JUDGMENT D.P. Uniyal, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal and arises out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 880/-. The case put forward by the plaintiff-appellant was that on the 16th July, 1951 an agreement was entered into between the parties where under the defendants agreed to execute a lease in respect of a nohra in favour of the appellant. The agreement provided that the nohra would be re-constructed by the respondents so as to make it suitable for installing a dal factory by the appellant. One of the terms of the agreement was that the appellant would pay a yearly rent of Rs. 1,200/- in advance to the respondents, out of which Rs. 500/- were paid on the date of the execution of the agreement Ex. 1, and the balance of Rs. 700/- was agreed to be paid by the appellant on or before the 10th of October, 1951, which was the date agreed upon for the completion of constructions by the respondent Cl. 5 of the agreement stated that the respondents shall put the appellant in possession of the nohra after completing the constructions, where after the lease in respect of the building would commence. It was clearly stipulated that in case the respondents failed to complete the constructions by the 10th October, 1951, they would be liable for the loss suffered by the appellant. 2. Clause 6 of the agreement provides that the annual rent of Rs. 1,200/. shall be paid in advance by the appellant to the respondents; out of which Rs. 500/- was admittedly paid on the date of the execution of the agreement and the balance of Rs, 700/- was to be paid on the date of the completion of the building, i.e. on or before the 10th October, 1951, Cl. 11 lays down that if the respondents failed to complete the constructions by the agreed date (10-10-1951) it will be open to the appellant if he so liked, to carry out the necessary constructions at his own expense. In that event the appellant will be entitled to deduct the money spent by him from the annual rental. 3. It is admitted that the appellant paid Rs. 500/- on the 16th July, 1951, the date on which the agreement in question was executed. The appellant also made further payment of Rs. In that event the appellant will be entitled to deduct the money spent by him from the annual rental. 3. It is admitted that the appellant paid Rs. 500/- on the 16th July, 1951, the date on which the agreement in question was executed. The appellant also made further payment of Rs. 380/- to the respondents before the agreed date of the completion of the building. According to him he did not pay the balance of Rs. 320/- because the respondents failed to abide by the terms of the contract and did not complete the constructions by the 10th October, 1951. He, therefore, brought the present suit for recovery of the advance paid by him to the respondents. 4. The respondents pleaded that there was no breach of contract on their part. According to them they had already incurred considerable expense in re-constructing the nohra but the appellant withheld payment of Rs. 400/- on account of which the work of further construction had to be discontinued and stopped. The case of the respondents was that the payment of Rs. 1,200/- by the appellant was a condition precedent to their contractual 'obligation to re-construct the nohra according to the terms of the contract. 5. The Munsif decreed the suit on the finding that according to the terms of the contract the respondents had an obligation to complete the re-construction of the nohra before payment of the balance of Rs. 700/- was made to them by the appellant. 6. The learned Civil Judge reversed the judgment of the Munsif and dismissed the suit. While observing that Cl. 5 of the agreement was in the nature of reciprocal promises, he inconsistently held that the payment of Rs. 1,200/- by the appellant was a condition precedent to the completion of constructions by the respondents. He held that the appellant by withholding payment of the balance of Rs. 400/- committed default and, as such, was not entitled to recover the money advanced by him to the respondents. 7. The decision of the controversy as to whether the appellant or the respondents was in default depends on the true construction of the agreement Ex. 1. Cls. 5 and 6 of the said agreement set out the terms and conditions which were to be performed by each party. Cl. 7. The decision of the controversy as to whether the appellant or the respondents was in default depends on the true construction of the agreement Ex. 1. Cls. 5 and 6 of the said agreement set out the terms and conditions which were to be performed by each party. Cl. 5 clearly states that the respondents (first party) shall complete the reconstruction of the nohra before the 10th October, 1951 and will handover the possession of the building to the appellant (second party). It further provides that the lease shall commence from the date on which delivery of possession is made to the appellant (second party). Provision is also made for payment of damages in case there is breach on the part of the respondents in completing the constructions on or before the 10th October, 1951. Cl. 6 goes on to say that out of Rs. 1,200/-, which was the annual rent agreed to be paid by the appellant to the respondents, Rs. 500/- had already been received by the respondents and the balance of Rs. 700/- shall be paid by the appellant on the date of the completion of the constructions, i.e., by 10-10-1951. 8. It seems to me clear from the terms of clauses 5 and 6 of the agreement aforesaid that the annual rent of the building to be re-constructed by the respondents was fixed at Rs. 1,200/-. This sum was to be paid by the appellant before the commencement of the lease of the building. Secondly, the constructions to be made by the respondents had to be completed on or before the 10th October, 1951 and possession of the building was to be delivered to the appellant by that date. It was clearly stipulated that the balance of Rs. 700/- due from the appellant was to be paid to the respondents on the of all constructions, i.e., by the 10th October, 1951. Admittedly, the respondents failed to complete the constructions by the 10th October, 1951. The liability of the appellant to pay the balance of Rs, 400/- arose on the date of the completion of the constructions, and not before it. Thus though the terms of Cls. 5 appear in many respects to be reciprocal in character, on a fair reading of Cls. 5 and 6 the intention of the parties appears to have been that the balance of Rs. Thus though the terms of Cls. 5 appear in many respects to be reciprocal in character, on a fair reading of Cls. 5 and 6 the intention of the parties appears to have been that the balance of Rs. 700/- would be paid by the appellant on the completion of constructions by the respondents. In other words, the completion of the building by the respondents was a condition precedent to the payment of the balance of Rs. 700/- by the appellant. This appears to be evident from the fact that according to the terms of the agreement the respondents were charged with the obligation of delivering possession of the building to the appellant after it had been suitably re-constructed. The commencement of the lease was therefore postponed till the completion of construction by the respondent. These two circumstances, in my opinion, fully establish that the payment of Rs, 400/- by the appellant was not a condition precedent to the fulfilment of their part of the contract by the respondents. 9. The contention of the respondents was that they had already spent over Rs. 2,000/- on the reconstruction of the building and as the appellant had not paid the balance before the 10th October, 1951 they were under no obligation to deliver possession of the building to him. On behalf of the respondents strong reliance was placed on the terms of Cl. 11 of the agreement which provides that if the respondents fail to complete the constructions within the time fixed in the contract it will be open to the appellant to make the necessary constructions and deduct the amount so spent out of the annual rent of the building. In my opinion, this clause did not absolve the respondents from their obligation to complete the constructions by the 10th October 1951. The terms of clause 11 gave option to the. appellant to reconstruct the building if he so liked. It was not in the nature of an obligation imposed on him, but a right given to him which he was free to exercise at his choice. No help could, therefore, be derived by the respondents from Cl. 11. 10. Section 52 of the Contract Act contemplates a situation in which reciprocal promises are to be performed. It was not in the nature of an obligation imposed on him, but a right given to him which he was free to exercise at his choice. No help could, therefore, be derived by the respondents from Cl. 11. 10. Section 52 of the Contract Act contemplates a situation in which reciprocal promises are to be performed. It says that where the order in which reciprocal promises are to be performed is expressly fixed by the contract, they shall be performed in that order, and where the order is not expressly fixed by the contract they shall be performed in that order in which the nature of the transaction requires. Illustration (a) of Section 52 points out that where there is a contract to complete a house at a fixed price, the promissory must carry out his part of the con tract before the promisee is asked to pay for it. In the present case the essence of the contract was reconstruction of the building by the 10th October, 1951 and the payment of the balance of Rs. 400/was to be made on the completion of constructions. Thus the completion of reconstruction of the building was to come first in point of time and it was only when all the constructions were complete that the obligation of the appellant to make the payment could arise. 11. In Re. Sandwell Park Collier Company Field v. The Company, 1929 (1 Ch.) 277. the court was called upon to consider whether breach had been committed by the vendor in performing his part of the contract in that case the contract was for sale of certain property subject to the approval of the court. No time was, however, fixed for obtaining such approval. The evidence disclosed that the purchasers had offered to pay the money but in spite of their readiness to perform their part of the contract the vendor did not take any steps to obtain the necessary permission. Maugham, J. held that in the circumstances of the case a reasonable time could not be later than the date fixed for completion of the sale. The learned Judge observed. Maugham, J. held that in the circumstances of the case a reasonable time could not be later than the date fixed for completion of the sale. The learned Judge observed. "This is not based upon the view that the date for completion was in equity of the essence of the contract, a matter with regard to which I do not think it necessary to express an opinion, although it seems to be clear that the intention of the purchasers was to acquire the property for purposes which might be thought to involve expedition." It was, therefore, held that the delay in obtaining the approval of the court, apart from the definite repudiation of the purchasers, entitled the purchasers to object to specific performance of such a contract. In conclusion the Court said, "That the consequence is that the purchasers have their legal rights as regards the deposit, and these are, to treat the contract as at an end, and, to recover the deposit paid, together with all interest earned by such deposit since it was paid to the vendor." 12. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that breach of the contract was committed by the respondents when they failed to complete the constructions by the 10th October, 1951. Since they were not in a position to deliver the property to the appellant in accordance with the agreement they could not insist on the performance of the contract which was at an end. The appellant had therefore a right to recover from the respondents the money paid by him to the latter towards the annual rent as the respondents were themselves responsible for the breach of the contract. 13. I accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the court of first instance and decree the plaintiff's suit with costs.