JUDGMENT 1. THE respondent firm is the owner of premise no. P-17, Mission Row Extension, a multi-storeyed building. While the building was still under construction, the appellant State Government proposed to requisition the first, second and third floors of the building under the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and served a prohibitory order, dated February 25, 1949, under Sec. 3 (3) of the Act, restraining the respondent from disposing of or structurally altering the premises. By another order, dated June 7, 1949, there was the order of requisition made and possession of the requisitioned floors was taken on August 30, 1949. The respondent moved against the order of requisition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, and obtained a temporary injunction restraining the State Government and its servants and agents from taking further steps under the order of requisition. That injunction was vacated on May 24, 1950. Shortly thereafter, on September 7, 1950, the flats were derequisitioned and possession of the flats was delivered back to the respondent. The respondent claimed compensation for the requisitioned floors for the period beginning from February 25, 1949 to September 7, 1950, calculated at the rate of Rs. 6,075/- per month and claimed another sum of Rs. 89,864/8/-by way of interest and damages. The State Government rejected the claim as made and only offered monthly compensation at the rate of Rs. 3,847/8/-for the period from August 30, 1949 to September 4, 1949 and from May 25, 1950 to September 7, 1950 (that is to say for a period of three months twenty days), which of course the respondent was not prepared to accept. Since there was no agreement either on the amount of compensation or for the period for which the same was payable, the State Government appointed an Arbitrator, in exercise of its powers under sec. 11 (1) (b) of the Act, for determination of the amount of compensation. The Arbitrator assessed the compensation at the rate of Rs. 6,075/-per month from August 30, 1949 to September 7, 1950 (that is to say for one year nine days ). Thus, in place of the total offer made by the State Government, namely, Rs. 14,107/8/-, the Arbitrator made an award of Rs. 74,722/8/-, that is to say, an excess sum of Rs. 60,615/ -. 6,075/-per month from August 30, 1949 to September 7, 1950 (that is to say for one year nine days ). Thus, in place of the total offer made by the State Government, namely, Rs. 14,107/8/-, the Arbitrator made an award of Rs. 74,722/8/-, that is to say, an excess sum of Rs. 60,615/ -. Aggrieved by the award, the State Government preferred an appeal to this Court and in the grounds of appeal disputed the correctness of the award both as regards the amount of monthly compensation and the period for which the same was awarded. Nevertheless, the appellant State Government did not value the appeal on the difference between the amount offered by itself and the sum awarded by the Arbitrator, namely, Rs. 60,615/-, but on the difference between the monthly compensation offered and the monthly compensation awarded, namely, a sum of Rs. 2,227/8/- only and paid advalorem court-fees thereon. 2. NOW under section 8 of the Court Fees Act, the amount of fee payable on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for acquisition of land for public purposes is to be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. If Section 8 applies the appeal should have been valued at Us. 60,615/- and advalorem court-fees should have been paid thereon. When the appeal came up for hearing, the question arose whether the memorandum of appeal was properly valued and proper court fees were thereon paid. Mr. N. C. Chakravarti, learned Government Pleader, took up the stand that requisition was not acquisition and that section 8 of the Court Fees Act had no application to an appeal against an order relating to compensation for requisition of premises. He went further and contended that if any provision of the Court Fees Act applied, clause (iv) of Article 17 in Schedule II of the Court Fees Act did and the memorandum of appeal need bear court fee stamp of Rs. 15/- only ; alternatively, he contended, in the absence of any specific provision in the Court Fees Act, the memorandum need be treated as an application and need bear court-fees stomp of the value of Rs. 2/- only. The first branch of the contention of Mr. Chakravarti is of no substance. 15/- only ; alternatively, he contended, in the absence of any specific provision in the Court Fees Act, the memorandum need be treated as an application and need bear court-fees stomp of the value of Rs. 2/- only. The first branch of the contention of Mr. Chakravarti is of no substance. Clause (iv) of Article 17 in Schedule II of the Court Fees Act applies to suits to set aside an award and as such to appeals there from. A proceeding before an Arbitrator for fixation of compensation is not a suit to set aside an award. Therefore clause (iv) of Article 17 has no application. The other branch of the argument is also unworthy of being upheld. The word 'requisition' when it came to be used in this country under the Defence of India Rules, during the last World War, meant demand for supply of anything for military purposes. In the absence of any specific provision in the legislative lists for requisition, legislation on requisition was at first justified as within the powers of the Legislature under the heading "public Order" (Vide the case of (1) Jashoprokash Mitter v. Deputy Commissioner of Police, 49 C. W. N. 607 ). Now, of course, the word has acquired a broader meaning and means taking of temporary possession of property for administrative purposes. The question for my consideration is whether the words "acquisition of land", as used in section 8. of the Court Fees Act, are wide enough to include requisition of premises. That it does is now covered by several decisions of this Court. In the first place, there is the decision of Lodge, J. in (2) Sohon Lal v. The Province of Bengal, (50 C. W. N. 820) in which his Lordship held that Section 8 of the Court Fees Act applied to an appeal against an award of an award of an Arbitrator under Section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939, allowing compensation for temporary requisition of land. An extract from the judgment of Lodge, J. is set out herein below : "Though the ordinary acquisition of land contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was the acquisition of all rights in the land, other forms of acquisition were provided for in Part VI of that Act. The phrase "acquisition of land" does not necessarily imply acquisition of all interests in the land. The phrase "acquisition of land" does not necessarily imply acquisition of all interests in the land. The phrase is equally applicable to the acquisition of a limited interest, e. g., an occupancy raiyat's interest in the land, or a tenure-holder's interest together with the right to khas possession. 3. THE mere fact that sec. 8 obviously contemplated the case of one lump sum being paid as compensation does not seem to me conclusive, on the question whether the term "acquisition" in the section includes temporary requisition. One can easily imagine cases in which Government for some reason needs to requisition land for a public purpose for a definite limited period, say for five years and the legislature might provide for such requisitioning and might further provide that title should remain in the original owner and one lump sum be paid as compensation for the requisitioning. In such a case, though a case of temporary acquisition, it would be difficult to argue that sec. 8 of the Court Fees Act did not apply. " 4. THE judgment of Lodge, J. was followed by a single Judge of this Court in (3) Satya Charan Sur v. State of West Bengal, (63 C. W. N. 325) in the case of an award by an Arbitrator under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. Lastly, in the case of (4) Chayarani v. Assistant Secretary, Land and Land Revenue Deptt. (68 C. W. N. 826 at p. 834) Bachawat, J. (Arun Kumar Mukherjee, J. agreeing with him) held that the word 'acquisition' would include also requisition of land for the use and occupation of the Government. In a different context the Supreme Court also read the word 'acquisition' in this broad sense (See for example the decision in (5) Paresh Chandra Chatterjee v. State of Assam, A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 167 ). There are some who weave their sophistry till their own reason gets entangled. That is what happened in this case. When the catena of authorities above referred to came up for discussion, Mr. Chakravarti felt that his argument that acquisition would not include requisition might prove to be a forlorn cry and that it would be difficult for him to avoid the effect of Section 8 of the Court Fees Act. That is what happened in this case. When the catena of authorities above referred to came up for discussion, Mr. Chakravarti felt that his argument that acquisition would not include requisition might prove to be a forlorn cry and that it would be difficult for him to avoid the effect of Section 8 of the Court Fees Act. He therefore prayed for an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal, on August 24, 1964, in order to consider his position. That prayer was granted. Thereafter, on August 27, 1964, he filed an application praying for leave to revalue the appeal by way of abundant caution. That application again he withdrew, on September 4, 1964, and invited a judgment on the point. In matters of concern there is no surer argument of a wavering mind than irresolution-that is to say to remain undetermined, even where the necessity is urgent. That is how the problem was ultimately sought to be tackled by the learned Government Pleader. 5. IN my opinion, there was no reason on the part of the legal advisers of the State Government not to take notice of the judgment of Lodge, J. in (2) 50 C. W. N. 820, delivered as far back as the year 1946. That case gave very substantial guidance as to how appeals from awards in cases of requisition should be valued. I am of the opinion that Section 8 of the Court Fees Act applies to the instant case and court fee must be paid on the difference between the amount offered by the appellant State Government and the amount awarded by the Arbitrator. I would therefore exercise my powers under sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Court Fees Act and direct that the appellant be allowed to re-value the memorandum of appeal and to put in the deficit court-fees within two months from today. In default, the scope of the appeal shall be limited to the figure as now appears in the valuation portion of the memorandum of appeal. The contesting respondent is entitled to cost of this hearing, which I would assess at five gold mohurs.