Order.- I may very briefly refer to the undisputed facts first. These are two orders of eviction passed by the Registrar of the Court of Small Causes at Madras, in proceedings before him for summary eviction under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. The orders are very cryptic, and are merely to the effect that both parties were heard in person. This is followed by a direction for delivery by the specified date. Presumably, the order is under section 43 of the Act, and the Court was satisfied that the respondent was entitled to apply under section 41, and to obtain orders of eviction in both instances. Learned Counsel for revision petitioners has submitted an argument, with which I do not agree, that section 9 of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act will place an embargo on a judgment of this kind, being pronounced within the time specified under that section. Though the City Tenants’ Protection Act does refer to the sections relating to summary eviction under the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, there is no provision of law in either Act that such eviction cannot be ordered, because the person sought to be evicted (tenant) may apply for his right of purchase of the site for value under section 9; on the contrary, the normal interpretation would be that the two procedures are independent of each other. However that might be, the facts remain that the revision petitioners (defendants) resisted the eviction sought for upon certain pleas, which I am deliberately refraining from analysing at the present stage. It seems clear from the record that, after these written statements were filed, learned Counsel for the parties were absent on the date of hearing, and the parties alone were present ; the Court appears to have heard the parties alone, and then to have passed the order, which is the subject-matter of the revisions. Admittedly, the procedure is a summary one, and no elaborate judgment of Court need be expected in such a matter. Even so, I am quite unable to accept the actual orders, as legally adequate or conforming to the principles of natural justice. When the evictions sought for were resisted on grounds appearing in the written statements, orders of Court, however summary they may be, will have to be passed only upon consideration of those grounds. Even so, I am quite unable to accept the actual orders, as legally adequate or conforming to the principles of natural justice. When the evictions sought for were resisted on grounds appearing in the written statements, orders of Court, however summary they may be, will have to be passed only upon consideration of those grounds. Certainly, the Court is free to reject them as unsubstantial ; but the interests of justice require that, however brief the order or judgment might be, it should be an indication of the application of the judicial mind to the facts of the instant case before Court, or to its merits. The observations of Jagadisan, J., in Acharya v. Halima Meeran1are in point here, though that ruling related to a judgment in a New Trial Application. The learned Judge observed: “ The New Trial Court must say in its judgment what is the question of law raised before it, and then give its opinion either that it is not a question of law or if it is a question of law, it is not well founded.” In my view so long as there is an order that can be the subject of the exercise of the revisional power of this Court, and it is made by a subordinate Court or Tribunal, and further it is not an order ex parte, but one on the merits, it must bea on the face of it evidence of the application of the judicial mind to the merits. The Court cannot merely rest upon its subjective satisfaction, and give the decision alone, without any reference to the grounds for that decision. Accordingly, I allow the two revisions, set aside the orders of the Court, and" remand the applications for ejectment for disposal by the Court, in the light of the observations now made. There will be no order as to costs. R.M. ------------- Revisions allowed.