JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal in a suit for permanent injunction praying that defendants 1 and 2 who are the Municipal Board, Ujhani, and the Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Ujhani, be restrained from demolishing the shop in question, the details of which have been given in the plaint and from evicting the plaintiff from the shop aforesaid. 2. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that the plaintiff is a tenant of a shop which appertains to a tomb of Nawab Abdullah Khan, situate in mohalla Narainganj, Ujhani, to the east of Bareilly-Mathura Road. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants 1 and 2 had wrongly served the plaintiff with a notice under Sections 186 and 211 of the U. P. Municipalities Act with ulterior motives for demolition of the building and removal of the materials against which the plaintiff appealed but his appeal was rejected by the Additional District Magistrate Budaun. The plaintiff further said that this order of the Additional District Magistrate, Budaun, cast cloud on the plaintiff's rights and the plaintiff had apprehension that his shop would be demolished. It was said that the notice issued by defendant No. 1, the Executive Officer, under Sections 186 and 211 of the U. P. Municipalities Act was invalid. Since no new construction had been made, there was no necessity to obtain the sanction of the Board. On these allegations the present suit was filed for the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was contested by defendants I and 2 on the ground that the plaintiff was not the tenant of the shop in suit. He was only a trespasser, as such he was not entitled to maintain the suit. It was also said that the plaintiff had not given correct boundaries of the shop which had been given in the written statement. It was asserted in the written statement that several persons had begun making unauthorised constructions over a large piece of land shown in the map appended to the written statement without the permission of the Municipal Board. When these encroachments were discovered notices for demolition were given to all of them by the defendant-Board after a resolution of the Board had been passed. When these encroachments were discovered notices for demolition were given to all of them by the defendant-Board after a resolution of the Board had been passed. It was further said that the plaintiff appealed against the said notice under Section 318 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and the appeal was rejected by the Additional District Magistrate, Budaun, and the order of the Additional District Magistrate was final under Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. The Municipal Board further asserted that the construction in dispute was on the land of the public road which is a public street within the meaning of the Municipalities Act and the plaintiff had made new unauthorised constructions which he was not entitled to do. Various other pleas were raised by the defendant-Board with which we are not concerned in this second appeal. 4. On the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed as many as 9 issues which are as follows: 1. Whether the land in suit forms part of the Maqbara land and if so are the plaintiffs its lessee ? 2. Whether the Municipal Board, Ujhani, is the owner of the land in suit or it forms part of the public street ? 3. Whether the suit is barred by Section 326 of the Municipalities Act as no notice was given ? 4. Whether the suit is barred by Section 321 of the Municipalities Act ? 5. Whether the plaintiff has made any constructions, if so, have they made them with the permission of the Municipal Board ? 6. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? 7. Whether Wilayat Husain was a cotenant of Chand. If so is he entitled to continue this suit ? 8. Whether Ghulam Mohammad is the Mutwalli of the Wakf Maqbara Nawab Abdullah Khan ? 9. Whether notice was served on the plaintiff by the defendant No. 2, if so, was it served on behalf of defendant No. 1, and is valid. Can defendant No.3 challenge the validity of the notice? 5. 8. Whether Ghulam Mohammad is the Mutwalli of the Wakf Maqbara Nawab Abdullah Khan ? 9. Whether notice was served on the plaintiff by the defendant No. 2, if so, was it served on behalf of defendant No. 1, and is valid. Can defendant No.3 challenge the validity of the notice? 5. After having framed the above issue the trial court took up issues 4 and 9 which were about the applicability of Sections 186 and 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and having accepted that the notice, issued by the Board under Section 186 was a valid notice, it came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. In view of the above findings the trial court considered it unnecessary to decide the other issues in the case with the result that the trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff with costs. 6. The plaintiff aggrieved by the decision of the trial court filed an appeal before the lower appellate court the only question that was pressed was about the validity of the notice issued under Section 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act inasmuch according to the plaintiff's argument it was the Board alone which was competent to issue the notice and since the notice in the instant case had been issued by the Executive Officer the plaintiff claimed that the said notice was invalid and on the basis of that notice the Board had no authority to demolish the construction in suit. 7. The lowerdered this argument of the plaintiff appellant and came to the conclusion that the notice issued by the Board was a valid notice and in this view of the matter confirmed the judgment of the trial court. This was the only point pressed before the lower appellate court as is clear from the judgment of that court. 8. In this appeal before me the learned counsel for the appellant made the following two submissions: (1) Sec, 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act authorises the Board only to issue the notice under that section. According to the learned counsel the Board has to apply its mind about the particular property sought to be demolished which had not been done in this case. It is the Board and Board alone and not the Executive Officer who could do this. According to the learned counsel the Board has to apply its mind about the particular property sought to be demolished which had not been done in this case. It is the Board and Board alone and not the Executive Officer who could do this. (2) The second submission of the learned counsel is that the Executive Officer's powers are limited by Section 60 read with Schedule II of the U. P. Municipalities Act which Schedule has been amended by the Amending Act of 1953 and the power to issue notice under Section 186 has been taken away. Under this head the submission of the learned counsel further was that the notice issued in the instant case could not be deemed to be in execution of the resolution within the meaning of Section 111 (2) and the issuance of notice by the Executive Officer was beyond the scope of his employment which is circumscribed by Section 60 Schedule II. Learned counsel referred to the notice issued by the Board under Sections 186 and 265 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 9. I have considered the argument of the learned counsel and have also looked into the various provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act and the notice issued by the Municipal Board in the present case. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel and having looked into the various provisions of law and the said notice I am of opinion that the decision of the courts below is correct and calls for no interference. 10. It appears that the plaintiff and several other persons made encroachments on the Municipal land and made new constructions thereon, on which certain complaints were made and the matter was brought to the notice of the Board. The Board passed the following resolution: "Legal opinion has been procured. The Board resolves that the encroachments should be removed and the building which has been constructed against permission should be demolished. The Board directs the Executive Officer and gives orders to him to issue notices under Section 186 and 211 and to take proper action." 11. It has to be seen as to whether this resolution complies with the requirements of Sec, 186 of the I. P. Municipalities Act. The Board directs the Executive Officer and gives orders to him to issue notices under Section 186 and 211 and to take proper action." 11. It has to be seen as to whether this resolution complies with the requirements of Sec, 186 of the I. P. Municipalities Act. A bare reading of the resolution would show that the Municipal Board applied its mind to the facts of the various encroachments and came to the conclusion that the same was unauthorised and should be demolished. For this purpose the Municipal Board directed the Executive Officer to issue the relevant notice under Sections 186 and 211 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and to do the needful in the matter. In my opinion, the Board having passed the resolution, it cannot be said that there is non-compliance of Section 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. What the Board did in the instant case is that it asked one of its servants to carry out the instructions given by it. The Executive Officer in the present case has done nothing but the ministerial act which he was asked to do. Learned counsel's contention that unless and until there is a specific resolution in respect of this particular property in suit there cannot be a compliance of Section 186 of the U. P. 'Municipalities Act does not appeal to me. When several persons encroached upon the Municipal land and the matter was brought before the Board, the Board having considered this matter directed the Executive Officer to issue notice under Sections 186 and 211, it cannot be said that the Board did not apply its mind in respect of the particular shop which is the subject matter of the present suit. Having looked into the various documents on record, specially the resolution and the notice issued in this case, I am satisfied that the Board did apply its mind in respect of this shop as well and directed the Executive Officer to issue notice under Section 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 12. Having reached the above conclusion it is next to be seen as to whether the notice issued under the signature of the Executive Officer was validly done or not? 12. Having reached the above conclusion it is next to be seen as to whether the notice issued under the signature of the Executive Officer was validly done or not? It is not disputed that after the amendment of 1953 the power to issue notice vests in the Board and the Board alone, but by virtue of Section 111, sub Clause (2) a resolution of the Board can be carried into execution by any agency duly authorised in this behalf by or under this Act or by a servant of the Board acting within the scope of his employment. In this case the Executive Officer as a servant of the Board who could on the behest of the Board execute the specific order given to him and exactly that the Executive Officer has done in this case. In my opinion the ministerial act done by the Executive Officer at the behest of the Municipal Board cannot be said to be non-compliance of Section 186 or contrary to Section 111 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. I do not agree with, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the act done by the Executive Officer in the instant case was beyond the scope of his employment. 13. Further, the argument of the learned counsel that the resolution of the Board was tantamount to delegation of authority on the Executive Officer also does not appeal to me. A bare reading of the resolution which has already been quoted above shows that the Municipal Board applied its mind and came to a definite conclusion. It was only the execution of the resolution of the Board which was given in the hands of the Executive Officer. This cannot mean delegation of authority. 14. Once it is held that the notice issued in the instant case under Section 186 of the U. P. Municipalities Act was a valid notice, it is clear that Section 321 of the U. P. Municipalities Act is atonce attracted and the Additional District Magistrate having rejected the appeal of the plaintiff, his orders became final and could not be challenged in the civil court. 15. In view of the above I find myself in entire agreement with the decisions of the two courts below and finding no substance in this appeal direct the same to be dismissed with costs.