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1965 DIGILAW 81 (RAJ)

Divisional Personal Officer, Northern Railway, Jodhpur v. Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) Jabalpur

1965-04-19

JAGAT NARAYAN

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JAGAT NARAYAN, J.—This is a revision application by the Divisional Personnel Officer, Northen Rly. Jodhpur, against an order of the Payment of Wages Authority issuing a direction to him under sec. 15(3) of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which was partially confirmed on appeal by the District Judge, Jodhpur. 2. The claim was preferred by the Central Regional Labour Commissioner, Jabalpur, on behalf of Shri Motilal Kachhwaha, confidential stenographer to the Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway, Jodhpur Division, on the allegation that deductions amounting to Rs. 460/- which were unauthorised by the Act had been made from his salary. A sum of Rs. 4500/- was claimed by way of compensation. 3. The deductions were made from 1st March, 1961. The present claim was filed on 12-10-62, much beyond the period of six months prescribed under sec. 15(2) for preferring such claims. The delay was condoned by the Payment of Wages Authority under the second proviso to sec. 15(2). 4. The claim was resisted by the Divisional Personnel Officer on the ground that the deductions were made under the order of competent authority and that the deductions were justified. The Payment of Wages Authority framed the following issues— (1) Whether the application for the period prior to six months from the date of its filing is within time. (on applicant) (2) Whether the claim of the applicant is not within the scope of the Payment of Wages Act. (on non-Applicant) (3) Whether the applicant was entitled to get Rs. 280/- p. m. as confidential stenographer. (on applicant) (4) Whether there were illegal deductions of Rs. 30/- per month from the applicants wages from 1-3-61 to 31-5-62 amounting to Rs. 450/-. (on applicant). (5) If not, whether he was correctly fixed in terms of his fixation. (on non-applicant) A date was fixed for recording the evidence of the parties in the case. Before that date. The applicant served a number of interrogatories on the non-applicant who submitted a reply to them. The applicant thereafter moved an application on 2-9-63 praying that either the case be decided under order 12, rule 6 C. P. C. or in the alternative the burden of proof of issues Nos. 3, 4 and 5 may be shifted to the non-applicant. 5. This application was opposed on behalf of the D.P.O. and a date was fixed for hearing arguments on it. 3, 4 and 5 may be shifted to the non-applicant. 5. This application was opposed on behalf of the D.P.O. and a date was fixed for hearing arguments on it. The Authority heard arguments on this application but instead of passing orders on it decided the whole case without giving an opportunity to the non-applicant to adduce evidence or to address arguments on the whole. This was a material irregularity. The appellate court however failed to attach due weight to it on account of the fact that it failed to comprehend the true nature of the defence put forward on behalf of the D.P.O. 6. I accordingly set aside the order of the appellate court and remand the case to the Authority for decision in accordance with law. 7. Before parting with the case I would like to explain the defence of the D. P.O. which both the courts below have failed to understand. Shri Motilal was fixed in the grade of Rs. 80-220 and was drawing Rs. 220/- on 1-4-60 when he was fixed in the grade of Rs. 200-10-300 retrospectively from 1-4-56. His salary on 1-4-56 in this grade was fixed at Rs. 230/. On 1-4-60 his salary in this grade came to Rs.270/-. This fixation was verified by the then Divisional Accounts Officer and Shri Motilal drew the salary in accordance with this fixation for 15 months when an objection was raised by the then Divisional Accounts Officer that the fixation was wrong. He was of the opinion that the salary of Shri Motilal should have been fixed at Rs. 200/-on 1-4-56. In other words he was of the opinion that Shri Motilal had drawn Rs.30/-per month in excess all along. The future salary bills of Shri Motilal were prepared in accordance with the opinion of the Divisional Accounts Officer, under rules 1702 and 1704 of the Indian Railway General Code, Vol. I. These rules run as follows: "1702. Claims which are susceptible of internal check, though incorrect otherwise, will be passed by the Accounts Officer for the correct amount, the amount not admitted being disallowed. The amount of disallowance and the reasons therefore should be intimated to the officer drawing the bill, with the least possible delay, for communication to the person concerned. Claims which are susceptible of internal check, though incorrect otherwise, will be passed by the Accounts Officer for the correct amount, the amount not admitted being disallowed. The amount of disallowance and the reasons therefore should be intimated to the officer drawing the bill, with the least possible delay, for communication to the person concerned. When the sanction of a higher authority is necessary to the payment of an amount disallowed, it shall be the duty of the officer drawing the bill to obtain such sanction before the amount disallowed is passed for payment." "1704 When a claim has been disallowed on the ground that it is not covered by an existing rule or order and the drawing officer or the party concerned is unable to accept the Accounts Officers interpretation, it shall be open to the drawing officer or the party concerned to represent the case to a higher authority, and the amount disallowed will not be passed for payment unless the Accounts Officers interpretation of the rule or order is set, aside by the authority competent to do so." 8. The case of Shri Motilal was referred for decision to the higher authority in accordance with rule 1704 and a prayer was made before the Payment of Wages Authority to adjourn the case till a decision was given. The Authority granted an adjournment, but as the decision was delayed it proceeded to dispose of the case. A decision has since been given upholding the view of the Divisional Accounts Officer and an order of fixation in accordance with it has been passed by the Divisional Personnel Officer on 29th March, 1965 which was produced before me. 9. What the Payment of Wages Authority had to consider was whether the deduction made in the circumstances narrated above fell within sec.7 (2) (h) of the Act namely, deduction required to be made by order of a competent authority. If the Authority is of the opinion that the deduction falls under sec.7 (2) (h) then it shall dismiss the application. If on the other hand it comes to the finding that it does not so fall then the applicant will be entitled to a direction under sec. 15(3) for the refund of the sum of Rs. 450/- deducted at Rs. 30/- per month for a period of 15 months. If on the other hand it comes to the finding that it does not so fall then the applicant will be entitled to a direction under sec. 15(3) for the refund of the sum of Rs. 450/- deducted at Rs. 30/- per month for a period of 15 months. Further the Authority will have to consider the amount of compensation to which the applicant is entitled under sec. 15(3). 10. In the present case there is not an iota of evidence on record justifying the grant of any I compensation to the applicant. It is noteworthy that what is awarded under sec. 15(3) is compensation which means recompense for the injury sustained by the employee. The sub-section does not authorise the imposition of any penalty on the employer. It stands to reason therefore that the applicant has to make out a case for grant of compensation. He has to prove what injury he sustained on account of unauthorised deductions. 11. There is a proviso appended to sub-sec. (3) which runs as follows:— "Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to— (a) bonafied error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or (b) the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, such that the person responsible for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising reason able diligence, to make prompt payment, or (c) the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept payment." The principle underlying this proviso is equally applicable to the case of a deduction. If the deduction is due to a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employee or the occurrence of an emergency or the existence of exceptional circumstances or the failure of the employee to apply for or accept payment then no compensation will be payable. 12. It will thus be seen that the Authority cannot determine whether or not the applicant is entitled to any compensation without giving an opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence on the points mentioned by me above. 13. 12. It will thus be seen that the Authority cannot determine whether or not the applicant is entitled to any compensation without giving an opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence on the points mentioned by me above. 13. The Authority purported to decide the case under order 12, rule 6 and the appellate court held that the provision contained in it was applicable to the present proceeding by virtue of rule 11 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. In my opinion, order 12, rule 6 has no application to the proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act. 14. The powers of the Authority are enumerated in sec. 18 which runs as follows:— "Every authority appointed under subsection (1) of section 15 shall have all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents, and every such authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of section 195 and of Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1898 (V of 1898). 15. It will be seen that only such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable as relate to the taking of evidence, enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents. 16. Order 12, rule 6 relates to the decision of the case on admissions. It falls outside the scope of sec. 18. 17. Rule 11 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937, runs as follows:— "Exercise of powers.—In exercising the powers of a Civil Court conferred by section 18 the Authority shall be guided in respect of procedure by the relevant orders of the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with such alterations as the Authority may find necessary, not affecting their substance, for adapting them to the matter before him and save where they conflict with the express provisions of the Act or these rules." 18. The above rule does not extend the application of the Code of Civil Procedure beyond that provided for under section 18. The learned District Judge was thus in error in thinking that the whole of the Code of Civil Procedure has been applied to proceedings under the Act by rule 11. 19. The above rule does not extend the application of the Code of Civil Procedure beyond that provided for under section 18. The learned District Judge was thus in error in thinking that the whole of the Code of Civil Procedure has been applied to proceedings under the Act by rule 11. 19. Even if order 12, rule 6 had been applicable to the present proceeding there was no admission on behalf of the D. P. O. in the present case on the basis of which the case could have been decided. His case throughout has been that the deductions which were made were authorised under the Act. It was for the Authority to decide whether or not they were authorised. 20. Both the courts below granted Rs. 50/-as costs. This is in contravention of rule 20 of the Rajasthan Payment of Wages Rules, which lays down that a sum of Rs. 10/- only shall ordinarily be awarded as costs and in no,case the amount of costs awarded is to exceed Rs. 30/-. 21. In the present case the application was filed beyond the period of six months prescribed under sec.15 (2). An objection was taken that the applicant was entitled to claim only the deductions made during the period of 6 months immediately preceding the application. The Authority framed an issue on this point and after hearing arguments recorded an order on 6-5-63 that it decides the issue in favour of the applicant. No reasons were appended. The Authority acted improperly in not appending reasons for its decision in its order dated 6-5-63. As was held in Sitaram V. M.N. Nagrashna (1) the sufficient cause which has got to be established under the second proviso to sec.15 (2) is not any cause which in the opinion of the Authority is sufficient. The sufficient cause contemplated by the proviso is a cause sufficient in law and the sufficiency of the cause is to be decided not by any discretion of the Authority but by proper legal principles. 22. Even in its final order all that the Authority has said as to why it condoned the delay is: "The Labour Inspector placed before me all the correspondence that has passed between him and the railway authorities and from a perusal of the same I was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay and accordingly I entertained the application." 23. The above passage does not meet the requirement of law. In fact the Authority has given no reasons for condoning the delay. The mere fact that there is protracted correspondence is not sufficient in every case for condoning the delay. It is only when the correspondence shows that there was reason to hope that the grievance would be redressed as a result of the correspondence that sufficient cause for condoning the delay is made out. 24. On behalf of the D. P. O. it was contended before the learned District Judge that no case for condoning the delay had been made out. But he refused to go into the question on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to do so. It was no doubt held by Chagla C.J. in Prem Narayan vs. Divisional Traffic Manager (2) that in hearing an appeal under sec. 17 against a direction issued under sec.15 (3) the order of the Authority condoning the delay in filing the application could not be attacked as such an order is passed under sec. 15(2) and an order under sec. 15(2) is not appealable under sec. 17. I regret I am unable to subscribe to the view. The order under sec. 15(2) condoning the delay is not appealable as such. But I see no reason why the principle underlying sec. 107 C. P. C. should not be applicable to an appeal under sec. 17 of the Act. In my opinion in an appeal under sec. 17 against a direction issued under sec. 15(3) it is open to the appellant to challenge the correctness of an order condoning the delay in filing the application which might have been passed by the Authority. Similarly, I am of the view that if an application is rejected on the ground that it was filed beyond the limitation prescribed under sec. 15(2) the order of the Authority Refusing to condone the delay can be challenged by filing an appeal under sec. 17. The view which I have taken was taken by Oak J. in Sheo Prasad vs. Addl. District Judge, Moradabad (3). I am in respectful agreement with it. 25. In the result the revision application is allowed as indicated above. 15(2) the order of the Authority Refusing to condone the delay can be challenged by filing an appeal under sec. 17. The view which I have taken was taken by Oak J. in Sheo Prasad vs. Addl. District Judge, Moradabad (3). I am in respectful agreement with it. 25. In the result the revision application is allowed as indicated above. It will be open to the Divisional Personnel Officer to make a prayer before the Authority to admit into evidence his order dated 29th March, 1965 refixing the pay of Shri Motilal and the other connected papers.