JUDGMENT : Ahmad, C.J. - The Appellant Buda Kirsani, who is about 25 years old, was tried u/s 302, Indian Penal Code, in connection with the murder of a co-villager of his having the same name (Buda Kirsani) and u/s 307, Indian Penal Code for having attempted to kill Lachmi Kirsani (p.w. 1) the brother of the deceased Buda Kirsani. Both the offences were said to have been committed on the same day i.e. the 20th February, 1963 at about 6 A.M. at the same place in village Kitchudipada which falls within the jurisdiction of Police Station Madulipada, at a distance of about 10 miles from there. He has been convicted under both the sections and sentenced to transportation for life, u/s 302, Indian Penal Code, and to a rigorous imprisonment of four years u/s 307, Indian penal Code with the direction that both the sentences are to concurrently. 2. All these persons including the eye-witnesses in the case belong to the same village and are practically close neighbours. 3. It appears that on the night in between the 19th and 20th February, 1963, the house of the Appellant had caught fire and the entire house including all his belongings lying therein were burnt to ashes. The prosecution case is that, in the course of that fire, Lachmi Kirsani (p. w. 1). having heard of it, rushed to the scene to extinguish it. He had then with him his bow and arrows as well. It is said that while there he had left them on the ground while he was cutting the stings with which some of the pigs and goats were tied within the house and thereafter when he returned they were retained by the Appellant on some pretext. It appears however that the Appellant had a suspicion against this P.W. 1 that it was he who had set fire to his house. So, in the morning there was a punchayati held at about 6 A. M. in the village at the instance of the Appellant somewhere near his house. The punchayati was attended by a number of persons including\the deceased Buda Kirsani, his brother Lachmi Kirsani (p.w. 1), I the Appellant Buda Kirsani, and p.ws. 2, 3 and 4 who claimed I at the trial, to have been present at the time of the occurrence. The punchayati was attended by a number of persons including\the deceased Buda Kirsani, his brother Lachmi Kirsani (p.w. 1), I the Appellant Buda Kirsani, and p.ws. 2, 3 and 4 who claimed I at the trial, to have been present at the time of the occurrence. At the punchayati the Appellant is said to have charged P.W. 1 Lachmi Kirsani for having set fire to his house and for having shot two arrows at, him from his bow. When challenged, one of which missed him and the other hit him at the thigh when deflected. P.W. 1 strongly refuted this allegation and in support of his innocence, he was about to swear oath in the name of Mother Earth, when the Appellant is said to have discharged an arrow at him which hit him on his chest. This arrow was then and there taken out by P.W. 1 from his body and left at the spot. There after he took to his heals towards the jungle but while he was still on his way two more arrows were shot at him by the Appellant-one hitting him near the shoulder and the other on the right arm. These two arrows he took out from his body when he had reached the jungle and were thereafter produced by him before the Officer in Charge of Mathili Police Station on 21-2-1963. In the meantime, at the place of Punchayati the deceased Bud - Kirsani seeing that his brother (p.w. 1) was being repeatedly 11 shot with arrows by the Appellant, took up his bow and aimed I an arrow at the latter. Before however he could actually shoot it, the Appellant hit him on the back with his arrow and he fell down. But even thereafter the Appellant rushed at the deceased and having taken out a knife from his person (which he had on his waist) he stabbed the deceased twice with it-firstly on the chest and then on the abdomen. This caused his instantaneous death. Naturally at this the punchayeti people ran away from the place halter skelter and on that day nobody took any steps to bring the matter to the notice of the Police or any other authority. This caused his instantaneous death. Naturally at this the punchayeti people ran away from the place halter skelter and on that day nobody took any steps to bring the matter to the notice of the Police or any other authority. On the next day, the Appellant himself is said to have' gone to P.W. 5 and to have told him all about the occurrence, including as to how he had shot arrows at P.W. 1 and the deceased and then had stabbed the latter with the knife twice. Further he is said to have also told him as to how P.W. 1 had set fire to his house and when challenged shot two arrows at him on the previous night. He is also said to have requested P.W. 5 to lodge information about it at Madulipada Police Station. Accordingly thereafter P.W. 5 reported the matter at the said Police Station on 21st February. 1963 at 4 P. M. and on his statement his report was entered in the station diary by P.W. 7. This report was subsequently converted into a regular F.I.R. on the 22nd February, 1963 by P.W. 10. Then, in the course of investigation there was also a judicial confession made by the Appellant, which was recorded on 1st March, 1963 by a Magistrate Sri D.K. Mohanty. That confession is Ext. 12 on the record. Finally therefore the Police on these and other materials submitted chargesheet against the Appellant which led to his trial and conviction as stated above. 4. Now before I proceed with the discussion of the case there is one more small point which needs some reference. That is about P.W. 1. It has already been stated that immediately after the assault on him he had run away to the jungle. In the jungle his father and sister-in-law also joined him and it is said that with their assistance he started from there to the Police Station Mathili and reached there on Friday, the 22nd February, 1963. There he produced the two arrows which he had taken out from his body in the jungle and gave his statement. But as in the meantime investigation had already been taken up on the basis of the information given by P.W. 5 at Mudulipada Police Station the Police at Mathili Police Station did not take any further steps in the matter. 5. But as in the meantime investigation had already been taken up on the basis of the information given by P.W. 5 at Mudulipada Police Station the Police at Mathili Police Station did not take any further steps in the matter. 5. The defence put forward at the trial by the Appellant was that he killed the deceased and injured P.W. 1 under grave and sudden provocation and in exercise of the right of private defence of person. According to the Appellant his house was set on fire by P.W. 1 and when he (Appellant) protested against this aggressive act of his, the latter shot two arrows at him, one of which missed and the other hit him on the thigh. Accordingly he snatched the bow and arrow from P.W. 1. and retained the same with him. In the morning following both the brothers again turned up there and as both of them were then armed with bows and arrows he got afraid that they would kill him. He therefore, in exercise of the right of private defence of person shot arrows at them and thereafter killed the latter. 6. In support of its case, the prosecution laid reliance on the evidence of four eye-witnesses, viz., p.ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 as also on the judicial confession made by him before the Magistrate and the extra judicial confession made by him before P.W. 5 and other circumstantial evidence. 7. So far as the evidence of P.W. 1 is concerned that relates to the injury caused on his person alone as immediately thereafter he had run away to the jungle. So he is not a witness to the assault on the deceased. Futher, there are two facts stated by him which have been adversely criticised against his veracity. The first relates to the claim made by the Appellant that the bow and arrows of P.W. 1 which he had with him at the time of fire in the Appellant's house, had been seized from him for the reason that he (p.w. 1) had shot two arrows at the Appellant and were not innocently left behind him, at the instance of the Appellant. The trial Court as to this part of the story, relying on the evidence of p.ws. The trial Court as to this part of the story, relying on the evidence of p.ws. 2 and 5, as also on the other materials on the record, has found-and I think rightly-that there appears to be a grain of truth in the defence version. Accordingly, it has observed that "the evidence of this witness need not be accepted in toto unless corroborated". I see no reason to differ with that view. The other fact relates to the number of arrows that were said to have been shot at him by the Appellant. The claim of P.W. 1 is that the Appellant shot three arrows at him, but p.ws. 2, and 4 who were present at the time of the occurrence speak only one arrow being shot at him by the Appellant. In other words, they do not support P.W. 1 in respect of the other two arrows said to have been shot by the Appellant. In my opinion, this discrepancy may be due to the fact that in the heat of excitement they may have failed to notice the use of the other two arrows at him by the Appellant. These other two arrows are said to have been shot at him while P.W. 1 had already left the place and was running away from there. Therefore, it is also quite understandable that at that time these witnesses instead of giving any attention to this part of the occurrence were concentrating their attention on some other matters happening nearer to them and immediately at the spot. Secondly, neither of the two facts as stated above has any direct hearing on the main part of the prosecution story which is the subject matter of investigation in this case. Therefore, the Court below, I think, has rightly observed that all that they lead to is that, on the facts connected with the prosecution his evidence should be accepted only when the same is found corroborated by other materials on the record. 8. The other three prosecution witnesses are p.ws. 2, 3 and 4. Out of these three persons the evidence of P.W. 3 I think cannot be safely acted upon. In the course of his cross-examination at the trial his attention was drawn to the statement he made in the committing Court. 8. The other three prosecution witnesses are p.ws. 2, 3 and 4. Out of these three persons the evidence of P.W. 3 I think cannot be safely acted upon. In the course of his cross-examination at the trial his attention was drawn to the statement he made in the committing Court. That was to the effect that: I did not see if the arrow shot by the accused hit at the back of the deceased. I did not also see if the accused snatched the knife of the deceased and pierced his abdomen by giving two blows with that knife. But what in reply, he stated was the "It is not a fact that I denied in the lower Court to have seen the actual stabbing by the accused to the deceased." This denial is obviously not true. In this view of the matter I think the subsequent statement made at the trial which was contrary to it cannot be safely relied on. In fact even the learned Government Advocate appearing for the State has very candidly and fairly conceded that the veracity of this witness is, after all, not free from doubt. His testimony therefore has to be discarded from consideration. But so far as the evidence of p.ws. 2 and 4 is concerned that, in my opinion, is fully convincing and there is no material brought to our notice which can at all justify the rejection of their testimony. Both these witnesses have consistently and uniformly supported the entire prosecution case in an its important aspects-atleast so far as the assault on the deceased Buda Kirsani is concerned. The trial Court has accepted their evidence as true and unimpeachable. It is true as already stated that as regards the assault on P.W. 1 they have spoken only of one arrow shot at him and not three as claimed by P.W. 1. That discrepancy has, however, already been discussed above, and in any case it relates at best to the charge of assault on P.W. 1 alone which shall discuss hereafter while dealing with that part of the case. As for the assault on the deceased Buda Kirsani P.W. 4 in cross-examination has unequivocally asserted that "I have seen the stabbing; I am not lying." And to the same effect is the evidence of P.W. 2. Therefore the evidence of these two witnesses (p. ws. As for the assault on the deceased Buda Kirsani P.W. 4 in cross-examination has unequivocally asserted that "I have seen the stabbing; I am not lying." And to the same effect is the evidence of P.W. 2. Therefore the evidence of these two witnesses (p. ws. 2 and 4) proves beyond reasonable doubt that it was the Appellant who had, with the knife, inflicted fatal injuries on the person of the deceased and it was that which resulted in his instantaneous death. And as such even if there had been no other material on the record to prove it, that would not have made any difference. 9. But on the records of this case there are two more materials which also have been strongly relied upon by the prosecution in support of its case and in corroboration of the evidence of these two prosecution witnesses 2 and 4. They are: firstly the judicial confession recorded by the Magistrate and secondly the extra judicial confession made by the Appellant before P.W. 5. I take up the latter first. 10. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or in Court. This term embraces not only express confessions of crime, but also those admissions and acts of the accused from which his guilt may be implied. There is no controversy that such confessions are receivable in evidence if they are voluntary. Now here the statement made by p. w 5 at the trial was that- On Thursday before noon, accused told me how he, shot an arrow at P.W. 1 and shot an arrow at the deceased and stabbed him twice as he had set fire to his house and as he shot arrows at him the previous night. He wanted me to lodge information at Mudulipada which I did. Further, in cross-examination also he asserted that "I have stated about the stabbing." But the fact is that before the Police when he lodged information at the Police Station, he made no mention about stabbing. Therefore the claim subsequently made at the trial that there was a confession made before him about stabbing cannot be safely relied upon. All what this witness stated before the Police was that the Appellant killed these two persons by means of an arrow. Therefore the claim subsequently made at the trial that there was a confession made before him about stabbing cannot be safely relied upon. All what this witness stated before the Police was that the Appellant killed these two persons by means of an arrow. There is no mention made in the station diary entry that he had stabbed the deceased with the knife. Even so, however, there are no doubt some incriminating facts which are claimed therein to have been stated by the Appellant before P.W. 5. Therefore, it could be surely used if not as a substantive piece of evidence, at least as a corroborative piece of evidence in support of what has been stated by p.ws. 2 and 4. 11. The other piece of evidence is the judicial confession. The judicial confession, as already stated, is Ext. 12. Therein the Appellant has, inter alia stated: Thereafter at about cock crow time Lachmi and his brother Buda Kirsani both came to kill me. Lachmi Kirsani was holding a knife in his hand. Buda Kirsani was having a bow and arrow and also knife in his hands. Presuming that they would kill me I shot an arrow at Lachmi from the bow snatched by me from Lachmi Krisani. That arrow hit him. Then shot another arrow at his brother Buda Kirsani. He fell down. Then I pushed down the knife held by Buda on his body. There he died. The trial court has elaborately dealt with this confession and has finally held that- This is quite in consonance with the positive evidence in the case and there is no reason to hold that it is not voluntary. 12. In this Court, however, Mr. Nanda, appearing amicus curiae for the Appellant, has strongly contended that this confession made by the Appellant being self-exculpatory, is not admissible in law, In this connection he has drawn our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Palvinder Kaur Vs. The State of Punjab (Rup Singh-Caveator). That decision is wholly based on the principle of law as laid down by the Privy Council in the case of AIR 1939 47 (Privy Council) . Therein Lord Atkin observed: No statement that contains self-exculpatory matter can amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. Therein Lord Atkin observed: No statement that contains self-exculpatory matter can amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a confession must either in terms admit the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession, e. g. an admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no explanation of any other man's possession. Some confusion appears to have been caused by the definition of confession in Article 22 of Stephen's Digest of Law of Evidence which defines a confession as an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. If the surrounding articles are examined it will be apparent that the learned author, after dealing with admissions generally is applying himself, to admissions in criminal cases and for this purpose defines confession so as to cover all such admissions in order to have a general term for use in the three following articles confessions secured by inducement, made upon oath, and made under a promise of secrecy. The definition is not contained in the Evidence Act of 1872. And in that Act it would not be consistent with the natural use of language to construe confession as a statement by an accused suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. Judged from the standard as laid down in the aforesaid case, I feel no hesitation to hold that, in the present case, the confession is not self-exculpatory. It clearly admits in terms the offence of murder and also substantially all the facts which constitute that offence. The only expression which can, if at all be suggested to be self exculpatory is the statement that "presuming that they would kill me". This is not a statement of fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed by him, but is at best an opinion held by him about the threat that he apprehended, or a statement of what the Appellant then believed. This is not a statement of fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed by him, but is at best an opinion held by him about the threat that he apprehended, or a statement of what the Appellant then believed. Therefore in substance this statement amounts to a plea of justification but not to a denial of what he did; and so far as the plea of justification is concerned that is a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, in order that it may be of some avail to the Appellant it has to be judged on its own merits in the light of law bearing on the subject and not merely on the basis of his apprehension or belief; nor can any simple assertion of such an apprehension or belief by itself amount to any denial of the offence or of the facts constituting the offence which the Appellant directly admits to have committed or done. In my opinion, therefore there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the Appellant that the confession is exculpatory and as such is not admissible in law. And if it is admissible, which I think it is, it fully supports the prosecution case as to the charge of murder against the Appellant. Therefore this further lends support to the truth of what has been stated by p. we. 2 and 4 about that part of the case. Lastly, there is also some circumstantial evidence on the record which equally supports the testimony of p.ws. 2 and 4. In this connection the evidence of the Investigating Officers p.ws. 10 and 11 is important and when read with the report of the Chemical Examiner and the Serologist clearly confirms the evidence of p.ws. 2 and 4 as to the mode and manner of the occurrence. Therefore, I think, there is little scope for any reasonable doubt that it was the Appellant who inflicted fatal injuries with the knife on the person of the deceased and caused his instantaneous death. 13. 2 and 4 as to the mode and manner of the occurrence. Therefore, I think, there is little scope for any reasonable doubt that it was the Appellant who inflicted fatal injuries with the knife on the person of the deceased and caused his instantaneous death. 13. The defence set up by the Appellant however is that even if the story of the assault on the deceased and P.W. 1 as given by the prosecution is accepted as true, that cannot constitute an offence u/s 302, Indian Penal Code, for that act of assault was done on sudden and grave provocation and in exercise of the right of private defence of person. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention. In support of the plea of sudden and grave provocation, reliance has been placed on three facts: (i) that it was P.W. 1 who had on the previous night set fire to the house of the Appellant, (ii) that thereafter on protest being raised by the Appellant against that act of his P.W. 1 shot two arrows at him, one of which hit at his thigh, and (iii) that thereafter in the morning both P.W. 1 and his deceased brother had come to his house. So far as this third and the last fact is concerned, it is not at all proved. There is no evidence given in support of it excepting the statement of the Appellant himself. On the other hand that part of the defence version stands thoroughly believed by the evidence of p.ws. 1, 2 and 4 as also by the circumstances present on the record. They firmly prove that P.W. 1 and the deceased had not, after the incident of fire gone to the house of the Appellant and that the entire incident took place thereafter in the morning when they were all present at the Panchayati. Therefore so far the third fact is concerned, that has to be held as untrue. As for the first two facts, it will suffice to say that even if they are taken to be true they had occurred long before the incident which took place in the Panchayati. Therefore those two facts could not constitute any case of sudden and grave provocation for the assault that the Appellant long thereafter committed on, the deceased and P.W. 1 in the morning at the Panchayati. Therefore those two facts could not constitute any case of sudden and grave provocation for the assault that the Appellant long thereafter committed on, the deceased and P.W. 1 in the morning at the Panchayati. Likewise the plea of the right of private, defence also is untenable. At the Panchayati all that P.W. 1 had done was a simple denial of the allegation made against him and the attempt to support the denial with oath in the name of Mother Earth. That could not possibly provide to the Appellant any occasion for the exercise of the right of private defence of his person. It is true that at the time when P.W. 1 and the deceased were present in the Panchayati they were armed with bows and arrows and also with knives, as deposed to by P.W. 2. But there is no evidence on record to suggest that before the assault on P.W. 1 was opened by the Appellant, there was any attempt made by any of them to use either the bows and arrows or the knives. In fact it was the Appellant who invited the trouble and opened an unwarranted aggressive assault. Therefore that act cannot be held to have been done in exercise of any right of private defence of person. On the contrary, this act of the Appellant in shooting arrow at P.W. 1 being unwarranted and aggressive, gave valid justification to the deceased to exercise right of private defence of the person of his brother P.W. 1. In that view of the matter, even if thereafter the deceased had aimed his bow and arrow at the Appellant that cannot be held to be unjustified. Nor can it be relied upon to support the defence that what the Appellant did thereafter was done by him in exercise of the right of private defence of his person. In any case this much is definite and well proved that as a result of the arrow shot by the Appellant the deceased had already fallen down. Therefore that by itself was more than sufficient to eliminate the possibility of any further danger to his person from the side of the deceased. In any case this much is definite and well proved that as a result of the arrow shot by the Appellant the deceased had already fallen down. Therefore that by itself was more than sufficient to eliminate the possibility of any further danger to his person from the side of the deceased. As such even if thereafter, not content with what he had already done, he rushed to the place where the deceased was lying and having snatched the knife from his person stabbed him twice and on both occasions at delicate parts of the body, that was nothing but a vindicative and malicious act on his part and not an act done in justification of any apprehension that he had in his mind about the assault on his person. Looked at therefore from any point of view, there is, I think, no substance in the plea of right of private defence of person as set up here by the Appellant. In law, as laid down in Section 100, Indian Penal Code a person can defend himself by causing the death of the assailant only if the assailant can reasonably be apprehended to cause grievous hurt to him. In the present case the apprehension even if any as to the likelihood of his being assaulted grievously was invited by the Appellant himself as just stated by hurling repeatedly three arrows at P.W. 1 and in any case even that little apprehension, which the Appellant might have in his mind as a result of the deceased aiming bow and arrow at him, had altogether disappeared when the deceased was completely thrown on the ground by the arrow of the Appellant. It is true, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jai Dev Vs. The State of Punjab, . The means which a threatened person adopts or the force which he uses should not be weighed in golden scales. But it is also well established and fully reiterated therein that. "The violence which the citizen defending himself or his property is entitled to use, must not be unduly disproportionate to the injury which is to be averted or which is reasonably apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose. But it is also well established and fully reiterated therein that. "The violence which the citizen defending himself or his property is entitled to use, must not be unduly disproportionate to the injury which is to be averted or which is reasonably apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose. The exercise of the right of private defence must never be vindictive or malicious." On the facts of the present case, therefore, the act of the Appellant in inflicting an unwarranted assault either on P.W. 1 or the deceased cannot be justified on the ground that it was done in exercise of the right of private defence of person. 14. As such, the charge against the accused u/s 302 Indian Penal Code for causing the death of Buda Kirsani has to be held as proved beyond any reasonable doubt. 15. Then comes his conviction u/s 307, Indian Penal Code. In that regard the submission made on behalf of the Appellant is that for the assault said to have been committed by him on P.W. 1, he can at best be liable u/s 324 Indian Penal Code and not u/s 307 Indian Penal Code. To support this contention, reliance has been placed mainly (1) on the report of the Doctor as to the injuries found on the person of P.W. 1, and (2) on the absence of any corroboration by the other p.ws. that the Appellant shot 3 arrows at P.W. 1. So far as the second point is concerned that has already been fully considered above. In my opinion the mere fact that p.ws. 2 and 4 do not speak about the other two arrows thrown by the Appellant at P.W. 1 cannot belie the claim as made by him. On the other hand, the very fact that the Doctor on examination found 3 injuries on his person is sufficient corroboration of the claim made by P.W. 1 that he had been thrice assaulted with arrows by the Appellant. Therefore I find no reason to disbelieve this part of the claim made by P.W. 1. It is true that all the 3 injuries as reported by the Doctor were simple; but they were all found to have been caused by a sharp weapon. Therefore I find no reason to disbelieve this part of the claim made by P.W. 1. It is true that all the 3 injuries as reported by the Doctor were simple; but they were all found to have been caused by a sharp weapon. Further the fact that the Appellant did not spare P.W. 1 even after he had left the place and run towards jungle and continued shooting arrows at him is a strong circumstance suggesting that the Appellant was determined to inflict some fatal injuries on the person of P.W. 1. This inference finds support also from the fact that there was no love lost between P.W. 1 and the Appellant. Lastly 2 of the injuries found on the person of P.W. 1 were located at the delicate part of the body and it was sheer luck that these arrows did not prove fatal and resulted only in causing simple injuries. Therefore, in the circumstances, it cannot be held that the assault inflicted on P.W. 1 was a simple case of assault u/s 324 Indian Penal Code and not an act constituting the offence u/s 307 Indian Penal Code. 16. For these reasons, I hold that the appeal is without substance and I see no reason to interfere either with the conviction or sentence of the Appellant. It is accordingly dismissed. Barman, J. 17. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed