Judgment ANANT SINGH, J. 1. The petitioner was convicted under S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for violation of R. 3 of the Sugar (Movement Control) Order, 1955, by a Magistrate, Mr. S.C. Gupta, First Class, Baghmara, in the district of Dnanbad in connection with the movement of 91 bags of sugar by a truck. The conviction of the petitioner was maintained by this Court with some modification in the sentence in Criminal Revision No. 564 of 1961 disposed of by me, while sitting singly, on the 18th September, 1961. There was, however, no order passed by the Magistrate, while convicting the petitioner, either for forfeiture of the 91 bags of sugar or any part thereof, as provided in sub-cl. (b) of S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, to be referred to hereafter as the Act. The petitioner, while the aforesaid criminal revision was being heard by me, made a prayer for the refund of the 91 bags of sugar or the price thereof. I then passed an order that it was open to the petitioner to apply for the refund before the trial Court, since that matter was not for consideration before me in the aforesaid criminal revision. The petitioner filed a petition on the, 31st January, 1962 before the trial Court for refund of 91 bags of sugar or the value thereof. The learned Magistrate, by his order, dated the 18th April 1962, rejected the petition and made an order forfeiting the 91 bags of sugar to the State of Bihar. The petitioner then preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge, who, by his order, dated the 6th July 1962, upheld the Magistrates order forfeiting the bags of sugar. This application has been filed against the aforesaid order of the learned Sessions Judge. 2. Mrs. Lall, appearing for the petitioner, has drawn our attention to the provisions of S. 7 of the Act which provides three kinds of penalties for contravention of any order made under S. 3 of the Act : One is imprisonment for a specific term depending on the nature of the offence, the second is fine which is optional, and the third is forfeiture of the property in respect of which the order has been contravened, or a part thereof. It should be noticed that the sentence of imprisonment and forfeiture are mandatory, unless an order to the contrary is made in respect of the either penalty as has been provided under the two provisions - one appearing under the provision of imprisonment and the other appealing under the provision of forfeiture. I may, however, quote the provision relating to forfeiture, as provided in sub-cl. (b) of S. 7 of the Act : "(b) any property in respect of which the order has been contravened or such part thereof as to the Court may seem fit shall be forfeited to the Government : Provided that it the Court is of opinion that if is not necessary to direct forfeiture in respect of the whole or, as the case may be, any part of the property, it may, for reasons to be recorded, refrain from doing so". 3. It would appear that the Court, while convicting an accused for violation of an order under the Act, is required to impose a sentence of imprisonment and also to order forfeiture of either the whole of the property or a part thereof in respect of which the order has been contravened, and if it does not decide to pass a sentence of imprisonment and an order of forfeiture, it has to give its reasons for not doing so. In the instant case, however, the Court, while convicting the petitioner, did not pass any order of forfeiture and also assigned no reasons for acting to the contrary. The fact remains that no order for forfeiture was passed at the time of delivering the judgement. The question is whether in such a situation the Court could pass an order of forfeiture at any subsequent stage under any of the provisions of the Act or under the provisions of S. 517 of the Cr. P.C. 4. Section 517 of the Cr. P.C., no doubt, provides for confiscation, amongst other things, of any property after the conclusion of a trial. This, however, is a general provision, and in my opinion, cannot be invoked overriding the special provisions of S. 7 of the Act which itself provides as a mandatory measure for making an order of forfeiture at the time when the judgement is delivered. There are authorities of different High Courts in support of the view. This, however, is a general provision, and in my opinion, cannot be invoked overriding the special provisions of S. 7 of the Act which itself provides as a mandatory measure for making an order of forfeiture at the time when the judgement is delivered. There are authorities of different High Courts in support of the view. Reference may be made to Raghunath Krishna V/s. Emperor, AIR 1947 Bom 239, Pratap Singh V/s. The State, AIR 1952 Cal 90 and Jalim Chand V/s. The State, AIR 1950 Assam 132. The Bombay case related to Food Grains Control Order, 1942, Cl. 7-A of which also provided for the forfeiture of any food grains in the event of conviction of an accused, and it was held that when the Court wished to exercise its power of forfeiture, it must be exercised under the specific provisions of that clause and not under S. 517 or 518 of the Cr. P.C. Such was the view taken also by the Calcutta and Assam High Courts in the cases referred to above. 5. Mrs. Lall, appearing for the petitioner, in all fairness has, drawn our attention also to a decision of a Single Judge of the Allahabad Nigh Court in Mohammad Hanif V/s. Rex, AIR 1952 All 578 , which, has taken a contrary view to the decisions in the aforesaid cases. The Allahabad High Court in the aforesaid case has taken a view that the order of forfeiture is an order which follows conviction and is not a part of the sentence but is a part of the function of the Court under S. 517 of the Cr. P.C. which may direct how the property in respect of which a crime has been committed shall be disposed of. It seems that the decisions in the aforesaid cases of Bombay, Calcutta and Assam were not placed before his Lordship of the Allahabad High Court. With respect, however, I am not inclined to agree with the view of the Allahabad High Court. As I have already pointed out S. 7 of the Act provides forfeiture of property in respect of which the offence has been committed as one of the penalties, and the same has to be imposed at the time the judgement is passed convicting the accused. Section 53 of the Penal Code also includes forfeiture of properly as one of the punishments. Section 53 of the Penal Code also includes forfeiture of properly as one of the punishments. Thus, there can be no doubt that the forfeiture of a property in respect of which an offence has been committed is a part of the penalty provided in S. 7 itself. 6. In Sita Ram Sah V/s. The State, 1964 BLJR 638, a similar question, though in a different context, arose whether the forfeiture of a property as provided in sub-cl. (b) of S. 7 of the Act was a penalty similar to the one provided in sub-cl. (a) of S. 7 of the Act. Kamla Sahai, J., who decided the case, answered the question in the affirmative, reading such an intention from the use of the word and appearing at the end of sub-cl. (a) and the beginning of sub-cl. (b). A plain reading of the two sub-clauses will so indicate, and there can be no doubt that the forfeiture of property in respect of which an offence has been committed is a penalty which has to be imposed at the time of passing the judgement in the event of conviction of the accused. 7. The Calcutta High Court in D. Kominatos V/s. Emperor, AIR 1946 Cal 1, also held, in relation to Cl. 10 of the Essential Drugs Census Order, which contains a similar provision as S. 7 of the Act providing for forfeiture of the drug in respect of which an offence is committed, that such a punishment is an additional punishment. Thus, on a preview of the provisions of law and the authorities, there can be no manner of doubt that the forfeiture of the property within the meaning of sub-cl. (b) of S. 7 of Act is a penalty which has to be imposed at the time of delivering the judgement. Such an order, however, cannot be made after the Court has become functus officio after it has delivered the judgement. Section 258 of the Cr. P.C. provides that in the event of conviction of an accused, the Court shall pass sentence upon him according to law, and obviously, it cannot defer passing of any of the sentence under a particular law. Section 369 of the Code completely bars making any alteration or review of the judgement after the judgement has been pronounced and signed except to make correction of any clerical error. 8. Section 369 of the Code completely bars making any alteration or review of the judgement after the judgement has been pronounced and signed except to make correction of any clerical error. 8. In the instant case, the trial Magistrate, if he failed to pass an order forfeiting the bags of sugar in respect of which the offence was committed at the time he found the petitioner guilty, could not make any such order at any subsequent stage; otherwise it would amount to reviewing the judgement, not by way of clerical error. It is true that the provision of sub-cl. (b) of S. 7 of the Act is mandatory, and the Magistrate should have passed an order of forfeiture, unless he decided to the contrary for which he should have assigned reasons. But if he failed to do so, he has no jurisdiction to review his judgement at a subsequent stage by making an order of forfeiture of the bags of sugar in respect of which the offence had been committed. The view taken by the two Courts below, in my opinion, is clearly erroneous in law, and it must be set aside. The petitioner now must be given back 91 bags of sugar which had been seized, or an equivalent price thereof should be paid to him. The application is allowed accordingly. UNTWALIA, J. 9 I agree.