MODI, J.—This is a writ petition by Messrs Karam Chand Thappar & Brothers (Coal Sales) Limited, Jaipur under Art. 226 of the Constitution, praying for a writ of Certiorari or a direction in the nature thereof against an order of assessment dated the 20th December, 1956 (Ex. P.9) and a demand notice (Ex. P. 9-A) dated the 12th February, 1957, of the Sales Tax Officer City Circles A, Jaipur. The State of Rajasthan has also been impleaded as a respondent No. 2 in this petition. This petition originally came for hearing and was allowed by a bench of this Court (consisting of Sarjoo Prosad C.J. and Beri J.) by its order dated the 21st April, 1961. The ratio of that decision was that the petitioner was not a dealer within the meaning of Sec. 2(f) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 (Act No. XXIX of 1954, hereinafter called the Act of 1954) but was merely a broker or a middleman and, therefore, it was not liable to pay sales tax on the coal supplied by it to the State. The petitioner had also disputed its liability to pay tax on two other grounds, namely, that the sales had taken place in the course of inter-State trade and alternatively entirely outside the State of Rajasthan. But these points were left undecided by this Court. Against that judgment, the State was granted special leave for appeal by the Supreme Court, and the case has been remitted back to this Court by its judgment and order ( in Civil Appeal No. 702 of 1963 ), dated the 2nd October, 1964. The Supreme Court agreed with the finding of this Court that the petitioner was not a dealer within the definition of that term contained in the first part of Sec. 2(f) of the Act of 1954 but it further held that the petitioner was an agent within the Explanation to sec. 2(f), and therefore, it must be deemed to be a dealer for the purposes of the Act. 2(f), and therefore, it must be deemed to be a dealer for the purposes of the Act. Incoming to this conclusion it was further pointed out that it was not contended before their Lordships on behalf of the petitioner that: "assuming that the supply of coal amounted to sale the Equitable Coal Company was not carrying on the business of selling or supplying goods within Rajasthan." The operative part of judgment of the Supreme Court may be reproduced at this place: "In the result, the appeal must succeed, but as the High Court did not deal with the question of the situs of sale or whether the sale was made in the course of inter-State trade, the case must be remitted, to the High Court. Although Mr. Tiwari has opposed the raising of the question at this stage whether the supply are inclined to allow this point to be raised because the question is one of law which can be decided on the material on the records of the case, in the light of the decision of this Court in M/s New India Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar (1964 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 459) which was decided after the judgment of the High Court in this case. We express no opinion whether the said decision covers the present case or not." This is how the case has come before the present Bench. 2. In order to be able to decide the points now in controversy before us, the following facts may be stated. 3. The petitioner is a public limited company with its head office in Calcutta and carries on the business of the supply of coal throughout India. The petitioner has also a branch office in Jaipur which did retail business and also supervised the supply of coal made to consumers by the collieries, and was registered as a dealer with the Sales Tax Officer, Jaipur. On the 2nd September, 1948, the petitioner entered into an agreement with the Equitable Coal Company Ltd. (hereafter called the Collieries) which owns collieries in the State of Bengal, whereby it obtained a monopoly from the said Company for the supply of coal in certain areas including Rajputna as it was then called. According to this agreement, the said Collieries could effect the sales of their products through the agency of the petitioner and none else. According to this agreement, the said Collieries could effect the sales of their products through the agency of the petitioner and none else. On April 28, 1955, the petitioner entered into a contract with the Government of Rajasthan for the supply of coal for one month to the power house at Jaipur for the first time. Similar agreements were then entered into later for the regular supply of coal to the aforesaid power house as well as that situated in the town of Kota. The petitioner supplied coal under this arrangement upto May, 1958. The petitioner as a dealer submitted its return to the Sales Tax Department for the year 1955-56 (it also submitted a like return for 1956-57 which was pending assessment at that time) wherein it showed the supplies made to the power houses at Jaipur and Kota under the head "turnover of goods exempted without fee" as being of the total value of Rs. 7,11,941,/l3/3. The Sales Tax Officer included in his assessment order for 1955-56 dated the 20th December, 1956 the said sales made by and through the petitioner to the State and after deducting the tax already paid by the petitioner issued a demand notice for Rs. 20,346/14/9 (Ex. P. 9-A). The Sales Tax Officer by its order dated August 8, 1958, also levied a penalty of Rs. 7000/- on the petitioner for failure to pay this tax. The petitioner challenges both these orders as illegal and inoperative. 4. It must be mentioned at this juncture that it is common ground between the parties that at the time of the supply of the coal by the petitioner, with which we are concerned, the Colliery Control Order, 1945, governed the supply of coal from the collieries. We shall have occasion to refer in some detail to the provisions of this Order. But suffice it to be stated at the present stage that by this order, the Government of India had imposed certain restrictions on the sale and purchase of coal and the price at which it could be sold and the procedure by which such sales and purchase had to be conducted. Another thing to which it is necessary to refer before we proceed further is the agreement (Ex.P.3) according to which the petitioner had agreed to supply coal to the Rajasthan State. Another thing to which it is necessary to refer before we proceed further is the agreement (Ex.P.3) according to which the petitioner had agreed to supply coal to the Rajasthan State. This agreement reads as follows: "Articles of agreement made this twenty eighth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and fifty five between His Highness the Rajpramukh of the State of Rajasthan of the one part, and M/s. Karamchand Thappar& Bros. (Goal Sales) Ltd., of 5, Royal Exchange Place, Calcutta, hereinafter called the contractor of other part. The contractor shall supply the coal to the Rajasthan Government Power Houses at Jaipur in accordance with the specifications and terms as follows, for a period of one month— 1. Rubble coal, selected grade A, double screened, size 3/4" to 1-1/2" fusion point of 1250 F, from Rajdih Dhemomain and Jamaria West Collieries and as per coal analysis mentioned in their letter No. CB/4844 dated 11-2-55. 2. The contractor shall deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) as security for due performance of the contract, which would be forfeited in the event of their failure to fulfil their part of the contract satisfactorily. 3. The test report given by the laboratory at Jaipur Power House will be final. 4. The decision of the Chief Engineer, Electrical and Mech. Department, Govt. of Rajasthan, will be final, for all purposes. 5. The coal will be supplied F.O.R. colliery subject to the following: (a) Payment will be claimed only in respect of supplies actually received and admitted as per specifications at the Jaipur Power House. (b) The contractor will arrange all the transport and safe delivery of coal at Jaipur Power House. (c) First consignment is to reach Jaipur Power House within 10 days from the date of order and supplies will not be less than 150 tons per day for the first ten days. 6. Coal will be supplied at the controlled rate. Railway freight will be paid by the coal supplier in the first instance and reimbursement claimed afterwards on the strength of relevant vouchers along with the bill, for the admitted supplies of the coal in Jaipur Power House." 5. 6. Coal will be supplied at the controlled rate. Railway freight will be paid by the coal supplier in the first instance and reimbursement claimed afterwards on the strength of relevant vouchers along with the bill, for the admitted supplies of the coal in Jaipur Power House." 5. It will be observed that according to clause (6) of the agreement, coal was to be supplied at the controlled rate and the railway freight was to be paid by the coal supplier in the first instance and reimbursement claimed afterwards on the strength of relevant vouchers along with the bills for the supplies actually received and admitted at the power house. By clause (2) of the agreement, the contractor was also required to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as security for the due performance of the contract and this was liable to be forfeited in the event of its failure to fulfil its part of the contract satisfactorily. 6. It was in these circumstances that the controversy was raised by the petitioner that it was not a dealer at all but was merely a broker or a middle-man for the supply of coal to the Rajasthan State and consequently it was not liable to pay any sales tax for the sales made by it to the State. The petitioner succeeded in this Court but finally lost before the Supreme Court on this point. We are, however, called upon to decide certain other points arising in the case which were left undecided by this Court in the first instance, and a further question which was raised before the Supreme Court for the first time whether the supply of coal in the present case amounted to sale at all. It is this last question which we propose to take up first because that in our opinion goes to the very root of the matter. 7. Now in order to decide whether the supply of the coal by the petitioner to the State amounted to sale, the precise contention raised is that as the supply was made under the provisions of the Colliery Control Order, 1945, it did not amount to a sale at all. We shall, therefore, refer to the material provisions of the Colliery Control Order at this place. 8. We shall, therefore, refer to the material provisions of the Colliery Control Order at this place. 8. We may begin by pointing out that this Order was made by the Central Government under rule 81(2) of the Defence of India Rules. By clause (3) of the Order, the Central Government was given the power to constitute a Board to be called the Coal Control Board for the purpose of advising the Central Government and its Officers on all matters connected with the working of this Order. By clause (4) of the Order, it was provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Gazette of India, fix the prices at which coal may be sold by colliery owners, and that different prices may be fixed for different grades of coal and coke and for different collieries. By clause (5) it was laid down that: "No colliery owners, and no person acting on behalf of a colliery owner, shall sell, agree to sell, or offer to sell coal at a price different from the price fixed in that behalf under clause 4 or while purporting to charge a price not different from the price fixed under clause 4, grant or agree to grant any commission, rebate or such other concession in any form which will have the effect of reducing either directly or indirectly the said price so far as the purchaser is concerned." Then comes clause (6) and its first two sub-clauses read as follows: "1. Where a colliery owner has signified to the Deputy Coal Controller (Distribution) in writing his willingness to sell direct to consumers and an allotment is made by the Deputy Coal Controller (Distribution) to a consumer with his consent for such direct sale, the coal shall be delivered to the consumer at the price fixed under clause 4, and no commission or other charges shall be paid in addition, except that where a broker is employed, brokerage not exceeding six annas per ton may by paid by the colliery owner to the broker. 2. 2. Where a consumer purchases coal through a del-credere agent such agent shall not, on the sale of such deal, charge or receive from the consumer a margin over the price fixed under clause 4 which exceeds: (a) one rupee per ton in the case of coal; or (b) one rupee eight annas per ton in the case of soft coke or (c) two rupees eight annas per ton in the case of hard coke and if, in any such transaction as aforesaid a broker is employed or the del-credere agent himself serves as a broker a brokereage not exceeding six annas per ton may be paid by the colliery owner to the broker or, as the case may be, to the del credere agent." Clause (8) then provides as follows: "The Central Government may from time to time issue such directions as it thinks fit to any colliery owner regulating the disposal of his stocks of coal or of the expected output of coal in the colliery during any period,including directions as to the grade, size and quantity of coal which may be disposed of and persons or class or description of persons to whom coal shall or shall not be disposed of, the order of priority to be observed in such disposal, and the stacking of coal on Government Account." Clause (9) then lays d own that: "Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, every colliery owner to whom a direction is given under clause 6— (i) shall dispose of coal in accordance therewith, (ii) shall not dispose of coal in contra vention thereof." We may then refer to clause 10-A (i) which provides that: "The Coal Controller with the Government India may by order in writing direct, that any coal despatched by any colliery owner or a person acting on behalf of a colliery owner, to any person which is in transit, shall subject to such terms and conditions if any as the said Coal Controller deems fit be diverted and delivered to another person specified in the order and such an order could be modified or cancelled by the Coal Controller and the coal diverted or delivered to a person other than the person originally named in sub- clause (3) thereof. These orders can be made by the Coal Controller subject to such compensation as he may deem reasonable vide sub-clause (5). These orders can be made by the Coal Controller subject to such compensation as he may deem reasonable vide sub-clause (5). By sub-clause (12), the powers conferred upon the Coal Controller with the Government of India under this clause can be delegated by him in writing to any officer subordinate to him. The next important clause to which reference must be made is clause 12(e) which reads as follows: "No person shall acquire or purchase or agree to acquire or purchase any coal from a colliery and no colliery owner or his agent shall despatch or agree to despatch or transport any coal from the colliery except under the authority and in accordance with the conditions contained in a general or special authority of the Central Government." Again by clause 15, the functions of the Central Government under clauses 8 and and 12-E among others have been made exercisable also by the Coal Controller with the Government of India, the Deputy Coal Controller (Distribution), the Deputy Coal Controller (Production) and the Joint Deputy Coal Controller (Distribution). 9. The point to decide having regard to the provisions of the Colliery Control Order referred to above in some detail is whether the supplies made by the petitioner from the collieries to the State Power Houses could be treated as a sale in the eye of law. The argument of the learned Advocate General was that although the transactions in question were governed by certain restrictions imposed by the Government of India, they essentially amounted to those of sale and purchase, the contention being that only those transactions which fell under clause (8) of the Control Order could not be regarded as sales but not those which were entered into and fell under clause (6) of the Order. Under the last-mentioned clause, submitted the learned Advocate General, a colliery owner signified his willingness to sell coal to consumers and thereafter an allotment was made by the competent authority to the consumer with the latters consent, and, although for this only the price fixed under the Control Order had to be paid, such a transaction essentially and substantially amounted to a sale. 10. We have carefully considered this argument and are unable to find any substance in it. 10. We have carefully considered this argument and are unable to find any substance in it. In the first place, it seems to us that clauses 6 and 8 cannot be read in separate water-tight compartments and do not seem to provide for distinct classes of transactions as the learned Advocate General would like us to accept. In the second place, even assuming that clause (6) provides for transactions which according to the learned Advocate General are and would be "sales", he forgets that under the clause, the colliery owner does not convey his willingness to sell to the consumer but to the Deputy Coal Controller ( Distribution ), and this he does by saying something like this that he has enough stocks to make sales direct to consumers, and then after examining their respective requisitions the Deputy Coal Controller makes allotments to the various consumers with the consent of the latter. It seems to us that in such a situation there is really no offer by the seller to the purchaser and equally there can be no acceptance of any offer by the purchaser to the seller. And that being so the essential elements of a voluntary sale are lacking in such a transaction. 11. Whatever doubts there might otherwise have been about the proper conclusion to come to, in a situation like this, are, in our opinion, conclusively resolved when we come to consider clause 12-E of the Control Order, which preem-ptorily lays down that no person shall purchase any coal from a colliery, and no colliery owner shall sell or despatch coal to any consumer, except under the authority and in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Central Government in this behalf. In our opinion, therefore, a transaction of supply of coal, like this of course for a price to be paid and received, does not really amount to that of a sale and purchase in accordance with the accepted nations of that terms. 12. We are clearly of the opinion that the case before us falls within the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar (1). The facts of this case are as follows. 12. We are clearly of the opinion that the case before us falls within the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar (1). The facts of this case are as follows. The assessees were manufacturers of sugar in Bihar and they despatched large quantities of sugar to the various agents of the State of Madras in compliance with the directions issued by the Controller exercising powers under the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1946. The course of dealing between the parties was that the various State Governments intimated to the Sugar Controller their requirements of sugar and similarly the factory owners sent to the Sugar Controller the statements of stocks of sugar held by them. After considering the requirements and the statements, the Sugar Controller made the allotments. In each case, the allotment order was addressed to the factory owner, directing him to supply sugar to the State Government in accordance with the despatch instructions received from the competent officer of the State Government. A copy of the allotment order was simultaneo-uslly sent to the State Government on receipt of which the competent authority of the State Government sent to the factory concerned detailed instructions about the destinations to which the sugar was to be despatched to each place. It was in these circumstances that the question arose whether the assessees were liable to be taxed for the sugar supplied by them to the State of Madras under the Bihar Sales Tax Act of 1947. By a majority decision it was held relying on the State of Madras v. Gannon Dwnkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. (9 S.T.C. 353) that in order to constitute a sale of goods, property in goods must be transferred from the seller to the buyer under a contract of sale and therefore a contract of sale was an essential pre-requisite to a sale which must be understood not in the popular sense but in the sense in which it was used in the Sales of Goods Act. It was further held that a contract of sale as contemplated under the said Act, postulated exercise of volition on the part of the contracting parties and there was no such volition on the part of the assessees in complying with the orders passed by the Controller. It was further held that a contract of sale as contemplated under the said Act, postulated exercise of volition on the part of the contracting parties and there was no such volition on the part of the assessees in complying with the orders passed by the Controller. To quote the observations of their Lordships on this aspect of the case: "There was manifestly nor offer to purchase sugar by the Province, and no acceptance of any offer by the manufacturer. The manufacturer was under the Control Order left no volition: he could not decline to carry out the order; if be did so he was liable to be punished for breach of the order and his goods were liable to be for feited. The Government f the Province and the manufacturer had no opportunity to nego tiate, and sugar was despatched pursuant to the direction of the Controller and not in acceptance of any offer by the Government." It was further contended before their Lordships that even if there was no offer or acceptance, a contract of sale nevertheless came into existence when the Controller directed the assessees to deliver specified quantities of sugar and the assessess despatched the same to the State. This contention was also repelled by their Lordships in the following words:— "But the action on the part of the assessees in despatching the goods was not voluntary; they were compelled to send the goods. They could not be deemed by despatching sugar to have made any offer to supply goods and in the absence of any offer the contract resulted by the acceptance of goods by the Provincial Government. To infer a contract from the compulsory delivery of sugar and acceptance thereof would be to ingnore the true position of the parties, and the circumstances in which goods were delivered." Lastly, it was held by their Lordships that the intimation by the Province of Madras of its requirement to the Controller did not amount to an offer and the supply of goods pursuant thereto to assessees did not amount to its acceptance and therefore no sale resulted and consequently no liability to pay sales tax under the Bihar Sales Tax Act could possibly arise. 13. The question then is, how does the above decision apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case? 13. The question then is, how does the above decision apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case? According to the actual procedure which was adopted for the supply of coal by the petitioner to the State and which was not disputed by the State before the High Court or the Supreme Court was that the Chief Engineer, Electrical and Mechanical Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur contacted the Deputy Coal Controller, Calcutta for a monthly ad hoc allotment for the supply of coal through the petitioner, and a copy of this requisition was marked to the petitioners office at Jaipur. On the basis of this demand, the petitioner through its head office at Calcutta submitted the programme to the Deputy Coal Commissioner (Distribution) Calcutta for the supply of coal from the collieries. Thereupon the Deputy Coal Commissioner (Distribution) issued the sanction against these programmes and he directly sent the copies of sanction to the railway allotment authorities for the allotment of wagons and also to the collieries for supplying the coal accordingly. On receipt of such sanction from the Deputy Coal Commissioner (Distribution) Calcutta, the collieries supplied coal directly to the Executive Engineer of the Power House concerned and the railway receipt was sent to the consignee through the petitioner so that he could take delivery of the coal from the railway. The bills for the sale price of the coal supplied to the State along with the copies of the railway receipts were sent from the collieries to the head office of the petitioner from where they were forwarded to the branch office for collection whereupon the latter collected the sale price from the State with respect to the coal supplied to it by the collieries. 14. As we look at the matter, it was open to the Deputy Coal Commissioner (Distribution) Calcutta under the Central Order to make such allotments of coal to the Rajasthan State as he thought proper and further at no stage it could be said that the State made any offer to the manufacturers or the suppliers or that there was any acceptance of the same by the manufacturers or the suppliers. In other words, the essential element of volition which is the kernel of a contract of sale according to the decision of our Supreme Court was lacking in this case. In other words, the essential element of volition which is the kernel of a contract of sale according to the decision of our Supreme Court was lacking in this case. The conclusion seems to us, therefore, to be inescapable on the facts and circumstances of this case that there was no sale. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to succeed on this account. We hold accordingly. 15. On the finding to which we have come above on this aspect of the case, it is strictly not necessary for us to deal with the other two questions arising herein. Be that as it may, one of these two other questions was argued before us at some length, and, therefore, we propose to deal with that also. That point is whether assuming that there was a sale in the present case, the transactions were entered into in the course of inter-state trade and consequently the assessee was not liable to pay any sales-tax on this score as well. 16. Now before we deal with the meaning of the expression "inter-state trade", we should like to point out that the period with which we are concerned in this case is from the 1st April, 1955 to the 31st March, 1956. Now, Art. 286 of the Constitution before it was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956 stood as follows— "1. No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place— (a) outside the State ; or (b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India. Explanation—For the purposes of sub-clause(a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sales or purchase passed in another State. 2. 2. Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-state trade or commerce. Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of this constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thrity-first day of March, 1951. 3. No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent." By the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956 which came into force on the 11th September, 1956, the Explanation to clause (1) was deleted and for clauses (2) and (3), the following were inserted: "2. Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place to any of the ways mentioned in clause (1). 3. Any law of a State shall, in as far as it imposes, or authorises the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may be law specify." As amended by this very Amendment Act, the relevant portion of Art. 269 of the Constitution reads as follows: Art. 269(1)—The following duties and taxes shall be levied and collected by the Government of India... (g) taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. (2)............ (g) taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. (2)............ (3) Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce." Further, the Seventh Schedule was also amended by adding item No. 92-A to List 1, which reads as follows: "Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce." By these amendments, the Union Government was given the power to tax sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers made in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. 17. Properly speaking, therefore, we are concerned with the law which was in force before Article 286 was amended, and, that being so, clause (2) of Art. 286, as it then stood, clearly ordained that, unless Parliament provided otherwise, no State could impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of Inter-State trade or commerce. It is no bodys case that the Parliament had made a different provision derogating from this general position. 18. The only (question which then arises is : What is inter-State trade ? The answer to this is provided by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Cement Marketing Company vs. State of Mysore(2). That case unmistakably lays down that where the contract of sale occasions or involves the movement of goods from one State to another, that is, for example, where by the very contract of sale, goods which are manufactured in one State are required to be transported to another State for consumption or use, such transactions would be clearly transactions of sale of goods in the course of inter-State trade. In coming to this conclusion, their Lordships relied on an earlier case reported as Mohanlal Hargovind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (VI S.T.S. 687). In coming to this conclusion, their Lordships relied on an earlier case reported as Mohanlal Hargovind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (VI S.T.S. 687). The principle deducible from that case, and some other cases bearing on this pointy among which the State Trading Corporation vs. State of Mysore (3) may be mentioned, is that before a sale could be said to be made in the course of inter-State trade, two conditions must be satisfied (1) that there is a sale of goods and (2) that there is a transport of goods from one State to another under the contract of sale. 19. Applying this test here, we shall assume the first condition for the purposes of the present argument in favour of the respondents. As for the second, it clearly appears from the agreement Ex.P.3 executed between the petitioner and the State that the goods were to be supplied F.O.R. the collieries, that is, in the State of Bengal and the petitioner was made responsible for their transport to Rajasthan at its own expenses for which it was to be reimbursed later. See conditions 5 and 6 of the agreement (supra). We have, therefore, no doubt that the present is a case of inter-State trade and cannot but fall within the mischief of Art.286 (2) of the Constitution as it originally stood. 20. This position has, however, been somewhat complicated by another enactment to which we must now refer, that is, the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (Act No.VII of 1956, hereinafter called the Act of 1956). 20. This position has, however, been somewhat complicated by another enactment to which we must now refer, that is, the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (Act No.VII of 1956, hereinafter called the Act of 1956). Sec. 2 of this Act reads as follows:— "Validation of State laws imposing, or authorising the imposition of, taxes on sale or purchase of goods in the course of interstate trade or commerce—Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, no law of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce during the period between the 1st day of April, 1951, and the 6th day of September, 1955, shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely by reason of the fact that such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; and all such taxes levied or collected or purporting to have been levied or collected during the aforesaid period shall be deemed always to have been validly levied or collected in accordance with law." The historical background of this legislation is this. It was held by the Supreme Court by majority in the State of Bombay Vs. United Motors Ltd. (4) that sub-clause (a) and the Explanation in clause (1) of Art. 286 prohibited the taxation of a sale involving inter-State elements by all States, except the State in which the goods were delivered for the purpose of consumption therein, and furthermore, that clause (2) did not affect the power of that State to tax the inter-State sale even though Parliament had not made a law removing the ban imposed by the clause. The result of this was that dealers resident in one State were subjected to the sales-tax jurisdiction and procedure of several other states with which they had dealings in the normal course of their business. 21. In the case of Bengal Immunity Co. The result of this was that dealers resident in one State were subjected to the sales-tax jurisdiction and procedure of several other states with which they had dealings in the normal course of their business. 21. In the case of Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar (5), the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision in the United Motors case (Supra) and construed Article 236 in a manner that no law of a State imposing or authorising the imposition of any tax on sales or purchases when such sales or purchases take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce can be valid unless the Parliament by law removes the restrictions imposed by clause (2) of that Article. The result of this was that as there was no such law made by the Parliament, this decision of the Supreme Court which was given on the 6th September, 1955, had the effect of making illegal the levy and collection of sales-tax by State Governments in accordance with their laws. 22. It was in order to remove the difficulties arising from this situation that pending a suitable amendment of Article 286 of the Constitution, the Act of 1956 was introduced validating the existing laws between the 1st April, 1951, and 6th September, 1955. The inevitable effect of this legislation would therefore be, assuming that the transactions with which we are concerned are, properly speaking, sales within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, that the petitioner would be assessable to tax between the 1st April, 1955, to the 6th September, 1955. But the Act of 1956 obviously does not validate the tax from 6th September, 1955 onwards. It clearly seems to us that an amended Article 286(2) existed in the Constitution and must have its away between the 7th September, 1955, and the 31st March, 1956 and indeed until the 10th September, 1956, during which period it existed in its unamended form. 23. It clearly seems to us that an amended Article 286(2) existed in the Constitution and must have its away between the 7th September, 1955, and the 31st March, 1956 and indeed until the 10th September, 1956, during which period it existed in its unamended form. 23. Summing up the position on this aspect of the case, our conclusion thus is that the sale off coal which was manufactured in the State of Bengal and which was required to be transported to the State of Rajasthan under the contract of sale between the petitioner and the State was in the course of inter-State trade and consequently the latter State could have no power to impose sales tax on the same, subject to this that the imposition of such sales tax was by the Act of 1956 validated with respect to the period extending from 1st April, 1955, to the 6th September, 1955, but it would be still invalid from the 7th September, 1955 to the 31st March, 1956. 24. That being the position, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner however was that as in the present case, the assessment is a composite one and cannot be directed, the entire assessment must fall; while on the other hand, the learned Advocate General equally strenuously contended that the case on this view of the matter should be remanded back for a fresh assessment for sales made during this period. 25. On a most careful and anxious consideration of the rival arguments, we are inclined to the view that as the assessment is a composite and indivisible one, the total assessment has to be declared as illegal and void. Reference may be made in support of this view to Provincial Government of Madras V.J.S. Basappa (6). It was held in that case that when an assessment consists of a single undivided sum in respect of the totality of the property treated as assessable, the wrongful inclusion in it of certain items of property which by virtue of a provision of law were expressly exempted from taxation, renders the assessment invalid in toto though in those cases where the assessment of many matters results in amounts of tax which though parts of the whole assessment, stand as completely separate items, the court can declare such separate items as illegal and exclude them from the levy. But where the tax is a composite one and to separate the good part from the bad, proceedings in the nature of assessment have to be undertaken, the civil court would lack the jurisdiction to do so. The assessment here is unquestionably an entire and indivisible quantity. That being so we are disposed to hold the view that the whole of it should fail. Apart from that, we do not think that we would be justified in ordering a re-assessment of the tax separately for the period of the sales from the 1st April, 1955, to the 6th September, 1955, on the view which we have felt persuaded to form on the main question arising in this case namely as to whether the supplies of coal made by the assessee to the State amount to sales at all in the accepted legal connotation of that expression and on which question our answer, as discussed above, is in favour] of the petitioner. 26. This leaves us with the third question as to what is the proper situs of these sales? As learned counsel for the petitioner did not seriously press this part of his case, we have not felt called upon to deal with it. 27. The result is that we allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order of assessment dated the 20th December, 1956, and the Demand Notice issued by the Sales Tax Officer against the petitioner in pursuance thereof. The further order of the Assessment officer in imposing a penalty on the petitioner for the nonpayment of the tax must fall asunder along with the main order. As to costs, we are of the opinion that as the petitioner has principally succeeded on a point which was not raised before the Sales Tax authorities or even before this Court in the first instance and was raised before the Supreme Court for the first time the parties should be left to bear their own costs throughout. We order accordingly.