JAGAT NARAYAN, J.—This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution by nine member$ of the Makrana Municipal Board against a declaration that the motion of noconfidence moved by them against the Chairman of the Board under sec. 72 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act 1959 had not been carried. The petition was contested on behalf of the Municipal Board, Makrana (respondent No. 1), State of Rajasthan (respondent No. 2) the Collector Nagaur (respondent No. 3), Shri Gauri Shankar Jha, Sub-Divisional Magistrate Parbatsar who was the nominee of the Collector and who made the impugned declaration (respondent No. 4) Shri Ashraf Ali (respondent No. 8) and Shri Ghulam Mustafa (respondent No.11). Respondents Nos. 5 to 12 are members of the Municipal Board who opposed the motion. Out of them Shri Ghulam Mustafa (respondent No. 11) is the Chairman of the Board against whom the motion of noconfidence was made. 2. The petitioners sent a written notice of their intention to make a motion of noconfidence in the Chairman on 4-8-64. This notice was received by the Collector on 6-8-64. He convened a meeting of the Board to consider the motion on 4-9-64 and nominated Shri Gauri Shankar Jha, Sub-Divisional Officer, Parbatsar to preside over the meeting. A notice of the meeting was duly sent to all the members by registered post not less than seven clear days before the date of the meeting as prescribed under sec. 72(3). The Board consists of 17 members including the Chairman and on 4-9-64 thirteen of them were actually present at the meeting. Shri Moti Khan respondent No. 5 filed an application before Shri Jha praying that the meeting should be adjourned as notices for it had not been served on Shri Noor Mohammad, Shri Ashraf Ali, Smt. Sayra and Smt. Khatun who were absent. This prayer was opposed by the petitioner who drew the attention of Shri Jha to the provisions of sec. 72. They pointed out that under sec. 72(3) all that was necessary was to send notices by registered post not less than seven clear days before the date of the meeting and sub-secs. (4) and (5) made it quite clear that the meeting could not be adjourned on the ground that some members had not been served with notices. 72. They pointed out that under sec. 72(3) all that was necessary was to send notices by registered post not less than seven clear days before the date of the meeting and sub-secs. (4) and (5) made it quite clear that the meeting could not be adjourned on the ground that some members had not been served with notices. They filed their objection in writing also (annexure 4, page 20) and in this document they stated they were expressing their want of confidence in the Chairman Shri Ghulam Mustafa. This document was signed by all the nine petitioners and was handed over to the presiding officer. Despite their protest Shri Jha adjourned the meeting to 15-9-64 on the ground that the notices issued to four of the members who were absent had been returned with the endorsement that they could not be delivered. Annexure 5 ( pages 21 and 22 ) contains the minutes of the meeting dated 4-9-64 which were recorded by Shree Jha. It was stated by him in these minutes that sec. 72 did not contain any provision as to what was to be done in case the notices were not served on some of the members and requested the Collector to obtain a clarification from the Law Department of the Government on the point. 3. It may be mentioned here that the petitioners learnt that Shri Ghulam Mustafa had been able to influence the Sub-Divisional Officer who was to preside at the meeting on 4th September, 1964, and had settled with him that he will not attend the meeting on some pretext so that it will not take place on that date, but will have to be adjourned to another date. Abdul Rahman petitioner filed an application before the Collector on 31-8-64 (annexure 3, page 18) intimating to him what he had learnt and praying that alternative arrangements may be made for some one else to preside over the meeting in this case Shri Jha did not attend it on 4th September, 1964. 4. Shri Jha however attended the meeting and adjourned it to 15-9-64. 4. Shri Jha however attended the meeting and adjourned it to 15-9-64. Abdul Rahman petitioner then filed another application (annexure 7, page 25) before the Collector on 5-9-64 stating that his apprehensions about Shri Jha being under the influence of Shri Ghulam Mustafa, Chairman, had turned out to be true and requested him to take steps to see that law is not violated again and the motion of noconfidence is considered, observing "now we feel that if such things prevail noconfidence motion can never be put to vote in Shri Ghulam Mustafas life time even by the over-whelming majority". On 7-9-64 the Collector addressed the following letter to the Director of Local Bodies enclosing a copy of the minutes of the meeting dated 4-9-64 recorded by Shri Jha and seeking his advice as to what he should do in the circumstances (annexure 11, page 79:— "Nine out of the 17 members of the Makrana Municipal Board submitted to me under sec. 72 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act a written notice expressing noconfidence in their Chairman. As provided in sub-sec. (3) of sec. 72 a notice of meeting convened for the consideration of the motion was sent by me by registered post to every member of the Board. The S.D.O. Parbatsar was appointed as my nominee to preside over the meeting. This meeting was presided over by him on the appointed date i.e. September 4, 1964. An application was presented to him during the course of the meeting requesting him to adjourn the meeting on the ground that the notice of meeting sent by registered post could not be delivered to the 4 members of the Board. After considering the whole matter the S. D. O. took the view that the meeting be adjourned. A copy of the proceedings of that meeting is enclosed for your information. Now kindly clarify whether this was sufficient ground for adjournment within the provisions of sec. 72 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. I will very much appreciate if you kindly examine this question and let me have clarification as early as possible so that no occasion for adjournment of meeting on this ground may arise in future and date for convening a meeting for consideration of the motion may be fixed." 5. 72 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. I will very much appreciate if you kindly examine this question and let me have clarification as early as possible so that no occasion for adjournment of meeting on this ground may arise in future and date for convening a meeting for consideration of the motion may be fixed." 5. The Director of Local Bodies sent the following telegram (Annexure 10, page 76) to the Collector in reply to his letter:— Sub-Divisional Officers action unlawful. However proceed with meeting fixed for 15th Sept." The Collector forwarded a copy of the above telegram to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Parbatsar, for information and necessary action with the direction that he may convene the meeting on 15th September, 1964 as per instructions given by the Director of Local Bodies in the above telegram. 6. A meeting of the Board was accordingly held to consider the noconfidence motion on 15-9-64. All the members of the Board were present in this meeting and took part in it. The nine petitioners voted for the motion and the eight respondents voted against it. Shri Moti Khan respondent No. 5 and Shri Abdul Gafoor respondent No. 6 then filed an application before Shri Jha that Shri Abdul Samad petitioner No. 9 was disqualified as his son Noor Hasan was an employee of the Board and was therefore not entitled to vote for the motion. Relying on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Deo Dutt Sharma vs. Collector Ajmer (1) the presiding officer held that Shri Abdul Samad was disqualified under sec. 26(xii). He accordingly declared that the motion of noconfidence had not been carried. 7. Sec. 72 runs as follows:— "Motion of non-confidence against chairman (or vice-chairman.—(1) A motion expressing non-confidence in the chairman or vice-chairman shall be made only in accordance with the procedure laid down in this section. 26(xii). He accordingly declared that the motion of noconfidence had not been carried. 7. Sec. 72 runs as follows:— "Motion of non-confidence against chairman (or vice-chairman.—(1) A motion expressing non-confidence in the chairman or vice-chairman shall be made only in accordance with the procedure laid down in this section. (2) A written notice of intention to make a motion of non-confidence in the chairman or vice-chairman signed by such number of members of the board as constituted not less than one-third of the whole number of such members, together with a copy of the motion which it is proposed to make, shall be sent to the prescribed authority, who shall thereupon convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion to be held at the office of the board on the date and at the time appointed by him, which shall not be earlier than twenty or latter than thirty days from the date of the receipt of the notice. (3) The prescribed authority shall send by registered post not less than seven clear days before the date of the meeting a notice of such meeting and of the date and time appointed therefor to every member of the board. (4) The prescribed authority or his nominee shall preside at such meeting and if within half an hour from the time appointed for the meeting such authority or nominee is not present or if such authority is unable for any unavoidable cause to preside at the meeting, the meeting shall stand adjourned to the date and the time to be appointed and notified to the members. (5) Save as provided in sub-sec. (4), a meeting convened for the purpose of considering the motion under this section shall not for any reason be adjourned. (6) As soon as the quorum is present, the prescribed authority or his nominee shall read the motion for the consideration of which the meeting has been convened and declare it to be open for discussion. (7) Such discussion shall not be adjourned and shall automatically terminate on the expiry of four hours from the time appointed for the commencement of the meeting unless it is con cluded earlier. (7) Such discussion shall not be adjourned and shall automatically terminate on the expiry of four hours from the time appointed for the commencement of the meeting unless it is con cluded earlier. (8) Upon the conclusion of the debate or upon the expiry of the said period of four hours, as the case may be, the motion shall be put to the vote of the board and the prescribed authority or his nominee shall neither speak on the merits thereof nor vote thereon. (9) If the motion is not carried by a majority specified in sub-sec. (9) of sec. 65 or if any meeting cannot be held for want of a quorum, no notice of any subsequent motion of non-confidence in the same chairman or vice-chairman shall be received until the expiry of a period of six months from the date of the meeting." 8. Under notification No. F.4(34)LSG/59, dated 29/30th October 1959 the Collector of the District concerned has been appointed as the "Prescribed Authority" under the above section by the State Government. 9. The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the section only prescribes that the Collector shall send notices of the meeting to every member of the Board by registered post not less than seven clear days before the date of the meeting. It does not prescribe that the notice shall be served on every member before the motion can be considered. On the contrary it lays down that a meeting convened for the purpose of considering the no-confidence motion shall not be adjourned for any reason except as provided in sub-section (4). Sub-section (4) lays down that if the Collector or his nominee is not present within half an hour from the time appointed for the meeting or if such authority is unable for any unavoidable cause to preside at the meeting, the meeting shall stand adjourned to the date and the time to be appointed and notified to the members. It is argued that the action of Shri Jha in adjourning the meeting on the ground that the notices were not served on four of the members was wholly illegal and mala fide. 10. These contentions are correct in my opinion and the learned counsel for the contesting respondents did not dispute them at the hearing. It is argued that the action of Shri Jha in adjourning the meeting on the ground that the notices were not served on four of the members was wholly illegal and mala fide. 10. These contentions are correct in my opinion and the learned counsel for the contesting respondents did not dispute them at the hearing. Sub-section (3) only prescribes the sending of notices to members by registered post not less than seven clear days before the meeting and sub-section (5) rules out any adjournment on any ground whatsoever except on the ground contained in sub-section (4). That means that the meeting cannot be adjourned on the ground that notices were not delivered to some of the members. Sub-section (4) only envisages an adjournment in two contingencies—(i) if the Collector or his nominee who is to preside at the meeting does not turn up within half an hour from the time appointed for it, or (2) if he is unable to preside at the meeting for any unavoidable cause. In both these cases the adjournment is automatic as it is provided that the "meeting shall stand adjourned to the date and the time to be appointed and notified to the members". 11. The next contention on behalf of the petitioners is that as the meeting could not be adjourned it should be taken to have been concluded and from an examination of the proceedings it is quite clear that 9 members supported the motion of no-confidence and the remaining members present constituted a minority. A reference is made to section 65 (9) which runs: — "Every chairman and every vice-chairman of a board shall forthwith be deemed to have vacated his office if a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed by the votes of a majority of the whole number of members at a a special general meeting convened for the purpose." and it is contended that by virtue of this provision Shri Ghulam Mustafa will be deemed to have vacated his office on 4-9-64 as nine of the members constituting a majority of the members of the Board expressed their want of confidence in the Chairman by submitting to the presiding officer a signed document (annexure 4 containing a declaration about it. 12. I am unable to accept this contention. 12. I am unable to accept this contention. Section 72(1) lays down that a motion expressing non-confidence in the Chairman shall be made only in accordance with the procedure laid down in that section. Sub-section (6) provides that as soon as the quorum is present the presiding officer shall read the noconfidence motion and declare it to be open for discussion. Under sub-section (7) this discussion can continue for a period of four hours from the time appointed for the commencement of the meeting. Sub-section (8) provides that the motion shall be put to the vote of the board. In the present case the proceedings contemplated in sub-sections (6), (7) and (8) did not take place. It is true that it is not obligatory for the members to hold a discussion before voting on the motion. But it is necessary for the presiding officer to read the motion and then give an opportunity to the members to discuss it. 13. The object of these provisions is to ensure that the vote of no-confidence is passed for really valid reasons and not capriciously and are aimed at giving the chairman material grounds on which the vote of no-confidence has been proposed so as to enable him to make a proper representation. In my opinion the provision regarding opportunity to hold a discussion before voting on the motion is mandatory. In this connection I may refer to the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mahesh Chandra v. Tara Chand(2). 14. Next it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the motion was passed by a majority in the meeting held on 15-9-64 as Shri Abdul Samad had not been removed from office by an order of the State Government on the ground that he had incurred any disqualification and he was consequently entitled to vote at the meeting. 15. It was not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents at the hearing that Abdul Samad had not vacated his office and was entitled to vote at the meeting. Their contention however is that the meeting itself was invalid. 16. The decision of a learned Single Judge in Deo Dutt Sharma vs. Collector Ajmer(l) was reversed by a Division Bench of this Court in Rameswar Prasad vs. Collector, Bharatpur (3) in which it was held— "Sec. 26 of the Act of 1959 is declaratory. Their contention however is that the meeting itself was invalid. 16. The decision of a learned Single Judge in Deo Dutt Sharma vs. Collector Ajmer(l) was reversed by a Division Bench of this Court in Rameswar Prasad vs. Collector, Bharatpur (3) in which it was held— "Sec. 26 of the Act of 1959 is declaratory. It mainly specifies the various disqualifications which may disable a member from being chosen or continuing as a member. The section does not deal with the mode of noticing and giving effect to disqualifications. The question whether a member has incurred a disqualification will, generally speaking, be controversial one and a proper determination thereof with a view to preventing a member from functioning as a member can be made only under sec. 63 of the Act. Under the Election Rules, 1959 and Election Petition Rules, 1959, the disqualification can be taken note of for limited purposes stated therein. These provisions are, however, irrelevant in determining the rights of a member to function as a member. The disqualifications cannot be noticed and given effect to otherwise than in accordance with the above specific provisions of the Act. The Chairman of the Municipal Board and the prescribed authority have no authority under law or in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction to notice and give effect to the disqualifications and preventing members from functioning as such. Sec. 79 need not be confined to general meeting but it saves all acts and proceedings of the Board from being vitiated on the ground of disqualification of any person taking part in the proceedings of the Board." 17. The same view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mool Chand Sharma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (4) regarding similar provisions contained in the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916. The same view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mool Chand Sharma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (4) regarding similar provisions contained in the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916. It was held as follows— "A member of the Municipal Board does not automatically come under suspension or lose his right to take part in the proceedings of the board or perform the duties of a member or cease to be a member of the board merely on his incurring any of the disqualifications mentioned in Sec. 13-D. It may be mentioned that any other conclusion can have very unstable effect and can indefinitely make the validity of the proceedings and action of the board uncertain as one cannot predicate at any moment of time as to which of the members of the board has incurred a disqualification, a matter which must be dependent mostly on the proof of the allegations made which could not have been the intention of the Legislature." 18. After the decision in Rameshwar Prasads case (3) the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 was amended by Act No. 26 of 1961. The opening words of sec. 26 dealing with disqualifications for members formerly ran as follows— "A person notwithstanding that he is otherwise qualified shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being a member of a board." 19. The words "and for being" occurring before the words "a member of a board" were omitted so as to make it clear that the disqualifications under sec. 26 were only applicable to a person standing as a candidate for election to a board. 20. Further the following sub-sec. (1-A) was added to sec. 63:— "The power conferred by sub-sec. (1) may be exercised by the State Government of its own motion or upon the facts otherwise coming to the knowledge of the State Government; Provided that, until a member is removed from office by an order of the State Government under this section, he shall not vacate his office and shall subject to the provisions contained in sub-sec. (4), continue to act as, and to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of, a member and shall as such be entitled to all the rights, and be subject to all the liabilities, of a member under this Act." 21. (4), continue to act as, and to exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of, a member and shall as such be entitled to all the rights, and be subject to all the liabilities, of a member under this Act." 21. After the above amendment there is no scope left even for a plausible argument that Shri Abdul Samad was not competent to vote even if one of the disqualifications mentioned in sec. 26 was applicable to him. 22. It may be mentioned here that clause (xii) of sec. 26 which was applied by Shri Jha to Shri Abdul Samad runs as follows: — "26. General disqualifications for members.—A person, notwithstanding that he is otherwise qualified, shall be disqualified for being chosen as a member of a board— ............ ...... ... ... (xii) who, save as hereinafter provided, has directly or indirectly, by himself or his partner, employer or employee, any share or interest in any work done by order of such board, or in any contract or employment with or under or by or on behalf of such board." A candidate for election as a member of the board cannot be held to be disqualified under the above clause merely because his son is employed as a clerk under the municipality concerned. 23. On behalf of the contesting respondents however the validity of the meeting of. 15-9-64 was challenged on the ground that the presiding officer had illegally adjourned the meeting on 4th September 1964 to this date, that this meeting was not convened by the Collector, that Shri Jha who presided over it had no authority to do so as he was appointed to preside over the meeting which was to be held on 4-9-64 only and that as it was held beyond 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice of the no-confidence motion the provisions contained in sec. 72(2) were violated. 24. On behalf of the petitioners a number of arguments were put forward in reply to these objections which may briefly be stated thus: The presiding officer having illegally and mala fide adjourned the meeting, the adjournment cannot affect any party prejudicially. The adjourned meeting held on 15-9-64 should be regarded as a continuation of the meeting held on 4-9-64 as the illegal and mala fide adjournment was a nullity. The adjourned meeting held on 15-9-64 should be regarded as a continuation of the meeting held on 4-9-64 as the illegal and mala fide adjournment was a nullity. Under the common law also an adjourned meeting is regarded as a continuation of the earlier meeting and no notice of such meeting is required. The meeting was illegally adjourned by the presiding officer at the instance of some of the respondents. The respondent-members of the Board are the supporters of Shri Ghulam Mustafa Chairman and have been acting in unison. All of them are bound by the act of securing the adjournment and are estopped from challenging its validity. All the respondent-members attended the meeting held on 15-9-64 and took part in it without raising any objection about its validity. Now that the result of the meeting goes against them they cannot turn round and challenge its validity. 25. The Act lay down that the first meeting shall be convened by the Collector. It does not lay down that an adjourned meeting shall also be convened by the Collector. If it is held that the adjourned meeting should be convened by the Collector then the meeting held on 15-9-64 can be taken to have been convened by the Collector. Although Shri Jha originally fixed the date of the adjourned meeting, but the Collector sought the advice of the Director, Local Bodies on two points. Firstly, he asked for his opinion as to whether the adjournment of the meeting of 4-9-64 was valid. Secondly, he asked his advice as to the date on which the next meeting for consideration of the motion should be called. In reply the Director informed the Collector in his telegram that the presiding officer had acted illegally in adjourning the meeting of 4-9-64 and advised him to proceed with the meeting fixed for 15-9-64. The Collector forwarded a copy of this telegram to Shri Jha for information and necessary action with the further direction that he may convene the meeting on 35th September, 1964 as per instructions given by the Director of Local Bodies in the above telegram. The meeting was thus held on 15th September, 1964 under the directions of the Collector and will be deemed to have been convened by the Collector. A similar view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shyabuddinasab v. Municipality of Gadag-Betgeri (5). 26. The meeting was thus held on 15th September, 1964 under the directions of the Collector and will be deemed to have been convened by the Collector. A similar view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shyabuddinasab v. Municipality of Gadag-Betgeri (5). 26. The operative part of the order appointing Shri Jha to preside over the meeting runs as follows (annexure 2, page 17: — vr% eSa ,p-,e- ekFkqj ftyk/khk] ukxkSj uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e 1959 dh /kkjk 62 ¼2½ ds vUrxZr iznRr vf/kdkjksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, lwfpr djrk gwW fd fnukad 4-9-54 dks izkr% 10 cts uxjikfydk Hkou edjk.kk esa mDr iz;kstu gsrq uxjikfydk edjk.kk ds lnL;ksa dh cSBd vkeaf=r djrk gwWA eSa ,p-,e- ekFkqj ftyk/khk] ukxkSj Jh xksjhkadj >k] lcfMohtuy eftLVªsV ijcrlj dks esjh vksj ls uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e 1956 dh /kkjk 72 ¼4½ ds vUrxZr iznRr vf/kdkjksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, mDr foks"k cSBd dh v/;{krk ds fy;s ukekafdr djrk gwWA 27. The meeting was adjourned by Shri Jha to 15-9-64 and a copy of the minutes of the meeting were sent by him to the Collector in which this fact was mentioned. The Collector sought the advice of the Director of Local Bodies as to the date on which the next meeting for consideration of the motion should be called. In reply the Director advised the Collector to proceed with the meeting fixed for 15-9-64. The Collector forwarded a copy of this telegram to Shri Jha for information and necessary action with the direction that he may convene the meeting on 15-9-64. In the context this order of the Collector to Shri Jha amounts to his appointment to preside over the meeting which was to be held on 15-9-64. 28. The period of time prescribed under sec. 72(2) is only applicable for the first meeting convened to consider the motion of no-confidence. It is not applicable to subsequent meetings that may be convened to consider the motion if the motion cannot be considered in the first meeting. Further the period is not really a period of limitation in the ordinary sense. The conception of a period of limitation is that an aggrieved person is to move a public authority for the redress of his grievance within a certain period. If he lets that period go-by he ordinarily loses the right to agitate his grievance any more. Further the period is not really a period of limitation in the ordinary sense. The conception of a period of limitation is that an aggrieved person is to move a public authority for the redress of his grievance within a certain period. If he lets that period go-by he ordinarily loses the right to agitate his grievance any more. There is no period of limitation in that sense when, a public authority is required to take a certain action within a certain time. The period of 20 to 30 days has been fixed to provide reasonable time for the Collector to take the necessary action in compliance with the requirement of sec. 72. This view was taken with regard to similar provisions contained in the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in D.K. Pandey vs. District Magistrate of Nainital (6). 29. The power of the Collector to convene a meeting is not exhausted till the motion of no-confidence has been considered and voted upon. That is clear from the provisions contained in sec. 72(4). If the Collector or his nominee does not turn up within half an hour of the time fixed for the commencement of the meeting or is unable to preside at the meeting for any unavoidable cause the meeting shall stand adjourned to another date which is to be appointed and notified to the members. That itself shows that the power of the Collector is not exhausted after convening the first meeting. It continues till the motion is disposed of. The motion does not lapse if the presiding officer illegally adjourns the first meeting. 30. If for some reason it is still considered that there was any defect in convening the meeting of 15-9-64 it is cured by sec. 79 of the Act. The meeting was attended by all the 17 members of the Board who took part in the proceedings and the resolution passed by it should be deemed to be a valid resolution. 31. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. It is common ground that Shri Jha had no power to adjourn the meeting of 4-9-64 to 15-9-64 and that the adjournment was illegal. 32. There is a power at common law to adjourn a meeting. This power has been expressly taken away by secs. 72(4) and (5). It is common ground that Shri Jha had no power to adjourn the meeting of 4-9-64 to 15-9-64 and that the adjournment was illegal. 32. There is a power at common law to adjourn a meeting. This power has been expressly taken away by secs. 72(4) and (5). The right vested in the meeting to adjourn itself is also taken away by these provisions. Under the common law an adjourned meeting is no doubt treated as a continuation of the earlier meeting and neither any notice for it nor any quorum are necessary. But the common law rule cannot be applied to a meeting held under section 72. The fact that all the members of the Board were present at the meeting of 15-9-64 and took part in the proceedings can only validate the defect of notice but not other defects. In Antieaus Municipal Corporation Law, Volume I, at page 171 it is stated— "However, if all members of the governing body are in attendance at a special meeting and consent to the transaction of the particular business, defects in the notice will be deemed cured." 33. Sec. 79(3) of the Act also embodies the same principle:— "No resolution of a board or any committee appointed under this Act shall be deemed invalid on account of any irregularity in the service of notice upon any member, provided that the proceedings of the board by such irregularity." 34. In the present case however it is not contended on behalf of the contesting respondents that the meeting held on 15-9-64 was defective on account of any defect in the service of notice. 35. So far as the question of estoppel is concerned only one member Shri Moti Khan asked the presiding officer to adjourn the meeting and an estoppel, if any, can only apply to him. The Chairman and his other supporters cannot be held to be estopped on account of the conduct of Shri Moti Khan on the ground that the latter was also a supporter of Shri Ghulam Mustafa and moved for an adjournment to prevent the no-confidence motion from being passed on that date. Nor can the respondent-members be held to be estopped from challenging the validity of the meeting of 15-9-64 on the ground that they took part in it without raising any objection. Nor can the respondent-members be held to be estopped from challenging the validity of the meeting of 15-9-64 on the ground that they took part in it without raising any objection. Sec. 115 of the Evidence Act runs as follows:— "When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing." 36. It cannot be said that by any act of theirs they intentionally caused the petitioners to believe that the meeting was valid. The question of the validity of the meeting of 15th September, 1964 was not raised at all by any one in the meeting and there was no occasion for the respondents to make an assertion about its validity. It is thus open to them to challenge the validity of this meeting. 37. It is not expressly stated in sec. 72 as to who shall convene the adjourned meeting. Express power has been given to the Collector under sec. 72(2) to convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion. No power has been given to the nominee to convene the adjourned meeting as has been done under the U. P. Municipalities Act. The only reasonable interpretation which can be put on sec. 72 is that the adjourned meeting shall also be convened by the Collector. Further the section does not lay down that the Collector has power to convene the meeting for the consideration of the motion only once. It stands to reason that the Collectors power to convene a meeting to consider the motion is not exhausted till the motion has been considered and voted upon in accordance with sub-secs. (6) to (9) of sec.72. 38. It is clear from section 72 that only the Collector has power to convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion. There is no provision for delegating this power to his nominee. In Vishwanath v. Pt. (6) to (9) of sec.72. 38. It is clear from section 72 that only the Collector has power to convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion. There is no provision for delegating this power to his nominee. In Vishwanath v. Pt. Jamanlal(7) it was held that rule 3 of the Town Municipalities (Chairmans Election Rules) 1951 laying down that the Collector shall fix a date, place and time for a special meeting of the Municipal board for the purpose of electing chairman was mandatory and that, in the absence of any provision to that effect, the power under it could not be delegated. The reasons which appealed to the learned Judges who decided that case are equally applicable so far as the power to convene a meeting to consider the no-confidence motion under section 72 is concerned. I accordingly hold that only the Collector is empowered to convene a meeting under section 72—whether it is the first meeting to consider the motion or any subsequent meeting. 39. In Vishwanaths case(7) the Collector passed an order on 13th July, 1955 directing the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to fix a date for holding the meeting to elect a chairman. A meeting was held on the date fixed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate at which all the members of the board were present and took part in the election. It was held that the election was void. 40. In the present case the date of the adjourned meeting was initially fixed by Shri Jha and not by the Collector. When the Collector received a copy of the proceedings of the meeting on 4-9-64 from Shri Jha he did not give his consent to the holding of the next meeting of 15-9-64, but referred the matter for advice to the Director of Local Bodies. He asked the Director inter alia to advise him as to the date on which the next meeting for the consideration of the motion should be called. The Director advised him to proceed with the meeting fixed for 15-9-64. It was on the receipt of this advice that the Collector directed Shri Jha to convene the meeting on 15-9-64 as per instructions given by the Director of Local Bodies in his telegram. The question which arises is as to whether it can be said in the circumstances of the case that it was the Collector who convened the meeting on 15-9-64. The question which arises is as to whether it can be said in the circumstances of the case that it was the Collector who convened the meeting on 15-9-64. 41. The contention of the petitioners is that in the circumstances of the case the meeting was held on 15-9-64 under the directions of the Collector and will be deemed to have been convened by the Collector. Reliance is placed on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shyabuddinsab V. Municipality of Gadag-Betgeri (5). In that case the Collector called a special general meeting of the municipal board on 30th July, 1954 to elect a president. He nominated the Prant Officer to preside over that special general meeting. On 30-7-54 the Prant Officer adjourned the meeting to 3-8-54 without transacting any business under instructions from the Collector. In the meeting of 3-8-54 all the 32 councillors were present. The same Prant Officer who presided read out the following telegraphic message from the Collector:— "Government have directed to hold election of President of Gadag Municipality on 3rd August as already arranged. Hold election accordingly today fail." 42. It was held on the above facts that the meeting of 3-8-54 for the election of the president had been called by the Collector who had authorised the Prant Officer to preside over that meeting and that the election of the president at that meeting was valid. 43. It was contended that there was no evidence that the Collector had called the meeting of 3-8-54 or that he had made an order in writing that the Prant Officer had been authorised to preside over that meeting. These contentions were overruled with the following observations:— "From the record of the proceedings of the proposed meeting of 30-7-54 and the actual meeting on 3-8-1964 it is clear that whatever had been done had been done under the orders the Collector. He had called the meeting of the 30th July, as also of 3-8-1954. It was he who had appointed the Prant Officer as the presiding officer for both those meetings." 44. Another contention which was raised in that case was that no notice of the meeting of 3-8-54 was served as required by section 35(3) of the Municipal Boroughs Act. He had called the meeting of the 30th July, as also of 3-8-1954. It was he who had appointed the Prant Officer as the presiding officer for both those meetings." 44. Another contention which was raised in that case was that no notice of the meeting of 3-8-54 was served as required by section 35(3) of the Municipal Boroughs Act. That contention was also overruled on the ground that the provisions of section 35(3) were directory and the irregularity in the service of notice was cured by the following provision contained in that Act:— "No resolution of a municipality............... shall be deemed invalid on account of any irregularity in the service of notice upon any councillor or member provided that the proceedings of the municipality......were not prejudicially affected by such irregularity." 45. On behalf of the contesting respondents it was argued that the facts of the above case are distinguishable. In the above case the date 3-8-54 was fixed by the Prant Officer under the instructions of the Collector. In the present case the date was fixed by Shri Jha without obtaining the instructions of the Collector. 46. The facts of the case before their Lordships of the Supreme Court were no doubt different. But I am of the opinion that in the circumstances of the present case no meeting would have been held on 15-9-64 if the Collector had been given a different advice by the Director of Local Bodies. The Collector had specifically sought his advice as to the date on which the next meeting for the consideration of the motion should be called. It was only on receipt of his advice that the Collector directed Shri Jha to convene the meeting on 15-9-64. The meeting on 15-9-64 was thus held on the directions of the Collector and will be deemed to have been convened by him. 47. Further the endorsement made by the Collector on telegram annexure 10 amounts to nominating Shri Jha, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Parbatsar to preside at the meeting of 15-9-64. 48. All the members were present at the meeting of 15-9-64. It is true that they did not receive any notice of this meeting from the Collector. 47. Further the endorsement made by the Collector on telegram annexure 10 amounts to nominating Shri Jha, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Parbatsar to preside at the meeting of 15-9-64. 48. All the members were present at the meeting of 15-9-64. It is true that they did not receive any notice of this meeting from the Collector. But this defect is cured by the validating provision of S. 79(3) referred to above as all the Member of the Board were present at the meeting and no prejudice was caused to any of them by the fact that a notice for this meeting was not sent to them by the Collector himself. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad v. Collector Bharatpur(3) that the provisions of section 79 are applicable to a special meeting of the board held under section 72 to consider a no confidence motion. I have already referred to above to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shyambuddinsab V. Municipality of Gadag-Batgeri(5) in which it was held that a similar validating provision contained in the Municipal Boroughs Act was applicable to a special meeting of the board held to elect the president. 49. It will thus be seen that although the adjournment of the meeting of 4-9-64 to 15-9-64 by Shri Jha was illegal the adjourned meeting held on 15-9-64 became legal as it will be deemed to have been convened by the Collector as has been held above. 50. On behalf of the contesting respondents the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police vs. Gordhandas(8) was cited and it was contended that in view of this decision the meeting held on 15-9-64 cannot be deemed to have been convened by the Collector. I am of the opinion that there is nothing in this decision which may help the respondents in the present case. In the case before their Lordships an application was made to the Commissioner of Police for constructing a cinema house. The Commissioner accorded the necessary permission by his letter dated 14/16th July, 1947. This sanction occasioned representations to the Government as a result of which the Commissioner wrote to the applicant directing him not to proceed with the construction of the cinema pending Government orders. The Commissioner accorded the necessary permission by his letter dated 14/16th July, 1947. This sanction occasioned representations to the Government as a result of which the Commissioner wrote to the applicant directing him not to proceed with the construction of the cinema pending Government orders. Shortly afterwards, the Commissioner wrote to him: "I am directed by Government to inform you that the permission to erect a cinema at the above site granted to you under this office letter .........dated 16th July 1947 is hereby cancelled." 51. The question which arose in the case was whether this was a cancellation by the Commissioner on his own authority acting in the exercise of some power which was either vested in him or of which he bona fide believed himself to be possessed, or whether he merely acted as a post office in forwarding orders issued by some other authority. 52. The Commissioner filed an affidavit to the effect that this was really an order of cancellation made by him and the order was his order and not that of Government. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not rely on this affidavit and observed: "Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect land are intended to effect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." 53. In the present case my finding that the meeting held on 15-9-64 will be deemed to have been convened by the Collector is based on the language of the minutes recorded by Shri Jha, and the official communications addressed by the Collector to the Director, by the Director to the Collector and by the Collector to Shri Jha. It is not based on any affidavit or private noting on any file. 54. Lastly it was contended that as the meeting of 15-9-64 was held beyond 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice of the noconfidence motion the provision contained in sec. 72(2) was violated and so the meeting was invalid. I am of the opinion that the period of time under that sub-section is only applicable for the first meeting convened to consider the motion of no confidence. 72(2) was violated and so the meeting was invalid. I am of the opinion that the period of time under that sub-section is only applicable for the first meeting convened to consider the motion of no confidence. It is not applicable to subsequent meetings that may be convened to consider the motion, if for any reason it cannot be considered in the first meeting. That is quite clear from the provisions of sec. 72. The first meeting is convened after a period of 20 days and within 30 days from the receipt of the notice about the motion. The meeting may be convened even on the thirtieth day. If at such a meeting the Collector or his nominee do not turn up within half an hour from the time appointed for the commencement of the meeting or they are unable for any unavoidable cause to preside at the meetings the meeting shall stand adjourned and some later date is to be fixed for the consideration of the motion after sending notices to the members. The limitation contained in sec. 72(2) will obviously not apply to that adjourned meeting. It stands to reason therefore that the period of time prescribed under sec. 72(2) is only applicable to the first meeting which is convened to consider the motion and not to subsequent meetings. 55. In D. K. Pandey vs. District Magistrate of Nainital(6) the question for interpretation of the provisions of sec. 87-A of the U.P. Municipalities Act dealing with the motion of no confidence against the president came up for consideration. The provisions of that section are similar to the provisions of sec. 72 of the Rajas-than Act except that a judicial officer nominated by the Collector is to preside at such a meeting. The Judicial Officer has power under sec. 87-A(5) to adjourn meeting, but not for more than 15 days and the meeting has to be convened by the Collector not earlier than 30 days and not later than 35 days from the date of the receipt of the notice of noconfidence motion under sec. 87-A(3). The meeting could not however be held on 6th February, 1955 in view of an interim stay order issued by the High Court in a writ petition challenging the validity of the no-confidence motion. That writ petition was dismissed on 4th May, 1955 and the interim stay order stood automatically discharged. 87-A(3). The meeting could not however be held on 6th February, 1955 in view of an interim stay order issued by the High Court in a writ petition challenging the validity of the no-confidence motion. That writ petition was dismissed on 4th May, 1955 and the interim stay order stood automatically discharged. A special appeal was filed against the rejection and another interim stay order was passed on 27th August, 1955. This order was vacated on 8th May, 1957. Thereafter the Collector called a meeting for the consideration of the no-confidence motion on 18th June, 1957. This meeting was held much beyond 35 days of the vacation of the interim stay order. It was held by their Lordships that the period of time prescribed under sec. 87-A (3) was not really a period of limitation. 56. They went to observe: "The conception of a period of limitation is that an aggrieved person is to move a public authority for the redress of his grievance within a certain period. He has to move in the matter in accordance with law within a certain period, and if he lets that period go by he ordinarily loses the right to agitate his grievance any more. There is no period of limitation in that sense when a public authority is required to take a certain action within a certain time. Further, in the present case it appears to us that this period of thirty to thirty-five days has been fixed to provide reasonable time for the District Magistrate to take the necessary action in compliance with the requirements of the said section. He has to consider the appropriate time and date for the meeting in consultation with the judicial officer who has to preside at the meeting in accordance with sub-sec. (4) of sec. 87-A. He has to take into consideration the requisite for the due service of notice on the various members of the Board and for the publication of the notice. The provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 87-A by their terms apply to the first calling of a meeting for the consideration of a no confidence motion and do not apply to the calling of a subsequent meeting for the purpose when the first meeting could not be held in view of the orders of the Court. The provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 87-A by their terms apply to the first calling of a meeting for the consideration of a no confidence motion and do not apply to the calling of a subsequent meeting for the purpose when the first meeting could not be held in view of the orders of the Court. If the first meeting is adjourned by the judicial officer who was to preside over the meeting, the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 87-A come into play and, according to them, the judicial officer has to adjourn the meeting after recording his reasons to some date not later than fifteen days from the date appointed for the meeting under sub-sec. (3). Sec.87-A does not contemplate a meeting for considering a no-confidence motion when the original meeting convened for the purpose is to be put off under the orders of the Court. We are, therefore, of opinion that the meeting convened on the 18th of June, 1957 cannot be held to be an illegal meeting on the ground that it was convened after a period of thirty-five days plus the period of stay granted under the orders of the Court from the date of delivery of notice of no-confidence motion." I am respectfully in agreement with the view taken in the above case. The right to move a motion of no-confidence against the chairman is a very important and substantial right. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature that if the meeting is not held on the date for which it is first convened under sec. 72(2) then the motion should lapse. On the contrary as I have shown above the limitation contained in sec. 72(2) is only applicable to the first meeting convened to consider the motion. It does not apply to subsequent meetings which it may become necessary to convene for the consideration of the motion. Further I am of the opinion that the power of the Collector to convene further meetings is not exhausted till the motion of no-confidence has been disposed of in the manner provided in sub-sections (6) to (9) after being considered and voted upon. 57. The result is that for reasons given above the meeting held on 15th September, 1964 to consider the no-confidence motion was a valid one and the motion was passed by a majority of 9 against 8. 57. The result is that for reasons given above the meeting held on 15th September, 1964 to consider the no-confidence motion was a valid one and the motion was passed by a majority of 9 against 8. Shri Gulam Mustafa respondent No. 11 vacated the office of the chairman of the Board under section 65(9) on that date as soon as the motion was passed. 58. I accordingly allow the writ petition with costs, quash the order of the presiding officer declaring the motion of no-confidence as having been defeated, declare that the motion of no-confidence against Shri Ghulam Mustafa was carried and direct him to hand over charge of the office of Chairman to the Vice-Chairman if he has not already done so. Further I direct the Collector Nagaur to take steps for the election of a new Chairman.