S. K. Kapur ( 1 ) NO. 2 filed an application for registration of a trade mark kew" under No. 18958 which was advertised before acceptance in the Trade Marks Journal No. 319 at page 934, dated, Sunday, September 16, 1962. Under section 21 (1) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, any person may, within three months from the date of the advertisement or within such further period not exceeding one month in the aggregate as the Registrar may allow, give notice in writing in the prescribed manner to the Registrar of opposition to the registration. Rule 51 (3) provides that the request for extension of time must be made before the expiry of three months from the date of advertisement of the application for registration in the Journal. The application for extension of time for giving notice of opposition is required to be in the prescribed form TM- 44. It was on 17th December, 1962 that an application was made under section 21 (1) read with rule 51 (2) for extension of time for giving notice of opposition. This application was made on behalf of Kumar Engineering Works, Delhi, in the form TM-44. On 27th December, 1962, another application in form TM-44 was filed by Acme Company for extension of time. This application was made on behalf of Syaram Kumar Engineering Works (Private) Limited, the appellant. Two letters were issued to Acme Company on 3rd January, 1963 by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks. By letter No. TOP 9460, Acme Company were informed that their request dated 17th December, 1962 for extension of time was allowed and the time extended upto 16th January, 1963 for filing notice of opposition. By the other letter No. TOP 9454, Acme Company were informed that their request dated 27th December, 1962 was rejected being barred by time. On 14th January, 1963, an opposition notice was filed on behalf of the appellant setting out the grounds of opposition. No reply having been received, Acme Company wrote to the Registrar of Trade Marks on 9th March, 1963 pointing out that Kumar Engineering Works on whose behalf application for extension of time was filed on 17th December, 1962 and the appellant-company were one and the same concern and, therefore, notice of opposition be placed on the record. No reply having been received, Acme Company wrote to the Registrar of Trade Marks on 9th March, 1963 pointing out that Kumar Engineering Works on whose behalf application for extension of time was filed on 17th December, 1962 and the appellant-company were one and the same concern and, therefore, notice of opposition be placed on the record. On 15th April, 1963 an application in form TM-16 was filed on behalf of the appellant requesting that the notice of opposition dated 10th January, 1963 (filed on 14th January, 1963) be amended by substituting the name of the appellant-company in place of Kumar Engineering Works, Delhi. By letter dated 16th April, 1963, Acme Company acting on behalf of the appellant forwarded to the Registrar a copy of the deed of assignment entered into between Kumar Engineering Works and the appellant-company. It was pointed out that, "under these circumstances, the notice of opposition filed by us on behalf of the party be taken on record immediately and the necessary corrections be made on our request for the extension of time. " Again on 17th May, 1963, Acme Company wrote to the Registrar that the change in the name of the opponent could be entered at any stage of the proceedings and did not affect their legal right to oppose the registration application. By letter dated 21st June, 1963, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks informed Acme Company that the hearing in respect of their request on form TM-16 filed on 15th April, 1963 was fixed for 12th July, 1963 at 10-30 A. M. A similar notice was sent to the other side and they submitted their arguments in writing on 26th June, 1963. The hearing was thereafter adjourned to 13th August, 1963. On 12th July, 1963 a copy of the written arguments submitted by the other side was forwarded by the Assistant Registrar to Acme Company. By letter dated 7th August, 1963, the Assistant Registrar wrote to Acme Company inviting their attention to the Registry s letter No. TOP-1955, dated 14th May, 1913, and stating that in view of the same the question of any hearing did not arise. By letter dated 7th August, 1963, the Assistant Registrar wrote to Acme Company inviting their attention to the Registry s letter No. TOP-1955, dated 14th May, 1913, and stating that in view of the same the question of any hearing did not arise. It may be pointed out that the Assistant Registrar had written to Acme Company informing them that their request on form TM-44 filed on 27th December, 1962 by the appellant had been refused and, therefore, notice of opposition filed on 15th April, 1963, could not be taken on record. Some correspondence ensued between Acme Company and the Assistant Registrar and finally by letter dated 19th September, 1963, the Assistant Registrar declined to give any hearing to the appellant. It is alleged by the appellant that they came to know for the first time from letter dated 7th January, 1964, received from respondent No. 2, that their trade mark had been registered. The appellant then made an application under section 56 (2) of the said Act for rectification of the register by removing therefrom the entry relating to the registered trade mark No. 19580 registered in favour of respondent No. 2 in class 12 in respect of parts of motor-vehicles . This application was refused by the Assistant Registrar by his order dated 1st February, 1965, and the present appeal is directed against the said order. ( 2 ) THE Assistant Registrar, inter alia, held that the application for extension of time in form TM-44 filed on 17-12-1962 was late by one day since the advertisement was issued in the Journal bearing No. 319 dated, Sunday, September 16, 1962. According to him, therefore, there was no notice of opposition pending in the Registry and the grievance of the appellant that the impugned mark was registered before the final disposal of the notice of opposition had no merit. Two contentions have been raised on behalf of the appellant. Firstly, the postcards dated 19-4-1965 and 10-5-1965, annexures a and b to the appeal, show that the Journal No. 319 dated 16-9-1962 was, in fact, issued on 22-9-1962, and consequently the application in form TM-44 filed on 17-12-1962 was within time as specified in rule 51 (3 ). According to the learned counsel, "the date of advertisement. . . . . . . . . According to the learned counsel, "the date of advertisement. . . . . . . . . " in rule 51 (3) does not mean the date borne on the Journal but the date on which it is actually issued and it happens quite often that the Journals are issued on dates later than the date borne thereon. He further says that at the time of hearing of the rectification application the question of one day delay was never raised and the agrument proceeded on the assumption that application dated 17-12-1962 was within time. It is said that if the question had been raised the appellant would have satisfied ". he Assistant Registrar that the Journal was issued later than the 16th September, 1932. Secondly, that in view of the above, the only question that needed consideration by the Assistant Registrar was whether the registration had been allowed without disposing of the notice of opposition. According to the learned counsel, the question of one day delay was for the first time brought in by the impugned judgment. On behalf of the respondant, on the other hand, it is argued that the notice of opposition dated 17-12-1962 was on behalf of a difierent person namely Kumar Engineering Works and there was no opposition on behalf of the appellant pending when the registration was allowed, because their application dated 27-l2-1932 was,on any process of ret. saning, barred by tine. It is hovever, not disputed on behalf of the respondent that the question of one day s delay regarding the application dated 17-12-1932 did not arise for discussion at the stage of hearing. ( 3 ) SO far as the first contention of the appellant Company is concerned, I am in agreement with their contention that the words "from the date of advertisement" in rule 51 (3) of the said Act must ine-in tlie date when the Journal is issued and not the date borne on the Journal. It appears from the postcards dated 19th April, 1965 and 10th May, 1965, annexures a and b to the appeal, already REFERRED TO above, from the Trade Marks Registry that Journal No. 319 was actually issued on 22nd September, 1962. That shows that the Journal may sometime issue after the date shewn thereon. It appears from the postcards dated 19th April, 1965 and 10th May, 1965, annexures a and b to the appeal, already REFERRED TO above, from the Trade Marks Registry that Journal No. 319 was actually issued on 22nd September, 1962. That shows that the Journal may sometime issue after the date shewn thereon. If the period of three months from the date of the advertisement were to be counted from the date borne on the Journal, though issued much later, a serious prejudice may be caused to the rights of the parties seeking to oppose the registration. Take a case where a Journal dated 1st of May is issued after the expiry of three or four months. Would it mean that the right of the parties to oppose disappears by reason of delay in publication? In my view such a construction can hardly be in consonance with the intention of the law. In Pavunny Ouseph v. The Registrar of Trade Marks , a similar view was taken by the Travancore-Cochin High Court. In that case, Koshi, J. observed- "the object of advertising that an application for the registration of a trade mark has been received by the Registrar is obviously to let the public know about it and to invite opposition to it, if any. That object will be served only when the Journal is distributed among the subscribers or otherwise made available to the public and not when it is got printed or few copies or cuttings distributed among the subordinate offices of the Trade Marks Registry or among the applicants for registration. The relevant file called for at the instance of the appellant from the Office of the Additional Registrar of Trade Marks, Trichur, shows that it has all along been the practice of the Trade Marks Registry to count the four months time prescribed by rule 30 from the date of despatch of the journal containing the advertisement to the subscribers. This practice commends itself to us as embodying a common sense interpretation of the rule prescribing the period of time within which opposition should be filed. . . "i am in agreement with the view expressed in the said judgment and hold that the period commences when the Journal is actually published In this view the application dated 17th December, 1962 would be within time. That is, however, not the end of the matter. . . "i am in agreement with the view expressed in the said judgment and hold that the period commences when the Journal is actually published In this view the application dated 17th December, 1962 would be within time. That is, however, not the end of the matter. The contention on behalf of the respondent has still to be considered, namely that the application dated 17th December, 1962 was not filed on behalf of the appellant. The appellant-company claims that they being the successors of Kumar Engineering Works, Delhi, were entitled to have their name substituted in the application for extension of tine dated 17th December, 1962 and consequently entitled to file an opposition. This matter has not been considered by the Assistant Registrar, because he treated the application dated 17th December, 1962 as barred by time. The matter, will, therefore, have to go back to the Assistant Registrar to decide whether or not the registration was allowed without disposing of the opposition. That will, of course, depend on his decision as to whether or not the application dated 17th December, 1962 could be taken advantage of by the appellant. In this view I set aside the order of the Assistant Registrar and send back the case to him for the purpose indicated above. Parties will. however, bear their own costs. The stay order issued on 26th August, 1965 will stand vacated.