Kailasam, J. .- The defendants are the appellants The plaintiff filed the suit for a declaration of his title and possession. The first defendant took the “A” Schedule property on lease by a rental agreement dated 29th April, 1933, in favour of the plaintiff and his elder brother Srinivasa Pillai on a rent of Re. 1 per month. The tenancy was liable to be terminated by one month’s notice There was a partition between the plaintiff and his brother in 1935 under which he plaintiff became the owner of the northern half of the suit property described in the plaint B Schedule The first defendant continued to occupy the northern portion belonging to the plaintiff but surrendered possession of the southern portion to Srinivasa Pillai. The first defendant continued to pay the rent to the plaintiff till about 1952. In 1958 the plaintiff terminated the tenancy by a notice dated 30th June, 1958. The first defendant then set up title in himself, and the plaintiff again sent another notice terminating the tenancy on the ground of the first defendant claiming title to the property. The first defendant in his written statement contended that he entered into possession of the property about 45 years back. But he did not agree to pay any rent. As the plaintiff asked the first defendant to execute a document, the first defendant executed such a document without knowing its contents. He also executed another document ten years thereafter without knowing its contents. According to the 1st defendant, the plaintiff received from him a sum of Rs. 820 in three instalments. agreeing to sell the entire “A” Schedule property. The first defendant also pleaded that in case he fails to prove title to the property in his possession and if he is found to be a tenant, he is entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. He also pleaded that the suit filed without proper notice as required under the said Act is liable to be dismissed. The trial Court found that there was no such sale as alleged by the defendants and that the title was with the plaintiff. He also pleaded that the suit filed without proper notice as required under the said Act is liable to be dismissed. The trial Court found that there was no such sale as alleged by the defendants and that the title was with the plaintiff. It also found that even though the defendants have failed to prove their alleged purchase, there was sufficient evidence to show that the first defendant was a tenant under section 2 (4) of the City Tenants Protection Act and as such entitled to protection under the said Act. It therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. On appeal the lower appellant Court negatived the sale set up by the first defendant and found title in favour of the plaintiff. It also, found that as the defendants denied the title of the landlord and as the tenancy was terminated, the defendants cannot claim the benefits under the said City Tenants Protection Act and holding that the first defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the said Act, it decreed the suit. In this Second Appeal, it is contended on behalf of the defendants that the lower appellate Court was in error in holding that the first defendant was not entitled to the benefits of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. The facts found are that by virtue of the lease dated 29th April, 1933, the first defendant entered into the land and continued to be a tenant till his tenancy was terminated by a notice by the plaintiff on 30th June, 1958, forfeiting the tenancy due to the tenant setting up independent title Section 2 (4) of the City Tenants’ Protection Act (Madras Act III of 1922). defines ‘tenant ‘as meaning tenant of land liable to pay rent on it, every other person, deriving title from him, and as including persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy. The definition of the word Tenant’ was amended in 196o, but as the suit was filed in 1958, we are not now concerned with the amendment. The definition of the word “Tenant” includes (i) tenant of the land liable to pay rent, (ii) every other person deriving title from him and (iii) persons who. continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy. As the tenancy of the first defendant was validly terminated in 1958 he was not a tenant. The definition of the word “Tenant” includes (i) tenant of the land liable to pay rent, (ii) every other person deriving title from him and (iii) persons who. continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy. As the tenancy of the first defendant was validly terminated in 1958 he was not a tenant. Under clause (1) a tenant is liable to pay rent. The second clause has no application as the 1st defendant does not claim to be a person deriving title from a tenant. The question is whether the defendant comes under the third clause. Though the tenancy of the defendant had been validly terminated, he continued to be a person in possession after the termination of the tenancy. Under the Transfer of Property Act, lease of immovable property can be determined under one of the clauses enumerated in section in. Clause (g) relates to the determination of tenancy by forfeiture. It is not disputed that the tenancy was validly determined. But clause (iii) of section 2 (4) of the City Tenants’ Protection Act includes a person whether he be a tenant, or not who continues to be in possession after the termination of the tenancy. The definition is wide enough to include a person who was a tenant but whose tenancy was terminated validly but continued to be in possession after the termination of the tenancy. Mr. Balakrishnan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that after the termination of the tenancy validly, the tenant had no right whatsoever and therefore he cannot claim any right under the City Tenants’ Protection Act. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision reported in Madhava Raw Naidu v. Sri Gangadeswarar Temple1. In that case it was held that after the tenancy was terminated by notice because of the tenant’s denial of landlord’s title, a person who purchased in auction the right, title and interest of the tenant was not a tenant. It was also held that it cannot be said that because the tenant was in possession after the termination of the tenancy, he was entitled to pass on the benefit of the Act to the auction-purchaser of his right, title and interest. It was also held that it cannot be said that because the tenant was in possession after the termination of the tenancy, he was entitled to pass on the benefit of the Act to the auction-purchaser of his right, title and interest. Leach, C.J., dealing with this question observed as follows: “Ponnuswami denied his landlord’s title and therefore the landlord was entitled to terminate his tenancy which was done by a notice given to him on 10th September, 1936. He was informed that unless he vacated and delivered vacant possession of the land within three days of the receipt of the notice, proceedings in ejectment would be taken against him. The appellant’s purchase of the right, title and interest of Ponnuswami took place two years later. If Ponnuswami had in law any right in this land it would have passed to the appellant but clearly he had none. The argument of the appellant is that Ponnuswami was in possession after the termination of his tenancy and therefore was entitled to pass on the benefit of the Act to the appellant. It is impossible to accept the argument that a person who claims under a person whose tenancy has been determined is a tenant and is entitled to further notice. When the appellant purported to purchase Ponnuswami’s rights, Ponnuswami was not a tenant and therefore could assign no tenancy right to the appellant.” The learned Counsel for the appellant sought to distinguish this case on the ground that the question that arose for consideration in the case was whether the tenant after ceasing to be a tenant could pass on any right to his purchaser. But this case is different as the tenant himself is continuing to be in possession. On the facts of the case before the Bench there could be no difficulty in concluding that a person who derived title from a tenant, whose tenancy had been terminated, may not be entitled to claim the benefit as a tenant under section 2 (4). But this case is different as the tenant himself is continuing to be in possession. On the facts of the case before the Bench there could be no difficulty in concluding that a person who derived title from a tenant, whose tenancy had been terminated, may not be entitled to claim the benefit as a tenant under section 2 (4). The observation of the Bench appears to cover the case of tenants who continued to be in possession after the termination of the tenancy for it was stated thus: “ If Ponnuswami had in law any right in this land, it would have passed to the appellant but clearly he had none.” Again in conclusion it was observed as follows: “When the appellant purported to purchase Ponnuswami’s rights, Ponnuswami was not a tenant and therefore could assign no tenancy right to the appellant.” If the remarks of the Bench are to be construed as holding that a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy has no rights, it will not be in conformity with the 3rd clause of the definition of section 2 (4) for persons who continued in possession after the termination of the tenancy are included. In view of the importance of the question, I am of opinion that this matter should he disposed of by a Bench of this Court. The matter is therefore referred to a Bench. In pursuance of the above order this appeal was heard by a Bench (K. Veeraswami and P. Kunhamed Kutti, JJ.). R. Vaidynathan, for Appellant. T. V. Balakrishnan and N. Vanchinathan, for Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Veeraswami, J.*- The defendants appeal against a reversing judgment arising from a suit for a declaration of the title of the respondents and for recovery of possession of a site measuring 92 ft. by 36 ft. at Adambakkam. On 29th April, 1933, the 1st defendant took a lease of the “ A” Schedule property from the plaintiff and his brother on a certain rental. In 1935 at a partition between the brothers, the plaintiff became the owner of the northern half of the property covered by the original lease. Thereafter the 1st defendant surrendered the southern half but continued to occupy the northern half. Since the lease was terminable by a month’s notice, the plaintiff terminated it by a notice dated 30th June, 1958. In 1935 at a partition between the brothers, the plaintiff became the owner of the northern half of the property covered by the original lease. Thereafter the 1st defendant surrendered the southern half but continued to occupy the northern half. Since the lease was terminable by a month’s notice, the plaintiff terminated it by a notice dated 30th June, 1958. The 1st defendant then denied the plaintiff’s title on the ground that he had purchased the northern half of the site from the plaintiff. The plaintiff by another notice purported to terminate the tenancy on the ground that the 1st defendant denied his title and claimed title in himself. The plaintiff’s suit followed, which was resisted on two grounds, (1) title in himself by purchase from the plaintiff, and (2) he was entitled to protection under the provisions of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921. Both the Courts below have found against the claim of title by the 1st defendant, but they have differed on the question whether he was entitled to the protection of the Act, the lower Court holding that he was not. The Second Appeal was originally before Kailasam, J., who considered that if Madhava Rao Naidu v. Sri Gangadeswarar Temple1, had decided that a tenant continuing in possession after termination of tenancy had no right, it would not be in conformity with the third clause of the definition of a tenant in section 2 (4) of the City Tenants’ Protection Act, 1921. On that view the learned Judge referred the Second Appeal for disposal of by a Division Bench and that is how it comes before us. The Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act was enacted for the express purpose of giving protection to tenants, who in municipal towns and adjoining areas in the State of Madras have constructed buildings on other’s lands in the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they paid a fair rent for the land. The 1st defendant would claim to have put up certain huts on the land and sought protection under the Act. Section 9 provides for statutory protection of tenants in possession, as defined by section 2 (4) of the Act. The 1st defendant would claim to have put up certain huts on the land and sought protection under the Act. Section 9 provides for statutory protection of tenants in possession, as defined by section 2 (4) of the Act. The definition is as follows: “ 2 (4) ‘Tenant’ means tenant of land liable to pay rent on it, every other person deriving title from him, and includes persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy.” The statutory definition of a tenant includes, therefore, three classes of persons of which the first envisages the existence of contractual tenancy under the terms of which there is a liability to pay rent. The second category is based on a derivative title from a tenant of the first class. The third contemplates a person, who continues in possession notwithstanding the fact that there has been a termination of the tenancy. The 1st defendant claims that he will come under the third category. On the other hand for the plaintiffs the argument is that, where a person has suffered forfeiture by denial of the landlord’s title under section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, he will not fall within the purview of the third class of statutory tenant as defined by the Act. It seems to us that the decision above referred to concludes the point against the defendant and in our view, with respect, it is correct. There a Court auction purchaser of the right, title and interest of one quondam tenant of the property in question claimed that, placed as he was as a purchaser in the shoes of the vendor, who continued to be in possession even after denial of title by him and incurring forfeiture on that account he was entitled to the statutory protection. Sir Lionel Leach, C.J., and Mr. Lakshmana Rao, J., held in the circumstances that, if the vendor had in law any right in the land, it would have passed to the appellant, who was the auction purchaser, but clearly he had none. Mr. Vaidyanatha Iyer for the *18th February, 1955. appellant argues that the ratio of this decision is merely that the right to statutory protection under the Act is not a transferable or transmissible right. According to him, that is all that the Court decided in that case. Mr. Vaidyanatha Iyer for the *18th February, 1955. appellant argues that the ratio of this decision is merely that the right to statutory protection under the Act is not a transferable or transmissible right. According to him, that is all that the Court decided in that case. We have no hesitation in rejecting the contention for the learned Judges unmistakably pointed out that Ponnuswami, who was the original tenant, clearly had no right in himself, and it was on that account they held that the Court auction purchaser, who claimed his right, title and interest, had acquired no right. Quite apart from this decision, we are of the view that the lower appellate Court took the right view of the scope of section 2 (4), as it stood before the amendment in 1960. It is true that the third clause in the definition comprehends persons, continuing in possession, though the tenancy has come to an end. A tenancy may come to an end for a number of reasons as for instance denial of landlord’s title Such a denial under the ordinary law of transfer of property brings about forfeiture. The argument for the appellant before us is that even such a case will be within the actual words of the third category in the definition. But there is a fallacy in the argument. When a person, who continues to be in possession after termination of tenancy, claims that he does- so, as he is entitled to the property, as his own, it is obvious that there is hardly any room for such an owner to seek protection of his possession under the provisions of the Act. Clearly the Act is not intended to protect such owners, for there is no need for it. We are of the view that such a case will! not fall within the third category of persons entitled to protection under the Act. On that view, the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. R.M. ------------- Appeal dismissed.