J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE State of Gujarat has filed this Revision Application against the orders passed by the Sessions Judge Banaskantha at Palanpur on 11th March 1965 whereby the learned Sessions Judge released the opponent Govindlal Manilal Shah of Deesa on bail in anticipation of his arrest. The opponent Govindlal had preferred an application being Misc. Application No. 5/65 before the learned Sessions Judge Banaskantha at Palanpur for releasing him on bail on the ground that one Popatlal Tokarshi had given a complaint against him to the police for the offence punishable under sec. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and as after completing the investigation the police authorities had obtained sanction of the Government to prosecute him for the said offence. He had therefore preferred an application for releasing him on bail in anticipation of his arrest. The learned Sessions Judge held that in view of the amendment made in sec. 497 by adding the words suspected of commission of the powers to release on bail had been enlarged and such anticipatory bail could be legally granted. Accordingly the learned Sessions Judge had released the opponent Govindlal Manilal Shah on bail on his executing a bond for Rs. 1000/and on furnishing one solvent surety for the like amount in anticipation of any warrant that may be issued against him. ( 2 ) THE State has challenged the said order in the present revision petition. ( 3 ) AT the hearing as nobody appeared for the opponent I had requested Advocate Mr. D. C. Trivedi to appear as amicus curiae and I am very much beholden to him for his valuable assistance rendered in this case. ( 4 ) ON the question whether a person could be released on bail in anticipation of his arrest there appears to be some conflict of authorities but the preponderance of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that no such anticipatory bail could be granted. It is implicit in the very definition of the word bail that the person must be under some sort of restraint and the order of releasing a person on bail would set free a person who was under arrest detention or under some kind of restraint by taking security for his appearance. The powers to grant such bail are mentioned in Chapter 39 and sec. The powers to grant such bail are mentioned in Chapter 39 and sec. 426 of the Code and it is well settled that these provisions are exhaustive of the powers of bail and the Court would have no power except which is specifically provided therein. The power of such anticipatory bail is not one that is expressly mentioned in any of these provisions. ( 5 ) BOTH in secs. 496 and 497 the provision is made for release on bail for a person who is arrested or detained without a warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court. The controversy mainly centres round the expression appears and construction is sought to be put on that expression that it would include even a voluntary appearance of a person who is accused or suspected of an offence as by such appearance he must be deemed to have surrendered to the custody of the Court. This term will have to be interpreted in the context of a bail provision where some restraint is implicit in the very concept of bail. A person who is a free person and who is at liberty to go wherever he likes cannot ask for bail. Such a construction would therefore be anamolous in the context of bail The expression `must take colour from the other words with which it is associated especially when it is used in the context of a bail and when throughout the Code the expression appears or is brought before the Court in secs. 204 242 251 252 etc has been used in the sense of a person who is accused of an offence and who is brought before the Court by a police officer or who voluntarily surrenders himself in pursuance to or because of some warrant of arrest issued against him. Here appearance of a person by itself before a Court is therefore not sufficient. There must be accusation or at least suspicion against him on credible information of his having been involved in an offence and further the person must either be in legal custody or a warrant must have been issued against him. Much emphasis was laid on the fact that in sec. There must be accusation or at least suspicion against him on credible information of his having been involved in an offence and further the person must either be in legal custody or a warrant must have been issued against him. Much emphasis was laid on the fact that in sec. 497 (1) after the words accused of the words was suspected of the commission of the offence had been and by the amendment by Act 26 of 1955. That amendment would not make any difference because in the context of bail a person must be under some restraint and it would not be sufficient that there is only accusation or suspicion of the commission of the offence against him. Similarly the latter part of sec. 498 (1) which confers power on the High Court or the Court of Session to direct that any person be admitted to bail in any case whether there may be an appeal on conviction or not also would not confer power on the said Court to enlarge a person on bail against whom there was no restraint whatsoever. ( 6 ) THE earliest authority on this point is of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Hidayat Ullah v. The Crown A. I. R. 1949 Lah. 77 where Cornelius J. (as he then was) relied upon the provision of sec. 498 (1) as giving wide power to the High Court to enlarge any person on bail who was suspected of an offence for which he might be arrested by a police officer or Court and that power would have to be only cautiously exercised. In that case Cornelius J. had observed at page 80 that mere appearance before a Court was not sufficient; for the least that was necessary for the exercise of the power of depriving the subject of his liberty was that the latter should either have committed a crime which involved that result or that there should be a reasonable suspicion or reliable information against him that he had done any such act. The entire decision proceeds upon assumption of the wide amplitude of the expression used in sec. 498 (1) that the High Court could direct any person be admitted to bail. The entire decision proceeds upon assumption of the wide amplitude of the expression used in sec. 498 (1) that the High Court could direct any person be admitted to bail. This decision would be clearly inconsistent with the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Jairam Das v. King Emperor A. I. R. 1945 P. C. 94 where such a wide meaning was not given to the expression any person. This decision was therefore disapproved in the decision of the Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court in Amar Chand v. Crown A. I. R. 1950 East Punjab 53 on the ground that this decision was in conflict with the decision of the Privy Council. In that decision Kapur J. at page 64 aptly remarked that a person who was not already under some kind of restraint could not be put under restraint by being enlarged on bail and that the Code contained no such provision whereby what was termed as anticipatory bail could be given. In Muzafaruddin v. State of Hyderabad A. I. R. 1953 Hyd 219 Jaganmohan Reddy J. speaking for the Full Bench held that a person accused of any non-bailable offence could not apply for bail unless he was liable to be arrested in execution of a warrant of arrest issued or was ordered to be arrested relying on the concept of bail which was ordinarily understood to mean to set free a person who was under arrest detention or was under some kind of restraint by taking security for his appearance. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court consisting of Chandra Reddy C. J. Jaganmohan Reddy and Kumanayer J. in Public Prosecutor v. Manikya Rao A. I. R. 1959 A. P. 639 also took the same view relying on the concept of bail and held that the High Court or the Sessions Court had no power to grant bail to a person who was not arrested on any charge of a non-bailable offence or for whose appearance a warrant had not been issued but who merely apprehended that he might be arrested and had appeared in the Court. All these decisions have been exhaustively considered finally by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court consisting of Dixit C. J. and Pandey J. in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narayan Prassad Jaiswal A. I. R. 1963 Madhya Pradesh 276. In that case at page 281 it was held that the view take by Khan J. in Abdul Karim Khans case A. I. R. 1960 Madh. Pr. 54 on the basis of 1955 amendment in allowing anticipatory bail was overruled by holding that the said view gave no effect to the meaning of the word bail and to the fact that the word `appears took its colour from the provisions in which it had been used and which dealt with the release of a person on bail that is to say the release of a person from actual or threatened custody under an order of arrest issued against him. It was therefore held that under secs. 496 497 and 498 of the Code bail could not be granted to a person who had not yet been arrested for an actual charge of any offence or even on suspicion of his complicity in any offence and who was not required to surrender to any custody under any order of arrest but who apprehended that he would be arrested as person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence. It seems that the same view has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Juhar Mal v. The State A. I. R. 1954 Raj. 279 and by the Calcutta High Court in Amjad v. State A. I. R. 1955 Cal. 141. The only contrary decision was to be found as I earlier mentioned was of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Hidayat Ullah v. The Crown A. I. R. 1949 Lah. 77 which clearly proceeded on an erroneous interpretation of the wider powers of bail under sec. 498 (1) and which view was clearly in conflict with the decision of the Privy Council. Mr. Trivedi had pointed out that Khan J. in A. I. R. 1960 Madh. Pr. 54. (supra) and in 1963 (2) Cr. 77 which clearly proceeded on an erroneous interpretation of the wider powers of bail under sec. 498 (1) and which view was clearly in conflict with the decision of the Privy Council. Mr. Trivedi had pointed out that Khan J. in A. I. R. 1960 Madh. Pr. 54. (supra) and in 1963 (2) Cr. L. J. 97 (supra) had taken the view that there was some restraint when in a non-bailable offence there was a threat hanging on his head of the accused and there was the power of a police officer to arrest a person and such restraint was even sufficient. This view has been overruled by the Division Bench judgment in A. I. R. 1963 M. P. 276 as I have already mentioned. This view also appears to have been followed in Sundersing v. The State A. I. R. 1954 Hyd. 55. There also it should be noted that that judgment was clearly in conflict with the Full Bench decision of that Court in 1953 Hyd. 219. (supra) therefore it is clear that it is almost a settled view of almost all the High Courts in the country that the person who is merely accused or suspected of an offence could not by appearing in Court ask for bail unless he was actually under arrest or a warrant of arrest had been issued and he being liable to arrest he had appeared before the Court. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore wrong in granting the application for such anticipatory bail as he had no jurisdiction to grant bail at this stage. ( 7 ) IN the result I allow this revision application set aside the order of the learned Sessions Judge releasing the opponent Govindlal Manilal Shah on bail in anticipation of his arrest. The bail bond taken from him shall stand cancelled. Rule accordingly made absolute. Rule made absolute. .