Judgment :- 1. The question for consideration is whether Ext. P-9 order passed by the Director of Public Instruction is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record and whether the 1st petitioner is entitled to maintain the appointment of the 2nd petitioner as the Headmistress of the school. It is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion of the facts which led up to Ext. P-9 order. Suffice it for me to say that in a previous writ petition filed in this Court, namely O.P. No. 1883 of 1962 this Court directed the Director of Public Instruction to consider the appeal petition filed by the 2nd respondent and to pass the appropriate order. 2. On the retirement of the permanent undergraduate headmaster of the school in question, the D.E.O. sanctioned by Ext. P-1 order the creation of a graduate headmaster's post. By Ext. P-2 order, the graduate headmaster's post was made permanent. The 2nd respondent was the seniormost teacher in the school. But he was not a graduate. Sri. George Koshi, a junior to the 2nd respondent was appointed as the headmaster on 1-4-1960. Against this the 2nd respondent filed an appeal to the District Educational Officer. The D.E.O. approved the appointment of George Koshi by Ext. P-3. Subsequently George Koshi resigned from the headmastership and the 2nd petitioner was appointed as Headmistress and she took charge on 10-8-1960. The 2nd respondent filed an appeal against this order before the A.E.O., Haripad. The Assistant Educational Officer rejected this appeal by Ext. P-4 order. The 2nd respondent filed an appeal to the D.E.O. against Ext. P-4 order. On 11-10-1960 the 2nd petitioner's appointment was approved by the Director of Public Instruction. This order, it seems was passed on the appeal petition filed by the 2nd respondent before the 1st respondent against Ext. P-3 order. It appears that 2nd respondent filed an appeal before the Government against the order approving the appointment of the 2nd petitioner and the Government passed their proceeding dated 5-4-1962. The 1st respondent thereafter called upon the 1st petitioner to submit his explanation. That was submitted (Ext. P-6), and the 1st respondent passed the order Ext. P-7. It was to quash that order that O.P. No. 1883 of 1962 was filed in this Court. The 1st respondent thereafter called upon the 1st petitioner to submit his explanation. That was submitted (Ext. P-6), and the 1st respondent passed the order Ext. P-7. It was to quash that order that O.P. No. 1883 of 1962 was filed in this Court. This Court, after considering the arguments of counsel appearing in the case, set aside the order and directed the Director of Public Instruction to consider the matter afresh and pass a fresh order. In pursuance to that direction the order evidenced by Ext. P-9 has been passed and it is the validity of this order that is being challenged. 3. The main submission made by counsel for the petitioner was that the post of headmaster was made a graduate's post and therefore the 2nd respondent could have not been promoted as headmaster. It was submitted that when the Department has sanctioned the creation of the post of graduate headmaster it was impossible for the manager to have promoted the 2nd respondent as he had not the necessary qualification for being so promoted and that the appointment of the 2nd petitioner as headmistress was therefore in order. It was further contended by counsel that the manager of a school like the one under consideration has the fundamental right to appoint any person as headmaster or headmistress provided he or she has got the requisite qualification as enjoined by the rules. 4. Exts. P-1 and P-2 orders would make it clear that only a graduate could have been appointed to the post of the headmaster as it was made a graduate's post, Exts. P-1 and P-2 have not been superseded by any subsequent order. The argument of Mr. T. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent that it was not necessary for the Government to have superseded Exts. P-1 and P-2 does not appeal to me to be correct. So long as those orders remained in force it was not open to the manager to have appointed any person other than a graduate as headmaster of the school. This court had directed the Director of Public Instruction to consider the question whether without superseding Exts. P-1 and P-2, it was open to the manager to have appointed any person other than a graduate to the post. Ext. P-9 does not really tackle this question. I think that so long as Exts. This court had directed the Director of Public Instruction to consider the question whether without superseding Exts. P-1 and P-2, it was open to the manager to have appointed any person other than a graduate to the post. Ext. P-9 does not really tackle this question. I think that so long as Exts. P-1 and P-2 stood, the management was in order in appointing the 2nd petitioner. 5. The second aspect of the question pointed out by counsel for the petitioners was that the management of a school conducted by a religious minority has got the fundamental right under Art.30(1) of the Constitution to appoint any person as the headmaster of the school if that person possesses the requisite qualifications. This question was considered by this Court in Rt. Rev. A.M. Patron v. Kesavan (1964 KLT. 791) and it was held that in the case of a school conducted by a religious minority, the management of the school has got the fundamental right to appoint any person as headmaster provided he has got the requisite qualification to hold the post. The Court observed: "The post of the headmaster is of pivotal importance in the file of a school. Around him wheels the tone and temper of the institution; on him depends the continuity of its traditions, the maintenance of discipline and the efficiency of its teaching. The right to choose the headmaster is perhaps the most important fact of the right to administer a school; and we must hold that the imposition of any trammel thereon - except to the extent of prescribing the requisite qualifications and experience - cannot but be considered as a violation of the right guaranteed by Art.30 (1) of the Constitution. To hold otherwise will be to make the right'a teasing illusion, a promise of unreality"' I can see no reason why the principle laid down in that ruling should not apply to the facts of this case. The allegation that the school is owned and conducted by a religious minority has not been specifically controverted in the affidavit of the 2nd respondent. I therefore assume for the purpose of this case that the school is conducted by a religious minority. The allegation that the school is owned and conducted by a religious minority has not been specifically controverted in the affidavit of the 2nd respondent. I therefore assume for the purpose of this case that the school is conducted by a religious minority. If that be so, I see no reason why I should not hold that the management of the school has got the fundamental right to appoint any person as headmaster of the school provided he has got the requisite qualifications prescribed by the Kerala Education Rules and the notifications thereunder. It is not stated that the 2nd petitioner has not the requisite qualifications to hold this post. It is said that R.45 of Chap.14A of the Kerala Education Rules has been violated by the appointment of the 2nd petitioner for the reason that under the rule a graduate teacher who has put in service equal to three-fourths of the period of senior-most teacher alone can be appointed in preference to a non-graduate senior teacher. R.45 reads: "When the post of Headmaster of a complete Upper Primary School is vacant or when an incomplete Upper Primary School is raised to a complete Upper Primary School, those who are qualified to be graduate teachers, if any, shall have preference over under graduate teachers for appointment as Headmaster, notwithstanding their relative seniority provided that the Graduate Teacher has put in a service equal to three-fourths of the period of service of the seniormost teacher." This rule is really an exception to R.44. R.44 says that appointment of headmaster in a school shall ordinarily be based on seniority & R.45 creates an exception to that in the case of a graduate teacher if he has put in three-fourths of the service of a non-graduate teacher. But if the manager has got the fundamental right to appoint any person as headmaster of the school provided that person has got the requisite qualifications, I do not think that R.45 would stand in the way of the manager appointing the 2nd petitioner as headmistress of the school. But if the manager has got the fundamental right to appoint any person as headmaster of the school provided that person has got the requisite qualifications, I do not think that R.45 would stand in the way of the manager appointing the 2nd petitioner as headmistress of the school. R.45 only lays down the circumstances under which a graduate teacher will be entitled to preference for appointment to the post of headmaster in a school, where there is a non-graduate teacher who is his senior, it has nothing to do with the qualification necessary for appointment to the post of headmaster as envisaged by the Full Bench. Therefore even assuming that Exts. P-1 and P-2 did not oblige the manager to appoint a graduate as headmaster, it was open to the management to have appointed the 2nd petitioner as headmistress on the basis of its fundamental right under Art.30(1) of the Constitution. It was submitted that R.44 of Chap.14A was not struck down by the Full Bench and therefore that rule is binding on the management. I think the rule was not struck down because the rule will still apply in the case of schools established and administered by persons other than those mentioned in Art.30 (1). As I understand the decision of the Full Bench, the educational institutions established and administered by minorities will not be bound by this rule. The Rule therefore has no application to the case of such educational institutions. 6. I therefore quash Ext. P-9 order and allow the writ petition. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.