JUDGMENT-This is a tenants petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution. One Narayan was the landlord of two fields Survey No. 16/2, area 14 acres and 29 gunthas at village Akkalkot, and Survey No. 105/1, area 7 acres and 12 gunthas, of village Akola. Both the fields were being cultivated by the petitioner under a. lease granted by Narayan. 2 On May 4, 1961, Narayan gave a notice to the petitioner that he had failed to pay the lease money for the year 1960-61. The lease money was not paid for both the fields. By the notice the petitioner was called upon to pay the amount of lease money within a period of three months. In spite of the notice the petitioner did not pay the amounts of rent in arrears. 3. Narayan, therefore, filed an application on September 27, 1961, for possession under s.36 read with s. 19 of the new Tenancy Act. In those proceedings the petitioner admitted that Rs. 159 were due from him to the landlord by way of arrears of rent for the year 1960-61. Thus there was no dispute as to the quantum of arrears of rent due from the petitioner to the landlord. Narayan died during the pendency of the proceedings and the names of his legal representatives i. e. his widow Laxmibai and his son Arjun, were brought on record. 4. On October 13, 1961, the tenancy Naib-Tahsildar passed an order under s. 30 of the new Tenancy Act that the petitioner shall pay the arrears of rent of Rs.159 within three months, failing which the tenancy would be deemed to be validly terminated. There was no order as to costs. 5. In spite of this order nothing was paid by the petitioner till January 18, 1962, which was the last date for payment. On March 20, 1962, the landlord applied for a warrant" for delivery of possession being issued to evict the petitioner from the fields. A notice of these proceedings was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner tiled a written statement on April 12, 1962, in these proceedings for possession. On March 20, 1962, the landlord applied for a warrant" for delivery of possession being issued to evict the petitioner from the fields. A notice of these proceedings was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner tiled a written statement on April 12, 1962, in these proceedings for possession. In this written statement the petitioner contended that the amount was to be paid on or before January 18, 1962; but in the current year i. e. in the year 1961-62 the petitioner had poor yield, that there was failure of crops ond the land revenue of the village was suspended. In these circumstances, the petitioner claimed that he was unable to pay the amount in time and there was a further vague statement that the petitioner was still making efforts to raise the requisite amount, that he had brought the amount and that he would deposit the same in case the landlord does not accept the payment. He, therefore, claimed that the landlords application for possession should be dismissed. On April 28, 1902, the Naib.rahsildar passed a I. order that the petitioner deserved a further relief against the forfeiture of the tenancy, under the proviso to s. 30 (1) of the new Tenancy Act, and he directed that the petitioner shall make payment within one year from October "18, 1961, failing which "the tenant shall have lost all chances of annulling the termination of tenancy brought about under section 19 (1) ibid." The result of this appears to be that the petitioner was granted a further time of one year with effect from October 18, 1961. 6. Against this order the landlord preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Deputy Collector on September 16, 1962. 7. The landlord, therefore, approached the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal challenging the orders of the revenue authorities and the Tribunal has allowed the application holding that the Naib-Tahsildar could not further extend the time on failure of the petitioner to pay the amount of arrears within the time originally fixed by the tenancy Naib-Tahsildar. According to the view taken by the Tribunal s. 30 (1), proviso, of the new Tenancy Act does not contemplate a second opportunity being given to the defaulting tenant to make the payment. 8. The tenant, therefore, has filed this petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under art. 227 of the Constitution. According to the view taken by the Tribunal s. 30 (1), proviso, of the new Tenancy Act does not contemplate a second opportunity being given to the defaulting tenant to make the payment. 8. The tenant, therefore, has filed this petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under art. 227 of the Constitution. After the petition was admitted, the petitioner applied for permission to make an application to raise a new ground based on the provisions of s. 46 of the new Tenancy Act. Accordingly the petition has been amended. It is contended that the petitioner could not be evicted in a proceeding commenced after April 1, 1961, because the ownership of the land stood vested in the petitioner as a result of the provisions of s. 46 of the new Tenancy Act. I do not think it is permissible for the petitioner to raise this ground at this stage which involves an enquiry into many questions of fact. The provisions of s. 46 do not become applicable to all cases of tenancies and several questions of fact are required to be decided. The opposite side has no notice of this contention and I do not think it will be fair to entertain a plea based on the provisions of s. 46 for the first time in this Court. The petition will have to be decided, therefore, on the facts pleaded and the issues raised before the Revenue authorities to determine whether any of them has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or has committed any patent illegality in the interpretation of the law governing the parties. 9. On the merits of the controversy, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that upon a proper construction of the proviso to s. 30(1), an independent right has been given to a defaulting tenant to be granted further time if there is a failure on the part of the tenant to make payment within the time fixed by the Tahsildar under s. 30 (1) of the Tenancy Act. I do not think this contention is well founded. The scheme of s. 30 (1) has been examined in previous decisions of this Court. I do not think this contention is well founded. The scheme of s. 30 (1) has been examined in previous decisions of this Court. Under sub.s. (1) of s. 30, where the tenancy of any land held by a tenant is terminated for non-payment of rent and the landlord files proceedings to eject the tenant, the Tahsildar is required to call upon the tenant to tender to the landlord the rent in arrears, together with costs of proceedings, within three months from the date of the order. If the tenant complies with the order, the Tahsildar is enjoined to pass an order directing that the tenancy has not been terminated and thereupon the tenant is to hold the land as if the tenancy had not been terminated. Sub-section (1) of s. 30 itself also postulates the consequence of failure of the tenant to pay the amount of arrears of rent within the time fixed by the Tahsildar, and the consequence is that the Tahsildar is required to make an order of ejectment. 10. Now, turning to the proviso, the learned counsel says that the proviso creates an independent right in the defaulting tenant if there is a failure of crops or similar calamity on account of which he was unable to pay the rent due. By this it is contended that the inability must be with respect to the amount directed to be paid under the order under sub.s. (1) of s. 30, and the failure of the crops or such calamity during the period when the payment was required to be made under the orders of the Tahsildar would give a fresh right to the defaulting tenant to make an application to have the time extended upto a year over and above the time already granted by the order of the Tahsildar under sub-s. (1) of s. 30. This would mean, in other words, that the proviso is, as it were, an independent sub-section and creates an independent right consequent upon an unintended failure to pay the amount of rent within the time fixed by the Tahsildar. It is difficult to read the proviso in this manner. This would mean, in other words, that the proviso is, as it were, an independent sub-section and creates an independent right consequent upon an unintended failure to pay the amount of rent within the time fixed by the Tahsildar. It is difficult to read the proviso in this manner. The function of a proviso, it is well settled, is in the nature of carving out an exception, and the exception in this case is with regard to the time that may be allowed for making payment in excess of three months provided the condition stated in the proviso is satisfied. That condition is failure of crops or similar calamity which disables the tenant from making payment of the rent due. The words used are "if the Tahsildar is satisfied that in consequence of total or partial failure of crops or similar calamity the tenant has been unable to pay the rent due". This could hardly have reference to the amount determined by the Tahsildar which in a given case would include not only the amount of arrears of rent but also costs of the proceedings which are capable of being awarded in the discretion of the Tahsildar. If the proviso was intended to cover oases of default in payment of the amount of rent and costs within the time fixed by the Tahsildar in exercise of the powers under sub-s. (1) of s. 30, then not only the phraseology would have been different but the section would have included reference to award costs under its first clause. It cannot be said that this was an inadvertent omission or that the sum determine& by the Tahsildar, inclusive of arrears of rent and costs awarded, is equal to "the rent due". The only and proper construction to be put on the proviso is that the extended time is permissible to be granted to the defaulted tenant in the very first enquiry, and, as far as one can see, sub-s. (1) of s. 30 contemplates only one enquiry by the Tahsildar where the time which is fixed for payment of arrears of rent within three months, is liable to be extended to one year, provided the Tahsildar is satisfied that the failure of the tenant to pay the rent was due to the total or partial failure of crops or similar calamity. 11. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Sonajee Krishnajee Mujumdar v. Nathu Yadav Patil.1 That decision pertains to interpretation of Ss. 29 and 25 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in R.M. Paranjaape v. Mali2 which has interpreted the effect of sub-s. (2) of s.25 of the Bombay: Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. In. view of the principle on which that case is decided, it must be held that the statute itself having given a right to the defaulting tenant to a further grant of time within which to pay the amount of rent, there was hardly any further power in the Tahsildar to extend that time over again in the guise of exercising powers, as it :were, afresh un4,er the proviso. The proviso and the main sub-s. (1) of S. 30 had to be read together and are a part and parcel of the same scheme under which the statute permits the defaulting tenant to get an extended period for payment of arrears of rent, ordinarily as a matter of course for three months, but in case of failure to make payment due to failure of crops or similar calamity, up to a period of one year. This proviso cannot possibly be interpreted as creating a further locus penitentiae without payment of rent merely because an order passed by the Tahsildar under s. 30 (1) may come to be made in a year in which there may be failure of crops. Once this argument is accepted, it would lead to somewhat startling results. It would mean that the tenant would be entitled to claim relief by way of further extension of time by a year from the date fixed for payment of arrears of rent under sub.s. (1) or s. 30, on account of failure of crops in the year in which the Tahsildar comes to pass the orders. I do not think that the Legislature intended any such result to follow from the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 30 of the new Tenancy Act. 12. The result is that the petition fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.