P. D. Sharma ( 1 ) THIS judgment will dispose of two execution first appeals Nos. 132-D and 133-D of 1961, the. former filed by Behari Lal and Shrimati Venjhar Bai and the latter by Sat Ram Dass. Ladha. Ram Raghu Mal obtained an ex-parte decree for Rs. 1. 23. 572/4. 00 with future interset on 10/07/1953, under Section 13 ofthe Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act (hereinafter REFERRED TO to asthe Act) against Hakumat Mal and Sat Ram Dass. This decree wasgranted to him by the Tribunal functioning at Delhi. The two judgment-debtors on 4/08/1953, applied for setting aside of the above ex-parte decree. During the pendency of these proceedings, Hakumat Mal died. The names of his two sons Behari Lal and Radha Ram and widow Shrimati Venjhar Bai were brought on the record as his legal representatives. The Tribunal by his order dated 5/06/1958, set aside the decree onpayment of Rs. 250. 00 as costs and furnishing of a security for the amountof Rs. . l,00,000. 00. Behari Lal paid the costs and also offered the securitywhich was not considered adequate by the Tribunal. Behari Lal and Satram Dass filed two appeals in the High Court against the order of thetribunal dated 5/06/1958, on the ground that the order requringthem to furnish the security was contrary to law. Both these appealswere dismissed on 9/03/1961. In the result, the ex-parte decreestood in fact. The decree-holder obtained transfer certificate for execution of the decree from the Tribunal in the civil Court at Pakur, districtdumka (State of Bihar ). There upon two objection petitions were filedunder section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one by Sat Ram Dassand the other by Behari Lal and Shrimati Venjhar Bai in the Court ofshri Dev Raj Khanna, Subordinate Judge First Class, Delhi, alleging thatthe ex-parte decree was invalid as it was passed by the Tribunal withoutjurisdiction. The other grounds urged by them in support of their prayerwere that the amount sued for was not a debt as this term was defined inthe Act and that according to the decree-holder s own allegations part ofthe debt in dispute was incurred by the judgment-debtors after the partition of the country. Hence, one application for the recovery of debtsincurred before and after the partition of the country was not competentand since the whole claim was indivisible the application was manifestlybad in law. Hence, one application for the recovery of debtsincurred before and after the partition of the country was not competentand since the whole claim was indivisible the application was manifestlybad in law. The objectors further averred that they were also displacedpersons in as much as they owned properties in West Pakistan and that being so, the application could not have been entertained under section 13 of the Act by the Tribunal at Delhi as the judgment-debtors wereactually and voluntarily residing at Pakur and were also carrying on business there during the crucial period. According to them the applicationcould have been made if at all under section 10 of the Act not at Delhibut before the Tribunal in the State of Bihar. According to them theapplication was not filed within the period prescribed by law and the Tribunal was not competent to award future interest. It was also urgedthat Sat Ram Dass had no authority to execute Hundis to bind Hakumatmal and that the Tribunal failed to take notice of this fact. They finallypleaded that the objections raised by them against the execution of thedecree related to the in herent jurisdiction of the Tribunal which passedthe decree and hence could be x entertained at this state. The decree-hol-der controverted the above contentions. ( 2 ) THE Tribunal in both the objection petitions framed issues in the following terms :- (1) Whether the decree against the judgment-debtors is a nullity for any of the reasons mentioned in paragraphs 9 of the objection petition ? (2) Whether the objection petition is maintainable undersection47, Civil Procedure Code ?he after giving careful consideration to the arguments advanced atthe bar observed that under section 13 of the Act the decree-holder couldfile his petition even if the judgment-debtors were displaced persons ornot and that under section 2 (6) (e) of the Act the application could havebeen made for recovery of the debt incurred by the judgment-debtors before the commencement of the Act which came into force on 10/12/1951. He also observed that the judgment-debtors objection thatthe Tribunal at Delhi had no jurisdiction to entertain the applicationcould not be entertained at this stage because he had exercised jurisdiction on the basis of the recitals made in the petition to the effect thatthe judgment-debtors were not displaced persons as they were carrying onbusiness at Pakru (India) long before the partition of the country and as such the petition could be entertained by the Tribunal at Delhi. Hewent on to remark that the questions, whether the judgment-debtors weredisplaced persons or not, and whether the debt in question was due fromthe judgment-debtors or not, could only be decided by the Tribunal atthe trial stage of the petition and not after the passing of the decree. . He thus repelled all the objections raised by the judgment-debtors againstthe validity of the ex-parte decree which was sought to be executed againstthem by the decree-holder. He further held that the two objectionpetition under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed in thecourt of the Subordinate Judge First Class, Delhi, and not before thetribunal under the Act and on this score also those were liable to bedismissed. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the judgment-debtor-appellants in thecourse of his arguments mainly stressed on the point that the petitionunder section 13 of the Act was lodged after the expiry of the period oflimitation prescribed by law. He conceded that such a petition couldhave been lodged within one year from the date the Act came into force,i. e. , 10/12/1951. It is clear from the petition that it was filedin the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, with powers oftribunal under the Act, on 8/12/1952, who transferred it toshri B. L. Aggarwal for disposal according to law. The petitioner wasdirected to appear before him on 17/12/1952. Hence, the petition was filed in time. If for arguments sake it be conceded that thepetition under section 13 of the Act when filed was barred by time theneven the decree could not be treated as a nullity. In this connection reference may be made to the case, Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey. The othergrounds which the judgment-debtor-appellants had adopted in their objection petitions to show that the decree was a nullity were repelled by thetribunal for adequate reasons. In this connection reference may be made to the case, Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey. The othergrounds which the judgment-debtor-appellants had adopted in their objection petitions to show that the decree was a nullity were repelled by thetribunal for adequate reasons. The learned counsel for the appellantsdid not make any effort to rebut any one of these reasons and indeed thesame were irrebutable. ( 4 ) IN the result, both the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.