JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. The second defendant deceased, who was the father of the first defendant, was the owner of the property in suit, having purchased it in the year 1090 by Ex. P-3 as rectified by Ex. P-9. In the year 1103, he made a gift of the property to the first defendant by Ex. P-2, reserving to himself the right to enjoy the property and stipulating that the first defendant shall not alienate it. However, on the 27th Chingom, 1125, by Ex. P-1, an unregistered document, the first defendant agreed to sell the property in conjunction with the second defendant to the first plaintiff for Rs. 2,000 and received Rs. 100 in advance. He also gave the plaintiff, Exx. P-2 to P-10, the prior documents of title. On the 11th Thulam, 1125, the first defendant gave lawyer's notice Ex. P-11 to the plaintiff repudiating Ex. P-1 as inoperative and ineffectual and demanding the return of the documents of title. On the 11th Kumbhom, 1125, defendants 1 and 2 sold the property to the 3rd defendant by Ex. D-1. On these averments, the plaintiff commenced this suit on the 20th Kanni, 1126, for specific performance of Ex. P-1 on the ground, that the 3rd defendant is not a transferee for value without notice of Ex. P-1 and in the alternative for compensation for breach of Ex. P.1. The first plaintiff having died pending the suit, plaintiffs 2 to 4 were impleaded as his legal representatives and a decree in favour of the 4th plaintiff was prayed for, on the strength of a deed of partition between them. The second defendant also died during the pendency of the suit. 2. The first defendant contended, that the 3rd defendant represented to him that Ex. P-1 was void, and therefore he executed Ex. D-1 nominally in his favour. The second defendant denied the genuineness of Ex. P-1. The 3rd defendant, the contesting respondent, pleaded that Ex. P-1 is not genuine, that he had no knowledge of Ex. P-1, and that in any event, the plaintiff had abandoned his rights under it. The Subordinate Judge found Ex P-1 to be genuine, but held that the 3rd defendant had no notice of it and therefore declined to decree specific performance; instead he decreed refund of Rs. 100 to the plaintiff. The 4th plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 3. P-1, and that in any event, the plaintiff had abandoned his rights under it. The Subordinate Judge found Ex P-1 to be genuine, but held that the 3rd defendant had no notice of it and therefore declined to decree specific performance; instead he decreed refund of Rs. 100 to the plaintiff. The 4th plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 3. I find no difficulty in agreeing with the Subordinate Judge that Ex. P-1 is genuine. P.W. 1 who wrote and P.W. 2 who attested Ex. P-1 have proved its genuineness. The first defendant admitted its execution in the written statement and the second defendant pleaded inter alia that the first defendant executed it collusively. The 3rd defendant, D.W. 1 denied Ex. P-1 and said that it was invalid. In Ex. P-11 notice the first defendant admitted Ex. P-1, but repudiated it as no longer subsisting, for reasons which cannot stand. At that time, it is not possible to imagine that the first defendant was colluding with the plaintiff; rather, the inference is that he was trying to back out of it, probably to conclude the bargain with the 3rd defendant. P.W. 3, the husband of the 4th plaintiff deposed, that the plaintiff replied to Ex. P-11 and further gave notice for specific performance ; there is no documentary evidence to support this. However on the materials, I agree with the Subordinate Judge in holding that Ex. P-1 is genuine. 4. The more important question, is whether the 3rd defendant is a transferee for value without notice of Ex. P-1. As for the payment of consideration, there is only the evidence of D.W. 1, the 3rd defendant, that he paid it on the date of Ex. D-1 itself. He said that he paid Rs. 2000 towards the consideration which was in deposit in a bank and the balance of Rs. 700 by pledging jewels in a bank, about two or three days before the date of Ex. D-1. He also said that he decided to take Ex. D-1 only on the day previous to its execution, adding that negotiations had commenced one month earlier. No serious attempt was made by the 3rd defendant to prove the payment of consideration as stated by him. In the circumstances of the case presently to be noticed, his uncorroborated testimony is not sufficient. D-1 only on the day previous to its execution, adding that negotiations had commenced one month earlier. No serious attempt was made by the 3rd defendant to prove the payment of consideration as stated by him. In the circumstances of the case presently to be noticed, his uncorroborated testimony is not sufficient. It has been held in Raman Krishnan v. Krishnan Raghavan I.L.R. 1956 T-G. 431, that the burden of proving absence of notice is upon the transferee claiming exemption under section 27 (b) of the Specific Relief Act and as I have held in Muhammed v. Kunhabdulla 1964 K.L.T. 908, ordinarily, that burden is discharged by him by a denial in court and by negative evidence. This is no rigid rule and the weight of the burden would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In the circumstances of this case, I am led to hold in spite of his denial and negative evidence, that the 3rd defendant took Ex. D-1 with notice of Ex. P-1. 5. The prior documents, Exx. P-2 to P-10 have been produced by the plaintiff from his custody. Though they were not referred to in Ex. P-1, the first defendant had admitted in Ex. P-11, that they were delivered to the plaintiff; in fact he demanded their return to him. Of these, Ex. P-3 is the sale deed in favour of the second defendant, Ex. P-9 is the correction deed, Ex. P-2 is the gift deed in favour of the first defendant, Ex. P-8 dated the 7th Makarom, 1124, is the rent deed for one of the buildings on the property, Ex. P-10 is the release deed of the same date, both executed by the 4th defendant in favour of the first defendant, Exx. P-4 and P-7 are Corporation tax receipts of the years 1122 and 1124 for the building and Exx. P-5 and P-6 are the revenue receipts for the property for the years 1116 and 1118. These are important documents of title which no bona fide purchaser would ignore or omit to ask for or demand. D.W. 1 said that the second defendant represented to him, that they were lost and that he was given copies. Cross-examined further, he said that at the time of Ex. These are important documents of title which no bona fide purchaser would ignore or omit to ask for or demand. D.W. 1 said that the second defendant represented to him, that they were lost and that he was given copies. Cross-examined further, he said that at the time of Ex. D-1 or during the negotiations which preceded the documents of title were not looked into, because he was told that they were lost and because copies were furnished, which however he was not in a position to produce at the trial. In particular, he said he was given a copy of one of the documents, and that, apart from the particulars in it he had no other information about the title to the property or its possession and other details. In fact, he said, that Ex. P-1 was written on perusing the copy so furnished. Of the two prior title deeds referred to in Ex. D-1, he said that a copy of Ex. P-3 was shown to him. He wanted the previous revenue receipts, but was told that there was none. He admitted that the 4th defendant had been in occupation of the building ever since the date of Ex. P-8. The evidence of D.W. 1 is highly suggestive that he did not care to examine the title deeds of the property, which is consistent only with his knowledge of Ex. P-1. 6. The next circumstance is, that Ex. D-1 was registered at Nagercoil although the property is in Trivandrum. Exx. P-2, P-3, P-8, P-9 and P-10, in which defendants 1 and 2 were concerned, were executed in Trivandrum and the address set out in them was their residence in Trivandrum. In Ex. D-1 too, they gave their residence as in Trivandrum, but D.W. 1 said, that defendants 1 and 2 were living about 50 miles away from Nagercoil and so Ex. D-1 was registered in Nagercoil. The first defendant is a dhobi, admittedly carrying on business in Trivandrum; so too is the 3rd defendant. Even if defendants 1 and 2 or either of them had their residence away from Trivandrum, that was hardly a reason for the registration of the document at Nagercoil; they could have come over to Trivandrum. It is plain, that the intention of defendants 1 to 3 was to screen the execution of Ex. Even if defendants 1 and 2 or either of them had their residence away from Trivandrum, that was hardly a reason for the registration of the document at Nagercoil; they could have come over to Trivandrum. It is plain, that the intention of defendants 1 to 3 was to screen the execution of Ex. D-1 from the knowledge of the plaintiff who, was also living close to the property as the 3rd defendant. 7. The circumstances discussed above, point to the conclusion, that the 3rd defendant by taking Ex. D-1, was embarking upon a transaction in collusion with defendants 1 and 2, and behind the back of the plaintiff to defeat him. The burden of proof of consideration and of absence of knowledge being primarily on the 3rd defendant, I cannot hold, that the 3rd defendant has discharged his burden by his denial and by negative evidence. Differing from the Subordinate Judge, I hold, that the 3rd defendant was not a transferee for value without notice of Ex. P-1. 8. Learned counsel then contended, that this is not a case in which specific performance can be decreed and he relied on section 21 (a) of the Specific Relief Act which reads: "The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced: (a) a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief." The relevant part of section 12 of the Act is in these terms: "Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the specific performance of any contract may in the discretion of the Court be enforced” * * * (c) when the act agreed to be done is such that pecuniary compensation for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief ; or (d) when it is probable that pecuniary compensation cannot be got for the non-performance of the act agreed to be done. Explanation.-Unless and until the contrary is proved, the Court shall presume that the breach of a contract to transfer immoveable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money." Section 21 (a) is integrally connected with section 12 (c). In the light of the presumption, that a breach of contract to sell immoveable property cannot be adequately compensated in money, it is for the party who contends otherwise to allege and establish his contention. The 3rd defendant made no such plea, the relevant plea being that in view of Ex. In the light of the presumption, that a breach of contract to sell immoveable property cannot be adequately compensated in money, it is for the party who contends otherwise to allege and establish his contention. The 3rd defendant made no such plea, the relevant plea being that in view of Ex. P-11, the plaintiff must be held to have abandoned his right under Ex. P-1, a proposition which cannot be sustained. It was not for the first defendant to repudiate Ex. P-1 unilaterally. The plaintiff filed this suit, not long after Ex. P-11. The 3rd defendant having failed to plead, that compensation in money is adequate relief, he is not entitled to rely on section 21 (a). His learned counsel however relied on the decision in Ramji Patel v. Rao Kishore Singh A.I.R. 1929 P.G. 190; in that case, as observed by the Privy Council, it was alleged and proved, that the breach of contract could be adequately relieved by compensation in money. The Privy Council observed, that " in view of the finding that compensation in money is an adequate relief to the plaintiff and in view of the express provisions contained in sections 12 (c) and 21 (a). Their Lordships are of opinion that a decree for specific performance of the contract should not be made". In the absence of a plea, there is no scope for such a finding in the present case. Learned counsel also relied on the observations of the Privy Council on section 12 (d) of the Act. The contention was also advanced in that case under section 12 (d), that even if compensation in money was adequate relief, it was probable that such compensation could not be got for the non-performance of the act agreed to be done, but it was repelled for the reason that the plea was not taken. I am clear that the reliance on section 12 (d) is entirely misplaced. The fact that the sum of Rs. 100 paid under Ex. P-1 was ordered to be refunded by the first defendant, is no ground for holding, as was argued, that compensation in money had been decreed and so the case is covered by section 21 (a). That part of the decree was only in terms of the alternative relief in the plaint. 100 paid under Ex. P-1 was ordered to be refunded by the first defendant, is no ground for holding, as was argued, that compensation in money had been decreed and so the case is covered by section 21 (a). That part of the decree was only in terms of the alternative relief in the plaint. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act enjoins, that "any person suing for the specific performance of a contract, may also ask for compensation for its breach, either in addition to, or in substitution for, such performance". It has to be observed, that specific performance was refused to the plaintiff not because compensation in money was adequate relief, but because the 3rd defendant was held to be a transferee for value without notice of Ex. P-1. This is sufficient for the disposal of the appeal. It has to be observed that though the first defendant had only a reversionary interest in the property under Ex. P-2, with the death of the second defendant he became the full owner of the property. In the result, setting aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge, the 4th plaintiff is given a decree for specific performance of Ex. P-1 as prayed for. The appeal is allowed with costs to the 4th plaintiff in both the courts against the 3rd defendant--contesting respondent.