S. K. Kapur ( 1 ) THE present appeal arises out of an application filed by Kailash Kumar Vohra, husband of the appellant, under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights. The application was based on the ground that Gulshan Kumari, the wife, had withdrawn from the petitioner-respondent s society since 8-4-1958 without any reasonable or justifiable cause. The trial Court allowed the petition and passed a decree in favour of the husband for restitution of conjugal rights. Aggrieved by the said order the wife has come up in appeal. ( 2 ) HAVING regard to the contentions raised at the bar, which shall be discussed hereafter, it is necessary to briefly refer to the pledings of the parties. In the petition it is inter alia stated that. (A) "the marriage was solemnised between the parties on 17th February, 1957, at Delhi and the parties resided together as husband and wife for abont a year in Kishan Ganj, Delhi, and thereafter in Viney Nagar, New Delhi. (B) A son was born to them out of the wedlock. (C) The wife had without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the society of the husband with effect from 8th April 1958. (D) The wife was again in the family way about the end of March, 1958, when her mother came and requested the parents of the petitioner to send her to her parents house for a short while to which the petitioner s parents consented. (E) Before she was taken away by her mother on 8th April, 1958, she had asked the petitioner to provide her with Rs. 300. 00 to be paid to her parents to enable them to buy gifts to be presented to him in connect ion with some ceremony. He, however, expressed inability to provide the money. (F) The petitioner s mother went to fetch Gulshan Kumari but her mother refused to send her back. Thereafter he himself went to bring her but she declined to come on the ground that her parents would not send her back till he provided a sum of Rs. 300. 00 for the purpose mentioned earlier ; and (G) various efforts on the part of the petitioner and his parents to bring her back proved abortive and even the letters written by him and his father evoked no response. 300. 00 for the purpose mentioned earlier ; and (G) various efforts on the part of the petitioner and his parents to bring her back proved abortive and even the letters written by him and his father evoked no response. ( 3 ) THE defence of the wife (hereafter REFERRED TO to as the appellant as set out in her written-statement inter aha was that- (A) She was forced to leave the company of her husband because of his treatment of extreme cruelty towards her. (B) Her father gave suitable dowry at the time of marriage but every now and then the husband (hereafter REFERRED TO to as the respondent) used to coerce her for demanding more money from her parents. (C) The respondent used to give her severe beating, abuse her and at times turn her out of the house and it was under those forced circumstances that she left his house. He had, as a matter of fact, told her not to return. (D) It was in the above-said circumstances that the appellant s father had, at his own expense, sent her to Manav Bharti School. Her father paid Rs. 300. 00 as training fee besides admission and other fees. The entire expenses for completing the training course In the said school were also borne by her father. The respondent or his father never offered any assistance. (E) The appellant never became pregnant second time as alleged in the petition ; and (F) the story about the demand of Rs. 300. 00 was incorrect and that excepting letter of November 1958 she did not receive any other letter from the respondent. ( 4 ) THE respondent produced witnesses from the two localities where the parties lived together, namely, Kishan Ganj and Viney Nagar. These vitness, namely, Chandan Singh (P. W. 1), S. N. Seth (P. W. 7), A. K. Gupta (P. W. 2), Ram Chander (P. W. 3) and Vishnu Dutt Sharma (P. W. 6) deposed that they never noticed any quarrel between the parties. Ram Akshawar Shukla (P. W. 4) produced two advertisements exhibits P. I and P. 2 published in Hindustan Times showing that admission in the Manav Bharti School closed on 31-3-1958. Ram Akshawar Shukla (P. W. 4) produced two advertisements exhibits P. I and P. 2 published in Hindustan Times showing that admission in the Manav Bharti School closed on 31-3-1958. This witness appears to have been produced to prove that admission in the school had closed before she left respondent and therefore, she must have made up her mind earlier to join the school. P. W. 5 Srivastava, an employee in Railway, was produced to prove that the respondent was not in Delhi on 25-1-1959, the date on which the appellant claimed to have gone to the respondent s house along with the son and some other respectable persons with the intention of staying there. According to the appellant she had gone there on that day but the respondent exhibited annoyance and abused her. S. L. Vohra (P. W. 9) respondent s brother, and Des Raj (P. W. 10) his father, also appeared in support of the petition The respondent (P. W. 11) appeared as his own witness. The evidence on behalf of the appellantconsisted of witnesses who supported her regarding her visit to the respondent s house on 25-1-1959. They were R. W. 1. Mulakh Raj, R. W. 4. Om Parkash, and K. W. 5. Dina Nath. She also produced Dina Nath (R. W. 6), a clerk in the Manav Bharti School, who proved her application (Exhibit R. W. 6/1) dated 13th April 1958 seeking admission in the School. She appeared as her own witness as R. W. 3. I will now broadly mention the evidence of some of the witnesses which has bearing on the matter and on which reliance has been placed at the bar. The respondent appelant as his own witnesses inter alia stated that (a) the appellant left the house in April 1958 with her mother in his absence ; (b) his mother went to fetch the appellant towards April 1958 but she did not come and her parents inter aha told him that she will remain with them for some time more : (c) in May 1958 his parents went to fetch her again but they were told that the respondent should be sent personally for taking her back. He therefore went there in the middle of May, 1958, but his parents-in-law demanded Rs. 300. He therefore went there in the middle of May, 1958, but his parents-in-law demanded Rs. 300. 00 for the ceremony mentioned above (d) he wrote letters to the appellant in May 1958, and on 14th of June, 1958, asking her to come back but she did not even care to reply ; (e) having come to know later that she had joined Manav Bharti School he went to that School in the end of October 1958 but the appellant declined to meet him; and in November 1958 he sent a registered letter to her again advising her to come back to his house. He denied the appellant s visit of 25-1-1959 or that he ever treated her cruelly. Des. Raj (P. W. 10) father of the repondent, deposed that relations between the husband and wife were very cordial and the respondent never treated her cruelly. He also made several efforts to bring her back but of no avail. He proved the various letters written by him amongst others to the father of the appellant to which reference will be made later. He also stated that in 1961 he, accompanied by S. L. Vohra, Balak Ram and Parkash, went to the house of the appellant s parents to bring her back but she did not return. However, none of these three persons were produced as witnesses. Appellant, appearing as her own witness, stated that (a) her husband behaved with her nicely after marriage for about two months but started maltreating, abusing and beating her off and on thereafter ; (b) on one occasion, before she delivered the child, he beat her so mercilessly that she became almost unconscious ; (c) in July 1957 the respondent was beating her when Jagdish Chandar (R. W. 2) came to their house and rescued her ; (d) she conceived only once and never became pregnant second time ; (e) after the birth of the child (on 30. 11. 1957) the husband kept her in his house for about five days and thereafter sent her to the house of her parents (f) again in April 1958 the respondent beat her mercilessly. She wanted to go to police station to lodge a report but the neighbours intervened and she did not go ; (g) after two days of the aforementioned beating, that is on 8. 4. She wanted to go to police station to lodge a report but the neighbours intervened and she did not go ; (g) after two days of the aforementioned beating, that is on 8. 4. 1958 the respondent made her and the child board a bus and go to her parents house and she had been staying there since then ; and (h) she had gone to the respondent s house on 25. 1. 59 with the intention of staying there but the respondent did not welcome her. The respondent had been writing to her father and to her from time to time but since these letters were not properly worded and contained false allegations she did not go back to her husband and did not feel like replying to those nasty letters. ( 5 ) THAT broadly is the position of the evidence in the case. I now proceed to deal with the various contentions raised at the bar. Mr. N. R. Suri the learned counsel for the appellant, first of all raised what he termed as a purely legal objection and submitted that the perusal of section 9 of the said Act showed that if any statement made in the petition was incorrect the petition must fail. This argument is based on the language of the section and particularly, the words". . . . . . . . . . . . and the Court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly. " The learned counsel submits that on true interpretation of this section all the statements made in the petition must be correct and unless that be so, a petitioner cannot succeed. He says that there are various statements made in the petition. which are demonstrably false and the petition ought to be dismissed on. that short ground, lam afraid, I am not in agreement with such a broad proposition sought to be laid at the bar. "in my opinion, the object of section 9 is that when a husband or a wife makes a petition for restitution of conjugal rights the Court must satisfy itself as to the truth of the statements made in the petition. "in my opinion, the object of section 9 is that when a husband or a wife makes a petition for restitution of conjugal rights the Court must satisfy itself as to the truth of the statements made in the petition. That means that even in cases where the petition is not opposed the order should not be granted as a matter of course but the Court must properly direct its attention in finding out whether the statements made in petition in support thereof are established to be correct and justify the grant of petition. Take a case where a petition for restitution of conjugal rights is based on four grounds. There would, in my opinion, be no impediment in the Court granting the application if it is satisfied that one or more of such grounds justify the grant of the petition and the statements in support of the said grounds are correct. The emphasis is not on the truth of all the statements but on the satisfaction of the Court aboutthe truth This view is further supported by the language of section 23. The learned counsel for the appellant then contends that the evidence of the respondent-husband should not be believed for the following reasons:- (1) In the petition he made an allegation about the appellant s second pregnancy and repeated it in the replication and yet he did not say a word about it in his evidence. (2) In the petition he stated that the appellants had asked him to Pay Rs. 3001. 00 for the ceremony and this statement was repeated in the replication. S. L. Vohra, Public Witness. 9, the brother of the respondent-husband, did not say a word about it in examination-in-chief while in cross-examination he stated that respondent had told him that the appellant s parents wanted the money. The respondent appearing as his own witness took a completely different stand in his evidence from one taken in the petition and stated that his parents- in-law demanded Rs. 300. The respondent appearing as his own witness took a completely different stand in his evidence from one taken in the petition and stated that his parents- in-law demanded Rs. 300. 00 (3) According to the petition and his statement as his own witness the respondent claimed to have visited Manay Bharti School to meet his wife in October 1958 while in the registered acknowledgement due letter dated 24th November, 1958, written by him to the appellant he stated "to great surprise I have now learnt that your parents have put you in some school or college without my consent and knowledge. " According to the learned counsel, this shows that the statement in the petition and in his evidence were utterly false and the respondent was trying to create evidence in his favour. (4) In the said letter Exhibit P. 7 it was mentioned that the appellant took away jewellery and clothes while he did not say a word about it in evidence. The learned counsel also pointed out certain discrepancies between his evidence and the letter Exhibit P. 7 regarding the visits to the appellant s house for bringing her back, The learned counsel for the appellant, further says that the only reason given in the petition for the appellant leaving the house was a demand of Rs. 300. 00 by her and that demand has not at all been proved in evidence as has been discussed already. If that be so, submits the learned counsel, then one has to find some other reason why she left her husband s house and that reason can only be cruelty by the respondent. The reason suggested in the course of the arguments by Mr. Anand, the learned counsel for the respondent, was that she wanted to join a school to which the respondent did not agree and she must have left the house for that reason. That cannot be taken into consideration for the simple reason that it was never alleged either in the petition or in evidence. The appellant, on the other hand, denied that after reading the advertisement about admissiori in the school she decided to lee the respondent. Mr. That cannot be taken into consideration for the simple reason that it was never alleged either in the petition or in evidence. The appellant, on the other hand, denied that after reading the advertisement about admissiori in the school she decided to lee the respondent. Mr. Anand, the learned counsel for the respondents, placed strong reliance on certain letters written by the respondent s father to the appellant s father as well as to some outsiders in support of his contention that the respondent had been making all possible efforts to get her back but she was insistent on keeping away. He has also placed reliance on the letter dated 24th November, 1958 (Exhibit P. 7) written by the respondent to the appellant, letter dated 26th January, 1959 (Exhibit P. 4) written by the appellant s lawyer to the respondent and letter dated 23rd Dec. , 1958 (Exhibit P. 5) again written by the appellant s lawyer to the respondent in reply to the letter Exhibit P. 7. I need not refer to these letters in detail because in my view the letters were being written only to create evidence and were not genuine offers on behalf of the respondent to have the appellant back with him. The intrinsic evidence provided by these letters casts a great suspicion on the genuineness of the alleged efforts. The facts stated in the letters show that if they had been written in normal course inspired by a genuine desire to have the wife back they would not have been couched in that language and all type of unnecessary statements would not have been introduced. I have been taken through the entire evidence and I am of the opinion that the evidence of the appellant ought to have been accepted. I see no reason why the wife would leave her house if the husband was treating her properly. If, on other hand, there was any other reason for her leaving the house that would have been known to the husband and he would have come out with the same either in the petition or in his evidence. The only reason stated for her leaving the house was a demand for Rs. 300. 00 and I do not think that if the relations between them were cordial an issue could have been made on this small amount. Moreover, the evidence about the demand of Rs. The only reason stated for her leaving the house was a demand for Rs. 300. 00 and I do not think that if the relations between them were cordial an issue could have been made on this small amount. Moreover, the evidence about the demand of Rs. 300. 00 is so conflicting and contradictory that I do not place any reliance on the same. It, therefore, stands proved on the record that the appellant had been persistently maltreated and subjected to violence by the respondent. ( 6 ) MR. Anand, the learned counsel for the respondent, placed reliance on sub-section (2) of section 9 and pointed out that the defence available to the appellant was limited by the said sub-section and she could, therefore, plead only such cruelty in defence as would entitle her to judicial separation under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 10. If I understand Mr. Anand s argument rightly he appears to suggest that even if the allegations regarding cruelty be taken as correct they are notsuch as would justify a decree for judicial separation. Clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 10 is in the following terms :- (b) "has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. "the contents of the clause show that there must not be only cruelty but it must cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the subject that it will be harmfull or injurious for him or her to live with the other party. What acts of violence constitute cruelty within the meaning of the aforesaid provision depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. In construing this provision the changing social structure of the society has to be taken in to account. What then is the signification of the term "cruelty" ? Cruelty may be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The issue has to be determined having regard not only to the circumstances of each particular case but also keeping in view the physical and mental condition of the parties of their character and social status. The issue has to be determined having regard not only to the circumstances of each particular case but also keeping in view the physical and mental condition of the parties of their character and social status. Acts of violence or maltreating even if not constituting cruelty when taken in isolution. may amount to cruelty if they are persistent. It is for this reason that the Courts in resolving the question do not confine themselves to the consideration of any one particular act or set of acts, recognising that there are many matters which by themselves are not sufficient to constitute cruelty but which may do so when taken together. By no means should I be understood as saying that in no case can a single act of voilence be said to amount to cruelty. Acts consisting of physical violence need not always be persistent or become a fixed habit before they can be said to be "cruelty" authorising separation. A single act on a single occasion may be of such a nature or so severe and attended with such circumstances of atrocity as to justify judicial separation. Under certain statutes where cruelty has been made a ground for divorce or separation, law Reports do show that a single act of violence short of endangering life will not entitle the spouse to ask for divorce or separation but there seem to be few if any, cases which have denied that single act can never constitute a basis for divorce or separation on the ground of cruelty unless the statute in terms excludes a single act. The position in short would, therefore, be that in certain circumstances even a single act of the cruelty may provide sufficient ground for separation, though normally that would not be so. Again it is universally recognised that parties cannot be allowed to separate on the ground of cruelty merely because they live unhappily together from unruly tempers or marital wranglings for married people must submit to the ordinary consequnces of human infirmities Mere austerity of temper, petulence of manners or even occasional sallies of passion, if not threatening bodily harm or impairment of health cannot as a general rule amount to cruelty. Marriage status is not contractual so as to entitle each of the parties to demand the strict letter of the bond. Marriage status is not contractual so as to entitle each of the parties to demand the strict letter of the bond. Husband and wife are bound to exercise greater efforts for removing misapprehension, allaying quarrels, smoothing the road to concord than are people in other relations of life. The next requirements of clause (b) of section 10 (1) is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the spouse that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other party. That harm may be a harm to the body or mind. If acts of violence are established this requirement would be fully met. Once the evidence of the appellant is accepted cruelty by the respondent, even on its strictest interpretation stands established. It cannot, therefore, be said that the wife withdrew from the society of the husband without any reasonable cause. The respondent has been guilty of such acts of cruelty as would raise a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the appellant that continuous living with the husband would be harmful or injurious to her. ( 7 ) YET another argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the parties have been living apart since 1958 and it would not be just and reasonable to decree restitution of conjugal rights after a separation over seven years. The learned counsel submits that it is discretionary with the Court to grant the petition decline it and having regard to the circumstances the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant. He has REFERRED TO to Baburao v. Sushila Bai, wherein it has been held that the wording of section 9 (1) makes it clear that even when the conditions stated in that provision are satisfied, it is in the discretion of the Court whether or not to pass a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. In the view that I have taken on the merits, of the case it is not necessary for me to decide this question. ( 8 ) IN the circumstances, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The petition of the respondent under section 9 will stand dismissed. Appeal allowed.