JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Champa Dibya filed O.S. No. 172 of 1961 in the court of the Munsif, Puri, for declaration of sale deed (ext. A) dated 7-11-1960 executed by her in favour of Defendant No. 1 (opp. party No. 3, Brudaban Mohapatra) and a subsequent sale deed (ext, B) dated 9-6-1961 executed by Defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendant No. 2 as invalid and inoperative, On 8-11-62 the suit was decreed by the Munsif, Puri. Plaintiff's title to the suit property was declared and both the sale deeds were declared invalid and inoperative. Petitioner preferred Title Appeal No. 6 of 1963 on 11-1-1963 in the court of the District Judge, Puri. Champa Dibya died on 1-3-1963. Sarpani ra (opp. party No. 2) was substituted in her place as her legal representative by -order dated 28-6-1963. On 8-11-1963 Narasingh Mahapatra (opp. party No. 1) filed an application under Order 22, Rule 10 read with Section 141, CPC Code, alleging that Champa sold the lands, forming the subject-matter of the appeal, to him on 31-12-1962 for Rs. 1000/ - under a registered sale deed and praying that he should be permitted to be impleaded as a Respondent to effectively contest the appeal. On same day, a compromise petition was filed by the Petitioner and opp. party No. 2. On those applications the learned District Judge the following order on 8-1l-1963: One Narasingh Mahapatra appearing files a petition praying for being added as a co-Respondent stating reasons therein. Appellant and Respondent No. 1 file a joint petition of compromise. The petition of compromise is read over to the parties present in Court and they admit the terms to be correct. Compromise recorded. Put up on 7-12-1963 when parties may file objection, if any, to the petition filed by Narasingh Mahapatra to be added as Respondent and for further order. Compromise petition be put up at the time of final disposal of the appeal. On 7-12-1963 Petitioner filed an objection. The pleas taken therein were that the application was filed late and that the transfer by Champa was not valid. It was attacked as be illegal, collusive, fraudulent and without consideration. The maintainability of the application under Order 22, Rule 10 was also questioned. On 7-12-1963 Petitioner filed an objection. The pleas taken therein were that the application was filed late and that the transfer by Champa was not valid. It was attacked as be illegal, collusive, fraudulent and without consideration. The maintainability of the application under Order 22, Rule 10 was also questioned. The learned District Judge, without making enquiry into the validity of the objection except in respect of maintainability, allowed the application of Narasingh Mahapatra on 8-2-1964 and permitted him to contest the appeal as Respondent No. 3. The petition of compromise was directed to be put up at the time of hearing of the appeal. The Civil Revision is case against this order. 2. Mr. Mohapatra very strenuously contended that the learned District Judge having recorded the compromise was bound to pass a decree in accordance thereof and had no jurisdiction to contain the application of Narasingh to be added as a party-Respondent and that he should not have passed an order that the compromise petition was to be put up at the time of final disposal of the appeal. 3. It would be clear from the chronology of facts that alleged transfer by Champa in favour of Narasingh was at a time when the suit had been disposed of and the appeal had not been filed. In Saila Bala Dassi Vs. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and Another their Lordships held that Order 22, Rule 10, CPC had no application to such a case. But yet the transferee could be made a party u/s 146, CPC Code. Section 146 was introduced for the first time in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with the object of facilitating the exercise of rights by persons in whom they came to be vested by develop or assignment and being a beneficient provision should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense. In that case the application had been filed for continuing the appeal as Appellant. In Shew Bux Mohata and Others Vs. Bengal Breweries Ltd. and Others the identical principle was made applicable for addition of Respondents. It is thus clear that the application of Narasingh Mahapatra is maintainable u/s 146, CPC Code. 4. The application by Narasingh and the joint petition of compromise were filed on the same date. In Shew Bux Mohata and Others Vs. Bengal Breweries Ltd. and Others the identical principle was made applicable for addition of Respondents. It is thus clear that the application of Narasingh Mahapatra is maintainable u/s 146, CPC Code. 4. The application by Narasingh and the joint petition of compromise were filed on the same date. There is no assertion on the part of the Petitioner, nor is there any material on record to show that the petition of compromise was filed earlier than the application of Narasingh. On the contrary, the order dated 8.11.1963 shows that the application of Narasingh was filed earlier. At any rate, in the absence of materials to the contrary, it cannot be said that it was filed later. On this finding, the contention raised by Mr. Mohapatra is wholly academic. If the application for addition of party u/s 146, CPC was filed earlier or simultaneously, the lis was then pending. The only legal order that can be legitimately passed in those circumstances would be to enquire into the application of Narasingh and to dispose of the compromise petition thereafter. If on enquiry it is found that the transfer by Champa in favour of Narasingh is genuine, for consideration and passed a valid title, then the entire interest of Champa in respect of the subject-matter of the appeal passed by assignment in favour of Narasingh who alone is competent to be a party-Respondent to the appeal in place of Champa. Sapani would have no further interest in the property and any compromise effected by him would not dispose of the appeal. 5. It was contended for opposite party No. 1 that even if a compromise petition was filed the lis did not come to an end until a compromise decree was passed. A compromise was made on the wordings of Section 33 and Order 23, Rule 3, CPC Code. Section 33 lays down: The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment, and on such judgment a decree shall follow. A compromise was made on the wordings of Section 33 and Order 23, Rule 3, CPC Code. Section 33 lays down: The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment, and on such judgment a decree shall follow. Order 23, Rule 3, on the other hand, prescribes: Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties in token of their consent to such agreement or compromise, or where the Defendant satisfies the Plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit. Provided that the provisions of this rule shall not apply to or in any way effect the provisions of Order 34, Rules 3, 5 and 8. Emphasis is laid on the fact that under Order 23, Rule 3, the decree shall not merely follow the compromise recorded. It must be confined to that portion of the compromise which relates to the subject-matter of the suit. That part of the compromise which is outside the scope of the suit would not be embodied in the decree. Without noticing the aforesaid distinction, in Lakshan Chunder Dey Vs. Sm. Nikunjamoni Dassi and Others a Division Bench of that Court, consisting of the eminent Judges (Mookherji and Rankin, JJ.) took the view that the lis did not come to an end until the decree was drawn up. Mr. Mohapatra tried to distinguish that decision on the basis that the decree on the original side of the Calcutta High Court is not drawn up until an application is made by the party. Doubtless a decree is drawn up in this State not on the application of the party but in due course. The distinction pointed out does not, however, make any difference. Continuance of the lis has nothing to do with volition of the party. The Calcutta view has been followed in AIR 1934 Mad 337 and Alluri Venkata Narasimha Raju and Another Vs. Katteboyina Yellamanda and Others and has not been accepted in some decisions. It is unnecessary to express a final view on this aspect of the matter. Continuance of the lis has nothing to do with volition of the party. The Calcutta view has been followed in AIR 1934 Mad 337 and Alluri Venkata Narasimha Raju and Another Vs. Katteboyina Yellamanda and Others and has not been accepted in some decisions. It is unnecessary to express a final view on this aspect of the matter. The question is wholly academic in view of my finding that at the time when the application u/s 146, CPC was filed by Narasingh, the lis was pending. The principle of Saila Bala Dassi Vs. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and Another, would directly apply to such a case and the Court is bound to examine the question of addition of party. 6. Great stress was placed by Mr. Mohapatra on Laraiti Vs. Ch. Shiam Sunder Lal and Another, in support of his contention that the application for addition of parties should have been thrown out when the compromise petition was filed. In the Allahabad case, the compromise was filed on 10-2-1930 while the application for being made a party was filed one day later on 11-2-1930. On the view their Lordships took that the compromise terminated the lis, that case becomes distinguishable on facts and its principle has no application to the present case. That apart, there are observations in that very judgment which clearly support the view that if the application for addition of party was filed prior to the compromise petition, the application cannot be thrown out. Those observations in the judgment may quoted: Now, when this compromise was filed, there was nothing to indicate that Shiam Sunder claimed to be the purchaser of the Plaintiff's right.... We need not concern ourselves with the rulings of other High Courts where persons who were already parties to the suit have successfully objected to the acceptance, by the Court, of a compromise. In this case clearly, when the compromise was filed, Shiam Sunder was not a party to the suit. The aforesaid observations clearly indicate that their Lordships' conclusion would have been materiality affected if the application for addition of party had been filed earlier than or simultaneously with the compromise petition. 7. The position that emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that the application filed by Narasingh requires investigation. The learned District Judge was in error in straightaway allowing Narasingh to be made a party to the appeal. 7. The position that emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that the application filed by Narasingh requires investigation. The learned District Judge was in error in straightaway allowing Narasingh to be made a party to the appeal. He should have given full opportunities to the parties to lead evidence and canvass the question whether the alleged sale was genuine, for consideration and passed a valid title in favour of Narasingh. If the finding would be that the sale passed a valid title, Narasingh must be added a party-Respondent to contest the appeal. If, on the other hand, the finding is that no title passed the registered sale-deed, a decree must be passed in terms of the compromise. Mr. Mohapatra's contention that in no circumstance Narasingh would be made a party to the appeal is untenable and must be rejected. Though his contention is rejected, the order of the learned District Judge, as it stands, cannot be supported. He has allowed Narasingh to be made a party without an inquiry and a finding that the sale passed a valid title in his favour. 8. The order dated 8-2-1964 of the learned District Judge is set aside and he is directed to make an inquiry into the validity of the sale in favour of Narasingh Mahapatra by Champa after giving full opportunities to parties to lead evidence on the point and thereafter dispose of the application for addition of party u/s 146, CPC and the compromise petition in accordance with law and the observations made above. The Civil Revision is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Revision petition allowed. Final Result : Allowed