JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a defendants' second appeal from the concurrent decisions of the courts below decreeing the plaintiff-respondents' suit for recovery of damages for malicious prosecution against them. The main point urged in this appeal is that the courts below erred in not dismissing the suit as time-barred. It is necessary to state very briefly the facts. The plaintiff-respondents Bal Mukand Singh and 15 others filed a suit for the recovery of damages from the defendant-appellants Rama Singh and Jagardeo Bind on the ground that they had made a false report to the police alleging that the plaintiffs had committed a dacoity in the house of the defendant Jagardeo Bind. In pursuance of this complaint, criminal proceedings were taken against the plaintiffs, but after a long time they were discharged on 2nd January 1957. The defendant appellants on 6th February 1957 filed a revision against the order of discharge but this was dismissed on 4th April 1957. The plaintiff-respondents then filed this suit on 26th February 1958 claiming a sum of Rs, 2,000/- as compensation and damages from the defendants. The defendants resisted the suit and contended that it was barred by limitation. They also pleaded that their complaint was neither malicious nor without probable cause. Both the courts below held that the defendants filed a complaint maliciously and without any reason or probable cause. The defendants have come to this court in second appeal. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants urged three points in favour of this appeal. First he argued that the courts below erred in decreeing the suit against the appellant Rama Singh who had filed no complaint but merely given evidence in support of the prosecution case. The short answer to this argument is that both the courts below have found that Rama Singh while keeping him. self in the background actually instigated the appellant Jagardeo Bind to file a false complaint and even wrote out the complaint for him. In a suit for malicious prosecution it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant actually filed the criminal complaint. He will be jointly liable with the complainant if he was the instigator and active helper of the complainant. Secondly, learned counsel argued that the appellant Jagardeo Bind was not liable as he was merely a tool of the appellant Rama Singh. This argument cannot be taken seriously. He will be jointly liable with the complainant if he was the instigator and active helper of the complainant. Secondly, learned counsel argued that the appellant Jagardeo Bind was not liable as he was merely a tool of the appellant Rama Singh. This argument cannot be taken seriously. The word 'tool' is not a term of art but used figuratively to describe the conduct of a person who allows himself to be dominated by another person and does the dirty work for him. The real question is not whether such a person was the 'tool' of another but whether he knew at the time of filing the complaint that he had no cause to proceed against the plaintiff and his complaint was false. If he did, his being a 'tool' of another will not save him from liability. 3. Thirdly, learned counsel argued that the suit should have been dismissed as barred by limitation. It is necessary to give a few dates. The plaintiffs were discharged by the Magistrate on 2nd January 1957, The defendants filed a revision against the order of discharge on 6th February 1957. This was dismissed on 4th April 1957. This suit was filed on 26th February 1958. The contention is that limitation commenced from the date of discharge i.e. 2nd January 1957, and not from the date of the dismissal of the defendants' revision-i.e. 4th April 1957. It is common ground that the suit was time barred if limitation commenced on the 2nd of January 1957, but not if it began oil the 4th of April 1957. 4. The period of limitation and the commencement of this period are prescribed by Article 23 of the Limitation Act. The period is one year which commences from the date "when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated." Learned counsel receded that it had been held by this court and several other High Courts that where the defendant files a revision against the order of discharge or acquittal, limitation under Article 23 commences not from the date of discharge but the date of the dismissal of the defendants' revision. It is only necessary to mention these decisions. B. Madan Mohan Singh v. B. Ram Sunder Singh, AIR 1930 Allahabad 326, Bhagat Raj v. Garai Dulaiya, 1937 A.L.J.R. 1281, Soora Kulasekara Chetty v. Tholasingham Chetty, AIR 1938 Madras 349 (F.B.), S.K. Mehtab s/o Sh. It is only necessary to mention these decisions. B. Madan Mohan Singh v. B. Ram Sunder Singh, AIR 1930 Allahabad 326, Bhagat Raj v. Garai Dulaiya, 1937 A.L.J.R. 1281, Soora Kulasekara Chetty v. Tholasingham Chetty, AIR 1938 Madras 349 (F.B.), S.K. Mehtab s/o Sh. Farid v. Balji slo Krishnarao, AIR 1946 Nagpur 46 , Bhikham Singh v. Darshan Singh, A.I.R. 1942 Oudh 489. 5. But the learned counsel distinguished these cases on the ground that in all of them the revisional court issued notice to the respondent (the subsequent plaintiff in the suit for malicious prosecution) and decided ti-.e revision after hearing the parties. He contended that the principle laid down in these decisions does not apply where the defendant's revision against the order of discharge or acquittal is dismissed summarily without calling upon the accused (the plaintiff in the subsequent suit for malicious prosecution) to show cause. Learned counsel argued that the filing of a revision against an order of discharge or acquittal does not concern the accused until the revision is admitted and he receives notice, and therefore, a party cannot take advantage of the mere filing of the revision for the purpose of extending the period of limitation for his suit for malicious prosecution. I find little substance in this argument. In the first place, it is not known whether the defendants' revision against the order of discharge was dismissed summarily or after issuing notice to the plaintiffs. I have read the order of discharge which merely says that it was being passed after hearing the appellant's counsel. The revision itself was dismissed after two months of its being filed, which suggests that the plaintiffs may have been heard. Learned counsel for the appellants stated, on a question from nee, that lie was not in a position to state categorically that no notice of revision was issued to the plaintiffs. He asked for time to ascertain this fact, as it is a jurisdictional fact, according to him. I do not think that any adjournment is required, because in my opinion it is immaterial whether the revision was dismissed summarily or after issue of notice to the plaintiffs. He asked for time to ascertain this fact, as it is a jurisdictional fact, according to him. I do not think that any adjournment is required, because in my opinion it is immaterial whether the revision was dismissed summarily or after issue of notice to the plaintiffs. Article 23 of the Limitation Act provides, as stated above, that the period of limitation commences from the date "when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated." It has been held that a person is said to prosecute another when he sets the machinery of law in motion against that person. B. Madan Mohan Singh v. B. Ram Sunder Singh'. Therefore if he makes a report to the Police demanding the prosecution of the accused, he thereby sets the machinery of law in motion and the prosecution commences on the date when the report is filed. If the trial court discharges the accused, the machinery of the criminal law comes to a stop for the time being, but if the complainant files a revision against the order of discharge he once again sets this machinery in motion against the accused. It is quite incorrect to argue that the machinery of law is set in motion by a complainant when the court issues notice of the revision to the accused and not before. If this argument were accepted the accused will have no cause of action against a complainant where the police declines to take action against the accused if the court dismisses a complaint without issuing summons to the accused. It is against common sense to hold that the filing of a revision application which may end in the setting aside of the order of discharge (or acquittal) does not move the machinery of the law against the accused until he receives notice of it. In my opinion the issue of notice of the revision to the accused is only a stage in the motion of the law against him. 6. It has been held that for the purpose of computing limitation under Article 23 the prosecution must be deemed to have terminated when the Magistrate declines to commit the accused. Soore Kulasakara Chetty v. Tholasingam. I am inclined to extend this principle to a revision against an order of discharge and hold that the prosecution comes to an end when the revisional court refuses to interfere with that order. Soore Kulasakara Chetty v. Tholasingam. I am inclined to extend this principle to a revision against an order of discharge and hold that the prosecution comes to an end when the revisional court refuses to interfere with that order. The object of filing a revision against the Magistrate's order refusing to commit is to set the machinery of the law once again in motion, and as soon as it is filed the law is set in motion against the accused, and comes to a stop only when the revisional court declines to interfere l with the order of discharge. I am not impressed with learned counsel argument that the plaintiff in a suit for malicious prosecution is not concerned with a revision against the order discharging him until he receives notice of it and should not be permitted to take advantage of the revision by extending the period of limitation. If accepted the argument will lead to injustice in many cases. A revision may take more than a year to be listed even for admission. (In the High Court this is not a remote possibility). If meanwhile the discharged accused is compelled to file a suit for malicious prosecution and pay court fee he is put to, the risk of the suit being dismissed and the court fee wasted in the event of the revision being allowed. On the other hand, no injustice is done to the defendant in a suit for malicious prosecution if the period of limitation is made to commence after the dismissal of the revision. Moreover, it does not lie in the mouth of a defendant who takes advantage of the machinery of the law and files a revision for the purpose of securing the conviction of the plaintiff to contend that the step taken by him should be ignored in counting the period of limitation governing the plaintiff's suit. By filing a revision against the order of discharge, he puts the plaintiff to the hazard of further prosecution. It is but just and proper that the plaintiff should be permitted to exclude for the purpose of limitation the time during which he was under the shadow of the defendant's revision. 7. In my opinion, the courts below rightly held that the suit was within limitation. 8. No other point was urged. The appeal is dismissed with costs.