JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is an appeal by Waqf Alu-Allah kayam karda Ahmad Ullah Khan Saheb against the order of the First Civil Judge of Meerut allowing the appeal of Balak Singh, respondent, and thereby setting aside the order dated 8-8-1958 of the Assistant Collector First Class along with all the proceedings under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act and remanding the case to the executing court with the direction to readmit it at its original number and to take further proceedings in accordance with law. 2. The learned advocate for the respondent has raised an objection to the maintainability of the First Appeal From Order on the ground that as a result of the demarcation of land under Section 5 of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 he (respondent) has become a sirdar and on deposit of ten times the rent bhumidhar of the plots in dispute, and that by virtue of the provisions of this Act he was not liable to ejectment except in accordance with the provisions of this Act and, consequently; he was not liable to ejectment under Sec, 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. It is, on the other hand, coil tended by the learned advocate for the appellant that the respondent had been dispossessed from the lane] long before the demarcation of the land and it was by virtue of an illegal order without jurisdiction of the lower appellate court that he managed to secure possession and, consequently, he could neither acquire the status of a sirdar, nor of a bhumidhar, and the present proceeding under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act could continue. It will, therefore, be proper to first of all consider whether the order dated 8.8-1958 of the Assistant Collector First Class was appealable and, if not, can the restitution of possession r confer any right on the respondent ? 3. An application under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act for an order of ejectment is made to the court which passed the decree, though such an application can be made only when the decree for arrears of rent against an exproprietary, an occupancy or hereditary tenant has not been completely satisfied within one year from the date of such decree by any mode of execution other than sale of the holdings. The application under Section 168 can thus be made after steps for the execution of the decree for arrears of rent have been taken and the decree is not completely satisfied within one year from the date of such decree. But the application under Section 168 is made to the court which passed the decree and not to the court before whom the execution proceeding was or is pending or the court competent to entertain the execution proceeding. It is a proceeding taken before the executing court which can be treated as an execution proceeding. But if action has to be taken by the court which passed the decree, it is for all purposes an action taken prior to the execution of the decree. On account of the words "the court which passed the decree" used in Section 168(.1) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, no other inference can be drawn except that the application under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act is not in execution of the decree for arrears of rent already passed, but is a step for the amendment of the decree for arrears of rent to cancel the Pertinent of the judgment debtor. The application under Section 168 is thus in the main suit and not in execution. 4. To get over this difficulty, the learned counsel for the respondent invited my attention to the marginal note of Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, Rule 76 of the Rules framed under the U. P. Tenancy Act and also Form K incorporated in the rules. Reliance was also placed upon certain observations made in Raja Suryapal Singh v. Wahid Ali, A.I.R. 1945 Alld 238. The marginal note of Section 168 is "ejectment of certain tenants in execution of a decree for arrears." Pule 76 makes a provision for the issue of a notice as contemplated by Section 168 and in Form K it is mentioned as if the notice is issued by the executing court: 5. The rule making power of the State Government is contained in Section 292 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. This section makes it clear that the State Government can make rules, after previous publication, consistent with the Act and not inconsistent therewith. The rule making power of the State Government is contained in Section 292 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. This section makes it clear that the State Government can make rules, after previous publication, consistent with the Act and not inconsistent therewith. Consequently, if Rule 76 and Form K are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of Section 168, the rule and also the Form shall be invalid and can be disregarded in determining whether an application under Section 168 is or is not a step in execution of the decree for arrears of rent. 6. The marginal note cannot over. ride the provisions of the enactment, though it can be taken into consideration where the enactment is ambiguous and is capable of more than one interpretation. This naturally necessitates the consideration of Section 168. A reference has already been made to the material part of Section 168. The marginal note can thus be useful only if the words "which passed the decree" used in Section 168 (1) of the U. P. Tenancy Act are held to be superfluous and are omitted. It is a settled rule of interpretation of statutes that the courts of law cannot omit - words used in an enactment unless without such a course the provision cannot be given a proper meaning. In all such cases the words are omitted to give effect to the intention of the Legislature. But where the enactment is capable of a proper inter. predation by giving effect to all the words and the enactment as drafted clearly gives out the intention of the Legislature, the courts of lave cannot be justified in omitting words of importance. I do not find any ambiguity in Section 168. An application has to be made to same court and the Legislature can lay down to which court the application shall be made. Consequently, where the Legislature lays down the forum, that part of the enactment cannot be omitted even though the marginal note has been defectively drafted. 7. At this place it may also be observed that sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act speak of an order of ejectment while sub-Sec. (5) of the execution of such an order. Ordinarily, a decree or an order is passed before it can be put into execution. 7. At this place it may also be observed that sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act speak of an order of ejectment while sub-Sec. (5) of the execution of such an order. Ordinarily, a decree or an order is passed before it can be put into execution. The two proceedings are distinct and the Legislature apparently made a similar provision in Section 168. It was first of all indicated in what circumstances all order of ejectment can be passed, and thereafter a provision was made in sub-Sec. (5) for the execution of the order of ejectment and in case of deposit of the decretal amount thin one month of the delivery of possession for restoration of possession to the dispossessed person. On reading Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, as a whole no other opinion can be formed except that an order of ejectment is passed by the court which passed the decree, i.e. by the trial and not by the executing court and after the passing of the order of ejectment, further action is taken by the executing court to secure the compliance of the order of ejectment of the defaulter judgment debtor. 8. In Raja Suryapal Singh v. Wahid Ali none of the parties had raised the question, whether the application under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act lay before the executing court or before the court of first ins. tance i.e. the Court which had passed the decree for arrears of rent Even if we assumed that Raja Surya pal Singh v. Wahid Ali' is a case laying down that the court entertaining the application under Section 16F functions as the executing court, this decision stands overruled by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Firm Nandram Chhotey Lal v. Raja Kishori Ram Singh, 1956 A.L.J. 704 The Division Bench case arose out of a proceeding for the reduction of debt under Section 4 of the U. P. Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act and the copse quential reduction of the decree passed by the Special Judge under the provisions of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934; and it was held that no appeal lay against the order passed under Section 4 of the U. P. Zamindar's' Debt Reduction Act reducing the amount of the decree. An application for the reduction of debt under Section 4 could be made to the court which passed the decree, and by virtue of Section 7 the decree to the extent of the reduction so effect ed stood duly satisfied. The decree already passed was not amended as a result of the reduction of debt though the decree already passed to the extent of the reduction stood satisfied. When there was no amendment of the decree, the order under Section 4 could not be appealable as an amended decree. The order could be appealed against as a decree if it could be deemed to be an order tinder Section 47, C. P. C., i.e. an order relating to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree, passed in execution, and in such a case, by the executing court. The effect of Section 47, Civil Procedure Code was not considered in Firm Nandram Chhotey Lal v. Raja Kishori Ram Singh, 1956 A.L.J. 704; but in view of the wording of Sections 1 and 7 of the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act the order under Section 4 could not come within the purview of Section 47, Civil Procedure Code and hence was I not appealable as such. The finding recorded in the above case, namely, that the order under Section 4 was not subject to an appeal but a revision lay against it, can therefore, be utilised in holding that such an order is not passed in execution by the executing court. 9. Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act has been worded in the same manner as Section 4 of the U. P. Zainindars' Debt Reduction Act and the law laid down in Firm Nandram Chhotey Lal v. Raja kishori Ram Singh can be made applicable to the instant case and the observations to the contrary made in Raja Suryapal Singh v. Wahid Ali' cannot be taken to lay down the correct law. In other words, the proceeding initiated on the application under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act is not a proceeding under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code and any order passed in such a proceeding is not appealable as a decree. 10. In other words, the proceeding initiated on the application under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act is not a proceeding under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code and any order passed in such a proceeding is not appealable as a decree. 10. Section 263 of the U. P. Tenancy Act makes it clear that no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any court under this Act except as provided in this Act. In the absence of a provision the order passed shall be regarded as non-appealable. Sections 270 and 211 of the U. P. Tenancy Act govern appeals from orders of Assistant Collector First Class, and they do not cover an appeal from an order passed on an application under Section 168 of the U. P, Tenancy Act. In other words, such an order is not appealable and only a revision can lie against it. 11. The Assistant Collector has, as pointed out by the District Judge, passed confusing orders not strictly in accordance with the law. On May, 2, 1958, he passed an order for the issue of a warrant of possession, meaning thereby for the ejectment of the respondent. The warrant executed and the respondent dispossessed on May 27, 1958. On May 30, 1958, the respondent moved an application for reconsideration and, for setting aside the various orders passed as many irregularities had been committed. The application was partly allowed on July 12, 1958. The Assistant Collector realised that the provisions of the law had not been complied with. He, however, directed the respondent to pay the decretal amount by August 8, 19,58. ',''heir the amount was not paid by that date, the Assistant Collector confirmed his earlier orders. It was this order of confirmation of the earlier orders which was challenged in appeal before the District Judge. 12. There is no provision in the U. P. Tenancy Act for passing an order of confirmation of earlier orders. However, the courts of law should go into the substance of the order in determining under which provision the order was passed and whether the order is or is not appealable. The effect of the confirmation of the earlier orders was that there came into effect an order of ejectment coupled with the execution of that order. However, the courts of law should go into the substance of the order in determining under which provision the order was passed and whether the order is or is not appealable. The effect of the confirmation of the earlier orders was that there came into effect an order of ejectment coupled with the execution of that order. The respondent having already been dispossessed, no further steps for the execution of the order of ejectment were necessary. In substance, therefore, the order dated 8-8-1958 was an order under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act ordering ejectment of Balak Singh, respondent. The other part of the order regarding the execution of the order of ejectment can be kept out of consideration as such an order would fall only if the order of ejectment could be set aside by the lower appellate court. The order dated 8-8-1958 would thus be appealable only if an order of ejectment under Section 166 of the U. P. Tenancy Act can be challenged in appeal. .Is already mentioned above, the order of ejectment under Sec, 168 is not appealable and, consequently, the appeal preferred before the District Judge, which was eventually decided by the Additional Civil Judge was not maintainable, and the order under appeal in. this F. A F. O. is without jurisdiction. 13. The respondent had been ejected from the plots in dispute on May 27, 1958, and possession was restored to him after the decision of the appeal in a proceeding under Section 144, Civil Procedure Code The order dated 8-8-1956 was not appealable and the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to allow the appeal. The appeal was liable to dismissal on the ground of non-main attainability. In other words, the respondent get possession of the land under the order of the lower appellate court even though such an order was without jurisdiction and hence a nullity. 14. The other question for consideration is whether after the application of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956. to the land in dispute the proceeding under Section 168 of the 1 T. P. Tenancy Act can continue. The U. P. Tenancy Act stood repealed in its application to the Urban Areas with effect from the date of vesting, vide Section 84 of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. to the land in dispute the proceeding under Section 168 of the 1 T. P. Tenancy Act can continue. The U. P. Tenancy Act stood repealed in its application to the Urban Areas with effect from the date of vesting, vide Section 84 of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. I am informed that the date of vesting is July 1, 1963. By virtue of the U. P. General Clauses Act a proceeding already taken can in spite. of the repeal of the enactment, be continued unless the intention of the Legislature appears to be contrary and in such a case the repealing clause is to be given a retrospective effect even to proceedings already pending. In case it is found that the respondent has acquired the status of a sirdar or of a bhumidhar and he is not liable to ejectment except under and in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, read with the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, the present proceeding under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act shall become in fructuous and cannot be continued See Chet Narain Singh v. Jangadi Singh, 1961 A.L.J. 877 and Bholanath Rai v. Ram Brikh Rai, C.R. No. 1322 of 1963 decided on 21.12.1964. The provisions of chapters S and 10 of the U. P, Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, apply to agricultural areas acquired under the U. P. Urban Areas Zainindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956. When the proceedings before the lower appellate court were without jurisdiction the acquisition of possession in pursuance of the order of that court shall not confer any right to the respondent and by virtue of the restitution of possession he shall not acquire the status of a sirdar. However, he would be a per son in possession of the land under orders of the court, though not having any valid title. Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act alone makes a provision for the institution of a suit for the ejectment of a person taking or retaining possession of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force. Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act alone makes a provision for the institution of a suit for the ejectment of a person taking or retaining possession of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force. Section 210 thereof lays down that if a suit is not brought under Section 209 within the prescribed period of limitation the person taking or retaining possession shall become sirdar thereof. With the other provisions of Sec 210 we are not concerned. The words "Law for the time being in force" used in Section 209 are general and cover not only the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act but also any law for the time being in force. Consequently, a person occupying the land in pursuance of an order of the court cannot be deemed to be a person retaining possession of the land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force. 'Fill the disposal of the present F. A. F. O, the respondent could not be dispossessed from the land and on this ground no suit under Section 209 could be instituted. When no suit under Section 209 could be brought, the respondent could not acquire the status of a sirdar under Section 210. 15. When the respondent has not acquired the status of a sirdar, Section 200 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act shall be no bar to the continuance of the proceeding under Sec, 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. In other words, in spite of the enforcement of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956, the proceeding under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act could be continued with the result that this Court can entertain the present F. A. F. O. and pass suitable order. Naturally, it shall be open to the respondent to seek such other remedy as he can under the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act. 16. To avoid unnecessary argument is subsequent litigation, if any it is made clear that observations with regard to the non-acquisition of sirdari right have been made oil the assumption that the order of the Assistant Collector passed in the proceeding under Section 168 still stands. 16. To avoid unnecessary argument is subsequent litigation, if any it is made clear that observations with regard to the non-acquisition of sirdari right have been made oil the assumption that the order of the Assistant Collector passed in the proceeding under Section 168 still stands. These observations shall not be binding on the parties, in case the order is later set aside or modified. 17. To sum up, the order dated 8.8.1958 of the Assistant Collector passed in the proceeding under Section 168 of the U. P. Tenancy Act was not appealable and the lower appellate court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and to set aside that order. In the conditions in existence at present, this Court can entertain the F A. F. 0. and set aside the order of remand and after setting aside the order of remand further direct that the appeal preferred before the lower court was not maintainable and shall stand rejected. 18. The F. A. F. O. is hereby allowed and the order under appeal is set aside. It is further ordered that the appeal preferred against the order dated August 8, 1958, was not maintainable and it shall stand rejected, though it shall be open to the parties to seek such other remedies as they may be advised. Costs of this Court and also of the lower appellate court shall be on -the parties.