prevail for the purposes of sec. 18 and 19 would be the assessment made by the Mamlatdar on the principle of arithmetic average. It was also urged by Mr. D. D. Vyas that the fixation of rates of assessment under sec. 52 by itself would not amount to settlement for unless that fixation had gone through the operations of settlement as provided by Chapter VIII-A such assessment would not be settlement. ( 24 ) IN our view neither of these two contentions can be upheld for they are based on a narrow view of the expression survey and settlement used in sec. 19. Broadly speaking sec. 19 does not provide that survey and settlement of lands must be survey and settlement under Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code. Prima facie therefore if there is survey and settlement that would be sufficient compliance of sec. 19. No doubt sec. 117c of the Code defines settlement and under that definition the assessment settled can be one which goes through the operations set out in that chapter including the approval of the State Legislature. But it must be remembered that settlement is not necessarily the settlement as defined by sec. 117c. The settlement which has to pass through the operations in that chapter is the one which takes place under that chapter and is ordinarily for a zone and since it would affect the entire zone it was presumably thought necessary to have the Legislatures approval. 117c. The settlement which has to pass through the operations in that chapter is the one which takes place under that chapter and is ordinarily for a zone and since it would affect the entire zone it was presumably thought necessary to have the Legislatures approval. Unfortunately we have not got Baden-Powells work on The Land Systems of British India but we find a quotation from the 1892 Edition Volume I at page 243 in Guptes Commentary on The Bombay Land Revenue Code (1962 Edition at page 374) according to which settlement simply means the process of determining the amount of land revenue payable to Government and the person or the body whom Government recognizes as entitled to be proprietor or holder according to the Land Revenue Code liable to pay the revenue is said to be settled with or to hold the settlement. It is therefore not correct to say that the only survey and settlement are those done under Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code. If the land is surveyed and settled under any other provision of the Code it would still be land surveyed and settled within the meaning of the Code and also sec. 19 of the Act. It is true that sec. 52 talks of assessment of land revenue and not of settlement but sec. 54 makes it clear that such settlement is regarded by the Legislature as settlement. Under sec 54 when assessment is made under sec. 52 the assessment of each portion of the land or survey number shall be made with the person who under sec. 136 is primarily responsible to the State Government for the same and that would be as Baden-Powell has described settled with the person primarily responsible for payment. The operations of assessment which under sec. 52 have to go through under rule 17 would in substance and effect amount to survey and settlement and such survey and settlement in the absence of any words in sec. 19 of the Act that they must be under Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code must be held to be within the meaning of and complying with sec. 19 of the Act. 19 of the Act that they must be under Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code must be held to be within the meaning of and complying with sec. 19 of the Act. ( 25 ) FROM the affidavit in reply of the Under Secretary to the Revenue Department it is clear that the operations provided in rule 17 were in fact gone through before the revised rates for these two villages were fixed by the Collector under sec. 52. The affidavit states that in 1951-1952 the average rates of assessment for khalsa and non-khalsa villages were fixed and also states how they were fixed. After the reorganisation of States from November 1 1956 it was found that the assessment rates fixed in khalsa villages in Saurashtra area were much higher than in the comparable union areas of the Bombay State and with a view to bring about uniformity rule 17 was introduced in the Land Revenue Rules as from May 20 1959 At that time the amendment rules were published in the Gazette and objections from the public were invited and thereafter the same were brought into effect and implemented. The affidavit also states that a special officer for each district was appointed to implement rules 17 and 18 and villagewise local committees were formed for classification of lands into good medium and inferior varieties. Likewise comparable union areas of lands in the Bombay State with respect to ex-Saurashtra lands were fixed and on the basis of that village-wise and field-wise assessments were made which were approved by the Director of Land Records and Settlement Commissioner. These rules were then implemented by the Collectors of the districts concerned under sec. 52 of the Code. Under a notification issued in 1960 a study of different areas in the different districts of Saurashtra region was made and certain areas were declared as comparable with the regularly and scientifically fixed areas of the ex-Bombay State and then standard rates of such settled areas were extended to the aforesaid areas of the Saurashtra districts including the barkhali estates and thus assessment so fixed on each individual parcel of land under rule 17 was bases on the standard rates worked out by settlement made under the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the Code. Until then the average rates of assessment fixed during the time when the State of Saurashtra existed were not the settlement rates and therefore the Collectors of the various districts under cowers conferred on them under sec. 52 of the Code fixed and/or revised the assessment in the respective villages including barkhali and girasdari villages by applying the settlement rates of comparable union areas settled under the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the Code replacing thereby the average rates fixed in 1951-1952 by the Mamlatdar which appeared to be manifestly unfair. ( 26 ) THERE can therefore be no doubt that the revised assessment made by the Collector in the instant cases was done in accordance with the provisions of sec. 52 and rule 17 and assessments were made as a result of survey and settlement. As already stated there is nothing in sec. 19 to show that survey and settlement there contemplated are only survey and settlement under Chapters VIII and VIII-A of the Code. If there has been valid survey and settlement under provisions other than those two chapters of the Code that would be still survey and settlement within the meaning of sec. 19. The assessment made by the Mamlatdar under sec. 19 has to give way to an assessment made under the Code for it is under the Code that an occupant is liable to pay land revenue as prescribed by sec. 16. The assessment made therefore under sec. 52 has to be substituted for the one made under sec. 19 by the Mamlatdar and the annuity payable under sec. 18 being equal to one assessment it has to change if the assessment made sec. 52 on survey and settlement varies from that fixed by the Mamlatdar. In our view there is no validity in the contention that the assessment made under sec. 52 is not an assessment on survey and settlement. Equally there is no validity in the contention that once an assessment is made by the Mamlatdar the annuity gets fixed or crystallized on the basis of such assessment and is not liable to change even though in sec. 19 the Legislature has in terms stated that the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar is to subsist only till survey and settlement are made and the assessment is freshly fixed. ( 27 ) TWO further contentions urged by Mr. Nanavati may now be considered. 19 the Legislature has in terms stated that the assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar is to subsist only till survey and settlement are made and the assessment is freshly fixed. ( 27 ) TWO further contentions urged by Mr. Nanavati may now be considered. The first was that the right of a barkhalidar to receive cash annuity is a right to property guaranteed by Article 19 and since that right was adversely affected by reducing the rates of assessment by the Collectors executive act without affording an opportunity to the petitioners to be heard the revised assessment was in violation of Article 19 and therefore invalid. According to Mr. Nanavati rule 17 also is bad as it violates Article 19 in that by providing for a revised assessment the rule indirectly affects the right to property guaranteed by that Article. In our view the answer to this contention is that the operations carried out by the Collector under sec. 52 of the Code and rule 17 of the Land Revenue Rules were operations for the purposes of revising assessment for which sec. 52 has given the power. It cannot be gainsaid that the Collectors order fixing the revised rates was with jurisdiction. Since the revised rates reduced the rates of assessment fixed by the Mamlatdar which were higher than those prevailing in the rest of the State of Bombay for the same class of lands they did not prejudicially affect the persons liable to pay assessment. Prima facie if at all any one was entitled to a hearing it would be the person who was liable to pay assessment who could complain that no opportunity of being heard was furnished to him. It is however true that the revision of rates has affected the quantum of annuity payable to the petitioners. But if we are right in our conclusion on the first part of the argument and on the construction we have placed on secs. 18 and 19 of the Act the right to receive annuity is a right given by the statute and if that statute itself provides that annuity shall be equal to one assessment whatever that assessment is when it becomes annually payable that statutory right cannot be said to have been reduced or adversely affected. 18 and 19 of the Act the right to receive annuity is a right given by the statute and if that statute itself provides that annuity shall be equal to one assessment whatever that assessment is when it becomes annually payable that statutory right cannot be said to have been reduced or adversely affected. The contention is again based upon the same assumption that the question of quantum gets crystallized once the Mamlatdar has fixed assessment under sec. 19. But that assumption though it may be said to have been warranted in respect of compensation payable under the Land Reforms Act is not warranted under the present Act. When therefore as a result of the fixation of assessment by the Collector under sec. 52 of the Code the amount of annuity gets correspondingly reduced there is no infringement of sec. 18 or 19 of the Act for in the view we take of those sections that is precisely and the only right which the Act confers on the petitioners. Besides no right of hearing to barkhalidars is given either under the Barkhali Abolition Act or under sec. 52 of the Code. Since the validity of these provisions has not been challenged in these petitions and the fixation of assessment has been made in compliance with the provisions sec. 19 of the Act and sec. 52 of the Code this contention cannot be accepted. Reliance was placed however by Mr. Nanavati on the decision in Jayvantsinghji v. The State of Gujarat A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 821. That decision in our view has no applicability to the instant cases for what that decision held was that (1) the time limit prescribed in sec. 6 of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act 1958 was bad and (2) that secs. 3 4 and 6 of that Act were colourable pieces of legislation which under the guise of changing the definition of a permanent tenant deprived the ex-Talukdar of compensation which was payable under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 This decision also cannot apply because in that case the right to receive compensation at least at twenty times the assessment accrued to the ex-Talukdar under the Bombay Tenancy Act 1948 and it was that right which was infringed by an attempt to give a new definition of the expression a permanent tenant. That is not the case in these petitions. On the construction placed by us on secs. 18 and 19 of the Act the annuity is liable to vary according as the assessment varies for the only right that these sections confer on the Barkhalidar is to receive annuity equal to one assessment and as already stated sec. 19 itself contemplates that the assessment by the Mamlatdar thereunder is to subsist only till the village in which the lands are situated is surveyed and settled. If the assessment is changed as a result of survey and settlement the annuity having to be equal to that assessment is liable to be changed. Therefore no question of any infringement of sec. 18 of the Act arises. Equally there cannot be any question of a breach of right to property for the only right conferred by the statute is to receive annuity equal to one assessment as contemplated by sec. 19. ( 28 ) THE second contention was founded on Article 31 and as submitted by Mr. Nanavati the argument was that when sec. 19 uses the expression surveyed and settled it refers to an event which is to occur under the Land Revenue Code and not a power under that section. He argued that when the Presidents assent was taken the only law for survey and settlement was that contained in Chapter VIII and VIII-A of the Code for sec. 52 of that Code did not contain a provision for survey and settlement and rule 17 was not yet inserted in the Land Revenue Rules 1921 Therefore the Presidents assent must be held to be confined to the provisions as to survey and settlement contained in those two chapters only and to the assessment on the basis of arithmetic average contained in sec. 19 of the Act. Therefore if rule 17 were to be resorted to that could only be done by a fresh legislation and such legislation must have a fresh assent of the President. In urging this contention however what is forgotten is that sec. 52 of the Code giving power to the Collector to fix assessment was in existence when the President gave his assent to the Barkhali Abolition Act. In urging this contention however what is forgotten is that sec. 52 of the Code giving power to the Collector to fix assessment was in existence when the President gave his assent to the Barkhali Abolition Act. That section also contains the provision that the Collector can fix assessment in respect of lands not surveyed and/or settled under Chapters VIII and VIIIA of the Code and that he can exercise that power subject to the rules made under sec. 214 of the Code. Section 214 (1) (b) of the Code expressly confers power on the Government to frame rules for regulating assessment alteration and revision of such assessment. The President was therefore aware that the State Government in future might frame rules for regulating and/or for revision of assessment and must therefore be presumed to have given his assent being aware that rules such as rule 17 would be made in future. When he gave his assent to the Barkhali Abolition Act he was aware of the provisions of sec. 19 which in express terms contemplate assessment under the Code in future and that such assessment would include assessment under sec. 52. Since the power under sec. 52 is subject to the rules and that power is under sec. 214 to frame rules regulating assessments the assent was sufficient to cover the assessment which may be made in accordance with and subject to rule 17. ( 29 ) THESE were all the contentions urged before us. In the view we take of secs. 18 and 19 of the Barkhali Abolition Act sec. 52 of the Code and rule 17 of the Land Revenue Rules it is not possible to sustain them. The contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners therefore must fail. ( 30 ) SPECIAL Civil Applications Nos. 588 of 1963 and 168 of 1964 are the two petitions which raise an additional question namely that as the villages in which the lands in question in those petitions were unsurveyed at the time when the Mamlatdar under sec. 19 fixed the rates of the assessment the area of the lands in possession of the tenants of the petitioners in these two petitions was wrongly set out by the Mamlatdar in the occupancy certificates issued by him to the petitioners tenants and as a result of that mistake cash annuity payable to the petitioners was also incorrectly calculated. 19 fixed the rates of the assessment the area of the lands in possession of the tenants of the petitioners in these two petitions was wrongly set out by the Mamlatdar in the occupancy certificates issued by him to the petitioners tenants and as a result of that mistake cash annuity payable to the petitioners was also incorrectly calculated. The contention raised in these two petitions therefore is that the Mamlatdar should be directed to rectify the mistake committed by him in the cash annuity payment certificates issued in favour of the petitioners. After some arguments on this question Mr. D. D. Vyas who appears for the petitioners in both the petitions stated before us that he would not press this additional question these petitions and that instead he would make an application to the State Government requesting the State Government to direct the Mamlatdar to rectify the mistake. Thereupon the learned Assistant Government Pleader stated before us that if such an application were to be made by the petitioners the Government was prepared to consider such an application. In view of the fact that Mr. D. D. Vyas has not pressed this additional question it does not become necessary for us to consider it and therefore these two special civil applications also fall in line with the rest of the applications in the present group. Since we are not in a position to sustain any of the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners in this group of petitions all the petitions will have to be dismissed. Accordingly the rules in these petitions are discharged. The petitioner or the petitioners in each of these petitions will pay to the respondents the costs of each respective petition. ( 31 ) MR. Nanavati and the other learned advocates appearing for the petitioners apply for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Since these petitions involve an important question of interpretation of secs. 18 and 19 of the Barkhali Abolition Act 1951 and also involve other questions of law we allow the application and issue a certificate under Art. 133 (1) (c) to each of the petitioners in this group of petitions. Petitions dismissed. .